Arizona State University Theories of Public

ROBERT B. DENHARDT
University of Southern California
THOMAS J. CATLAW
Arizona State University
Theories of Public
Organization
SEVENTH EDITION
Australia • Brazil • Mexico • Singapore • United Kingdom • United States
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Theories of Public Organization,
Seventh Edition
Robert B. Denhardt and
Thomas J. Catlaw
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Contents
PREFACE vi
ABOUT THE AUTHORS xi
1 Learning and Public Organizations 1
The Acquisition of Knowledge 3
Different Approaches 5
Formal Theories of Public Organization 10
Building Theories of Public Organization 12
Mapping Previous Approaches to Public Organization 13
Other Constraints on Theory 17
Democratic Public Organizations 18
Conclusion 20
Discussion Questions 21
References and Additional Readings 21
2 The Intellectual Heritage: Marx, Weber, and Freud 23
Karl Marx 24
Max Weber 29
Sigmund Freud 34
What Can We Learn? 39
Conclusion 42
Discussion Questions 43
Cases 43
References and Additional Readings 43
3 The Political Heritage: From Wilson to Waldo 45
Beginnings of Public Administration Theory 46
Politics–Administration 50
iii
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The Lingering Influence of Politics–Administration 54
Adopting Business Management Techniques 55
Scientific Approaches to Management 57
Administrative Management and Organizational Structure 62
Centralization and Integration 63
Efficiency: The Key Measure of Success 68
Democratic Administration 71
Conclusion 74
Discussion Questions 75
Cases 75
References and Additional Readings 75
4 The Rational Model of Organization 79
A Science of Human Behavior 79
The Generic Approach to Administration 80
The Proverbs of Administration 81
The Rational Model of Administration 84
Decision Making and Policy Formulation 89
Closed Systems versus Open Systems 94
Contemporary Developments 99
Conclusion 101
Discussion Questions 101
Cases 102
References and Additional Readings 102
5 Organizational Humanism and the New Public
Administration 105
Themes in Organizational Humanism 106
Personality and Organization 110
Postscript on Motivation and Organizational Humanism 113
Organization Development in the Public Sector 114
The New Public Administration 119
Conclusion 126
Discussion Questions 126
Cases 127
References and Additional Readings 127
6 The Policy Emphasis and the New Public
Management 130
Development of the Public Policy Orientation 131
Responsiveness in Public Policy 134
Effectiveness in Public Policy 144
The Discovery of Policy Implementation 146
Methods of Policy Analysis 149
iv CONTENTS
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The Intellectual Crisis 151
The New Public Management 155
Conclusion 161
Discussion Questions 162
Cases 162
References and Additional Readings 162
7 Beyond the Rational Model: Toward Democratic
Public Organization Theory 168
A Critique of the Rational Model 170
Interpretive/Action Theory 176
Critical Social Theory 180
Discourse and Post-Traditional Public Administration 187
The New Public Service 198
Outlining the New Public Service 204
Governance, Networks, and Democracy 207
Conclusion 213
Discussion Questions 214
Cases 214
References and Additional Readings 215
8 The Practitioner as Theorist 223
Whose Theory? Which Practice? 224
Theory, Practice, and Public Organizational Life 226
Personal Learning and Theory Building 229
Toward Theories of Public Organization 232
A New Role for Theorists 236
Conclusion 236
Discussion Questions 238
Cases 238
References and Additional Readings 238
Appendix 241
The Administrative Journal 241
The Journal Format 243
Working in the Administrative Journal 246
Examples of Journal Entries 247
NAME INDEX 250
SUBJECT INDEX 253
CONTENTS v
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Preface
This seventh edition of Theories of Public Organization continues to advance the
important themes of prior editions of this book but also offers significant
enhancements and additions. The most notable and visible addition is Thomas
Catlaw as a collaborator and coauthor for this book. Professor Catlaw is the
Frank and June Sackton Professor of Public Administration in the School of
Public Affairs at Arizona State University. He has made considerable contributions to the development of public administration theory and, in particular, to
our understanding difference and democratic practice in contemporary public
organization. With Professor Catlaw’s arrival, we have taken the opportunity to
examine the book with fresh eyes and enthusiasm and to bring renewed clarity
to the book’s overarching concern for personal and organizational learning, democratic practice, and the need to reconsider the relationship between theory and
practice in a more constructive fashion. We think that these themes are more
important than ever for public organizations and the world we live in today.
Yet, as we explore through updated considerations of contemporary theory,
thinking about public organizations remains limited in ways that continue to
constrain our practice and, by implication, our individual and shared well-being.
ONGOING CENTRAL THEMES AND PURPOSES
Fundamentally, though, the additions and enhancements to this edition continue
with the important themes established in earlier ones. This is a book about theory but also about practice. It is written to introduce theories of public organization to students of public administration and to those outside the field who wish
to involve themselves in organizations committed to public purposes. More
important, this book is an attempt to develop a critique of the mainstream literature in public administration theory based on its inability to connect with the
real experiences of those working in and with public organizations.
vi
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In recent years, the traditional separation of theory and practice in the field
of public administration has become even more pronounced. Academics and
practitioners, who have always viewed each other with some skepticism, now
seem even more divided. This is an extremely unfortunate situation, limiting
both our understanding of public organizations and our actions within them.
The primary intent of this book is to understand more clearly the separation of
theory and practice and to begin to reconcile their differences through personal
learning and action.
To achieve this purpose, we first review a number of past efforts in the field,
not to present a comprehensive historical review of theories of public organization but to examine representative works that embody the commitments and
views of various groups at various times. Based on this review, we then consider
contemporary studies of public organizations and suggest ways in which we
might better understand the world of public administration. Several more generic
organization theorists, who have made sustained contributions to the field of
public administration, are included as well.
In our engagement with these works, we have discovered more consistency
exists among the various theorists than one might expect. This discovery has led
to the following conclusions, which are implicit in all that follows:
1. Although there have been many diverse theories of public organization, the
mainstream work in public administration theory has centered on elaborating a so-called rational model of administration and a view of democratic
accountability implicitly based on the politics–administration dichotomy.
2. As a theory of learning, this approach has limited itself to a positivist understanding of knowledge acquisition, failing to acknowledge or to promote
alternative ways of viewing public organizations. Specifically, this approach
has failed to integrate explanation, understanding, and critique in theories of
public organization.
3. As a theory of organization, this approach has limited itself to instrumental
concerns expressed through hierarchical structures, failing to acknowledge or
to promote the search for alternative organizational designs. Specifically, this
approach has failed to integrate issues of control, consensus, and
communication.
4. Theories of public organization have consequently appeared to practitioners
to be unrelated to their concerns, failing especially to provide a moral context for personal action in the governance process.
5. Despite the dominance of the mainstream view, there have always been
significant counterpoint arguments in the field.
6. These challenges become even more important as we move from an exclusive focus on government to a more embracing focus on governance, especially democratic network governance.
To fulfill the promise of public administration theory, we now require a shift
in the way we view the field, a shift that will lead us to be concerned not merely
with the government administration but also with the broader process of
PREFACE vii
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governance, human relationships, and managing change in pursuit of publicly
defined societal values. Following such a perspective, which is elaborated in
Chapter 1, we are led to a broadened concern for the nature of administrative
work in public organizations broadly defined—one that incorporates not only
the requirements of efficiency and effectiveness but also the notion of democratic
responsibility. This shift has implications for the field of governance and public
administration and for the larger field of management as well. To the extent that
various institutions of governance dominate the social and political landscape, it is
appropriate to ask whether all such organizations should be governed in such a
way as to seriously maintain our commitments to freedom, justice, and equality
among persons. The question is not how we should view the operations of government agencies but rather how organizations—and relationships—of all sorts
might be made more public, how they might aid in expressing the values of
our society.
For nearly a century, private administration, or business administration, has
stood as a model for public administration. We suggest in this book that public
organizations—and the theories and approaches that support them—may
become models for reconstructing organizations of all types along more democratic lines. The tradition of public administration contains elements of organizational reform that are important for all our institutions. If democracy is to survive
in our society, it must not be overridden by the false promises of hierarchy and
authoritarian rule. Democratic outcomes require democratic processes.
The connection between theory and practice will be very important in
accomplishing this goal. A theory that stands apart from practice and from the
values and meanings implicit in practice will never enable us to do more than
modify our practice incrementally. It will not permit the kind of broad commitment to the notion of democratic governance that our society requires. In our
view, however, the connection between theory and practice can occur only
through the process of personal learning. Only as individuals reflect on their experiences and generalize from them will they develop theories of action. And
only in this way will they be able to incorporate their ideas into a practical and
personal philosophy of public administration.
Consistent with this view, the book incorporates several pedagogical
features, including discussion questions and brief but pointed case studies after
each chapter. Most important, however, is the appendix on keeping an administrative journal. The journal provides a way of connecting theory and practice by
examining one’s administrative experiences from four different perspectives.
Careful use of the administrative journal will make the material in this text
come to life for the reader. In a sense, the reader is asked to develop his or her
own case studies through entries he or she makes in the administrative journal.
Just reading or thinking about theories independent of practice will not substantially affect our actions. For truly significant learning to occur, we need to demonstrate to ourselves the relevance and meaning of theory in our everyday lives.
Theory, we will find, is ultimately a very personal matter, and the administrative
journal helps make this connection.
viii PREFACE
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CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER CHANGES
To advance the work of the book, new suggested readings and discussion questions have been added throughout. More substantively, we have made the following changes in this new edition:
Chapter 1 has been significantly restructured and revised in order to bring
out more fully the unique approach to the question of the relationship of theory
to practice and connections among various perspectives and approaches presented
in this book. We urge both theorists and practitioners to consider alternatives to
“applying” theory to practice and to think differently about the expectations and
demands both have for one another.
In Chapter 2, we make important revisions to the sections on Karl Marx and
Sigmund Freud to reaffirm and make more accessible their importance for contemporary public organization and, in particular, thinking critically about democratic public organization and possibilities for knowledge acquisition.
Chapter 3 includes a new introductory discussion that situates the development of theories of public organization in a more nuanced historical context. It
also adds a new section on the pivotal role that gender played in the development of early theories of public administration and how gender conditioned and
constrained the way in which scholars and practitioners came to think about
“science.” This highlights the scholarship of Camilla Stivers and her analysis of
the importance of the Settlement Movement (and settlement women) for public
administration. The chapter now includes expanded discussion of early theorists
in the field who offered alternatives to the scientific, rational approach, such as
Mary Follett and Ordway Tead.
Chapter 4 includes an extensive new section on complex adaptive systems and
new institutionalist theories. We focus, in particular, on the relationship of systems
and institutionalist thinking to the underlying assumptions of the rationalist model.
Chapter 5 adds a new section on contemporary theories of motivation,
including public service motivation, and their implication for the prospects of
the organizational humanist perspective.
Chapter 6 has been entirely restructured and reoriented. The overall theme of
this chapter is now to locate the emergence of the policy perspective and the new
public management in the general search for new governmental theories and
practices that emerged from the late twentieth century in the face of considerable
political and social turmoil and, later, fiscal crises. The chapter includes new and
updated sections on the literature on policy implementation and the new public
management. These sections highlight both the intentions of these approaches but
also some of the unexpected—and unfortunate—consequences—of these efforts.
Chapter 7 significantly expands its discussion of gender and public organization and adds important new material on race, sexual orientation, and ablebodiness. It shows how feminist theories and queer theory, in particular, offer
unique and useful lenses through which we understand how differences and
identities matter in public-organizational life. The discussion of democratic
network governance has been revised significantly to incorporate key ideas from
Eva Sorensen and Jacob Torfing about how to democratically “anchor” these networks, and we advance the case for the necessity of making internal organizational
PREFACE ix
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dynamics part of conversation about democratic governance and reconsideration of
the relationship between politics and administration.
Finally Chapter 8, also considerably restructured and revised, brings together
many of the major themes of the book to offer a different way to approach the
theory–practice question. We highlight again how different forms of knowledge
acquisition imply different kinds of relations of theory to practice and, thus, to key
dimensions of public organizations. We suggest that the dominant approach to this
question presents a misleading account of practice and thus what we can expect
from theory and academic research. We show that there can be a place for all forms
of knowledge acquisition, but only when personal learning and individual sensemaking in particular organizational contexts are made our primary concern.
Throughout this work, we have come to believe more firmly that ideas do
make a difference. Human action requires human thought, and without thought,
our actions are blind. However, when we realize that thought leads to action, we
must also recognize the responsibility of those who theorize. The connection
between thought and action, theory and practice, demands that those who think
and those who write share a moral obligation with those who act in public organizations. This responsibility, the responsibility of the theorist, has, for the most
part, been underplayed in our field. A more thorough understanding of the vocation and the obligation of the theorists is very much needed in our discipline—
and indeed in all the social sciences.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS AND APPRECIATION
A word about our own learning about public organizations and to those who have
provided help and support during our work on this project, in both its original and
revised versions. Foremost among them, we want to recognize colleagues—past and
present—at the University of Missouri–Columbia, the University of Colorado–
Denver, the University of Delaware, the University of Southern California, and
Arizona State University. We have also benefited greatly from our association
with a network of other public administration theorists around the world including
friends such as John Nalbandian, Orion White, Cynthia McSwain, George Frederickson, Bob Backoff, Sloane Dugan, Barry Hammond, Astrid Merget, Larry
Kirkhart, Michael Harmon, Naomi Lynn, Brint Milward, Frank Marini, Bayard
Catron, Guy Adams, Jim Wolf, Frank Sherwood, George Frederickson, John
Forester, Cam Stivers, Cheryl King, David Farmer, Ralph Hummel, Hugh
Miller, Jos Raadschelders, Patricia Mooney Nickel, Angela Eikenberry, Jen
Eagan, Louis Howe, Sandra Kensen, Peter Bogason, Eva Sorensen, Jacob
Torfing, Richard Box, Kym Thorne, Alex Kouzmin, Margaret Stout, Richard
Box, and Kelly Campbell Rawlings. We also want to thank the administrative
practitioners and students who have been so helpful in focusing our work over
the past years.
Finally, at a personal level, thanks should go to those who have sustained
and encouraged us throughout this project. Bob thanks especially Janet, and
always Michael and Cari. Tom thanks Suzanne and the cats.
x PREFACE
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About the Authors
Robert B. Denhardt is Professor and Director of Leadership Development in
the Sol Price School of Public Policy at the University of Southern California,
Regents Professor Emeritus at Arizona State University, and Distinguished
Visiting Scholar at the University of Delaware. A past president of the American
Society for Public Administration and a member of the National Academy of
Public Administration, Dr. Denhardt has published twenty-two books, including
The Dance of Leadership, The New Public Service, Managing Human Behavior in Public
and Nonprofit Organizations, Theories of Public Organization, Public Administration:
An Action Orientation, In the Shadow of Organization, and The Pursuit of Significance.
Thomas J. Catlaw is the Frank and June Sackton Chair in Public Administration and an Associate Professor in the School of Public Affairs at Arizona State
University on the Downtown Phoenix Campus. His research centers on the
application of political and social theory to problems of governance and social
change. He is the author of Fabricating the People: Politics and Administration in
the Biopolitical State and has published widely on matters of public administration
and democratic participation. Dr. Catlaw was editor of Administrative Theory &
Praxis, an international journal dedicated to innovative and critical analysis
of governmental practice, and has worked previously for the U.S. Office of
Management and Budget in Washington, DC, on issues of federal audit policy.
xi
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The welfare, happiness, and very lives of all of us rest in significant measure upon
the performance of administrative mechanisms that surround and support us.
From the central matters of food and shelter to the periphery of our intellectual
activity, the quality of administration in modern society touches our daily lives.
Today your life may depend upon the administration of purity controls in a
pharmaceutical house, tomorrow it may depend upon the decisions of a state
department of motor vehicles, next week it may rest with the administrative
wisdom of an official in the Department of State. Willy-nilly, administration is
everyone’s concern. If we wish to survive, we had better be intelligent about it.
—Dwight Waldo (1955, p. 70)
Source: Waldo, Dwight. (1955) Public administration—study and teaching.
Garden City, NY. Doubleday
Free and unfree, controlling and controlled, choosing and being chosen, inducing
and unable to resist inducement, the source of authority and unable to deny it,
independent and dependent, nourishing their personalities and yet depersonalized: forming purposes and being forced to change them, searching for limitations
in order to make decisions, seeking the particular but concerned with the whole,
finding leaders and denying their leadership, hoping to dominate the earth and
being dominated by the unseen—this is the story of man and society told on
these pages.
—Chester Barnard (1948, p. 296)
Source: Barnard, C.I. (1948). Organization and Management Selected Papers.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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1
Learning and Public
Organizations
D wight Waldo’s appraisal of the importance of public organizations in our
daily lives is even more relevant today than when it was written over fifty
years ago (Waldo, 1955). During that time, public organizations at the federal,
state, and local levels have grown tremendously, to the point that today over
22 million people are employed by government in this country. In addition, millions more are employed in businesses and nonprofit organizations that play an
essential role in the governance process. More important, the range and complexity of the issues addressed by government and related agencies have been
extended far beyond what we might have envisioned even a few years ago.
Because of the serious impact public organizations have on our lives, when we
talk about administration, as Waldo says, we had better be intelligent.
As Chester Barnard (1948) points out, however, we must also maintain a
sense of the quality of organizational life. Although we often think of the public
bureaucracy as an impersonal mechanism, behind each of our encounters with
public organizations lies a lengthy and complex chain of human events, understandings, and behaviors developed in the everyday lives of people just like us.
Organizations are indeed the products of individual human actions—actions with
special meanings and significance to those who act. The allegedly impersonal
organization is the backdrop for a very personal world.
For this reason, public organizations may look quite different depending on
our particular perspective. As an example, we often talk about the endless maze
of confusion and red tape that seems to characterize public organizations. Certain
agencies, despite their alleged interest in efficiency and service, seem “designed” to
prevent satisfactory solutions to our problems. On the one hand, the bureaucracy
1
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may respond in such a routinized way as to appear uncaring; on the other, it may
seem so arbitrary as to be cruel. Consequently, we should not be surprised that
many Americans have a rather low opinion of public bureaucracy.
This picture changes as we become more familiar with the bureaucracy and
the people who inhabit it. These individuals are, for the most part, highly concerned and competent, working to make a living and seeking to deal effectively
with the complex issues they face. For most, the old notion of public service is
not dead. Working for the government is not just another job; it is a chance to
participate in solving difficult public problems. It is the “real world,” in which
people experience pain and pride, joy and disappointment. It is a very personal
place.
The relationship of the personal and impersonal in public organizations has
a second and related aspect to the quality of organizational life. Often when
people think about the relationship between politics and administration, it is
in terms of ends and means. Public bureaucracy is thought to be the means or
instrument for making public or policy goals a reality; administration is about
implementation. But we cannot separate ends and means because the meaning
and significance of what to do is substantively revealed to us in how we do it
(Harmon, 2008). When we forget this, we run the risk of viewing the public
servants who implement policies as mere instruments or tools rather than as full
human beings. This degrades the quality of organizational life and threatens to
turn bureaucracies into inhumane places for both citizens and employees. As
Harmon (2008 p. 72) writes, “An uncritical acceptance of the ends/means dualism conceals an ideological bias that not only perpetuates disparities of political
and organizational power but also precludes an alternative vision of personal
development and social relationship upon which a more practical and humane
conception of governance may be grounded.” The challenge and opportunity,
then, for practitioners and theorists of public organization is to understand how
the democratic advancement of broad public goals is bound up with the democratic administration of these organizations and the personal aspirations of those
who work in them.
So, though this book is concerned with what it means to be intelligent about
public organizations, it is also concerned with how our knowledge may be used to
deal compassionately with human problems and the world around us. We will be
concerned with a fairly basic set of questions: How can we develop a better and
more systematic understanding of public organizations? What do we need to know
in order to make public organizations more responsive and democratic? How can
we make use of the knowledge we have gained so as to improve the well-being of
both ourselves and the communities we serve?
2 CHAPTER 1
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THE ACQUISITION OF KNOWLEDGE
People gain knowledge in many ways. Our understanding of public organizations is clearly influenced by events that occur even before we regularly encounter those organizations. Our experiences in the family teach us much about
power, authority, and communication, while our experiences in church and in
school present us with information about more structured organizations. By the
time we begin to deal with major public organizations, either as members or as
clients, we have been thoroughly socialized in terms of some basic patterns of
behavior and action. Nevertheless, there is still a great deal of information we
must acquire and a number of different ways in which we can acquire it. We
can depend on rumor or hearsay, we can investigate the organization’s past practices, we can listen and learn from the advice of others in the organization, we
can be open to the experience and knowledge of the public or stakeholders that
we serve, or we can let ourselves be guided by efficiency experts and organization development specialists.
Deriving Theory from Practice
In each of these ways, we are constructing our own personal approach to or
theory of public organization; we are seeking explanations or understanding
that will allow us systematically to view public organizations, their members,
and their clients. The body of observations and evaluations we make may be
said to constitute implicit theories of public organizations, in the sense that
although they may rarely be articulated or even consciously considered, they
constitute a set of propositions about the way in which public organizations
work. Most important, these theories do not exist apart from practice; they are
integrally related to the way we act as members or clients of public agencies. Our
every action occurs within the framework of the theories we hold or, more precisely, as an expression of our theoretical positions. In the field of action, theory
and practice are one. This statement seems simple enough, but exactly the opposite characterization, that theory and practice are disconnected, is in fact the one
more frequently heard in contemporary discussions of public administration.
Administrative practitioners often complain that theorists, from the Founding
Fathers to present-day academics, live and work in ivory towers so distant from
the world of practice that their principles and pronouncements hardly correspond to life in the real world. Meanwhile, academics, even those most concerned with the relevance of administrative studies, complain that practitioners
in public agencies are so concerned with the nuts and bolts of administration
that they fail to maintain a theoretical overview. The gulf between theory and
practice seems too great to bridge.
However, like the relationship between ends and means, this way of framing
the relationship between theory and practice is misleading. The reason it is misleading is that even academic theorists are, in a very real sense, practitioners. Just
as public managers have implicit theories-in-use, theorists and other academic
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researchers seek to hone their craft and strive to develop practical expertise in
and understanding of the world that they live in. We will return to this theme
in greater detail in Chapter 8.
For now, however, we can say that the particular field of practice (Bourdieu,
1994) that academic theorists work within is different than the field that managers and analysts in public organizations practice in. It is, typically, a university
or other research setting. Working in different fields of practice means that the
practical wisdom we develop in theorizing about public organizations is different
than the practical wisdom other practitioners develop. This kind of reasoning can
be extended, for example, to the many different professions that work in public
organizations, such as law, engineering, medicine, social work, or accounting.
These professions all have unique bodies of expertise associated with them and
distinct ways of viewing the world and thinking about public problems. This
approach also can help us to think in a new way about the distance that seems
to separate public organizations from the clients they serve. All individuals,
including citizens and clients, develop particular expertise and understanding in
the fields of practice that they most commonly live and work within. Ordinary
people are experts in their own lives, though this personal expertise is different
from both the knowledge gleaned from academic research and professional
experience.
When we recognize that different groups of people are engaged in different
fields of practice and that there are different kinds of knowledge, we can chart a
new direction across the “theory-practice” divide (Catlaw, 2008). The task
becomes less how to apply theories to practice than to communicate and translate
across fields and bodies of knowledge through a process of personal reflection and
mutual learning. Our question becomes less a question of whether which academic theorist or practitioner has the ultimate and final account of the real
world of public organizations but rather a matter of what we can learn from
each other’s academic, professional, and personal knowledge and how this learning can help us to become more competent and compassionate actors in the
fields we practice in. In this sense, the relationship between theory and practice
can be reconstructed around the concept of personal action.
For this reason, the central aim of this book is to develop an understanding
of public organizations that enables us to integrate theory and practice, reflection
and action. To that end, subsequent chapters present an overview of those theories of the individual, the organization, and society that have been proposed as
guidelines for making sense of the actions of public organizations; a specific question will be how those theories and the arguments on which they have been
built inform our own processes of theory building—processes that lead to our
implicit theories of administration.
The central aim of this book is to develop an understanding of public organizations
that enables us to integrate theory and practice, reflection and action.
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DIFFERENT APPROACHES
As we have indicated, theorists and practitioners engage in both practice and theorizing. It is the case, though, that not only are their fields of practice different
but the theories that they use and create are as well. To illustrate this, we consider two cases that illustrate some of the central topics in public organization
theory but do so from the perspective of everyday organizational life. The next
section considers the issue of the formal theories of public organization that try to
systematically explain and make sense of that experience.
In each case, you might begin by asking how you as an observer would
characterize the various actors and how you would analyze their relationships
with one another. What kind of information—complete or incomplete, objective or subjective, and so on—do you have available? Does your asking for more
information suggest that you hold a certain view of organizations that would be
made more complete with the addition of this information? If your questions
reflect a set of assumptions about life in public organizations, how would you
characterize those assumptions?
Typically, students reviewing cases such as those in this chapter (and elsewhere in this book) comment that they need more information, that the case
did not tell them enough. Of course, those involved in the cases would say the
same thing—it just seems that there is never enough information. That said, you
might consider any case from the standpoint of those involved. Try to understand, from their point of view, exactly what was taking place in their field of
practice. Specifically, you might try to reconstruct their analysis of the situation.
On what knowledge or understanding of organizational life did they act? What
information did they have? What information did they lack? How would they
have characterized their general approach to life in public organizations? What
expectations about human behavior did they hold? How did they see the primary tasks of their organization? What was their understanding of the role of
government agencies and those working in such agencies? What was the relationship between their frame of reference and their behavior?
Case 1
Our first case illustrates the relationship between the way we view organizational
life and the way we act in public organizations. Ken Welch was a summer intern
in the management services division of a large federal installation. During his
three-month assignment, Ken was to undertake a variety of projects related to
management concerns in the various laboratories at the center. The management
services division was part of the personnel department, but personnel in the division often acted as troubleshooters for top management, so Ken’s unit enjoyed
considerable prestige within the department and, correspondingly, received special attention from its director.
After a period of about two weeks, during which Ken was given a general
introduction to the work of the division, the department, and the center, Rick
Arnold, one of the permanent analysts, asked Ken to help him with a study of
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the recruitment process in one of the computer laboratories. This was exactly the
kind of project Ken had hoped would grow out of his summer experience, and
he jumped at the opportunity to become involved. He was especially pleased
that Rick, who was clearly one of the favorites of the division’s chief and was
jokingly but respectfully known as “Superanalyst,” had asked for his help. In
addition to gaining some experience himself, Ken would have the opportunity
to watch a high-powered management analyst at work. Moreover, since it was
clear that Rick had the ear of the division’s chief, there were possibilities for at
least observing some of the interactions at that level, perhaps even participating
in meetings at the highest levels of the center’s management. All in all, it was an
attractive assignment, one on which Ken immediately began to work.
As it turned out, however, Ken could not do a great deal. Since Rick was
the principal analyst, he clearly wanted to take the lead in this project, something
that seemed perfectly appropriate to Ken. But because Rick had several other
ongoing projects, there were considerable periods in which Ken found himself
with little to do on the recruitment project. He was therefore more than happy
to help out when Eddie Barth, one of the older members of the staff, asked if
Ken would help him put together some organizational charts requested by top
management. Eddie was one of a small group of technicians who had formed
one of the two units brought together several years before to form the management services division. Ken soon discovered that the construction of an organizational chart, especially in the hands of these technicians, became a highly
specialized process, involving not only endless approvals but also complicated
problems of graphic design and reproduction far beyond what might be imagined. Ken was certainly less interested in this work than in the more human problems he encountered in the recruitment project, but Eddie had always been
cordial and seemed to be happy to have some help. So Ken drew charts. After
a couple of weeks of working on the two projects, Ken began to receive signals
that all was not well with his work. Another intern in the office overheard a
conversation in the halls about the overly energetic interns who had been
hired. One of the secretaries commented that she hoped Ken could “stand the
heat.” Since Ken felt neither overly energetic nor under any heat, these comments were curious. Maybe they were talking about someone else, he thought.
A few days later, however, Ken was asked to come to Jim Pierson’s office.
Jim, another of the older members of the staff, who, Ken thought, had even
headed the technical unit, had remained rather distant, although not unpleasant,
during Ken’s first weeks at the center. While others had been quite friendly,
inviting Ken to parties and asking him to join the personnel department’s softball
team, Jim had seemed somewhat aloof. But then Ken and Jim had very little
contact on the job, so maybe, Ken reasoned, it was not so strange after all. Ken
saw the meeting as a friendly gesture on Jim’s part and looked forward to getting
better acquainted. Any hopes of a friendly conversation, however, were immediately dispelled; as soon as Ken arrived, Jim began a lecture on how to manage
one’s time, specifically pointing out that taking on too many projects meant that
none would be well done. Although there were no specifics, Jim was clearly
referring to the two projects on which Ken had been working.
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Ken was stunned by the meeting. No one had in any way questioned the
quality of his work. There were no time conflicts between the two projects. And
even if there had been, Ken wondered why Jim would take it on himself to
deliver such a reprimand. Later that afternoon, Ken shared his conversation
with the other intern, who commented that Jim had always felt angered that,
when the two units were brought together, he was not made director. Ken
hinted at the controversy the next day in a conversation with Rick but received
only a casual remark about the “out-of-date” members of the division. Ken
began to feel that he was a pawn in some sort of office power struggle and
immediately resolved to try to get out of the middle. As soon as he had an
opportunity to see the division chief, he explained the whole situation, including
his feeling that no real problems existed and that he was being used. The chief
listened carefully but offered no real suggestions. He said he would keep an eye
on the situation.
Later in the week, at a beer-drinking session after a softball game, the director of the department of personnel asked how the internship was going. In the
ensuing conversation, Ken told him what had happened. The director launched
into a long discourse on the difficulties he had experienced in reorganizing units
within his department. But he also pointed out how the combination of the two
units into the division had decreased his span of control and made the operation
of the department considerably easier. It was clear that he preferred the more
analytical approach to management services represented by the chief and by
Superanalyst. In part, he said that the reorganization had buried one of his
main problems, or, Ken thought later, maybe he said it would do so soon.
This case illustrates a wide range of issues confronting those who wish to
know more about public organizations. What motivates people working in public organizations? How can we explain faulty patterns of communication in public agencies? How can we best understand the relationship between bureaucracies
and bureaucrats? How can we cope with or, perhaps even direct, organizational
change? Even more important for our purposes, this case indicates the central
role of the acquisition of knowledge as the basis of our actions. Each of the persons involved here was faced with the problem of accumulating knowledge
about the specific circumstances; then he had to determine how that information
might fit into (or require him to modify) his own frame of reference, his own
implicit theories about how people and organizations behave. Each of these
persons had to resolve three basic questions about his understanding of public
organizations: (1) What knowledge is needed as a basis for action? (2) What are
the best possible sources of that knowledge? (3) How can that knowledge be
applied to the situation at hand? Only after resolving these questions (at least
implicitly) was each person able to act.
Take Ken Welch, the central character in this case, as an example. Among
the many categories that Ken might have used to help him understand what was
happening in this situation, Ken chose to emphasize those relating to power and
authority. His concern (perhaps even obsession) with power and authority provided a special lens through which he viewed the world, a lens that highlighted
some events and filtered out others. After obtaining a certain amount of
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information, Ken concluded that he was a “pawn” in “an office power struggle”
and tried to work things out by appealing to those who had authority in the
organization. If, on the other hand, Ken had focused on other topics—for example, the breakdowns in communication that often occur in complex organizations despite attempts at cooperation—he would have acted quite differently,
probably trying to discover the cause of the confusion and seeking to work out
a more effective relationship with his fellow workers. In any case, it is clear that
Ken’s own perspective on organizational life, his own implicit theory of organization, was crucial in directing his actions.
Case 2
Let us examine another case, one that illustrates again the connection between
the theories people hold and the actions they take, but one that also illustrates
several other themes central to the study of public organizations. John Taylor and
Carol Langley worked for a local community development agency. Following a
rather massive reorganization of the agency, in which a number of new programs
were taken on, John was asked to supervise a new housing loan program, and
Carol was asked to assist him. The program was designed to provide lowinterest loans to help people rehabilitate housing in certain parts of the city.
Although John and Carol had experience in related areas, neither was familiar
with this particular program. To make matters worse, seminars to provide help
in establishing such programs had been held some months earlier. John and Carol
were simply given a manual and told to begin.
The program involved a number of new activities and took considerable
time to set up. For example, it was necessary to train new housing inspectors,
who would coordinate their activities with those provided by the city, and relationships had to be established with many agencies that would provide information about the applicants being processed.
John soon began receiving considerable pressure to complete the processing
of the first group of applications within a very short time. For one thing, the first
group of applicants consisted of about forty people who had originally applied
for other programs but had been turned down. Since their applications had
been on file in the agency for as long as a year, they were eager to have their
requests processed quickly. Initial visits and phone calls from several of the applicants made John quite aware of their feelings. In addition, however, John knew
that this particular loan program would have a significant impact on the community and that, consequently, his doing an efficient job under these difficult circumstances would be important to the agency and in turn important to his own
future in government service.
Carol recognized the necessity of doing the work as quickly as possible, but
she also felt a special obligation to the applicants themselves. She took seriously
the agency director’s comment that the agency could use this opportunity to
help “educate” the applicants about the procedures involved in such projects.
She felt that it was very important to contact the applicants periodically to
let them know what was happening, for example, with the inspections, cost
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estimates, loan amounts, financial information, and terms and conditions of the
loans. Unlike John, who spent most of his time in the office, she talked frequently with the applicants, many of whom she knew personally from her previous position in the agency.
For each applicant, John and Carol were to accumulate a complete file of
information about financial status and about the rehabilitation project the applicant had in mind. This file was to be received and signed by the applicant, then
forwarded to the regional office of the federal Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) for its action on the loan.
John felt that the process could be completed more quickly if Carol would
simply get the applicants to sign a blank set of forms that could be kept at the
office. When information was received regarding a loan, the appropriate items
could be entered on the signed forms, thus saving the time that would be
involved in reviewing each form with the applicant. Also, this procedure
would eliminate the often lengthy process of coordinating several office visits to
discuss the material.
When John asked Carol to obtain the signed forms, she refused. She not
only felt that the applicants should see and understand the materials before signing, she was afraid that it might be illegal to have people sign blank forms. When
she talked with John’s supervisor about the request, she was told that the procedure was not illegal and had even been used before in the regional office.
John and Carol obviously had different orientations toward the role of public administration in modern society. Similarly, they had different understandings
of how one might be effective as an administrator. Consequently, when they
encountered this particular situation, they immediately fit the given circumstances into their administrative frames of reference, and these frameworks
became the bases for their actions. John seemed most concerned with the efficient completion of the task with which he had been presented, while Carol
seemed more concerned that she be immediately responsive to members of the
client group and helping them to understand the loan process.
As we will see, the issues that seem to separate John and Carol are not
unusual; indeed, they lie at the heart of public administration theory. On the
one hand, government agencies are urged to attain the greatest possible efficiency in their delivery of services—to cut through red tape whenever possible.
On the other hand, since public agencies should presumably operate in the
public interest, they must be responsive to the needs and desires of those with
whom they work. Moreover, one might argue that public agencies bear a special responsibility to help educate citizens to deal more effectively with social
problems on their own.
On the one hand, government agencies are urged to attain the greatest possible
efficiency in their delivery of services. On the other hand, they must be responsive to
the needs and desires of those with whom they work.
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This case also provides an interesting commentary on another issue that we
will encounter in our study of public organizations: Where we stand in our
field of practice considerably influences what we see. Specifically, a person’s
actions often look quite different from the inside than from the outside. We
might, for example, characterize John’s behavior as self-serving, concerned
only with impressing those who might influence his impending promotion;
more charitably, however, we might characterize John as highly concerned
for the agency’s clients, anxious to help them receive their loan approvals as
quickly as possible in order to ease their financial difficulties. John himself
might describe his actions in either of these ways, or he might speak of the
situation in completely different terms. For example, he might say that he felt
tremendous pressure to get the job done, both from those inside and those
outside the organization; consequently, he experienced this entire situation,
especially the conflict with Carol, as a source of personal anguish. Although
we can rather readily describe the behavior of individuals in organizations, it
is much more difficult to assess the meaning that their activities have for
them. Yet in seeking intelligence and compassion in our understanding of public organizations, both are necessary.
FORMAL THEORIES OF PUBLIC ORGANIZATION
We mentioned earlier the academic, professional, and personal sources from
which we derive our understanding of public organizations. Regardless of
whether we consciously attempt to develop our perspectives, they do develop,
and they guide us. If we wish to sharpen our ability to respond with greater
intelligence and compassion to those situations we face as members or clients of
public organizations, we need to consider more carefully the implicit theories we
hold. One way to do that, of course, is to compare our own implicit theories of
public organization with those more explicit theories developed by theorists and
practitioners in an attempt to better understand the organizational world in
which we live. Interestingly, often when we read formal theories we may learn
for the first time that we actually have implicit theories that guide us and inform
our actions. These theories may enable us in some ways, but they may limit our
possibilities in others. In reading and reflecting on formal theories of public organization and comparing them with our own perspectives, we can make adjustments or refinements that would enable us to understand more clearly our own
actions and the actions of others.
Why Study Formal Theories?
There are clearly certain advantages to examining formal theories. Although
those who construct such theories entertain essentially the same questions as
others seeking a better understanding of organizational life, they do so with considerably more care, rigor, and sophistication. Not that they are any brighter or
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more perceptive than others—they simply have more time to devote to the
practice of theorizing. Because formal theories are more carefully developed,
they reflect both a wider range of topics than we might ordinarily consider and
an agenda emphasizing those items that seem most important. For this reason,
formal theories provide a benchmark against which we may measure our own
approaches to organizational life, and the rich plurality of formal theories, in
turn, provide us with a variety of ways to reflect on and consider the actions
we take. In seeking to improve our own understanding, we would be well
advised to study the way in which other theorists and practitioners have
attempted to construct their own theories. By doing so, we get an idea of the
range of questions that we should consider, an overview of the issues that have
been debated back and forth (and among which we will inevitably have to
choose), and a sense of where we stand with respect to the central questions
facing those in public organizations.
As we have suggested, theorists differ with respect to what constitutes an
appropriate theoretical base for understanding public organizations; however, at
a very broad level, most agree that the purpose of theory generally is to provide a
more coherent and integrated understanding of our world than we might otherwise hold. Theory seeks to move beyond a simple observation of facts or a blind
adherence to certain values to provide more general interpretations. It does not
simply draw together facts, it draws from them; it does not simply recognize
values, it reorders them. A theory is not simply an arrangement of facts or values
but a thoughtful reconstruction of the way we see ourselves and the world
around us. It is a way of making sense of a situation. Theories may then be evaluated in terms of their capacity to help us see our world more clearly and to act
more effectively in that world.
As we have already seen, administrative practitioners have to make choices
about the kind of knowledge they need, the ways in which it can be successfully
acquired, and the ways in which it may be applied. Theorists must do the same—
they must ask what kinds of knowledge they wish to produce, how they can
ensure that their results will be complete and accurate, and how the newly
acquired knowledge can be applied. Theorists must make certain choices
about what to study and how to study it. And, once these choices have been
made, theorists and their theories are bound by them.
For this reason, we should maintain some skepticism concerning theories of
public organization (and concerning other theories as well). We must realize that
these theories of public organization, like public organizations themselves, result
from human activity undertaken in fields of practice—particular constructions
that may be more or less appropriate for various purposes. All theories emphasize
certain things and deemphasize others. Theories reflect both the personal history
and field of practice of the theorist but also the historical context in which the
theory was produced. For this reason, as we consider various theories, we will see
life reflected—both personal and cultural life. However, we should realize that
this reflection is, again, limited and partial, filtered as it is through the lens of
history and the specific choices made by the theorist.
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The Role of Models
This fact can be illustrated by a consideration of the roles of models in transmitting knowledge. Public administration theorists often speak of their work as the
task of developing models of organization or models of administration. In this
sense, the term model does not mean an ideal form of organization or type of
administration but rather a representation of real life (in this case, a representation
in language). We might, for example, think of organizations as analogous to the
models of molecular structures found in physics, with the balls being various
offices and the connecting rods being lines of authority. In any case, the models
developed by theorists of public organization share some of the characteristics of
models in general.
Consider for a moment a particular model automobile. This model car is
intended to represent a real full-sized car. It has the same general shape as the
larger car; it has bumpers and windows; and it even has wheels that roll. In
these respects, the model car reflects reality rather well. But in one sense, the
model car is drastically different—it has a rubber-band motor instead of a gasoline combustion engine. In this respect, the model car distorts rather than reflects
reality. Yet this distortion was intentional. The model maker wished to illustrate
the fact that the automobile moves along the ground and felt that it was more
important to illustrate this aspect of the full-sized car’s performance than to portray accurately the device by which it is propelled. The resulting model is then
both a reflection—and a distortion—of reality. For the model to be meaningful
to us, we must recognize which is which.
In investigating theories of public organization, therefore, we should always
seek to be aware of the choices theorists have made in constructing their theories
and the distortions to which these choices may have led. In terms of language,
we should always inquire into what is said, what is left unsaid, and what should
be said next. This last point is particularly important, for, as it was discussed earlier, theory invites action. Thus, we should ask how theories express not only
who we and our organizations are but also who we and our organizations might
become.
BUILDING THEORIES OF PUBLIC ORGANIZATION
Let us now turn to the choices that theorists have had to make with respect to
building theories of public organization. Specifically, we argue here that these
choices have left our understanding of life in public organizations incomplete;
even so, although a comprehensive and integrated theory of public organization
cannot be developed for the reasons discussed above, a number of very important themes appropriate to that study have been explored in great detail. These
can help make us make sense of our involvement with public organizations and
in turn to improve the overall quality of the public service. Although this argument is developed throughout the book, it is appropriate at this point to review
some of the ways in which the issue of theory building in public administration
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has been viewed in the past and to outline some of the ways in which a more
integrated approach might be developed.
Before doing so, a word of caution. As Jos Raadschelders (2011) has elaborated, there are serious challenges to developing anything like a single comprehensive theory of public organization. Indeed, such a theory is probably not
possible for several reasons. First, virtually every discipline in the social sciences
studies things relevant to life and work in public organizations. Knowledge about
public organization is also highly fragmented across thousands of bureaus and
offices. No one can collect, let alone master, all this knowledge. Second, and as
suggested above, academic researchers do not have a monopoly on defining their
object of inquiry, that is, public organization. Policy makers, administrative practitioners, citizens, and nonprofit and business groups all play a role in defining the
scope and quality of public organizations. Finally, as we will see in this book,
there is substantial and often fundamental disagreement among academic theorists themselves about the topic. Just as all individual perspectives and theories are
limited, so too are all efforts to integrate theories.
In our view, what books like this one can do is offer ways to “map” or
integrate the various sources of knowledge and theories of public organization
(Raadschelders, 2011). There are many ways to do this, and it is important to
be clear about how and why such a mapping is undertaken. Our approach is,
again, aimed to highlight the centrality of personal reflection and mutual learning so
that we can each become more competent and compassionate actors. This reflection and learning must also take place in the face of considerable uncertainty and
the acceptance that the unification of knowledge about public organizations is
impossible. In our view, it is ultimately through personal action that different theories and ways of knowing can be integrated in ways that are useful for advancing public purposes. In the next section, we add the concern for the particular
quality of that personal action and emphasize the importance of democratic practice
in and across public organizations.
MAPPING PREVIOUS APPROACHES TO
PUBLIC ORGANIZATION
With respect to the scope of public administration theories, at least three orientations to the study of public organizations can be identified. First, public administration has been viewed as part of the governmental process and therefore akin
to other studies in political science. In this view, a theory of public organization is
simply part of a larger political theory. Second, public organizations have been
viewed as much the same as private organizations. In this view, a theory of public
organization is simply part of a larger theory of organizations. Third, it has been argued
that public administration is a professional field, much like law or medicine, that
draws on various theoretical perspectives to produce practical impacts. In this
view, a theory of public organization is both unattainable and undesirable. As
we will suggest, these three approaches present significant obstacles to
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recognizing the possibilities for personal action as the location for integrating
different ways of knowing and problematically constrain our understanding of
public organization.
Public Administration and Government
The view that public administration is distinguished by its relationship to the
governmental process was held by many early writers in the field and continues
to attract numerous followers. From this perspective, the public organization—
typically the public bureaucracy—is recognized not only as being an arm of government but also as playing a significant role in the governmental process. Public
organizations are said to affect the development and implementation of public
policy in various ways and consequently to affect the allocation of values in society. If this is the case, however, then such organizations must be subject to the
same criteria of evaluation as other actors in the political process. Terms such as
freedom, equality, justice, responsiveness, and so on are as appropriately applied to
public administration as to the chief executive, the legislature, or the judiciary.
Therefore, according to this view, the body of theory most appropriate to
inform the operations of the public organization is political theory, and the
most important recommendations theorists might make are those that would
guide the formulation and implementation of public policy.
This view of public organizations as central to the political process was held
by many early theorists, especially those from the discipline of political science.
(Curiously, the relationship between the subfields of public administration and
political theory is marked by considerable ambivalence. Although often seen as
the practical and philosophical extremes of the discipline, public administration
and political theory share an important heritage based on their concern for effective democratic governance.) Although the roots of public administration in
political theory have often been neglected, usually in favor of more immediate
technical concerns, some theorists have maintained an interest in the political
theory of public organization—an interest that we will later see especially
marked in the “new public service” and in certain aspects of the emphasis on
public policy. It is an especially critical issue as we explore the emergence of
democratic network governance.
Public Administration and Private Organizations
In contrast to this position, others have argued that the behavior of individuals
within organizations and the behavior of organizations themselves are much the
same, regardless of the type of organization being studied. This generic approach
to organizational analysis has also attracted many followers and has indeed created
an interdisciplinary study drawing from work in business administration, public
administration, organizational sociology, industrial psychology, and various other
fields. Proponents of this view argue that the basic concerns of management are
the same, whether one is managing a private corporation or a public agency.
That is, in either case, the manager must deal with issues of power and authority,
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with issues of communication, and so forth. If this is the case, we should expect
that lessons learned in one setting would be easily transferable to the other. More
important, lessons learned in either setting would contribute to a general theory
of organizations. For example, research on both the motivation of assembly line
workers in the automobile industry and the effects of new incentive patterns in
the public sector would contribute to a more general explanation of employee
motivation.
Typically associated with the view that a generic study of administration
should be undertaken is that the chief concern of such a study should be efficiency. In part, this concern grows out of the early relationship between science
and business, which clearly emphasized the use of scientific principles to increase
the productivity of the organization. This concern was soon voiced as well in the
public sector; indeed, in an article often cited as inaugurating the field of public
administration, Woodrow Wilson (1887), the future president, argued that such
a study might permit the same gains in efficiency as those being made in the
private sector. In any case, this viewpoint, proposing a generic study of organizations structured around an interest in making organizations more efficient,
remains an important and perhaps even a dominant one among scholars of public
administration, such as Herbert Simon and James Thompson.
Critics of the generic view of organization contend that, notwithstanding
the implications of democratic political theory, there are important differences
between public and private organizations (Allison, 1997; Bozeman, 1987;
Rainey, 2003, Ch. 3; Stillman, 1996). For example, they note that government
agencies are typically more interested in service than in production or profit and
rely on legislative appropriations rather than markets for funding. Consequently,
they argue that the purposes of government agencies are considerably more
ambiguous than those of private industry and are usually stated in terms of service rather than profit or production. With goals that are more difficult to measure, they argue, government agencies are inherently limited in the degree of
efficiency they can attain. Moreover, practitioners point out that the decisionmaking process in public agencies is pluralistic, and that not only must agency
personnel be attentive to other factors in the environment but also their ability
to act may be effectively preempted by decisions made elsewhere in the governance system. The requirement that government and its related organizations be
responsive to the interests of the citizenry places obvious, although certainly
proper, restrictions on the decision-making process. Finally, practitioners note
that their actions occur much more in the public eye than those of their counterparts in industry. As the old saying goes, public administrators live in a goldfish
bowl, their every movement scrutinized by an often-critical public.
As we will explore in Chapter 7, contemporary developments in public service and governance add an interesting wrinkle to the relationship between the
political theory and generic management approaches. As more nongovernmental
organizations, such as businesses, nonprofit organizations, and citizen groups,
become involved not only in policy formulation but also service delivery, the
conventional boundaries between public and private organizations are blurring.
This raises interesting questions about the role of private organizations in the
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political process and the implications of democratic political theory for them. So
while public organizations may learn from the generic study of organizations and
management, the concerns of democratic political theory are deeply relevant to
management and generic organization theory today.
Moreover, conceptually, the intertwined relationship of means and ends discussed earlier also complicates the relationship between management and political theory. In other words, since there is not a hard and fast distinction between
political goals (what we want to do) and administration techniques (how we do
it), management and political theory, too, are bound up with and cannot do
without one another. As mentioned earlier, when we forget this, we run the
risk of viewing the public servants who implement policies as mere instruments
or tools rather than as full human beings. This degrades the quality of organizational life and organizational effectiveness and threatens to turn public organizations into inhumane fields of interaction for both citizens and employees.
Public Administration as a Profession
Finally, there is the view that public administration is best viewed as a profession,
like law or medicine, drawing from many theoretical perspectives. Dwight Waldo
(1975, pp. 223–224), one of the most revered theorists in public administration,
was especially vocal in promoting this viewpoint, drawing an analogy with the
field of medicine: “There is no single, unified theory of illness or health, theories
and the technologies based on them constantly change, there are vast unknowns,
there is bitter controversy over medical questions of vital importance, the element
of ‘art’ remains large and important. ‘Health’ proves, on close scrutiny, to be as
undefinable as ‘good administration.’” Yet in spite of the apparent lack of coherence in theory, medical schools purport to train professionals in the field of medicine and do so by drawing on the theoretical perspectives of many different
disciplines. Similarly, one might argue that education for careers in public administration should follow a comparable strategy, with our being concerned less with
the disciplinary background of certain ideas and techniques than with their applicability to problems administrators actually face. Given that no single discipline can
currently provide the kind of knowledge needed by administrators in the public
sector, we might hope that all disciplines would contribute what they can.
While viewing public administration as a profession is a very pragmatic
approach to the issue, unfortunately this view, perhaps even more than the
other views presented here, precludes the possibility that a theory of public organization will fully match the interests and concerns of practitioners. To say that
public administrators must merely draw from theoretical perspectives developed
within the context of such a traditional academic discipline as organizational
analysis or political science is to say that public administrators must depend for
guidance on theories not directly suited to their interests. From the standpoint
of the administrator, political theory remains incomplete, for it leaves out essential concerns of management; similarly, organizational analysis is incomplete, for
it leaves out a concern for democratic responsibility. In any case, the administrator is left with the theoretical problem of reconciling the two perspectives.
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OTHER CONSTRAINTS ON THEORY
Before the scope of theories of public organization can be examined further, we
note two other tendencies in public administration theory that have limited the
range of questions entertained by the field, though we have already hinted at
them.
Focusing on Large, Complex Organizations
First, most, although certainly not all, public administration theorists have
focused their work primarily on large and complex organizations. Thus, definitions of the term organization have revolved around features most clearly associated with traditional bureaucratic structures. Organizations are said to be groups
of people brought together to accomplish some purpose; they are seen as directing the activities of many individuals so that some particular goal can be
achieved. In addition, the direction of these activities occurs through a series of
authority relationships in which superiors and subordinates interact. Characteristically, in these relationships authority flows primarily from the top down.
Bureaucratic organizations are also defined by their structure, or hierarchy,
which results from dividing labor and clarifying authority relationships (so that
each person has only one boss).
Although most definitions of organization developed by persons studying
large and complex organizations involve some combination of these elements,
it is possible to define organization in a more open-ended fashion. For example,
Chester Barnard (1948, p. 73) described an organization as “a system of consciously coordinated activities or forces of two or more persons.” Note that
Barnard’s definition not only expands the range of groups we might consider
organizations but also suggests that we focus on coordinated activities rather
than formal mechanisms. Although most of the theories reviewed in this book
concentrate on large and complex organizations, the wide range of public agencies as well as profound changes in the contemporary nature of governance suggest that we be open to a less restrictive definition of our subject matter.
Moreover, we should be aware that by taking attributes of large bureaucratic
structures as defining characteristics of public organizations, we may unconsciously commit ourselves to a continuation of such structures. If public administration practitioners and theorists choose to study only bureaucratic
organizations, they are far less likely to consider alternative modes of organization. Indeed, they may tend to try to fit other organizations into this model.
(As we see later, there is a great advantage to being more flexible on this issue.)
Equating Public and Government Administration
Second, most, although again not all, public administration theorists have largely
equated public administration with government administration—that is, with
carrying out the mandates of government. Students of public administration
have concentrated on those agencies formally a part of government: departments,
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boards, and commissions at the local, state, and federal levels. Paul Appleby
(1945, Ch. 1) argued that since “government is different” from private enterprise, public administration is different from business administration. As we discussed earlier, there certainly are reasons for thinking that the field of public
administration can be differentiated from other, similar fields, but is this simply
because it is attached to government? When those in public agencies are asked
what they see as distinctive about their work, they tend to clearly distinguish
their perception of their own work from their perception of work in private
industry. For many administrators in this country, these opportunities and constraints do indeed set the world of public administration apart. However, there
are signs that these features are not simply due to the fact that government is
involved. One could certainly argue that less democratic political systems can
be more precise in their objectives, less pluralistic in their decision-making processes, and more careless about openness or accountability. It is quite possible to
conceive of totalitarian systems in which administrative activities would appear to
have none of these distinguishing characteristics. In addition, many so-called private enterprises are today being increasingly thrust into the public arena as part of
the governance process and are finding it necessary to modify traditional management practices. Many private and quasi-public organizations are more and
more oriented toward service objectives. They carry out their efforts with
increasing concern for the impact of uncertain environmental factors, and their
operations are subjected to careful scrutiny by both government and the public.
This development suggests not that government and business are becoming
more and more alike—which may be the case—but that the degree of democratization to which an organization is committed determines the publicness of its management
processes. Those organizations that are committed to following an open, public
process in the formatting and execution of policy will encounter the special
opportunities and constraints that we associate with public organizations.
DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS
In light of these matters, our point of view is that an approach to developing an
integrative theory of public organizations should accomplish several things.
First, it should clarify the perspectives of earlier approaches to the field—the
political, the generic, and the professional. Democratic political theory as typically described is concerned with the way in which public institutions promote
societal values that have been defined and applied with a high degree of citizen
involvement and with a high degree of responsiveness to the needs and interests
of the citizenry. Democratic theory thus focuses on such issues as freedom, justice, and equality. Theories of organization, in contrast, are concerned with how
individuals can manage change processes to their own or to corporate advantage,
especially in large systems. Such theories focus on issues of power and authority,
leadership and motivation, and the dynamics of groups in action. This book
brings these perspectives together and, in doing so, complicates traditional
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thinking about the relationship between politics and administration, means and
ends, and the inside and outside of organizational life.
Second, an integrative theory of public organization should illuminate
and make sense of the different ways of acquiring knowledge in and about
public organizations. This book describes three major models of knowledge of
acquisition—the rational, the interpretive, and the critical. Each approach considers
sources of knowledge and the relationship of theory to practice in a distinctive
manner, and these differences have important implications for organizational processes. Though we see a role for all forms of knowledge, we raise questions here
about dominant model of knowledge acquisition and explore how it constrains
human and organizational learning. In turn, we offer a way to think differently
about how to connect different forms of formal and personal knowledge.
Third, an integrative theory of public organization should identify public
administration as a process rather than as something that occurs within a particular
type of structure (hierarchy, for example), organizational form, or societal sector
(government, for example). This emphasis on public administration as a process
rather than the particular work of a particular sector or institution complicates
the familiar societal division of labor among government, market, and civil society. We can see public administration as occurring across different kinds of organizations and sectors.
Fourth and finally, such a theory should emphasize the public quality of that
process. This is a significant point. As noted above, we can readily imagine many
political systems that do not seek to incorporate democratic practices into their
work. It is also easy to imagine many kinds of organizations—businesses, nonprofits, and governments—in democratic political systems being involved in the
work of contemporary governance whose relationships among each other lack
openness and transparency and whose own organizational processes treat their
employees and clients poorly and disrespectfully. This third point emphasizes
centrality of the public and democratic quality of the relationship among the
many actors in public administration—both among collaborators in public service and within organizational boundaries.
Taking this all together, we argue that public administration is concerned with
managing change processes in pursuit of publicly defined societal values. Such a
definition of the field suggests that public administration is more than simply the
conjunction of several other approaches to study and practice—that it contains an
essential and indeed distinctive coherence of subject matter. This formulation
would permit the development of theories of public administration rather than
theories related to public administration. To the extent that we are able to define
our subject matter in a distinctive way, we will be able to focus on the development of a coherent and integrated theory of public organization, one that fits
with emerging trends in the governance process. Moreover, to the extent that
our definition is relevant to contemporary administrative practice, it will be of
considerably greater use to those active in the field than other theories that have
thus far been proposed. Indeed, it will recognize the awkward complexity that
characterizes the work of those in public service and the imperative for openness
and mutual learning that marks the context of governance today.
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Public administration is concerned with managing change processes in pursuit of
publicly defined societal values.
This view of the practitioner implied here points to an individual sensitive to
the impact of interpersonal and structural relationships on the development of
stable or changing patterns of organizations—someone able to recognize and
respond to the subtleties of organizational change processes. It also acknowledges
that these practitioners stand in a special relationship to the formulation and elaboration of societal values—a relationship that provides an ethical basis for public
organizational management. “The [practitioner] lives in the nexus of a political
and an administrative world and therefore is neither an independent actor nor
solely an instrument of the political system. In this singular position, [she]
accepts, interprets, and influences the values which guide the application of skills
and knowledge” (Denhardt & Nalbandian, 1980).
CONCLUSION
With these considerations in mind, we may now turn to some of the forces that
have shaped our understanding of public organizations in modern society. As we
have seen, all of us construct implicit theories that guide our actions in public
organizations, and one way to focus our own theories more clearly and to
improve their effectiveness as guides to action is to study formal theories of public administration. By doing so, we can test and reflect on our personal theories
by comparing them with those of others and consider more carefully how our
theories might help us as members or clients of public organizations. We can also
aspire to better understand the various ways in which other people theorize their
own experience in public organizations.
All of us construct implicit theories that guide our actions in public organizations.
The next several chapters examine how theorists and practitioners in public
administration have sought to develop more formal perspectives on public organization and management. Although the contributions of such disciplines as
political science and organizational analysis are noted, attention is focused on
the works of those theorists who have consciously emphasized the study of public organizations and, in doing so, have formed the basis of the modern study of
public administration.
Our discussion begins with a consideration of the broad significance of
the study of public organizations for individuals in modern society. As the
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discussion in this chapter has made clear, building a theory of public organization is not simply a matter of accumulating sets of techniques that can be
applied to particular situations. To speak of the meaningfulness of our experiences or the impact that those experiences have on the values of society is to
begin a much more complex study—one that suggests that we be attentive not
only to empirical questions related to the management of change in complex
systems but also to the larger social, political, and ethical contexts within which
public organizations exist.
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
1. What are some strategies you might employ to learn about public
organizations in a democratic society?
2. What are some questions you might ask in learning from case studies or the
experiences of others?
3. What is the role of formal theory in learning about public organizations and
democratic governance?
4. In what ways is working in public organizations different from working in
the private sector?
5. How might definitions of “public administration” vary—and what
difference would the variations make in the way we understand work in
public organizations?
REFERENCES AND ADDITIONAL READINGS
Allison, Graham T. (1997). Public and private management: Are they fundamentally alike in all
unimportant respects? In Jay M. Shafritz and Albert O. Hyde (Eds.), Classics of public
administration. Fourth ed. New York: Harcourt Brace & Company (Originally
published 1983).
Appleby, Paul. (1945). Big democracy. New York: Knopf.
Barnard, Chester. (1948). The functions of the executive. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Bourdieu, Pierre. (1994). The logic of practice. (Richard Nice, Trans.). Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press (Originally published 1980).
Bozeman, Barry. (1987). All organizations are public: Bridging public and private organization
theories. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Catlaw, Thomas J. (2008). “What’s the use in being practical?” Administrative Theory &
Praxis 30 (4): 515–29.
Denhardt, Robert B., & Nalbandian, John. (1980). “Teaching public administration as a
vocation.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Society for Public Administration.
LEARNING AND PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS 21
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some third party content may be suppressed from the eBook and/or eChapter(s). Editorial Review has deemed that any suppressed content does not materially
affect the overall learning experience. Cengage Learning reserves the right to remove additional content at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it.
Harmon, Michael M. (2008). Public administration’s final exam: A pragmatist restructuring of
the profession and the discipline. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press.
Raadschelders, Jos C. N. (2011). Public administration: The interdisciplinary study of government. New York: Oxford University Press.
Rainey, Hal R. (2003). Understanding and managing in the public sector. Third ed. San
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Stillman, Richard J. (1996). The American bureaucracy. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
Waldo, Dwight. (1955). The study of public administration. New York: Doubleday.
Waldo, Dwight. (1975). Education in the seventies. In Frederick C. Mosher (Ed.),
American public administration, pp. 181–232. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
Wilson, Woodrow. (1887, June). “The study of administration.” Political Science Quarterly 2:
197–222.
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2
The Intellectual Heritage
Marx, Weber, and Freud
Theorists of public organization, like other social theorists, must address themselves to a particular tradition of discourse, one that at least in part defines
the nature of their work. The questions considered by earlier theorists must be
accepted, reformulated, or shown to be irrelevant—and their omissions must be
pointed out and corrected. Under all circumstances, theories must be adapted to
the changing social and cultural circumstances of the times. Only in this way can
theories claim to improve our understanding of life—in public organizations or
elsewhere.
Obviously theorists focusing on public organizations must take into account
previous works in public administration theory. They also must relate their work
to the larger cultural and intellectual traditions of which that work is a part. If for
no other reason than to justify that their study is an important one that addresses
central human concerns, theorists of public organization must resist the temptation to take a very narrow or mechanical view of their topic. Like other social
theorists, they must ask how their work fits with other cultural and intellectual
efforts of their time and how it addresses the broadest questions regarding the
human condition. To fail to do so may itself ensure that their studies have little
relevance for the general advancement of humanity.
This chapter, therefore, takes the somewhat unusual, but nonetheless important, step of examining the works of three theorists—Karl Marx, Max Weber,
and Sigmund Freud—whose thinking defined the intellectual orientation of the
Western world and whose writings presented some of the most articulate and
influential statements on the quality of life in modern industrial society. Taken
together, the efforts of these three theorists have substantially influenced the
23
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direction of social theory over the past century, and although their work did not
obviously influence the early development of the field of public administration,
they established an agenda that all social theorists grapple with—whether they
are conscious of it or not. For theorists and practitioners in public administration,
the demand for relevance requires being attentive not just to technique but to
broad social and cultural conditions. Thus, before more explicit theories of public organization are examined, the basic orientations of these thinkers and the
ways in which they have influenced the development of modern social theory
are reviewed. Moreover, we attempt to integrate their works into a critical standard by which specific works on organizational life might later be evaluated.
KARL MARX
Karl Marx (1818–1883) is, of course, best known for his critical analysis of the
dynamics of capitalism and for establishing the theoretical basis for the expansion
of socialism and communism in the twentieth century; in addition, his work provides an important and quite fundamental statement of the conditions of social life
in modern industrial society. Marx expresses an intense concern for the restrictions
that the development of modern institutions places on the development of human
capabilities. As we saw dramatically illustrated by events in Eastern Europe and the
former communist bloc during the early 1990s, Marx’s work has obvious flaws as a
prediction of historical developments in the twentieth century. However, his analysis of the impact of modern industrial organization on individual development
remains one of the most important and influential statements on this topic.
Hegel to Marx
Marx’s efforts are based in large part on Hegel’s view of history as the unfolding
of reason and of the freedom that reason implies. According to this view, existing
circumstances, seen as passing phases in the evolution of freedom, must be
removed in order to ensure the continued extension of reason and freedom.
The present is compelling, however, in the sense that it occupies our attention,
thereby diverting us from the task of expanding freedom. For this reason, the
present is more important for what it conceals than for what it reveals.
The task of social theory becomes one of unmasking the false appearances
generated in the present in order to permit expanded freedom in the future. It
is through the act of critique that we exceed the limits of the present and permit
the possibilities of the future. To demonstrate the way in which ideas would play
themselves out in the development of reason, Hegel employed a dialectical
approach that sees ideas as being produced in a continuous process of conflict
and conciliation. In its classic exposition (though one from which Hegel often
departed), the dialectic involves an original idea, a thesis, countered by its opposite, the anti-thesis, or antithesis. The interaction of thesis and antithesis culminates
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in a synthesis, not merely a compromise between the two opposing ideas but an
advancement beyond them. The synthesis, in turn, becomes a new thesis, which
is opposed by an antithesis, and so on. Accordingly, the development of ideas
occurs through a process in which conflict is central.
Marx’s specific contribution was to connect Hegel’s understanding of dialectical processes to the historical and empirical analysis of different forms of social and
economic organization, or “modes of production.” This view is called “historical
materialism.” These modes of production are aimed at satisfying basic material
needs—such as food, shelter, and clothing—that are essential for sustaining
human life, and each establishes a set of social relationships for the distribution
and exchange of goods and services. Over time, both the technical and social
dimensions of these modes of production change. For Marx, these socioeconomic
forces of production are fundamental to the development of human societies.
They make up the “base” on which society rests. Political, legal, artistic, religious,
and other phenomena are secondary and are, in large measure, reflections of the
“superstructure” for those primary socioeconomic relationships. In this way, the
consciousness of any age reflects the basic forces or modes of production that lie
at its heart. Each individual and each society develops its own understanding of the
world, but this understanding is conditioned by the social and economic circumstances that characterize the particular epoch and the historical forces that gave rise
to it. As Marx (McLellan, 2000, p. 329) famously put it, human beings “make
their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make
it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly
encountered, given, and transmitted from the past.”
Division of Labor, Class Conflict, and Class Consciousness
Marx (Tucker, 1978, p. 699) saw historical change as largely a consequence of
contending economic forces that result in conflicts between economic classes:
“All history is the history of class struggles.” For example, the dialectical relationship between the ancient slave societies and the emergence of feudalism eventually gave way to the development of capitalism. Later, in Marx’s view, the
conflict between capitalism and socialism would lead to communism.
The possibility of class relationships and class conflict emerges when the tasks of
production start being divided among various workers and specialization begins. For
Marx, the first such division of labor was between material and intellectual work,
though he emphasizes the importance, too, of the sexual division of labor among
men and women in the household. With the division of labor, individuals are
required to do only one kind of work in order to survive. One type of work
is given to one group of people, and another kind of work to another. There is
“fixation of social activity” (McLellan, 2000, p. 185), and social classes form around
these various types of work. While the modern mind sees the division of labor as
natural and as producing “efficiencies” in the economy, Marx argues that such specialization encourages people—especially those engaged in intellectual, managerial,
and artistic labor—to neglect their connection to material socioeconomic realities
and to unequally distribute these meaningful and creative activities. Invariably, one
THE INTELLECTUAL HERITAGE 25
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group of workers becomes dominant and one type of work accrues to it undue
social prestige and material advantage.
Because Marx saw an intimate connection between the human condition
and the process of production, the development of the division of labor was
disconcerting, though he did join Adam Smith (1976) in acknowledging the
impressive economic forces it unleashed. Marx saw each individual as possessing
certain natural capacities, “natural powers, vital powers,” comparable to instincts.
At the same time, however, he saw the individual as a “suffering, conditioned,
and limited creature,” dependent on outside forces for sustenance (Tucker, 1978,
p. 115). Since the objects of our instincts lie outside, we must, according to
Marx, engage in an attempt to control the outside world in such a way that it
serves our interests—“The first historical act is thus the production of the means
to satisfy [our] needs” (Tucker, 1978, p. 156). Thus, in the most basic sense,
people are defined by the work they do. So, to the extent that we become
“fixed” in narrow, restricted activities, we are limited in what we can be and
the lives we are able to lead.
The Problem of Change
Marx was also interested in understanding why people seem to put up with these
conditions. He offered a highly influential and important answer to this question.
Those in dominant economic positions seek to reproduce and sustain their positions. Importantly for this purpose, the groups who control means of production
also have substantial influence over the dissemination of knowledge through
society (through the superstructure and, for example, the media) and, by virtue
of this influence, may be said to direct the consciousness of the society. Those
ideas consistent with the interests and perspectives of the dominant class will be
dominant: “The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas …”
(McLellan, 2000, p. 192). As a result, many members of society come to adopt a
consciousness or worldview that may be contradictory to their own material
interests and that serves to reinforce their subordinate class position. Workers,
for example, may come to believe that their work should contribute to the accumulation of private property by others, whom they may see as more fortunate
and even more deserving. As such, ruling groups are able to reproduce their
dominance in subtle ways.
Capitalism, Industrial Organization, and Individual Development
Though Marx was interested in understanding the historical development of
human societies, as we have indicated already he was especially concerned with
applying this materialist view of history to an analysis of the conditions of modern capitalism.
For Marx, capitalist societies are based on a particularly volatile, dominating
relationship between two classes, the capitalists, or bourgeoisie, and the workers,
or proletariat. Here a minority group, the capitalists, owns the means of production and is able to accumulate profits from the surplus production of the mass of
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proletariat. The accumulation of profit by the owners occurs only with a corresponding impoverishment of the workers. Those who own land and capital are
interested in personal profit and provide workers with only those wages necessary to continue their production. The individual worker’s contribution to the
productive process is expropriated by those in a position of dominance to
increase their own gain. The struggle between the capitalist and the worker
over wages and profits is, of course, one in which the owners of capital have a
distinct advantage.
In the dialectical movement of economic processes in modern society, the
forces of capitalist production seem to require an increasingly complex and
oppressive mode of organization to sustain and reproduce themselves. This is
epitomized in bureaucratic capitalism. Under bureaucratic capitalism, the division
of labor is taken to an extreme. The individual’s work is assimilated into the
production of standard units, which no longer bear the stamp of the individual.
Unlike the craftsperson, who can point with pride to the product of his or her
labor and consider it a unique contribution, the assembly line worker treats a
passing object in only a certain routine way. In this process, the quality of the
work is no longer important; only the quantity matters, and to that quantified
production, the individual’s labor merely adds a twist here or a turn there.
Given these conditions, Marx made two key observations about the nature of
the division of labor in capitalism. First, while specialization itself is not at all unique
to capitalism, capitalism harnesses the creative power of humans’ ability to coordinate
their work activities and places it under the domination of a single group, the capitalists. Innovation in economic production and the division of labor simply become
new ways to dominate labor: “[A]ll methods for raising the social productiveness of
labor are brought about at the cost of the individual laborer …” (McLellan, 2000,
p. 520). Second, we no longer see the product of our labor as an expression of our
own creativity, our own personality; rather, we view the product as simply an object
existing apart from us, and we come to view the work process itself in an objective
fashion, as standing apart from us. In doing so, we become alienated or estranged
from our work in the way Marx (Tucker, 1978, p. 74) describes:
The fact that labor is external to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to
his essential being; that, in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not
develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and
ruins his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself outside his
work, and in his work feels outside himself. He is at home when he is
not working, and when he is working he is not at home.
Even more important, if we are defined by the work we do, yet that work is
taken from us and made into an object, then we are separated from our own
sense of self. We are alienated not only from the specific work processes in
which we engage but also from a basic part of being human beings. No longer
do we work to satisfy our most basic human need to produce. Instead, we see
work as something to be avoided whenever possible. We work only because we
have to—because we need the money or are forced to work. Our waged labor is
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involuntary. We come to treat work as something we do in order to supply
other satisfactions. Work is no longer an end in itself but only a means to
an end.
We are alienated from our work and ourselves, and because labor is an
inherently social process, we are also alienated from one another. As our work
becomes increasingly detached and objectified, as we come to view our work
in instrumental terms, we also recognize others as mere objects in our instrumental world. As this orientation affects more and more interactions, those interactions become devoid of human qualities and are better described in the language
of the machine, the chief metaphor of industrial processes. As we see ourselves as
objects in a system of production, we see others in the same way, and the
distance between ourselves and others increases. In sum, bureaucratic capitalism
creates conditions in which our alienation from our work, ourselves, and others
is inevitable.
That we continue to submit to such a situation is in part the result of our
domination by others, those who control the means of production and the
means of cultural reproduction. For very practical reasons, the slave must submit
to the master, the worker to the manager. But, as suggested above, our submission may be even more subtle. Our condition of confinement and alienation is
accompanied by a particular form of ideological justification that portrays the
existing situation as the way things are supposed to be, as a natural order in
which some are to lead and others to serve, some are to be rich and others
poor. To the extent that we become captive to this ideology or consciousness,
we do not question the circumstances under which we live. Although we may
occasionally complain about working conditions or the amount of our pay, we
may fail to address the underlying condition of domination and exploitation that
is the basis of our suffering.
According to Karl Marx, the forces of production seem to require an increasingly
complex and oppressive mode of organization, in which individuals suffer increasing
alienation and depersonalization.
Social Theory as an Impetus to Action
Yet we do suffer. Occasionally our suffering is so clearly revealed to us that we
are compelled to act, and social theory is intended as a force that inspires that
action. The task of social theory, Marx suggested, is to reveal to us how our
understanding of our present conditions has been clouded by ideology and
other forms of mystification, to illustrate the conditions of domination that
limit us, and to point the way toward greater individual and collective freedom
and possibility. These conditions are examined in light of larger historical processes and of the individual’s potential for greater autonomy and responsibility
in the future. Critique leads to action.
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This last point is of particular importance. The critical social theory that
Marx devised in an attempt to help us understand the limits of personal and
social freedom in a complex society also demands that we take action to alter
our situation. The connection between reflection and action, between theory
and practice, is very close. A theoretical knowledge of the actual conditions
under which we live reveals so much that we are compelled to act to improve
our circumstances. Knowledge of the limits that society has placed on us is so
striking that we must respond. Theory and practice become one, a connection
described by Marx with the Greek term praxis. Through praxis, we engage in
critical reflection on our own situation and that of our society to reveal the
basis of social domination and the suffering it promotes; then, recognizing the
reality of our situation (moving beyond our false consciousness), we are compelled to act to increase our sense of autonomy and responsibility, both for ourselves and for our society.
MAX WEBER
The German sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920), although best known to students of public administration for his analysis of rational bureaucracy, has had a
broad and profound impact on the social sciences. Weber envisioned a sociology
that would combine a concern for objectivity with an understanding of the meaning of human action for those involved—a combination extremely difficult to
achieve. Indeed, Weber struggled with this issue through many of his works, and
his interpreters have taken widely differing positions based on their understanding
of this issue. In any case, of the three writers whose works are examined in this
chapter, Weber has clearly had the most direct impact on theories of public organization, although even his influence was felt fairly late in the development of the
field. For this reason, his work and its extensions are studied here in some detail.
Capitalism and the Protestant Ethic
Weber’s most famous book, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1930),
examines the relationship between social thought and economic action, specifically with reference to Calvinist Protestantism and capitalist economic life. In
contrast to Marx’s emphasis on the relationship between economic conditions
and patterns of social change, Weber acknowledged that change could be propelled by other forces—for example, tradition or belief. Importantly, these forces
were not necessarily tied to the class position of the individual; indeed, one could
argue that they cut across class relationships. Therefore, according to Weber, the
interests expressed in changing societies are not merely economic; they relate as
well to the world of ideas and ideals.
As an example, Weber argued that the belief in predestination was so disconcerting to followers of Calvin that they sought a kind of “loophole” in their destiny, a way of ensuring that they would be among the elect who enter the state of
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grace. The loophole they developed was “earthly success,” which they saw as a
sign of heavenly favor and assurance of their place among God’s chosen, and
they diligently sought to extend their holdings. The result, according to Weber,
was an accumulation of capital and an entrenchment of the capitalist system unparalleled elsewhere. In this case, a system of belief propelled an economic system
rather than vice versa.
Although Weber, as a social scientist, did not endorse any one economic
system, he was careful to point out that from the perspective of technical rationality (i.e., formal efficiency), the capitalist dependence on private ownership,
managerial control of the means of production, and reliance on competitive pricing in the marketplace were clearly at an advantage. Especially in contrast to
socialist systems of planning, Weber saw capitalism as maintaining the capacity
to calculate in formal terms the most rational (efficient) organization of the productive mechanism. Not that Weber glossed over the possible detrimental effects
of such a system, especially with respect to individual creativity and personal
development—capitalism and the type of rationality it represented were mixed
blessings, capable of tremendous material advances but at odds with a concern for
individual prerogative.
Rationalization of Social Theory: The Notion of the “Ideal Type”
There is an interesting connection between Weber’s work on the Protestant
ethic and his later work on rational bureaucracy. Weber contrasted the ascetic
approach to life that seemed to characterize the modern age—and which he
seemed to prefer himself—with the mystical spirit he saw elsewhere. To the
ascetic, experiences were generally seen as means to ends; for example, Calvinists
worked in order to ensure their salvation. The mystic, instead, seemed to
appreciate experiences as ends in themselves. The question of whether human
action, including human labor, is best seen in instrumental terms, as a means to
an end, lies at the heart of Weber’s analysis of the rationalization of society.
But to understand Weber’s formulation of this question, we must first
understand his approach to the development of social theory. Although Weber
was interested in establishing the legitimacy of an objective social science, he was
also well acquainted with the special considerations that differentiate the work of
the social scientist from that of the natural scientist. He felt that objectivity in the
social sciences could be achieved through procedures designed to eliminate personal prejudice in the research process. Although science can tell us what is, it
cannot, in his view, tell us what ought to be. Although science can assess the
likelihood that given actions will move us efficiently toward our objectives, it
cannot say what those objectives should be. These questions need to be
addressed in quite a different forum and must be carefully eliminated from
research. But Weber also recognized that values do play a part in social science,
with respect both to the way in which the values of individual social actors influence social relationships and to the way in which the social scientist selects those
topics that are of greatest interest or significance. Clearly, all actors bring to their
interactions with others preferences and concerns that affect their behavior; it is
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futile to attempt to understand action without reference to the meanings held by
the actors involved. The social scientist, then, unlike the natural scientist, must
be constantly aware of the way in which cultural values manifest themselves in
the activities of individuals. Moreover, since the social scientist is also a social
actor, the scientist’s own values influence both the topic to be studied and the
boundaries of the study itself. In large measure, the social scientist makes these
decisions based on an estimation of the cultural significance of the particular subject to be investigated. The topics of importance to a particular society are those
that will most likely be given attention by social scientists. Sociology, according
to Weber, is “a science concerning itself with the interpretive understanding of
social action and thereby with a causal explanation of its course and consequences” (Giddens, 1947, p. 328). The sociologist is interested in how interacting subjects constitute structures of meaning that in turn guide future action.
This issue has important implications for the conduct of social science
because, although the social scientist seeks objective explanations of the phenomena under investigation, those explanations need not be of the same order as
those of the natural scientist. Indeed, what distinguishes the search for explanation in the social realm is not the comprehensiveness of one’s theoretical perspective but rather the capacity of explanations to help one understand the
uniqueness of human undertakings. We seek to understand those aspects of our
lives that strike us as somehow out of the ordinary. Even if we seek general theoretical frameworks, we do so in order to understand what is unique.
This point leads directly to Weber’s notion of the “ideal type” as a way of
formulating social understanding. Through the elaboration of ideal types, according to Weber, social scientists can provide an objective analysis of the impact of
social events on individuals and societies. The ideal type is not ideal in a normative sense; it does not suggest that a particular social configuration is desirable and
should be pursued. Rather, the ideal type is an abstraction and elaboration of a
particular set of elements whose combination imparts a special cultural significance. As such, the ideal type is more than just a description of a set of events;
indeed, it may never have existed in an empirical sense. Yet it is of conceptual
importance in that it contains an explanation and interpretation of a significant
component of social reality. Importantly, however, the ideal type grows out of
an interest in specific and definable problems.
Ideal-Type Bureaucracy
Most familiar to students of public administration, of course, is Weber’s analysis
of the ideal-type bureaucracy, a discussion that occurs in the context of a larger
examination of patterns of social domination. Weber argued that every system of
authority must establish and secure a belief in its legitimacy, but that this may be
done in many different ways. Variations will occur with respect to the kind of
legitimacy claimed, the kind of obedience sought, the kind of administrative staff
supporting the authority, and the way in which authority is exercised. Specifically, Weber identified three “pure types” of legitimate authority: (1) legal
authority, based on a belief in the legality of certain patterns or rules and in the
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right of those in positions of legal authority to issue commands; (2) traditional
authority, based on a belief in the importance of enduring traditions and those
who rule within such traditions; and (3) charismatic authority, based on an emotional attachment or devotion to a specific individual.
Legal authority, which depends on the establishment of legal norms within a
group and the agreement of members of the group to be bound by the legal
system, is exercised through a bureaucratic administrative staff. Weber’s (1947)
discussion of the pure type of legal authority with the employment of a bureaucratic administrative staff outlines the central characteristics of bureaucratic organization. In this form, officials operate according to the following criteria:
1. They are personally free and are subject to authority only with respect to
their impersonal official obligations.
2. They are organized in a clearly defined hierarchy of offices.
3. Each office has a clearly defined sphere of competence in the legal sense.
4. The office is filled by a free contractual relationship. Thus, in principle, there
is free selection.
5. Candidates are selected on the basis of technical qualifications. In the most
rational case, these qualifications are tested by examination, guaranteed by
diplomas certifying technical training, or both. Candidates are appointed,
not elected.
6. They are remunerated by fixed salaries in money, for the most part with a
right to pensions. Only under certain circumstances does the employing
authority, especially in private organizations, have a right to terminate the
appointment, but in addition to this criterion, the responsibility of the
position and the requirements of the incumbent’s social status may be taken
into account.
7. The office is treated as the sole, or at least the primary, occupation of the
incumbent.
8. The office constitutes a career. Promotion is based on seniority, achievement, or both and depends on the judgment of superiors.
9. Officials work entirely separated from ownership of the means of administration and without appropriation of their positions.
10. They are subject to strict and systematic discipline and control in the
conduct of the office. (p. 328)
Weber pointed out that bureaucratic organization may be applied equally
well in a number of different settings. Although the term bureaucracy is most
often applied to government agencies, this form of organization is also found in
business organizations, voluntary associations, and even religious institutions.
Bureaucratic organization is so attractive because it appears to be the most efficient approach to controlling the work of large numbers of people in pursuit of
given objectives. Weber (1947, pp. 333–334) put it this way: “Experience tends
universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type of administration … is,
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from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of
efficiency and is in this sense formally the most rational known means of carrying
out imperative control over human beings.” Because bureaucratic organization
provides exacting structures of authority within which commands may be transmitted, it allows a degree of “calculability of results” for those in positions of
authority (p. 337).
Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type of
administration is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the
highest degree of efficiency and is … the most rational known means of carrying
out imperative control over human beings.
—Max Weber
Expansion of Bureaucracy
Given the complexity of modern society, Weber saw the expansion of bureaucratic systems to all spheres of human activity as the single most important development in the modern world. Businesses, governments, churches, all seem to
organize around the same principles, which emphasize the exercise of authority
through hierarchical structures. This development, according to Weber, although
stimulated by the rise of capitalist systems, is not restricted to such systems.
Indeed, Weber noted that socialist systems may require an even higher degree
of bureaucratization than capitalist systems in order to provide a stable economic
life. “Bureaucratic administration is, other things being equal, always, from a formal, technical point of view, the most rational type. For the needs of mass
administration today, it is completely indispensable. The choice is only that
between bureaucracy and dilettantism in the field of administration” (Weber,
1947, p. 337).
It is difficult to determine whether Weber’s analysis of bureaucratic administration constitutes an endorsement of this mode of organization or whether his
presentation is more a warning of the inevitable consequences of increasing
bureaucratization. Herbert Marcuse (1968, pp. 223–224) has argued the former—
that Weber’s critical analysis ultimately turns into “apologetics” that are quite
favorable to the extension of capitalist domination through bureaucratic mechanisms. Marcuse sees in Weber a melding of formal and substantive rationality, in
the sense that the technical requirements of continued capitalist expansion come
to displace a concern for some larger concept of reason, such as that associated
with notions of freedom, justice, and equality. Most important is Marcuse’s argument that Weber sees the increasing rationalization of modern life as the “fate”
of modern human beings, thus implying its inevitability. Such a viewpoint strikes
Marcuse as excessively deterministic, failing to recognize that conditions that
have been socially and historically constructed can be reconstructed through
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reasoned and aggressive human action. For Weber to argue that the inevitable
future of mankind lies in our submission to rigid, disciplined, bureaucratic orders
hardly provides the impetus for efforts to work out a more satisfactory relationship between the individual and the organization.
Weber, however, was not unmindful of the negative consequences of
bureaucratic organization, either the complaints of red tape and inefficiency or
the more enduring sociological consequences of extended formalistic impersonality. Weber’s formulation may be read as an ideal type pointing out those features of the social landscape that uniquely influence the development of society,
both positively and negatively. In this respect, at least according to some analysts,
Weber was entertaining essentially the same question that occupied Marx: the
increasing limitation of the human spirit under conditions of rapidly expanding
bureaucratic regulation. However, Wolfgang J. Mommsen (1974), an observer
more sympathetic to Weber, argued that Weber was deeply worried about the
implications of modern industrial capitalism and its bureaucratic “iron cage.”
This cage would severely constrain human potential, and its pervasiveness and
power across all areas of social life would leave the individual with little space
and hope for changing things.
The only possible escape, in Weber’s work, from the pattern of increasing
social regulation lies in his hope that charismatic leaders might emerge in positions
to control the otherwise enduring systems of bureaucratic administration. The charismatic leader is one to whom followers have an emotional attachment, one with a
certain presence or ability to inspire followers to greater endeavors. But charismatic
leadership is not simply inspirational; it is creative as well. Such leadership provides a
spark that permits societies to grow and to develop. Indeed, it was Weber’s dream
that through the direct democratic choice of charismatic leaders, societies might
finally be able to transcend the limitations of bureaucratic regulation.
SIGMUND FREUD
Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) was among the first, and certainly the most wellknown, theorists to emphasize the notion of the unconscious in the pursuit of a
healthier mental attitude. But Freud did much more: He developed an understanding of the life of groups, organizations, and societies. We focus here on this
more global interpretation of Freud’s work; however, to comprehend this work,
we must start with some basic concepts of psychoanalysis.
The Conscious and Unconscious Minds
Earlier in this chapter, we saw how Marx showed that the world may not be as
simple as it may appear. Complex social processes may be driven by economic
relations that are out of sight or, because of the influence of dominant ideas, out
of mind. Without understanding these underlying relations, we do not understand our conditions as well as we might and are in a weak position to change
them. Freud’s discovery of the unconscious makes a similar claim: Though we
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may think our conscious mind, or ego, is in the driver’s seat, in fact, our waking
life is guided by unconscious desires and repressed memories that are, like Marx’s
economic base, out of sight and the conscious mind.
Freud’s psychoanalytic theory begins with the straightforward supposition
that the individual seeks certain pleasures or gratifications but that relatively few
of these wishes can be fulfilled. Individuals also often push bad memories or
unpleasant thoughts out of their conscious minds. There are many things we
would rather not think about. When the unfulfilled wishes and unpleasant
thoughts of the individual are denied, they are repressed into the unconscious,
where they remain hidden and unrecognizable but capable of great influence
over the individual’s development and everyday life.
The repression of wishes that cannot be fulfilled creates the greatest discomfort for us, and often they sabotage our own conscious wishes to lead happy and
fulfilling lives. Freud (1955) writes:
We have come to the conclusion, from working with hysterical patients
and other neurotics, that they have not fully succeeded in repressing the
idea to which the incompatible wish is attached. They have, indeed,
driven it out of consciousness and out of memory and apparently saved
themselves a great amount of psychic pain, but, in the unconscious, the
suppressed wish still exists, only waiting for its chance to become active,
and finally succeeds in sending into consciousness, instead of the
repressed idea, a disguised and unrecognizable surrogate-creation, to
which the same painful sensations associate themselves. (p. 27)
Freud’s point in this passage is worth drawing out more explicitly. He is saying
that the wishes and thoughts that we repress into the unconscious mind return
into our lives but they return in different forms, so we do not recognize them for
what they are.
Freudian psychoanalysis identifies several ways in which the conscious mind,
the ego, avoids or defends against these unconscious desires and makes them hard
to recognize. The ego may engage in displacement, which entails varying the
object choice by substituting a new choice for the original. For example, if you
have just had a discussion with your supervisor who has asked you to take on a
new project, you might be angry with her without realizing it, feeling that she
does not know how much you have on your plate already. When the phone rings
and your spouse asks you to pick up dinner on the way home, you get angry.
Here, you have “taken out” or displaced your anger about your supervisor onto
your spouse. Another way that the ego relates is through projection. This is when
we externalize an internal wish, desire, or feeling. A common form of projection is
when we put negative feelings or attitudes about ourselves onto another person
that we “just don’t like.” Frequently, organizational and public life is organized
around “others” or enemies. Though these projections can help to allay group or
individual anxiety, they can often lead to tragic consequences (Adams & Balfour,
2009, pp. 24–25).
A third technique is reaction formation in which we replace a desired object
with its opposite. This is evident in people who sometimes demonstrate patently
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hypocritical behavior, for example, public officials who have a record of being
against homosexual behavior but, later, might be shown to have engaged in precisely that behavior. Finally, there is fixation or regression. This involves stopping
development at a particular stage or, in fact, regressing to an earlier stage in our
personal development. A common form of regression is retreating into the
“child” position, which is often expressed as helplessness or the desire for someone else, such as a parent, to resolve or take care of difficult situation.
Though the unconscious is not visible or directly accessible, it leaves many
clues for us to investigate further, if we are alert enough to spot them. Spotting
and interpreting them is largely what the process of psychoanalytic therapy
involves—the investigation of clues revealed through the interaction between
patient and therapist. The relationship between the therapist and the patient is
initiated because the patient vaguely recognizes some personal problem. Often
they are in some kind of emotional pain or find their life to be affectively flat
and unfulfilling. But neither the therapist nor the patient knows exactly what
the problem is, much less its source or its likely cure. However, both can use
certain clues to begin to recover and discuss a portion of the patient’s life history
that has formerly been concealed. Other clues may emerge as the therapist develops an interpretation of the symbols provided in the patient’s dreams or in
free association. Still other clues may reveal themselves in the patient’s personal
peculiarities—behaviors such as forgetfulness and slips of the tongue. These clues
may be taken as symptomatic of certain conditions lying beneath the surface of
the patient’s behavior and conscious intentions.
The role of the therapist is to trace the symptoms revealed in the outer
world back to the repressions they represent in the inner world, then to work
with the patient toward a more satisfactory resolution than that provided by the
mechanisms of repression. The interpretation provided by the therapist, therefore, is designed to restore a part of the individual’s repressed history—to connect
the dots, so to speak, between the conscious mind and the unconscious—in such
a fashion that allows the patient to live their life in a less personally and interpersonally destructive manner.
Understanding the Behavior and Impact of Group Psychology
Although he concentrated initially on the therapeutic role of psychoanalysis, later
in his life Freud began to examine more closely the implications of his work for
understanding social groups and even entire cultural systems. In his work on
group psychology, Freud discussed the “unconscious life of the group”—those
patterns or relationships that lie beneath the surface of a group’s existence but
influence the work of that group in direct but often unexplainable ways. He
began by noting that the behavior of the group is often quite at odds with the
behavior one might expect from a collection of rational adults, appearing to be
based more on regressive, childlike impulses. Some primitive or instinctual force
seems to drive the group beyond the normal bounds of logic or explanation. The
“mind” of the group can be erratic, impulsive, chaotic, and confused. “A group
is extraordinarily credulous and open to influence, it has no critical faculty, and
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the improbable does not exist for it,” Freud (1955, p. 28) wrote. “It thinks in
images, which call one another up by association … and whose agreement
with reality is never checked by a reasonable function. The feelings of the
group are always very simple and very exaggerated, so that a group knows neither doubt nor uncertainty.”
Nowhere is the confusion of the group more apparent than in the relationship between the group and its leader. Members of groups are highly desirous of
leadership, hoping to find someone who can help them to achieve the fulfillment
of their desires; the leader is seen as one who can actualize the fantasy of the
group. But leaders and groups operate in an environment that is not theirs to
control, so the leader will inevitably be forced—by the realities of his or her
situation—to come up with either less or more than the group desires. Moreover, leaders often have their own ideas about the direction the work of the
group should take, and these ideas may not be at all consistent with the desires
of the group’s members. In either case, the leader inevitably fails in the eyes of
the group and thus (at least symbolically) earns their hatred. Leaders must then
live with the special guilt that the group assigns them, being at once the object of
the group’s envy as well as its scorn.
Freud himself illustrated the relationship between the leader and the group
through the “scientific myth” of the primal horde. This myth imagines a time
when a father ruled over several brothers who simultaneously respected and
feared their father. When their fear and hatred of their father became unbearable,
they banded together to murder him, an act that led to extraordinary guilt on
their part. After living for a while in a fatherless, leaderless world, one of the
brothers emerged as the leader, but only after assuming responsibility for the
murder of the father and correspondingly assuming a massive burden of guilt.
Of course, this myth contains an analogy to the individual’s struggle to overcome the influence of the father figure, the reality-enforcing authority in his or her
life. But we can also speculate that social groups and social organizations develop in
a similar way. As groups form in an attempt to control a part of the world around
them, whether the natural or the social world, they inevitably do damage to that
world, for which they must assume a certain amount of guilt. But as the leader of
the group begins to speak for and be identified with the group, the group members can shift their own guilt to the leader. Then, recognizing the evil of the leader
and the guilt the leader bears, the group can only recoil against him or her, thus
creating an inevitable tension between the leader and the group. As this tension is
repressed into the unconscious mind of the group, it creates patterns that are inexplicable on the surface but nonetheless control the group’s behavior.
Groups and organizations, in this view, appear as much more significant to
the personal and psychological development of the individual than might first
appear. Individuals use groups and organizations not only to accomplish established ends but also to serve as direct sources of need gratification—to provide
a sense of security, a defense against the vagaries of an uncertain world. “Many of
the organizations we invent, the controls we accept in everyday life, are not so
much constructive attempts to solve our problems as defenses against our own
lightly buried primitive impulses” (Rice, 1965, p. 84).
THE INTELLECTUAL HERITAGE 37
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This point is extremely important, for it suggests that complex organizations
can never be viewed apart from their role in the development of the individual.
The organization is not simply an instrument or a technique to be used by an
individual or a group and then passed on to someone else; rather, the group, the
organization, is itself integral to the development of the person—a direct purveyor
of influence and values, of hopes and aspirations, of dreams and desires. In turn,
the developmental processes of the individual are integral to the development of
the group and the organization. To neglect one is to neglect the other. The individual’s relationships to the group, the organization, and ultimately the society
itself are critical to an understanding of the human condition.
Individual Autonomy and Cultural Constraints
Freud was well aware of this, and in Civilization and Its Discontents (1961), he
directed his critical insights toward an examination of the impact of civilization
on the possibilities for human satisfaction. At its base, civilization implies constraint, the requirement that individuals give up a part of their own autonomy
and submit to the restrictions of the group. Although we recognize that we can
never be completely happy living a social life, we are attracted to the sense of
security and solidarity that the culture seems to provide. This creates a basic tension between the efforts of individuals to achieve some expression of their individuality and the efforts of the culture to achieve compliance and order. Freud
(1961, p. 43) indicated the pervasiveness of this tension: “A good part of the
struggles of mankind center round the single task of finding an expedient accommodation—one, that is, that will bring happiness—between this claim of the
individual [for autonomy] and the cultural claims of the group.”
A good part of the struggles of mankind center round the single task of finding an
expedient accommodation … between this claim of the individual [for autonomy]
and the cultural claims of the group.
—Sigmund Freud
As long as we live and work together, we cannot escape the ambivalence of
our relationship with our culture. Again, we find the juxtapositions of love and
hate, attraction and repulsion, which Freud discussed in terms of an instinct
toward life and an instinct toward destruction and self-destruction. We seek life
through civilization and the unity and continuity it represents. Freud (1961,
p. 69) remarked that our “inclination to aggression is an original, self-sustaining
instinctual disposition in man, and … it constitutes the greatest impediment to
civilization.” We are left with the conclusion that civilization represents a
massive struggle between conflicting forces in the human condition.
We can see, then, that social and organizational life presents a fundamental
paradox. As Marx put it, we are “suffering, conditioned, and limited creature[s],”
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dependent on the outside world for the satisfaction of our desires (Tucker, 1978,
p. 115). Moreover, our primary sense of self and its place in the world are not
freely chosen but also come from outside us through our parents, teachers, and
early childhood experiences. In a basic sense, then, who we are and what we
desire actually are delivered onto us by others. Yet at the same time, we long
for something that is uniquely and singularly ours. However, as Freud pointed
out, our culture, it seems, can only thwart this desire, limiting our freedom and
independence. Consequently, we face an increasingly restrictive social world,
one that provides the outward symbols of status and reward but at the same
time prevents expressions of our individuality. For us to grow as individuals
requires that we act creatively to mold the world to our desires and, ultimately,
that we transcend the limitations of that world and the identities imposed on us.
But the creative expression of the individual personality is exactly what our organizational society seems to fear most. And as Freud’s discussion of the development of groups suggests, it is not only the individual that suffers in this process
but our organizations and society as a whole as well.
WHAT CAN WE LEARN?
How might we be guided in our study of public organizations by the insights of
Marx, Weber, and Freud? Certainly, any commentary their works might provide
would be indirect, for the study of public organizations was hardly the central
task of any of the three. However, from their collective work may be derived
certain insights that can enable us to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the role of public organizations in our lives. In the work of Marx, Weber,
and Freud, we begin to see some common themes that may guide our own
study of life in public organizations—hints at a view of public organizations
that puts our involvement in such organizations into perspective.
Clearly, all three theorists see the primary task of modern man as one of finding an effective relationship between the individual and the society. More specifically, given the complexity and the consequent rationalization of society, Marx,
Weber, and Freud depict the individual as engaged in a struggle with the forces
of organization in society, especially those forces represented by large and complex
bureaucracies, both public and private. The study of public organizations in this
book involves a similar analysis, although different terms may be used to describe
the relationship between the individual and the organization—terms such as management styles and client relationships. We too must try to place in perspective the
crucial relationship of the individual, the organization, and the society.
The central message of Marx, Weber, and Freud for our study may be that,
more than anything else today, we need a perspective for understanding the
world and our place in it—a perspective cognizant of the impact of complex
organizations on our lives yet not bound by it. Perhaps they intended to argue
exactly this—that our personal and collective survival depends on our developing
both a basic intelligence and a sense of compassion as we live and work in a
society of large and complex organizations.
THE INTELLECTUAL HERITAGE 39
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Our personal and collective survival depends on our developing both a basic
intelligence and a sense of compassion as we live and work in a society of large
and complex organizations.
Controlling Our Environment
Why would we want to develop such a perspective? What purposes might be
served by our acquiring such knowledge? One reason might be to control our
physical or our social environment to our own advantage. For example, we seek
knowledge of energy sources in order to provide heat, to protect ourselves
against one of the threats that our environment presents. We seek knowledge
of weather conditions and drainage patterns in low-lying areas in order to protect
ourselves against another threat. Similarly, if we know how people will react to
certain situations that we can change, we can begin to alter their behavior. For
example, if we know that an individual’s motivation to work is affected by
enhanced prestige, we can behave in such a way as to produce a result. In this
case, we seek knowledge to explain causal relationships, to predict outcomes, and
to control behavior. Indeed, this kind of control can bring to us both material
and psychological satisfaction.
Seeking knowledge for purposes of control means that we are most interested in instrumental statements—statements that suggest the proper means
toward a given end. If our objective is to achieve greater production, we want
to know what steps we can take to lead to that result. This knowledge, of
course, does little to tell us which objectives we should be seeking unless those
objectives are conceived simply as means themselves toward some larger objective; but such knowledge can be used effectively in moving toward already
established goals or objectives.
Finally, the analyses of Marx and Freud pose important questions for the
relationship between knowledge and control. As they both argue, what appear
to be self-evident, “rational” ends may often be pursued in the advance of some
other purpose. People in organizations, for instance, often pursue unconscious
desires even as they purport to act rationally, and as we will consider in Chapter 5,
humanistic approaches to organizational life that seek to enhance worker satisfaction can also serve the ends of more subtle managerial and technical control.
In turn, this prompts each of us, again, to ask about which objectives we are
asked to pursue in organizations and how those objectives were decided upon.
Interpreting the Intentions of Others
Control, however, is not the only purpose served by knowledge. We may also
seek knowledge in order to understand or interpret the intentions of others. In
this view, we comprehend the actions of individuals as having specific meanings
to those individuals and as being based on those meanings—that is, we find that
all action occurs within the framework of the intentions of individual actors.
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To understand what is happening in any situation, we must not only observe the
behavior of the individual but also understand the motives or intentions that support the individual’s action. Some theorists use the term behavior to refer to what
can be observed from the outside and the term action to refer to what is intended
by the individual. In such a formulation, it is clear that an individual’s behavior as
viewed by others can be far different from what he or she intends. Recall our
discussion of John and Carol in Chapter 1, in which we noted that our perspective significantly affects our perceptions.
If we wish to understand the intentions of others, the meanings they attach
to certain activities, we must do more than describe their behavior. We must
interpret their actions; that is, we must seek to understand their intentions in
acting. We seek interpretive statements, those that allow us to comment on the
meaning and significance people place on their actions. We ask, what was the
point? What was he or she trying to do? Through the act of interpretation, we
achieve understanding. Interpretation allows us to reconstruct the individual’s
own outlook on the world. To understand a person is to know the meaning or
significance that he or she attaches to events, and such understanding is not possible without engaging in dialogue and conversation with that person. Knowledge in this sense, then, requires openness to the views and interpretations of
others as well as an effort to understand the fields of practice that others live
and make sense of their work in.
Freeing Ourselves from Limiting Perspectives
We may seek knowledge for still another purpose—to free ourselves from patterns
of thought and action that we have come to accept, perhaps to depend on, even
though these patterns do not reflect our true needs or interests. Knowledge of this
type allows us to exceed the limitations that “reality” imposes on us and to see the
opportunities that the future presents. In this view, our lives are seen to be dependent on the acceptance of a particular view of the world, a “reality” that we take to
be natural and unchanging but that is, in fact, the result of a social process by which
we have come to believe in its truth. Now, if this process has been biased in some
way, so that we focus on one set of events or interpretations instead of another, we
may be restricted in the range of possible actions that appear open to us. Particularly
where a certain definition of reality has been imposed on us by those in positions of
control—that is, where we simply assume the dominant view (the view of the
dominant)—we will indeed be misled. We will see our possibilities as quite limited
when, in fact, they may be quite broad. We may be so taken in by our beliefs that
we no longer recognize them as beliefs or no longer recognize their source and are
therefore subjected to the most extreme form of control—control that is not even
recognized by those being controlled.
Ralph Hummel’s book The Bureaucratic Experience (2007) is an especially useful
and accessible overview of the problems raised by a “society reduced to organization, culture reduced to economics, psychology reduced to identity, language
reduced to information, thinking reduced to logic, and politics to administration”
(p. xx). In a society increasingly dominated by instrumental bureaucratic structures,
THE INTELLECTUAL HERITAGE 41
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whether in government, business, and elsewhere, we live out our lives constrained
by the forces of rationality and instrumentalism. We find freedom and reason
increasingly difficult to obtain. Moreover, citizens are not only limited in their
capacity to affect positive change, they are also subject to a new way of thinking,
a new psyche, that places restrictions on human possibilities. Particularly compelling is Hummel’s discussion of the way in which bureaucracy destroys human language, again limiting the possibility for exploring new modes of political
expression and indeed avenues for escape from the possibility of greater oppression.
In a telling phrase, Hummel writes, “Bureaucracy leaves us speechless” (p. 236).
In their book, Unmasking Administrative Evil (2009, pp. 33–34), Adams and
Balfour make the related point that the modern emphasis on instrumental rationality “exacerbates tendencies toward compliance—and administrative evil—in groups
and organizations …” by socializing humans to use their knowledge for narrow,
technical questions and to leave ethical and normative questions about what we
are doing and why we are doing it to people in positions of authority. In this culture, it becomes permissible to harm others so long as someone in authority assumes
responsibility. They point to the abuses in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and the
U.S. use of torture in the “war on terror” as contemporary expressions of this
culture. Like Hummel, Adams and Balfour see this narrow concern knowledge
for the aims of instrumental control as an impoverished and even dangerous basis
for professional public service that leaves us speechless.
Critical knowledge, on the other hand, allows us to broaden our perspectives,
to see more of the complexity of the conditions that constrain us, and in turn to
explore possibilities for expressing our own potential. As Freud instructs us, such
knowledge permits a more complete self-understanding—the basis for selftransformation; as Marx instructs us, such knowledge permits a clearer comprehension of social conditions and opens the possibility of social change. In either case,
the knowledge we acquire through critical self-reflection not only permits but
indeed compels action in the direction of greater autonomy and responsibility.
CONCLUSION
There are, therefore, various reasons we might wish to acquire knowledge and
various uses we might make of instrumental, interpretive, and critical studies. In
later chapters, we will find that each of these three perspectives is reflected in an
approach to practical and scientific understanding, and that these approaches
direct our attention in different ways. For now, the lesson that we learn from
Marx, Weber, and Freud is that appearances mask realities no less than realities
mask appearances. What seems to be objective reality may be misleading and,
when penetrated, may reveal conditions that we find extremely limiting, both
to ourselves and to our society. More important, we learn that modern societies
encourage us to view the world in instrumental terms and to see other human
beings as mere means to organizational or political ends. To resist such a view is
very difficult but at the same time very important. Under these conditions, what
guidance would we wish from theories of public organization?
42 CHAPTER 2
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DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
1. Why is it important for those interested in public administration to address
broad social and cultural issues such as those raised by Marx, Weber, and
Freud?
2. In Chapter 1, we presented the “Ken Welch” case. How would you analyze
this case from a Marxist perspective?
3. How would you analyze the same case from a Weberian perspective?
4. How would you analyze the same case from a Freudian perspective?
5. Ideas make a difference in how we view and interpret the world. What
are some of the contemporary social and cultural issues that bear on our
understanding of public administration?
6. Some scholars of organizations today contend that we have entered a
“post-bureaucratic” world dominated by networks and collaboration.
How can the ideas of Marx, Freud, and Weber be applied to this view?
CASES
1. Sam Maxwell has accepted a job as manager of a human resource department in a federal agency. One of the first things he does is to review the
agency’s organizational chart. After three months, he returns to the chart and
realizes that the way the chart says the organization works appears to bear
little resemblance to how it actually does. How can he reconcile these very
different impressions?
2. Amiko Sanders has experienced a great deal of frustration since assuming her
job as a management analyst in the Department of State. Everything seems
so structured and “top-down” that there’s little room for creativity—and the
problems she is facing could sure use a dose of creativity. She’s talked with
her boss, who just says, “Hang in there.” While Amiko is committed to
public service, she’s beginning to wonder whether working in a large
organization is right for her. What advice would you give? What advice
do you think Marx or Freud would give?
REFERENCES AND ADDITIONAL READINGS
Adams, Guy B., & Balfour, Danny L. (2009). Unmasking administrative evil. Third ed.
Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe.
Freud, Sigmund. (1955). The origin and development of psychoanalysis. Chicago: Regnery
(Originally published 1910).
Freud, Sigmund. (1961). Civilization and its discontents (James Strachey, Trans.). New
York: Norton (Originally published 1930).
THE INTELLECTUAL HERITAGE 43
Copyright 2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. Due to electronic rights,
some third party content may be suppressed from the eBook and/or eChapter(s). Editorial Review has deemed that any suppressed content does not materially
affect the overall learning experience. Cengage Learning reserves the right to remove additional content at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it.
Giddens, Anthony. (1947). Capitalism and modern social theory. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Hirshhorn, Larry. (1997). Reworking authority: Leading and following in the post-modern
organization. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Hummel, Ralph. (2007). The bureaucratic experience: The post-modern challenge. Fifth ed.
Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Marcuse, Herbert. (1968). Industrialism and capitalism in the work of Max Weber. In
Negations: Essays in critical theory (Jeremy J. Shapiro, Trans.), pp. 201–26. Boston:
Beacon.
McLellan, David (Ed.). (2000). Karl Marx: Selected writings. Second ed. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Mommsen, Wolfgang J. (1974). The age of bureaucracy. New York: Harper & Row.
Rice, A. K. (1965). Learning for leadership. London: Tavistock.
Smith, Adam. (1976). An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press (Originally published 1776).
Stivers, Camilla. (2008). Governance in dark times: Practical philosophy for public service.
Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Tucker, Robert C. (Ed.). (1978). The Marx–Engels reader. New York: W.W. Norton.
Weber, Max. (1930). The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism (Talcott Parsons, Trans.).
London: Allen & Unwin (Originally published 1905).
Weber, Max. (1947). The theory of social and economic organization (Talcott Parsons, Trans.).
New York: Oxford University Press (Originally published 1915).
Weber, Max. (1947). The theory of social and economic organization (translated by
A M Henderson and Talcott Parsons). New York: The Free Press.
44 CHAPTER 2
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3
The Political Heritage
From Wilson to Waldo
I
f public organizations are by definition committed to the pursuit of publicly defined
societal values, their members carry a special burden that others do not—that they
should always act in keeping with democratic norms. Whether they assist in the development of public purposes or facilitate their achievement, members must always be
attentive to those values that give public organizations their distinctive character.
Public administrators, in this view, must help to ensure that the central political commitments of the society are extended, and they must do this in part by the example of
their own work. For these reasons, the study of public administration must embrace
not only social theory but also political theory, an understanding of the ways in which
public organizations contribute to the growth of a democratic society.
Curiously enough, although such a political theory of public organizations
would seem to be the single most important topic for students of public organizations to consider, concerns other than those we normally associate with democratic political theory have historically been given precedence. Issues of freedom
and justice, equality, and participation have often taken a backseat to issues of
efficiency, technique, and control. Even so, a political theory of public organizations has been constructed, perhaps as much by default as by design.
This was the significant message in Dwight Waldo’s perceptive work The
Administrative State (1948). In this book, Waldo proposed to trace the development of the field of public administration from the perspective of political theory
and the history of ideas. He later reflected further (1965):
Looking closely at the literature of public administration through the
lens of Political Theory, it seemed to me plainly true that, paradoxically,
45
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it had a matrix of political theory: paradoxically because those producing
the literature frequently, characteristically, presumed or stated that they
were getting away from mere pleasant cloudgazing and were addressing
themselves directly to the world of facts and the hard, important
business of how modern government does and should perform its
functions. (p. 6)
As viewed by Waldo, the early writers commented on such highly theoretical questions as the good life, criteria for public action, and who should rule.
They were confronted with questions that had important theoretical implications, and their answers constituted a form of political theory—a political theory
of public organizations. Indeed, as Waldo argued, political theory is perhaps the
most important of our age, for it specifies the commitments that we are willing
to make in the conduct of public affairs in an organizational society.
The early writings on public administration not only constituted a political theory of public organizations but also set a tone for later work in the field of public
administration. By virtue of what was included or excluded by the early writers,
public administration and its relationship to the larger political system were defined.
For this reason, an examination of the works of the early writers and their influence
on administrative theory and practice will provide us with a better sense of the central metaphors that continue to guide our understanding of public organizations.
BEGINNINGS OF PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION THEORY
As Jos Raadschelders (2003, p. 3) has aptly written, “Government and governance
are as old as the human race.” Perhaps for equally as long, the people involved in
the affairs of governing have reflected upon their work and offered accounts of
how to govern better (Farazmand, 2002; Gladden, 1972). This was especially so
for city-states of Greece and the vast empires of the Romans, Byzantines, Hans,
Umayyad Caliphates, Mayans, and Persians, to name only a few. These cultures
developed an extensive and sophisticated understanding of how to govern
complex institutions and societies. The emergence of a more formal, systematic
inquiry into administration was slower to come. This systematic inquiry did not
appear until sometime in later part of the sixteenth century in Europe and
around the same time as the modern conception of the territorially bounded,
centralized state began to coalesce (Dean, 2010, pp. 102–116; Raadschelders,
2011, pp. 13–19). The systematic, formal study of administration—with aspirations
to becoming a “science”—made further advances at the end of the nineteenth
century as rather new kind of government evolved to address the unique challenges
of modern industrial society (Raadschelders, 2003).
46 CHAPTER 3
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In the context of the development of public organizations in the United
States, even before the formal study of public administration emerged, many theorists and practitioners also had commented on the role of administrative agencies
in performing the work of the American state. Most noteworthy in the early days
of the American history were the viewpoints expressed by Alexander Hamilton
and Thomas Jefferson. Hamilton’s administrative theory, as expressed in the
Federalist papers and later exemplified in his own career as a member of the executive branch, argued on behalf of a strong national government with considerable
power residing in the executive. Leonard White (1948a, p. 510) describes this
position as growing directly from certain elitist tendencies among the Federalists
generally: “The Federalist preference for the executive branch was a faithful reflection of their distrust of the people. An intelligent perception of sound public
policy, in their view, could come only from well-educated men of affairs, men
with trained minds and broad experience—in short from the upper classes.”
But Hamilton also preferred executive prerogative on the grounds of administrative principle. In this view, action, to be effective, must have clear direction,
and such direction can come from only one source, a unified executive. Whereas
dissent and discussion are important in legislative deliberations, the executive
branch cannot function effectively without unity of command—one final arbitrator whose decisions will be accepted by all. Moreover, a single executive can
be held responsible for his or her actions; a single center of power means a single
center of responsibility. This preference for a strong national executive did not
prevent Hamilton from envisioning some decentralization at the state and local
levels; however, it did clearly indicate a certain structure of administration at the
national level (Ostrom, 1973, pp. 81–88).
In contrast, Jefferson saw the problem of administration and organization as
directly connected to the problem of extending the notion of democracy. Lynton
Caldwell (1944, pp. 23–30) points out two fundamental principles central to
Jefferson’s administrative theory: “Government must be decentralized to the extent
that each citizen may personally participate in the administration of public affairs
and … government must serve to school the people in political wisdom and must
train a self-reliant citizenry.” In contrast to the wide discretion of the executive
proposed by Hamilton, Jefferson argued on behalf of strict legal and constitutional
limits on the power of the executive branch—limits that would ensure the responsibility of officials. Although it is certainly possible to describe the Jeffersonians as
confirming rather than denying the Federalist view of the national administrative
system in practice, it is also true that Jefferson’s views set a tone or spirit that was to
influence significantly the development of public organizations over the years.
Indeed, one might argue that the essentials of the Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian
views underlie important conflicts in public administration theory today.
Extending Democracy
Although there were certainly important developments in public administration
on the ground as the American state and society were transformed over the
next century or so by the forces of industrialization, democratization and military
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conflict (Bensel, 1990, 2000; Larson, 2001; Novak, 2008; Skowronek, 1982).
However, the modern, disciplinary, and self-conscious study of public administration did not emerge until the late 1800s, and when it did, it was very clearly a
reflection of the particular character of the political system at that time. During
this period, the Jeffersonian commitment to democracy was quite strong, perhaps
even stronger than the Founding Fathers (certainly Hamilton) had intended. As a
consequence, a highly decentralized view of government had developed.
Though often subjected to the capricious politics of state legislatures that viewed
them as administrative units (Goodnow, 1895), local governments—including
cities, counties, and special districts—retained considerable autonomy in their
operations. The various branches of government were also separated from one
another—for example, through elected rather than appointed judgeships—and
were consequently able to act with some independence. Although attractive for
many reasons, such a view also led to problems. Too often, autonomy became
arrogance, insulation became isolation, and independence became caprice. Lubricated by the remaining influence of the spoils system, government was not only
dispersed but disorganized and sometimes even downright dishonest.
Early students of American public administration were basically reformers
bent on restoring a sense of decency to public government. But, in a larger
sense, they saw their mission as extending democracy, as demonstrating that
democracy could be maintained under modern conditions. These writers, either
explicitly or implicitly, were political theorists, engaged in the theoretical task of
outlining a workable democratic system. For this reason, many early statements
make reference to the importance of normative issues in the study of public
administration. For example, Leonard D. White (1948b, p. 10), whose Introduction to the Study of Public Administration was for many years the standard textbook
in the field, remarked that “the study of public administration … needs to be
related to the broad generalizations of political theory concerned with such matters as justice, liberty, obedience, and the role of the state in human affairs.” At
the same time, these writers were practical people concerned with establishing
specific mechanisms that would enable them to respond to the increasingly
urbanized technological society in which they found themselves. To engage in
a more formal study of the growing administrative operations of government
might be one way in which this objective could be met.
Wilson’s “Businesslike” Approach
The general tenor of such a study of public administration was set in an essay by
Woodrow Wilson (1887). Wilson argued that students of politics prior to that
time had been largely preoccupied with constitutional questions and had ignored
the active operations of government agencies. But, especially with the growth of
government, these operations were becoming both visible and troublesome. For
this reason, Wilson argued, “it is getting harder to run a constitution than to
frame one” (p. 200). As part of the new study of public administration that he
endorsed, Wilson suggested that stable principles of administrative management,
“businesslike” principles, should be permitted to guide the operations of public
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agencies. “The field of administration is a field of business” (p. 209). In order to
achieve some measure of efficiency in the operations of government, Wilson
suggested, we should look to the private sector for models of administrative
management.
This latter supposition arose in large part from the experience of business
organizations during this period and from the general thrust of research into scientific management in business. The study of business administration had developed somewhat earlier in a society of rapidly expanding business and
corporations, characterized by extreme managerial prerogatives and vast social
influence. Moreover, in keeping with the emerging scientism of the age, business
fully embraced technology, applying it not only to machines but also to human
beings. The development of the vast, transcontinental railroad network, for
example, represented for many both a technological and managerial marvel.
Given this, it is not accidental that early business organizations were built like
machines; the machine is the epitome of efficiency and was therefore considered
the appropriate model for human organizations as well as for production. These
features easily carried over into the public sector.
From the field of business, Wilson drew the lesson that administrative efficiency as well as administrative responsibility would be enhanced through the
establishment of single centers of power controlling basically hierarchical structures. In Wilson’s view, and in the view of many others who wrote in the early
period, governmental power needed to take on a more integrated and centralized structure. According to Wilson, the responsibility for public action should
be located in a single authority in order to ensure trustworthiness and efficient
operations. Wilson saw no real problem with the possible inconsistency of this
view with democratic norms of decentralization and public participation. To
the contrary, he wrote, “There is no danger in power, if only it be not irresponsible; … if it be centered in heads of the service and in heads of branches of the
service, it is easily watched and brought to book” (pp. 213–214).
One might, of course, question whether the traditional business interest in
productive efficiency achieved through hierarchical organization is so easily
transferable to the public sector, distinguished as it is by more ambiguous purposes, more pluralistic decision-making processes, and the necessity of public
oversight. Yet Wilson’s view was clear: in pursuit of democracy, government
must follow the model of business, even where it appears nondemocratic. As
Waldo (1948, p. 200) was later to summarize the developing orthodoxy of the
period following Wilson’s work: “The means and measurements of efficiency
it was felt and strongly stated, were the same for all administrations: democracy,
if it were to survive, could not afford to ignore the lessons of centralization,
hierarchy, and discipline.”
For administrative agencies to work efficiently and in a businesslike manner,
it was necessary to insulate them from the vagaries of the political process. This
view was the basis for Wilson’s well-known distinction between politics and
administration: “Administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are not political questions. Although politics sets the tasks for
administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices” (1887, p. 210).
THE POLITICAL HERITAGE 49
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In the realm of politics, issues were to be debated and decisions about the direction of public policy were to be made; in the realm of administration, policies
were to be implemented by a neutral and professional bureaucracy. Through this
distinction, Wilson felt, we could achieve a proper balance between democratic
responsiveness and administrative competence. In Wilson’s work, we find two
prominent themes that have served as a focus for the study of public administration throughout most of its history: the supposed distinction between politics (or
policy) and administration and the search for scientific principles of administrative
management that would assist in attaining organizational efficiency. As we will
see, even today, these issues continue to be central to the mainstream or orthodox interpretation of public administration.
Administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are
not political questions. Although politics sets the tasks for administration, it should
not be suffered to manipulate its offices.
—Woodrow Wilson
POLITICS–ADMINISTRATION
An examination of early trends in the study of public administration reveals two
interesting although somewhat contradictory streams of thought. There is the view
that public administration is made distinctive by its relationship to the governmental
process and that this relationship requires that special attention be paid to such normative concerns as justice, freedom, and responsibility. There is also the view that
after decisions are made in a democratic manner, their implementation depends on
the same managerial techniques employed in private industry. The eventual ascendancy of the latter viewpoint is represented by the politics–administration dichotomy, whose symbolic importance cannot be overemphasized.
As is often the case, however, the symbol somewhat exceeds the reality.
Many who have commented on the earliest writings in public administration
have placed far too much emphasis on the politics–administration dichotomy as
a key to the early theoretical writings. For example, Howard McCurdy (1977,
p. 19) described it as “the holy writ of American public administration.” True
enough, the politics–administration dichotomy was mentioned by a number of
early writers. Yet it was hardly “holy writ.” Moreover, the dichotomy was never
as sharply drawn as many later commentators like to believe.
Especially at the local level, where the council–manager form of government assigned the policy role to the council and the administrative role to the
city manager, a fairly sharp distinction seemed to be proposed. Yet, even here,
areas of responsibility often overlapped. Surprisingly, the interaction of politics
and administration actually characterizes two formal works usually cited as advocating a strict politics–administration dichotomy: Frank Goodnow’s Policy and
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Administration (1900) and W. F. Willoughby’s The Government of Modern States
(1936), both of which take a more carefully reasoned position than is generally
attributed to them. In fact, Goodnow’s argument can be read as fundamentally
opposed to the separation of governmental functions into the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.
Reconciling Theory and Reality
Goodnow’s book is first of all a critique of the formalist view of government,
which holds that the study of the Constitution or other legal requirements is
sufficient to understand the operations of government actors. To the contrary
he argues, the strict separation of powers contained in the U.S. Constitution
has been violated many times and for good reason and, moreover, some of the
central institutions of American government do not appear in the Constitution.
Specifically, the theory of assigning to the legislature the role of making policy
and to the executive the role of carrying it out is not reflected in the actual practice of government. Political parties and the Supreme Court’s power of judicial
review are nowhere described in the Constitution. Therefore, it is appropriate to
rethink the formal theory of separation of powers so that our theory might more
closely match our practice and, practically, provide the means for addressing
pressing problems of modern industrial society.
True enough, as Goodnow points out, it is possible to distinguish, for analytical purposes, those operations of the state that are essential to the “expression
of its will” and those necessary to the “execution of that will” (p. 15). Politics is
concerned with the expression of the will of the state in policies; administration
is concerned with the execution of that will. But, “while the two primary functions of government are susceptible to differentiation, the organs of government
to which the discharge of these functions is entrusted cannot be clearly defined”
(p. 16). Although one organ of government, the legislature, is primarily concerned with expressing the will of the state, it is not the only organ of government to do so, nor does that activity preclude its acting as well to affect the
execution of that will. Similarly, agents of the government charged with executing the will of the state often have enough discretionary power that they may be
said to express the will of the state.
Goodnow’s comments on the relationship between central and local government responsibilities are also instructive. He notes that legislative centralization is often accompanied by administrative decentralization. In such cases, the
local administrative agency may “change the will of the state as expressed by
the body representing the state as a whole and so adapt it to what are believed
to be the needs of the local community” (p. 50). Although Goodnow specifically
recommends somewhat greater administrative centralization (accompanied by
greater legislative autonomy for local governments), his analysis of this point is
again in direct contrast to a strict separation of politics and administration. His
point is clear: the formal legal bases for the division of governmental responsibilities, both horizontally and vertically, are substantially altered by governmental
practice.
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Extending the Branches of Government
Many of the same comments apply to W. E Willoughby’s examination of the various functions of government. In an earlier book (Willoughby & Willoughby
1891, p. 42), he commented that “the duties of the executive are to enforce and
apply the laws of the nation after they are made by the legislature and interpreted
by the courts.” However, by the time of his 1919 text (revised 1936), Willoughby
recognizes certain difficulties in this position. Here he contends that there are not
just three branches of government, as generally conceived, but instead five classes
of governmental powers: the legislative, judicial, executive, electorate, and administrative branches. In addition to the three traditional branches, Willoughby argues,
the electorate should be recognized because the source of authority in a democracy
shifts from the ruler to the people. Also, the electorate has its own “definite and
distinguishable functions” (1936, p. 217). Similarly, the administrative branch
should be recognized, since there is a “difference between the function of seeing
that laws are enforced and that of actually doing things the law[s] call for” (p. 219).
To Willoughby, “the executive function is essentially political, [and] the administrative function is concerned with putting into effect … policies as determined by
the other organs” (p. 220). While arguing against the traditional separation of
powers, Willoughby does recognize a distinction between policy-making and
policy-executing activities, although that distinction is not absolute.
“A Seamless Web of Discretion and Action”
A similar acknowledgment of the difficulty of separating politics and administration, though one with quite a different tone, is found in Luther Gulick’s essay
“Politics, Administration, and the New Deal” (1933). Gulick bases his argument
on the range of discretion held by administrators in carrying out legislative mandates. To Gulick, “every act [of the public employee] is a seamless web of discretion and action” (p. 561). Although the amount of discretion varies within
agencies, discretion is exercised from the top of the organization to the bottom.
Even those who deal directly with the public must exercise considerable discretion on occasion, although Gulick notes that this situation occurs more often in
“badly organized and poorly directed administrative units” (p. 562). In any case,
Gulick sees administrative flexibility as being increasingly important.
Every act [of the public employee] is a seamless web of discretion and action.
—Luther Gulick
Beyond the era of spoils politics, during which efforts to distance administration from the corruption and inefficiency of politics were appropriate, Gulick feels
that the government of the future will assume important new roles. The national
government will become a super holding company, “devising and imposing a
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consistent master plan of national life” (p. 566). Such a highly organized society
would provide little opportunity for citizen involvement. According to Gulick,
“the success of the operation of democracy must not be made to depend upon
extended or continuous political activity by citizens nor upon unusual knowledge
or intelligence to deal with complicated questions” (p. 558). Apparently, in the
organized, administered world of the future, the politics–administration dichotomy
will be resolved by giving administrators power once held by citizens.
The Interaction of Policy and Administration
A more persuasive practical and theoretical understanding of politics and administration is presented in Leonard White’s classic text Introduction to the Study of Public
Administration (1948b). While acknowledging that a certain separation of policy
and administration is implicit in his definition of public administration, White
also recognizes the interaction between the two spheres. He finds particularly
noteworthy an increasing trend toward “executive initiative in public policy,”
which occurs both as administrators exercise discretion in carrying out vague or
general legislation and as the advice and counsel of permanent civil servants are
sought in the development of policy recommendations. Importantly, White points
out the special advantage of employing administrative personnel in policy formulation, recognizing that their impartiality and technical skill may equip them to
make especially good recommendations. At one point, White even comments
that bureaucrats may be in the best position to make policy: “Administration
may be the best-equipped branch of government to make genuinely public policy
free from overwhelming favoritism to one particular pressure group” (p. 13).
Although this point is not elaborated and specific mechanisms for enhancing
the policy potential of the bureaucracy are not explored, White does open the
possibility that “democratic administration” might parallel “democratic policy,”
presumably overlapping with each other in many instances.
Administrators as Significant Policy Actors
In any case, the emerging orthodoxy—that administrators are fully implicated in
the policy process—was summarized in the late 1940s in a series of lectures by
Paul H. Appleby. Appleby (1949) begins by noting the tendency of many academicians and practitioners to view policy and administration as separate activities and, in turn, to see administrators as having little or no policy-making role.
To the contrary, Appleby argues, administrators are significant policy actors who
influence the policy-making process in several ways, most importantly in the
exercise of administrative discretion: “Administrators are continually laying
down rules for the future, and administrators are continually determining what
the law is, what it means in terms of action” (p. 7). In addition, administrators
also influence policy through recommendations to the legislature. As a result,
according to Appleby, “public administration is policymaking” (p. 170). What
is perhaps most distinctive about Appleby’s formulation, however, is his philosophical tone—for administrators to be involved in making policy is perfectly
THE POLITICAL HERITAGE 53
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appropriate in a democratic society, where “there is always more of politics”
(p. 27). Such involvement is to be expected in a democratic society, but it does
raise again the need to examine the relationship between administrative action
and democratic governance.
THE LINGERING INFLUENCE OF
POLITICS–ADMINISTRATION
A reading of Goodnow’s and Willoughby’s original formulations of the distinction between politics and administration indicates that their treatment is far less
rigid than many, even now, have assumed. Both, in fact, argue against the formal, legal view that government operations follow the constitutional separation
of powers into the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. In contrast,
Goodnow and Willoughby argue that the relationship between such governmental functions as policy making and policy execution is much more complex
than was previously realized. They are indeed preoccupied with the relationship
between politics and administration, but they are not preoccupied with the distinction between politics and administration. The role of the bureaucracy
throughout the policy-making process was soon not only recognized but also
emphasized. One might well wonder, then, how the politics–administration
dichotomy gained its remarkable symbolic power and, even more to the point,
how it continues to guide the study of public administration.
Limiting the Field
In our view, there are three reasons for the continuing influence of politics–
administration. The first two derive from an interesting and very important
shift in administrative studies that occurred with Willoughby’s 1927 text, Principles of Public Administration. Where earlier studies had seen administration as a
function that occurs within various governmental settings, including the legislature and the judiciary, Willoughby defines the study of public administration as
concerned with the “operations of the administrative branch only” (p. 1). This
distinction is extremely important in at least two ways. First, attaching administration to a particular institution, a particular branch of government, does in fact
imply a politics–administration dichotomy, at least to the extent of saying that
administration can be studied apart from the political process. Second, as Marshall Dimock (1936a, 1936b) soon pointed out, such an approach confirms an
interpretation of administrative studies as concerned only with improving the
managerial efficiency of highly structured organizations.
Despite or perhaps because of these features—features that are examined more
closely a little later in this chapter—the shift from a process or functional definition
of public administration to an institutional view was soon confirmed. A very influential text by Simon, Smithburg, and Thompson contains the following statement
(1950, p. 7): “By public administration is meant, in common usage, the activities
of the executive branches of national, state, and local governments; independent
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boards and commissions set up by Congress and state legislatures; government corporations; and certain other agencies of a specialized character.” Subsequent texts
did not focus so distinctly on the executive branch but did make it clear that government employees or government agencies were their primary concern. For most
purposes, public administration came to be government administration, mainly the
operations of the executive branch.
Beginning with Willoughby’s institutional definition of public administration,
we find a confirmation of the politics–administration dichotomy without any discussion of it. All the academic and practical discussions of the issue during the first half
of the twentieth century pointed out the interdependence of policy and administration. Many writings were serious and sustained attacks on the supposed dichotomy.
As a theoretical matter, the politics–administration dichotomy was soon dead
(although it is perhaps more accurate to say that it had never been alive). As a practical matter, however, because Willoughby and later writers directed their works to
the practical problems of a specific audience—administrative personnel—the politics–administration dichotomy lived on in an institutional definition of public
administration. And to the extent that public administration is still defined in institutional terms, the dichotomy survives and remains an issue of debate and dispute.
In one such exchange, James Svara (2001) argues for an alternative interpretation of the politics and administration dichotomy, one based on “complementarily.”
This model suggests that politicians and administrators must join together in pursuit
of sound governance. “Complementarity recognizes the interdependence and reciprocal influence between elected officials and administrators …, (who) maintain distinct roles based on their unique perspectives and values and the differences in their
formal positions, but the functions they perform necessarily overlap” (p. 179).
Michael Harmon (2006) objects, contending that the politics–administration dichotomy is not merely the result of differing role and perspectives on the part of elected
officials and administrators but contains a theoretical flaw, an excessive dependence
on “dualisms” (i.e., value and fact, theory and practice, thinking and doing, etc.),
which must be corrected if the field is to advance. For Harmon, the question of
who is involved in politics and policy making is not the issue. Everyone agrees that
administrators are involved in politics and policy making. Rather the core question
is whether policy/political work is functionally distinct from administration and has
normative priority over it. The upshot of this position is that administration or
implementation follows, sequentially, after politics and, as such, is or should be apolitical. Harmon argues that to set aside this view, the field must overcome the dualistic assumptions that it holds. This would open the possibility for a collaborative
and experimental “unitary” mode of governance. The debate continues.
ADOPTING BUSINESS MANAGEMENT
TECHNIQUES
The desire to appeal to a particular audience—be they elected officials or professional public managers—is not the only reason that politics–administration continues to influence the field. As Dimock commented (1936a, p. 7), Willoughby’s
THE POLITICAL HERITAGE 55
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institutional definition of the field had the effect of confirming the earlier view of
Wilson and others that the administration of government exactly parallels the
management of organizational affairs in any sphere and has efficiency as its primary concern. In turn, it was felt that the field of public administration might
learn much from the field of business management. Willoughby himself adopted
just such a perspective in his 1927 text, using a business analogy in which legislators operated as “the board of directors of the government as an operating
organization” (p. 2). Such a view was certainly consistent with Wilson’s earlier
comments concerning the parallel between government administration and private management but even more directly followed Frederick A. Cleveland’s
argument that “the institutions of democracy are cast on practically the same
lines as are the institutions of private business…. Practically the same organization
was adopted, the citizen taking the place of the stockholder” (1913, p. 452).
As we will see in the following section, just such a view, that public and
private administration are essentially similar, was adopted throughout the 1920s
and 1930s by those writers who concentrated on questions of organization and
management. (As we will see in Chapter 6, the admonition to run government
like a business has resurfaced in the contemporary approach known as the “new
public management.”) Clearly, the interest in structural issues, scientific management, and organizational efficiency that characterized public administration theory during this period was only possible given an institutional definition of public
administration and the assumption that politics (or values) would not enter in.
Only the emergence of the view that administration could be studied apart
from politics made possible the adoption of the techniques and approaches of
business management.
The Role of Public Organizations in a Democracy
A third major reason for the continued symbolic importance of politics and
administration for the study of public administration is that the relationship (not
distinction) between politics and administration is indeed important to students
and practitioners in the field of public administration. In fact, ultimately the
whole issue of whether there is something special about public administration,
whether, as Appleby (1945, Ch. 1) wrote, “government is different,” may ultimately rest on this issue. More to the point, the relationship between politics and
administration has come to symbolize the question of the proper role of public
organizations in a democratic society. Specifically is there or should there be any
difference in the administration of affairs in a democratic, as opposed to an
authoritarian, society?
Certainly Frederick Cleveland (1920, p. 15) expressed the prevailing view
that “the difference between an autocracy and a democracy lies not in the
administrative organization but in the absence or presence of a controlling electorate or representative body outside of the administration with power to determine the will of the membership and to enforce the will on the administration.”
In this view, the requirements of democratic government are satisfied by legislative direction and review of a neutral and competent civil service organized
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according to the best principles of business. As we will see, however, the best
principles of business management are themselves not always consistent with
the norms of democracy; indeed, they are often directly at odds with democratic
norms.
Dwight Waldo has been the foremost among those questioning whether
democracy can survive nondemocratic public organizations. He too notes that
the affirmative view began with the separation of democratic political concerns
from those of efficient administration. Reviewing the development of public
administration theory into the early 1950s, Waldo (1952, p. 7) writes: “Both private and public administration were in an important … sense false to the ideal of
democracy. They were false by reason of their insistence that democracy, however good and desirable, is nevertheless something peripheral to administration.”
Most early writers handled the relationship between political democracy and
public organizations by strictly separating the two, assuming that autocracy in
public organizations may be required to effectively achieve a democratic society.
In contrast, an opposing perspective concerning the relationship between politics
and administration, democracy and bureaucracy, might maintain that regardless
of whether politics and administration are separated, the administration of affairs
in a democracy must always adhere to democratic norms and principles. However, before this viewpoint is developed, the principles of business management
that have influenced theories of public organization need to be more clearly and
specifically examined.
SCIENTIFIC APPROACHES TO MANAGEMENT
If politics could be separated from administration, it was only logical to assume
that the same lessons learned by students of management in the private sector
could be applied to administration in the public sector. Thus, in addition to initiating a lengthy consideration of the relationship between politics and administration, Wilson’s early (1887) essay implied a generic approach to management,
which would consider the study of management to be the same, regardless of its
setting. In turn, students of public administration would come to adopt essentially the same agenda as that of students of business—to seek scientific principles
of administrative management that would help to attain organizational efficiency.
Again, a tone was set for much of the research into public organizations that
immediately followed, a tone still reflected in theories of public organization.
Scientific Principles
The cornerstone of the emerging study of management was the attempt to derive
scientific principles that would guide the actions of practicing managers as they
sought to design or to modify organizational structures. The emphasis on science
was paramount, though in the beginning somewhat more symbolic than real.
Students of management, like social scientists in general, were somewhat awed by
science, especially as they witnessed the incredible impact of science and technology
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in industrial processes. Physics, chemistry, and, to a lesser extent, biology stood as
models for the kind of scholarly activity that would lead to individual and societal
benefits. However, as students of management sought to emulate the natural
sciences, their work became almost a parody of “real” science.
In part, the problem was that social scientists had not yet clearly resolved the
issue of what it meant to be scientific with respect to understanding social life. To
many, being scientific simply meant being rigorous and precise in gathering and
interpreting data; to others, indeed to an increasingly dominant group, being scientific meant adhering to a particular philosophical and epistemological viewpoint.
The early writers on public administration can certainly be accused of being naive
and unsophisticated in their understanding of science, but their later critics were
not without fault themselves. Specifically, the particular interpretation of science
that came to dominate the study of management through the middle of the twentieth century was itself limited in its comprehension of organizational life. But, in
any case, the interest in developing a science of administration was and continues
to be a particular preoccupation of students of public administration.
Taylor’s “One Best Way”
The naiveté of the early management scientists is reflected in the very influential
work of Frederick W. Taylor. Specifically, Taylor (1923, p. 7) felt that “the best
management is a true science, resting upon clearly defined laws, rules, and
principles.” At the base of this science is the careful study of the behavior of
individual workers in order that their efficiency might be substantially improved;
but beyond this, scientific management implies the extension of these scientific
principles to all realms of productive activity. Taylor’s science was therefore both
a technique (or mechanism for production) and a philosophy of social life.
At the technical level, Taylor argued, the best craftspersons of any period
knew how tasks could best be performed; their folk wisdom, derived largely
from experience, permitted them to develop the most efficient work processes.
For any particular task, there was “one best way” of performing—a way that
could be discovered (through scientific research) and applied by others. What
Taylor proposed to do was to investigate the various components of work in a
thorough and rigorous (that is, scientific) fashion and then to make his results
known so that all workers could use what had previously been the method of
only a few. By engaging in detailed studies of the time and motion required
for even the most mundane tasks, Taylor sought to demonstrate that management could vastly improve the efficiency of the productive process.
The best management is a true science, resting upon clearly defined laws, rules, and
principles.
—Frederick Taylor
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As an example, in order to demonstrate that “every single act of every workman can be reduced to a science,” Taylor examined the “science of shoveling”
(p. 64). This investigation was based on the premise that, for any top-notch
shoveler, a certain shovel load would result in the greatest daily productivity.
To discover this “one best way” to shovel, Taylor designed a very careful experiment in which the weight of the load was varied for several “first-class shovelers” who had agreed to participate in the experiment. It was discovered that
these workers would shovel the greatest tonnage per day with a shovel load of
about twenty-one pounds.
Obviously, scientific management recommends to managers a view of workers as machines to be tuned to their peak efficiency and an intensification of division of labor discussed in Chapter 2. The Taylorist approach aspires to break the
work process into its smallest component parts and then to discipline workers to
perform that single task as efficiently as possible. Taylor also more positively
recommends a new role for managers themselves, not unlike the division
between mental and physical labor noted by Marx. Managers were now needed
to design and conduct experiments, to discover the most efficient techniques
available, to plan work processes that would take advantage of these techniques,
and to train and supervise workers using these techniques. Managers, whose job
it was to make the organization more efficient, were required in increasing numbers and thus gained a new place in production.
One must concede that there was a certain benevolence, or humanism, which
animated Taylor’s efforts. By insisting that “science” be brought to bear in the work
process, he hoped to improve relationship between workers and managers by curbing the arbitrary exercise of managerial authority and forcing management to share
in the responsibility for performance. Authority would be grounded in real knowledge and would be put to use to help workers do their job. Furthermore, wide
distribution of this knowledge would improve overall working conditions and contribute to general social betterment. But at the same time, the development of this
scientific knowledge is the purview of management. Workers just carry out management’s designs. Management thinks, workers do. And the goal of these designs,
ultimately, is to extract the maximum amount labor from workers.
Science Defined
An attempt should be made at this point to clarify the approach to science
implied in scientific management. Taylor (1923) himself provided the following
explanation of this use of the term science in testimony before a congressional
committee:
A very serious objection has been made to the use of the word “science”
in this connection. I am much amused to find that this objection comes
chiefly from the professors of this country. They resent the use of the word
science for anything quite so trivial as the ordinary, everyday affairs of life.
I think the proper answer to this criticism is to quote the definition
recently given by a (well-recognized) professor … as “classified or
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organized knowledge of any kind.” And, surely, the gathering in of
knowledge which has existed but which was in an unclassified condition in
the minds of workmen and then the reducing of this knowledge to laws
and rules and formulae … represents the organization and classification of
knowledge, even though it may not meet with the approval of some
people to have it called science. (pp. 41–42)
Such a definition of science obviously lacks the rigor and sophistication of
the definitions used in the natural or social sciences. It provides the basis for
careful examination of work processes and the systematic organization of that
data, but it hardly contributes to a broader theoretical understanding of organizational life. Moreover, it remains loose enough that it can embrace not only
descriptions but also recommendations about the way organizations should be
run—recommendations that then appear to have the endorsement of science.
The philosophical implications of Taylor’s work are of great significance for
students of public administration. Although we may be amused by the crudities of
Taylor’s science, we cannot dismiss the impetus Taylor gave to the idea of applying
a rigid scientism to the study of organizations—an approach that was soon to prevail
in management science. Moreover, scientific principles were first applied at the
level of production but then extended “upward and outward” to higher levels of
the organization, perhaps to society generally. “There is an urge to extend the
objective, positivist approach to an ever-enlarging complex of phenomena; indeed,
having embarked upon this course, extension a further step seems always logically
and practically imperative” (Waldo, 1948, p. 57). Finally, to the extent that the
Taylorist philosophy implied the concentration of design activities in management
and the intensification of the division of labor, modern organizational life would
become subject to the narrow, alienating influences Weber and Marx described.
Science Applied to Public Administration
One realm into which the concern for scientific principles moved was the new
field of public administration. Since its beginnings, public “administrationists,”
like other social scientists, held forth the possibility of achieving a scientific
study of its subject matter. Throughout most of the early writing on public
administration, the term science—or other terms, such as principles, which came
to stand for science—was used in an extremely loose and ill-defined way. Not
until Herbert Simon’s Administrative Behavior (1957) was there an explicit formulation of science based on a carefully reasoned epistemology. Nonetheless, the
reverence for and pursuit of a scientific approach were unquestioned.
An important transition in the literature on public organizations, however,
prepared the way for Simon’s work. Again, the damage seems to have been done
by Willoughby. In the preface to his aptly titled Principles of Public Administration
(1927), Willoughby writes:
Objection may be raised to the designation of administration as a science. Whether this objection is valid or not, the position is here taken
that, in administration, there are certain fundamental principles of
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general application analogous to those characterizing any science which
must be observed if the end of administration, efficiency in operation, is
to be secured, and that these principles are to be determined and their
significance made known only by the rigid application of the scientific
method to their investigation. (p. ix)
In this view, science can produce principles, guides to action, and explanations to
aid the administrator in improving organizational efficiency.
Early Formulations: Leonard White
The earliest attempts to formulate principles focused mainly on organizational structure and dealt with such issues as the division of labor and the chain of command.
Such an approach came under serious attack, but, importantly, the central elements
of Willoughby’s formulation remained intact—that (1) the scientific method can be
employed in the study of administration; (2) science can produce guides to action;
and (3) those guidelines will improve organizational efficiency, the main criterion for
judging the work of organizations. Few argued that science, or any particular interpretation of science, was inappropriate to the study of human organizations; few
questioned whether the results of scientific investigation could be applied in practice; and few saw anything other than efficiency (for example, democracy) as the
goal of public organizations. What eventually occurred was a reconceptualization of
the “principles” approach into one more acceptable as legitimate social science.
A first step in this transition was taken by Leonard D. White in an essay entitled “The Meaning of Principles in Public Administration” (1936). Describing the
term principle as it is used in public administration as a “magic word” with supposedly “occult powers,” White suggests that the term may no longer be appropriate
to developing a scientific study (p. 13). For instance, physical scientists no longer use
the term; one does not seek principles of chemistry or physics. Moreover, the
ambiguity accompanying the use of the term in public administration restricts the
development both of statements indicating causal relationships and of statements
that might be appropriate guides to administrative action. One way to bring these
two purposes together is to think of principles in terms of hypothesis and verification, “to restrict the use of the term to mean a hypothesis or proposition so adequately tested by observation and/or experiment that it may intelligently be put
forward as a guide to action or as a means of understanding” (p. 18). (A hypothesis
is a formal statement of a relationship subject to verification.)
Early Formulations: Edwin O. Stene
Clearly, this interpretation more closely aligned the study of public administration
with other efforts to develop the scientific study of human behavior. Another
step was taken by Edwin O. Stene a few years later in an essay entitled “An
Approach to a Science of Administration” (1940). Stene argued that what had
been termed principles in the literature of public administration amounted to little
more than speculation or opinion and, as such, hardly constituted the science of
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public administration sought by so many. In contrast, Stene proposed to “determine causal relationships” as the basis for a science of administration (p. 425).
Through a series of preliminary definitions, axioms, and propositions, Stene
sought a rational basis for empirical research on which a science of administration
could be built. In this way, a science of administration could be achieved. For
example, one hypothesis stated: “Coordination of activities within an organization tends to vary directly with the degree to which essential and recurring functions have become part of the organization routine” (p. 1129). (We might note
the striking similarity to James Thompson’s [1967] discussion, some twenty-five
years later, of securing the “technical core” of organizations.)
Stene clearly moved the study of public administration toward a more formal, scientific approach. But in important ways, he also continued existing trends.
For example, a scientific effort was sought to provide guides to action in pursuit
of organizational efficiency. What was left out was also important—the question
of democracy entered only as a device for ensuring full dissemination of important information: “The principles involved suggest the importance of certain
democratic processes within administration, such as consultation with the minor
officials in charge of activities which will be affected by a contemplated decision”
(Stene, 1940, p. 1137).
Waldo’s Warning
Although terminology and approaches varied, there was little doubt that a scientific understanding of organizations could provide guides for action leading to
greater efficiency. In the process, however, other concerns were increasingly dismissed. By the late 1940s, political science was moving away from its earlier concerns for moral philosophy and political economy and toward what was taken to
be a true science of politics. As Waldo described it, when the new science of
politics merged with the progressive ideology of administrative efficiency, the
results were somewhat disturbing. “So far did [political scientists writing on public administration] advance from the old belief that the problem of good government is the problem of moral men that they arrived at the opposite position: that
morality is irrelevant, that proper institutions and expert personnel are determining” (1948, p. 23). In retrospect, Waldo’s warning was, if anything, too tentative,
although it hardly seemed so at the time. The new science of administrative efficiency that the early writers sought served not to extend democratic institutions
and practices but to restrict them, not to relieve us of moral responsibility, but
merely to veil us from it.
ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT AND
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
When students of public administration looked toward the study of business
management for advice, they discovered not only scientific management but
also a strong interest among scholars and practitioners in issues of administrative
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management. Especially important were writings on organizational structure.
The problem that occupied many writers on business management was how
organizations, particularly large and complex organizations, might best be
designed to permit efficient operations. The assumption seemed to be that a set
of principles of organizational design could be developed that would be applicable to all such organizations, public or private. Not surprisingly, the hierarchical
model of the military and the Catholic Church came immediately to mind.
When early students of public administration looked to business management for
advice, they discovered not only scientific management, but also a strong interest
among scholars and practitioners in issues of administrative management.
In the early 1930s, former General Motors executives James Mooney and Alan
C. Reiley (1939) offered their advice on the abstract principles by which organizations should be structured. In their view, four principles were involved. The first,
coordination through unity of command, emphasized the importance of strong
executive leadership exercised through a hierarchical chain of command. In such a
structure, in which each person would have only one boss and each boss would
supervise a limited number of subordinates, no confusion would exist about
whose orders to obey. Second, Mooney and Reiley discussed the “scalar” principle,
the vertical division of labor among various organizational levels. For example, in
military terms, the difference between a general and a private reflects the scalar
principle. Third, the functional principle, that various functions of the organization
could be grouped, referred to the horizontal division of labor. Again, in military
terms, the difference between infantry and artillery would represent the functional
principle. Fourth, Mooney and Reiley discussed the relationship between line and
staff: line offices represent the direct chain of command, the structure through
which authority flows, and staff offices such as personnel or finance should be available to advise the chief executive but should exercise no direct authority over line
offices. The line represents authority; the staff represents ideas and advice.
CENTRALIZATION AND INTEGRATION
Mooney and Reiley’s concerns for organizational structure were paralleled in the
field of public administration in several important works. First among these was
White’s Introduction to the Study of Public Administration (1948b), which examined
several important trends in the theory and practice of public organization. Two
issues seemed paramount—centralization and integration: the increasing centralization from local to state to national government and the increasing concentration of
administrative power in a single executive at whichever level.
The first concern, the move toward centralization at the national level,
seemed to White to be based on the greater level of administrative competency
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available at that level as well as on the need to provide uniform services and
uniform treatment for citizens. The trend toward “the principle of administrative
supervision and unified leadership” seemed to gain its major thrust from the
emerging scientific study of management, especially as voiced in various university “bureaus” active in the reorganization movement (p. 475). Despite these
trends, White was quick to point out the potential dangers of centralization in
a democratic society. The more highly centralized an administrative machine
becomes, the more the machine itself tends to become an independent center
of authority and the more likely it is to attempt to interfere in the processes by
which democracies seek to control their public officials.
White (1948b) advanced three arguments against increased centralization:
(1) certain matters may indeed be handled better at the local level and should
remain there; (2) administrative officials at the center may act in an arbitrary
and capricious manner; and, most important, (3) centralization will not permit
citizens to gain experience in assuming their civic responsibility. “If administration is to be the work of a highly centralized bureaucracy, it is impossible to
expect a sense of personal responsibility for good government,” which is best
acquired through involvement with local agencies (p. 96).
The second major issue, integration, White described as the tendency to pull
together many agencies of government into one massive unit controlled by a
single executive. White noted that this tendency is based on the presumption
that responsible government will best be achieved by locating executive power
in a single office, by permitting the occupant of that office to exercise considerable administrative power over subordinates, and by holding that person responsible for the outcome. Under such a plan, its advocates claim, the multiplication
of overlapping services, the independence and lack of coordination among agencies, and the absence of constraints or safeguards can be overcome. Those who
oppose such moves toward greater integration, however, hold that the centralization of power opens the possibility for political abuse while limiting the opportunities for political control. White’s own position seems to steer a path between
these two, concentrating on those mechanisms of accountability and control that
would permit a chief executive effectively to oversee the operations of responsible public agencies.
Toward Greater Efficiency: W. F. Willoughby
For White, the issues of centralization and integration are clearly bounded by a
concern for maintaining democratic responsibility. Willoughby and Gulick, in
contrast, focus more strictly on the development of principles to guide the
actions of administrators seeking greater efficiency. In their work, concerns for
democratic responsibility, though not absent, take a backseat to concerns for
structure, control, and efficiency.
Willoughby, for example, begins with a picture of the legislature as directing, supervising, and controlling the work of the administrative branch of government. The legislature serves as a board of directors, overseeing the operations
of the administration. But this can be done in various ways, including detailed,
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advance specification of what is to be done and how it is to be done or more
general grants of discretion accompanied by detailed reporting requirements. Of
these, Willoughby feels good management principles require the latter, which
leads to the question of who will be responsible for the execution of policies:
Should responsibility be vested in several administrative officers or in the chief
executive? Willoughby responds that, without question, administrative authority
should be vested in the chief executive, who should be given appropriate duties
and powers to carry out the work assigned. This step is the first in making the
administrative branch a “single, integrated piece of administrative machinery”; to
do otherwise would be to fail to conform to “correct principles in respect to the
exercise of administrative authority” (1927, pp. 37, 51).
According to Willoughby, the next step in creating the administrative system
prescribed by the principles of administrative management is to integrate the various departments and activities within the executive branch, so that groups with
similar missions and frequent working relations are grouped closely together.
Such a technique ensures simplicity, avoids conflicts of jurisdiction, and permits
far greater economy and efficiency in government. But the task of grouping organizational units together requires that “the principle of grouping … shall be the
correct one. As regards what this principle should be, there can be no doubt; it
should be that of bringing together under separate departments all those services,
and those services only, which have the same general function in respect to the
work to be undertaken by them” (1927, p. 86). The tenor of Willoughby’s
work is apparent: by following scientific principles of administrative management,
the administrative branch can operate much more efficiently. And the principles to
be followed are essentially those of private or business organizations—unity of
command, hierarchical authority, and division of labor. In this discussion, the
issue of citizen involvement and democratic practice simply do not arise.
Toward Greater Efficiency: Luther Gulick
Much the same is true of Gulick’s well-known essay “Notes on the Theory of
Organization” (1937a), occasioned by the work of the President’s Committee on
Administrative Management in 1937. Gulick saw the problem of government
organization, like the problem of organization generally, as one concerned with
“the structure of coordination imposed upon the work-division units of an
enterprise” (p. 3). In other words, the problem is one of achieving a satisfactory
division of labor, then developing appropriate means of coordination and control. For example, in describing the creation of new agencies designed to carry
out new programs, Gulick suggested four steps: (1) define the job to be carried
out, (2) select a director, (3) determine the nature and number of units required,
and (4) establish a structure of authority through which the director can coordinate and control the activities of the units (p. 7). The tension in organizational
design is between the necessity for specialization and the division of labor, on the
one hand, and coordination through a structure of authority, on the other.
“Division of work and integrated organization are the bootstraps by which mankind lifts itself in the process of civilization” (p. 44).
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A division of labor is required by the very nature of work processes—people
differ in their knowledge and skills, and because of the limits of space and time,
one person cannot do everything to accomplish the tasks of a modern organization. But work can be divided in a number of different ways and for a number of
different reasons. For this reason, Gulick proposes a set of “principles of departmentalization” that might be used by anyone seeking to analyze the work of a
unit and to arrive at an appropriate division of labor (1937a, pp. 21–29). Specifically, Gulick suggests that work may be divided on these bases:
1. Purpose. One may organize on the basis of the major purpose being served
by the agency, such as providing education or controlling crime. Although
this approach has advantages in providing a focus for public attention, it has
disadvantages in that governmental purposes are difficult to divide neatly.
Moreover, various specialists within the agency will tend to pursue different
and conflicting approaches.
2. Process. One may organize on the basis of the major process employed by the
unit, such as engineering, law, or medicine. Here a legal department would
have all the lawyers, an engineering department all the engineers, and so
forth. This way of organizing will emphasize technical skills but may occasionally obscure the major purpose sought by the organization.
3. Persons or things. One may also organize on the basis of the persons or things
dealt with by the unit—for example, the Veterans Administration deals with
all problems of veterans, including medical, legal, and other problems.
Although this approach has the advantage of providing simple and direct
contact with the consumer, it does tend to minimize the advantages of specialization. Moreover, when the government as a whole is considered, each
citizen clearly does not fall neatly into one category or another. (For example, some veterans are also criminals.)
4. Place. Finally, one may organize according to the geographic location of
those being served by the agency. This procedure has advantages in its ease
of coordinating services within a particular area and its flexibility in adapting
general rules to local conditions; however, management may become too
parochial and shortsighted, thus neglecting the importance of uniform
treatment.
Coordinating the Division of Labor
Whatever the basis for the division of labor, the various divisions need to be
coordinated. The intense the division, the more pressing the coordination challenge of reintegrating the various aspects of the labor process. Like most of his
contemporaries, Gulick saw the need for a single directing authority who would
supervise the work of the organization. The principle of unity of command
decreed that no one worker should be subject to orders from more than one
person. Beyond that, Gulick (1937a, p. 13) felt that a general movement was
needed toward a greater concentration of power in the administrative areas and
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especially in the chief executive. “In periods of change, government must
strengthen those agencies which deal with administrative management, that is,
with coordination, with planning, with personnel, with fiscal control, and with
research. These services constitute the brain and will of any enterprise.”
Interesting in this regard is Gulick’s discussion of the notion of government
as a holding company. Earlier we noted Gulick’s own use of the holdingcompany analogy in describing the increasing range of functions to be exercised
by government as part of the New Deal. Here, however, Gulick seems to have
recognized that such an analogy might imply a rather loose coordination in
which each agency would be an independent subsidiary with considerable
autonomy. This implication, of course, was far from Gulick’s intention, which
was to emphasize the need for coordination at the center.
For this reason, after criticizing the holding-company analogy, Gulick turns
the discussion quickly to the importance of freeing the executive from the need
to perform trivial tasks and from excessive legislative interference in order that he
or she can concentrate on the effective coordination and design of the enterprise.
The work of the chief executive is not the actual work of the agency but those
activities required to effectively coordinate the work of others. In perhaps the
most memorable, though probably least important, part of his essay, Gulick
(1937a, p. 13) identifies the work of the chief executive with the acronym
POSDCORB—planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting,
and budgeting.
Again, it is important to recall that although Gulick was writing on the theory of organization, not the theory of public organization, his purpose was to lay
the groundwork for what he took to be more effective and efficient management of government agencies. For this reason, Gulick was obligated to mention
issues such as democratic responsibility. However, his treatment of these issues
once again confirms that his primary interest was in extending the power of
administrative management. For example, he notes that “democracy is a way of
government in which the common man is the final judge of what is good for
him,” and in the very next sentence, he prescribes efficiency as “one of the
things that is good for him” (p. 11). Citizens apparently may choose—as long
as their choice is efficient administrative management in the manner Gulick
chose to outline.
Autocracy—The Price of Democracy?
In Willoughby and Gulick much more than in White, we see the emergence of
the administrative management viewpoint in public administration theory. Here
theory is reduced to a set of general guides for designing administrative structures. The problems of public organizations are seen as essentially the same as
those of private organizations; consequently, the solution is much the same: the
creation of hierarchical structures of authority overlaid on a careful division of
labor and coordinated through a single directing authority. Agencies are to be
governed by the principles of administrative management—principles far different from those of democratic government and there is little consideration given
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to what the extension to democratic ideas to management might even be. But
the potential conflict between the two, which has already been noted, was minimized, if it was considered at all. As Waldo (1948, p. 75) later remarked, the
prevailing view among the early thinkers in public administration was “ ‘Autocracy’ at work is the unavoidable price for ‘Democracy’ after hours.”
Is this point overstated? Weren’t these writers simply prescribing solutions to
the immediate problems of managers in the public sector? We do not think so.
Whether by intention or not, the implications of the administrative management
movement far exceeded a concentration on the minutiae of administration.
Instead, a particular philosophy and world view seemed to unite these writers,
a philosophy that grew in part from the experience of a rapidly expanding federal
government assuming many new functions and in part from a transposition of
business values into the public sector. The expansion of government is probably
best viewed by raising the issues of change: How can those in government cope
with rapidly changing social conditions, and how can they alter and expand institutional structures to deal with the problems those conditions portend? The solution sought by government generally was greater centralization and a rapid
expansion of government activity; the solution sought by writers on administrative management was to seek clear lines of administrative responsibility and control. The philosophy implicit in this viewpoint was a shift from dealing with
problems through politics to dealing with problems through management.
Through the executive’s planning, organizing, staffing, and directing, a new
design for society was to be achieved. Such an integrated approach would lead
to more rational and controlled plans and decisions made for (not by or, for that
matter, with) citizens. Not incidentally, it would also lead to what Gulick once
described as “a peak of eminence for top administrators.” But this philosophy
had one other aspect, the adoption of certain business values, most notably the
criterion of efficiency.
EFFICIENCY: THE KEY MEASURE OF SUCCESS
The separation of politics and administration and an accompanying view of public administration as essentially the same as private administration facilitated the
transfer of theories of administrative management to the study of public organizations. Nowhere was this transfer of approaches and values more clear, though
perhaps less understood, than in the adoption of the criterion of efficiency as the
key measure for the success of public organizations. It is important to recall that
the early writers on public administration were part of a culture undergoing a
technological transformation—a culture awed by the impressive gains of science
and industry. New ideas and inventions coupled with new techniques for their
production and distribution were changing society overnight. As the resulting
goods were valued, so were the instruments and processes that made them possible. The leading metaphor for the development of science and technology
became the machine, a precise, mechanical, rational, and efficient model for
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getting things done. Not surprisingly, when attention turned to the human organizational processes by which industry might be guided, the same metaphor was
used. It seemed only appropriate to seek models of organization that would
reflect the chief attributes of the machine—models that would prize efficiency
above all else.
But the efficiency criterion was given impetus in our society not only by
its association with a popular view of mechanized technology but also by its
clear association with the values of business in a capitalist society. The goal of
capital accumulation provided a clear standard by which to judge one’s success
or failure in the marketplace; the profit-and-loss statement provided the basis
for exacting calculations of economic gains or losses; and the profit motive
provided the inducement to make it all work. Efficiency, therefore, was more
than a cultural value born of science and technology; it was a very personal
concern. To the extent that a business culture implied that whoever was
most efficient would be most successful, few values, if any, were more personal
or more important.
Early Acceptance
It is hardly surprising, then, that the early writers on public administration
accepted the criterion of efficiency in the evaluation of the work of public organizations. Theories of public organization were simply theories that would make
organizations more efficient. For example, White (1948b, p. 2) wrote, “The
objective of public administration is the most efficient utilization of the resources
at the disposal of officials and employees.” And Luther Gulick (1937b, p. 192)
concurred: “In the science of administration, whether public or private, the basic
‘good’ is efficiency.” Efficiency was clearly the objective and the criterion of
public administration.
In the science of administration, whether public or private, the basic “good” is
efficiency.
—Luther Gulick
Questions were raised concerning the pursuit of efficiency, but they were
fairly readily dismissed. Marshall Dimock (1936b) challenged the unquestioning
acceptance of efficiency, especially in its more mechanical application. Dimock
painted a picture of management as far more intuitive and compassionate.
Whereas mechanical efficiency is “coldly calculating and inhuman,” Dimock
held, “successful administration is warm and vibrant. It is human” (p. 120). In
his view, the need for a more sensitive understanding of management in
human terms is especially important in considering public administration. For
those in government, “the fulfillment of communal wants is the ultimate test of
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all their activities.” Public administration, in this view, is “more than a lifeless
pawn. It plans, it contrives, it philosophizes, it educates, it builds for the community as a whole” (p. 133).
[For those in public administration,] the fulfillment of communal wants is the ultimate test of all their activities.
—Marshall Dimock
More explicitly, the criterion of efficiency might conflict with other criteria
that we might use to assess the work of public organizations—for example, measures of justice and participation. This potential conflict was, of course, recognized by several writers, some of whom attempted to broaden the notion of
efficiency to accommodate it to more general social concerns. For advocates of
administrative management, however, such as Gulick, there could be no doubt
of the final word. “There are, for example, highly inefficient arrangements like
citizens boards and small local governments which may be necessary in a democracy,” but these “interferences with efficiency” should not be taken to eliminate
efficiency in any way as “the fundamental value upon which the science of
administration may be erected” (1937b, p. 193).
Efficiency as a Value
Gulick’s language here is interesting. Unlike other writers, both before and after,
who see efficiency as a neutral concept, an impartial and objective measure of a
society’s performance, Gulick acknowledges that efficiency is a value, one that
may conflict with other values and that should be given precedence in such an
event. In contrast, Dwight Waldo (1948) holds that efficiency itself cannot be a
value, that it must always be defined in terms of the particular purpose being served.
What is efficient for one purpose may be quite inefficient for another. “For the
purpose of killing a bear, for example, a large-bore rifle is more efficient than a
bag of meal, but, for the purpose of keeping a bear alive, the reverse is true”
(p. 202). To place efficiency in a preeminent position is to fail to consider the substance of what is being done—in reality, a much more important consideration.
Gender, Science, and Efficiency
An important addition to our understanding of the historical context within
which public administration developed and the ways in which the values of science and efficiency became dominant is Camilla Stivers’s (2000) book, Bureau
Men, Settlement Women: Constructing Public Administration in the Progressive Era.
Stivers reminds readers of the contentious political environment within which
the early reform movements worked and argues convincingly that gender was an
important factor in shaping the way in which public administration developed.
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Reformers, she shows, were often denigrated in ways that were inflected with
distinct gendered tenor because they were critical of the rough of politics. Reformers were belittled as “goo goos” and discredited as “Miss Nancy[s], man milliner[s], and political flirt[s].” To respond to their critics, the reformers sought
safety in the rhetoric of science. She writes, “male reformers hoped to turn
aside such insinuations by clothing their activities in unmistakably masculine
garb—science, efficiency, and executive command and control—a move that
ultimately united traditional notions of masculinity such as virility and aggression
with overt middle class respectability” (p. 28). This move, she argues, suppressed
an alternative tendency in public administration that emphasized local democratic involvement in administration exemplified by Jane Addams and the settlement houses. Stivers also clearly highlights the contributions of women in a
history and field dominated by men.
DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION
Two points, then, remain to be considered. First, that the viewpoint being
expressed by the early writers constitutes a somewhat more embracing prescription
than is usually recognized, a political philosophy that the administrative state urges
on its citizens; and, second, that although the administrative management approach
came to dominate early writing on public administration (and indeed continues to
dominate the field), other viewpoints, minority opinions, were also being expressed,
like those of Jane Addams and the settlement movement. Both these points may be
illustrated through Dwight Waldo’s book The Administrative State (1948) and a subsequent essay entitled “The Development of a Theory of Democratic Administration” (1952). As mentioned earlier, Waldo argued that the early writers commented
on political theory, perhaps without even realizing it, but his own work was explicitly and unabashedly theoretical in content, applying a philosophical understanding
of democratic theory to the study of public organizations.
Administrative Theory and Democratic Governance
Although many writers attempted to limit the focus of public administration to
immediate technical matters, Waldo argued that the attempt was futile. Inevitably
questions of value arise, questions of the relationship between administrative practices and democratic theory. Sometimes such questions are addressed explicitly;
more often, they are addressed by default. Yet the result is the same either way—a
political theory of public organizations. Once such a theory is formulated, the next
obvious step is to ask how it relates to larger questions of democratic governance.
The orthodox view of public administration that we have described—that
administration is disconnected from the political process and relies on scientific
principles of administrative management—is just such a political theory. Indeed,
Waldo proposes a rendition of that theory in The Administrative State, arguing
that an uncritical acceptance of an administrative outlook constitutes a rejection
of democratic theory and that this is a societal problem, not simply a problem of
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administrative management. In other words, when read as political theory,
administrative thought comes up considerably short.
David Rosenbloom and Howard McCurdy (2006, pp. 2–4) argue that Waldo’s
critique of orthodoxy in public administration yielded four main conclusions. First, as
we have already noted, Waldo demonstrated that public administration’s focus on
technical matters concealed a political theory with important ramifications for democratic theory. Second, Waldo argued that changes in the principles of public administration reflected changing material and ideological conditions such as urbanization,
depression, and the like. Public administration theory was not “writ in stone,”
immutable and unchanging. Third, Waldo made clear that the political theory
implied in theories of public organization to that point were at odds with the political culture and constitutional design of the United States. In the orthodox public
administration of that period, democratic processes and democratic institutions were
often considered at odds with administrative concerns such as efficiency. Fourth,
Waldo’s critique presented a challenge to the field—to address in serious terms the
possibility of a theory of democratic administration. As we will see, that challenge has
continued to confound public administration scholars even to the present.
Waldo’s challenge went even deeper. Waldo (1948, p. 57) notes the messianic tendencies of management thought, especially scientific management—the
tendency “to extend the objective, positivist approach to an ever-enlarging complex of phenomena.” As we have seen, this same expansion of power and
responsibility appears in public administration theorists interested in administrative management. They, too, seem to think inevitable the creation of a new
guardian class of public managers, directing society through centralized administrative structures. But in neither case is the extension of ideology, the accumulation of power, overt; rather, the philosophy of managerial domination moves at
the margin, subtly, incrementally.
Of course, this very possibility was feared by Marx, Weber, and Freud—that
this philosophy would extend itself through society, rationalizing greater and
greater sectors of group life, until little room remained for individual choice
and democratic responsibility. Certainly, one does not have to be a Marxist, a
Weberian, or a Freudian to recognize the intrusion of complex organizations
into our personal and political life or to decry the excessive control and objectification that this intrusion implies. The extension of managerialist thought
undermines a sense of autonomy and responsibility, both for the individual and
for the society as a whole. In this way, the orthodox view of public administration carries with it a social and a political theory, but a negative one, an antipolitical theory, an attempt to turn the problems of politics into problems of
administration. Ironically, we would say that no theory is more political or ideological, than the theory that claims to be otherwise.
The “Other Side of Reform”: Toward a Democratic
Administration
Was there, and is there, an alternative? Perhaps. As Stivers’s research shows, there
was “another side to reform” that emphasized different practices, different
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relationships, and different values. They were not alone, though these remarkable
women are often neglected in histories of public administration. In addition to the
settlement women, among the early writers were several who would have
accepted David M. Levitan’s argument (1943, p. 359) that “a democratic state
must not only be based on democratic principles, but also democratically administered, the democratic philosophy permeating its administrative machinery.”
Margaret Stout (2013) calls this “collaborative tradition” in public administration.
Many would follow the brilliant work of Mary Parker Follett (Metcalf &
Urwick, 1940, p. 9), who believed that dynamic administration must be
grounded on “a recognition of the motivating desires of the individual and of the
group.” Follett, who provided a striking counterpoint to Taylorism, felt that
group dynamics were the key to understanding organizational life as well as
political life. In both realms, the key problem was that of coordination; coordination was the driving force in group life, more important than authority or
control. In turn, understanding the viewpoints of all those in the group or organization becomes essential. In this view, leadership is not merely exercised by
giving orders and expecting them to be followed; rather, the leader must articulate the purpose of the organization and then create mechanisms through which
the various activities of those in the organization can be coordinated. Her book,
The New State (1998), offers a sophisticated account of how these ideas can
be extended to develop an alternative understanding of individualism, social
relationship, and federal governance.
Another exemplar of this side of reform is Ordway Tead. Now sadly forgotten, in his time Tead was a well-known and prolific management theorist and
had long, often controversial, career in public life as a member of the New York
City Board of Education. He worked for the city’s Bureau of Industrial Research
and during World War I, taught the War Department’s management courses for
the War Department at Columbia University. Tead (1933, p. 102) expressed
deep concerns that democracy was being “discounted” as American society
sought to address the economic problems of the Great Depression. Like Follett,
he argued, “the rightful self-interests of the generality of people are assured only
as individuals discover that their well-being is inextricably dependent upon that
of their fellows.” This requires us to think of “democracy” not only as political
framework but, fundamentally, “a process that “minister[s] to the development
and enrichment of the personality of every citizen” and which seeks to do this
“through every department of life” (p. 104).
To this end, Tead (1937) emphasized the unique quality of what he called
“democratic leadership” in public service. He saw democratic leadership as
occurring when “the ends of public good are economically served at the same
time that all the participating members of the organization are taken account of
and implicated as themselves citizens and creative partners in the enterprise”
(p. 44). Leaders need to take followers’ points of view into consideration and
explore how organizational goals can also serve the best interests of followers.
Tead also did not see “leaders” as those at the top of the organizational hierarchy
but rather saw leadership opportunities at “every administrative level where
executives are charged with responsibility for the direction of the work of
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others” (p. 45). Leadership could be “creative force,” an “education process”
and, finally, a “democratic process.”
As world wars end and the country emerged from the Depression, the clear
heir to the tradition represented by Addams, Follett, Levitan, and Tead was
Dwight Waldo. His The Administrative State kept questions of democracy in public administration on the table in the field that would become preoccupied with
science and rationalization. Regarding the prospects of a democratic administration, he was cautiously optimistic. Despite the obstacles that he saw restricting
the development of democratic administration—specifically the authoritarian
bias of organizational thought, with its emphasis on hierarchy, control, and discipline—he held forth some hope for a democratic alternative, one that would
comprise a “substantial abandonment of the authority–submission, superordinate–subordinate thought patterns which tend to dominate our administrative
theory.” His call was plaintive: “In rare moments of optimism, one permits himself the luxury of a dream of a society of the future in which education and
general culture are consonant with a working world in which all participate
both as ‘leaders’ and ‘followers’ according to ‘rules of the game’ known to all.
Such a society would be postbureaucratic” (1952, p. 103).
CONCLUSION
From Woodrow Wilson’s early (1887) essay, two important themes in the
study of public administration emerge: first, the tension between politics and
administration and, second, the search for scientific principles of administrative
management that would improve the efficiency of government organizations.
As we have already seen, the politics–administration dichotomy was quickly
denounced by scholars and practitioners alike, although there is considerable
doubt that it ever carried the strength attributed to it. Similarly, the search for
principles of administrative management was attacked as both unreasonable and
unscientific. But other elements of earlier theories were retained. The early
writers on public administration did conclude that the problems of public organizations are essentially the same as those of private organizations, subject to
solution through the scientific principles of administrative management. Similarly, they saw democracy as best preserved through the efficient operation of
government agencies and efficiency, in turn, as best produced through sound
business management. In these ways, preserving the essence of the politics–
administration dichotomy and the study of administrative management, the
early writers on public administration set the tone for the study of public
organizations for the next several decades. Indeed, one might say that the
ghosts of theories past still haunt the study of public administration, with
its tales of politics–administration, scientific principles, and administrative
efficiency. It remains to be seen when—if ever—we will develop and pursue
new directions.
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DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
1. Contrast the Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian views of administration and
discuss their relevance for public administration today.
2. Discuss the origins of the distinction between politics or policy and administration. How is it relevant today? Does it make any difference whether you
use the word “politics” or the word “policy?” Does that change the debate?
3. If we live in a democratic society, why do we allow so many institutions in
our society—even those in government—to be governed in a hierarchical,
even authoritarian fashion?
4. Discuss the concept of efficiency as a measure of success in public organizations. What other concepts might also be considered measures of success?
5. Discuss “scientific management” and its critics. What is the lingering effect
of scientific management in public administration?
6. Discuss the elements of a “democratic administration.” How would it differ
from other approaches to administration discussed in this chapter?
CASES
1. Alberto Nunez is city manager of a large city in the southwest. He feels very
strongly that a new economic development initiative should be passed by
the council, but he’s worried about getting involved in policy formulation.
At the same time, a council member has suggested that the appointment of a
new police chief, which the charter says should be made by the city manager, should instead become a matter for council debate. How should
Alberto proceed?
2. Susan Brett’s supervisor, Alex Baptiste, is concerned about moving quickly
to develop a new way of processing regulatory reviews for small businesses.
Susan thinks the job could be done better by spending some time talking
with business owners about what would work best for them, but that would
take more time. What would you expect Susan and Alex each to say in a
conversation about this issue? How would they justify their positions?
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Bensel, Richard F. (2000). The political economy of American industrialization, 1877–1900.
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Bertelli, Anthony M., & Lynn, Laurence E., Jr. (2006). Madison’s managers. Baltimore,
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Caldwell, Lynton. (1944). Administrative theories of Hamilton and Jefferson. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Cleveland, Frederick A. (1913). Organized democracy. New York: Longman, Green.
Cleveland, Frederick A. (1920). The budget and responsible government. New York:
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Cook, Brian J. (2007). Democracy and administration. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press.
Dean, Mitchell. (2010). Governmentality: Power and rule in modern society. Second ed.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Dimock, Marshall E. (1936a). The meaning and scope of public administration. In John
M. Gaus, Leonard D. White, & Marshall E. Dimock (Eds.), The frontiers of public
administration, pp. 1–12. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Dimock, Marshall E. (1936b). Criteria and objectives of public administration. In John
M. Gaus, Leonard D. White, & Marshall E. Dimock (Eds.), The frontiers of public
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Fry, Brian R., & Raadschelders, Jos. C. N. (2008). Mastering public administration.
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popular government in the United States. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North
Carolina Press.
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Levitan, David M. (1943, Autumn). Political ends and administrative means. Public
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Stivers, Camilla. (2000). Bureau men, settlement women: Constructing public administration in
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4
The Rational Model
of Organization
Even at its height, the theory of public administration described by
Willoughby, White, Gulick, and others was being undermined by several
important developments in the social sciences. First, in political science as well
as in many other disciplines, there was increasing concern that research efforts
should contribute to a true science of human behavior, a theoretically coherent
body of knowledge produced in much the same manner as knowledge in the
natural sciences. Second, a movement had emerged, based on the recognition
of commonalities between public and private management, to develop a generic
approach to the study of administration. Neither of these trends originated
within public administration itself; indeed, public administration proved somewhat resistant to both. Yet in the end, these two forces were to have a critical
impact on the study of public organizations. Most important, these new points of
view would effectively displace the older, political conceptions of public
organizations.
A SCIENCE OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR
The first, and by far, major trend sweeping political science and related disciplines was a concern for developing a science of human behavior. In keeping
with the general scientism of the early twentieth century, many political scientists
felt their earlier studies of government institutions and political movements
lacked the rigor (and, therefore, the dignity) of work in such “real” sciences as
physics and chemistry. To correct this situation, they argued on behalf of an
approach to science based on the philosophical perspective of logical positivism.
79
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This approach held that regularities in human behavior, as in the behavior of
physical objects, could be determined by the careful and objective observation
of exhibited (or manifest) behavior and that scientific theories could be logically
derived from such observations. Just as one observes the behavior of molecular
structures and then develops theories concerning physical life, so, it was argued,
could one observe the behavior of human beings objectively—“from the outside”—and then develop theories concerning social life.
The role of human values, however, proved to be a major problem, both with
regard to the “objects” of observation and the process of observation itself. First, as
we discussed in Chapter 2, human beings act intentionally. We ascribe meaning,
purpose, and values to the things we do. So to understand human action fully, we
need to understand the intentions and values that inform it from the actor’s perspective. Any science of human behavior, then, is neglecting something significant if it
focuses only on observable behavior. This reality posed a second challenge to the
new science of human behavior by confronting it with the possibility that human
values would intrude on the scientific study of human behavior. But the response
came that facts and values should be considered logically distinct. According to this
view, the facts of administrative life, even the fact that certain administrators (and
scientists) display certain values, could be observed without the observation either
contaminating or being contaminated by personal values. In this way, the integrity
(meaning “objectivity”) of the research process could be maintained.
To further ensure objectivity, a particular approach to scientific research was
prescribed. A problem would be developed, hypotheses would be generated
concerning the relationships among relevant variables, and a research design
would be constructed and executed that would test these relationships. The findings would then be incorporated into the larger body of a particular field’s theoretical knowledge. For example, if we were concerned with the relationship
between decentralized decision making and job satisfaction, we might develop
hypotheses about this relationship—for example, that greater worker participation would lead to higher levels of satisfaction—and then attempt to test these
hypotheses through a controlled experiment or a field study.
In any case, scientific research was to be rigorously disciplined so that scientists
could have high level of confidence that the explanation derived was the correct
one (and that all other explanations could be excluded); and it was to be empirical,
meaning that it was to be based on the observations of objective reality rather than
on subjective belief. Ideally, any scientist performing exactly the same experiment
under exactly the same conditions would arrive at exactly the same result, thus
confirming the objectivity of the study—and of the method itself.
THE GENERIC APPROACH TO ADMINISTRATION
The second major development that altered the course of public administration
theory in the postwar period and beyond followed in part from the first. Scientists
seeking to locate regularities in human behavior argued that those regularities were
independent of their context—for example, that the exercise of power is essentially
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the same regardless of whether it occurs in the family, the workplace, or the
nation-state. Similarly, students of organizations began to suggest that organizational behavior is much the same whether it takes place in public or private organizations. To a certain extent, this argument was and is compelling. Surely basic
administrative processes, such as leadership and authority motivation and decision
making, are quite similar whether one serves as an executive in General Motors or
as an undersecretary in the U.S. State Department. Therefore, it was not surprising
that a major text on public administration in this period suggested, “In actual
administration, there is often a greater difference between small and large organizations than there is between public and private ones” (Simon, Smithburg, &
Thompson, 1950, p. 8).
Thus, a generic study of management or administration emerged. Originally
an amalgam of findings from various subparts of political science, business administration, sociology, and social psychology, organizational analysis soon took on its
own identity. From business came an interest in efficiency and decision making,
from sociology came both the systems and structural-functional approaches, and
from social psychology came a cognitive or behavioristic orientation. Generic
schools of administration were formed; journals such as the Administrative Science
Quarterly were created; and scholars from various university departments discovered their common interests. Consequently, public administrationists within
departments of political science often found they had more in common with organizational analysts in business schools than with their departmental colleagues in
comparative government, international relations, or political theory.
In this way, public administrationists, adopting the outlook of the behavioral
sciences, began to emphasize fact rather than value, means rather than ends. And
by joining the move toward a generic study of administration, the field fractured
its traditional and long-standing ties to the study of political values. These trends
were seen in both a rejection of previous allegedly nonscientific work in public
administration and in the establishment of an alternative: the rational model of
administration. In each case, the work of Herbert A. Simon loomed large.
THE PROVERBS OF ADMINISTRATION
Although interest had been growing for some years in developing a more scientific approach to the study of public administration, the two most formidable
calls to action did not come until the late 1940s. In 1946, Herbert A. Simon, a
recent graduate of the University of Chicago doctoral program in political science, published an article entitled “The Proverbs of Administration,” in which
he sharply criticized previous work in administrative theory and then outlined
several requirements for a scientifically based theory of administration. Simon’s
article was subsequently reprinted as a chapter in his book Administrative Behavior:
A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization (1957a), which
appeared the following year. In Administrative Behavior, an outgrowth of his doctoral dissertation, Simon presented in its now-classic form the rational model of
administration, a model that has had an enormous impact on the study of
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organizations. Also in 1947, Robert A. Dahl, who had recently completed his
doctoral work at Yale University, published “The Science of Public Administration,” an alternative critique of earlier work in the field. Dahl’s work was also
implicitly critical of Simon’s approach and precipitated a brief exchange, one
that foreshadowed discussions about public organizations for many years
thereafter.
Simon’s Critique of Previous Theories
Simon’s critique was by far the more biting, describing the principles of administration of Gulick, Urwick, and others as “proverbs,” sharing a particular defect
of other proverbs—that they often contradicted one another. Simon focused his
attack on four of the principles: specialization; unity of command; span of control; and organization by purpose, process, clientele, and place. Although Simon
(1946, p. 62) agreed that these ideas were acceptable as “criteria for describing
and diagnosing administrative situations,” he felt that when they were treated as
inviolable principles, they were often in contradiction. He then proceeded to
treat them as principles and to demonstrate the contradictions—for example,
that maintaining a short span of control might prohibit a small number of organizational levels or that unity of command would prevent an organization from
taking advantage of specialized leadership.
In summarizing his position, Simon (1946) wrote:
Administrative description suffers currently from superficiality, oversimplification, lack of realism. It has confined itself too closely to the
mechanism of authority and has failed to bring within its orbit the other,
equally important modes of influence on organizational behavior. It has
refused to undertake the tiresome task of studying the actual allocation
of decision-making functions. It has been satisfied to speak of “authority,” “centralization,” “span of control,” “function,” without seeking
operational definitions of these terms. (p. 63)
Actually, Simon’s conclusions were far less a departure from the mainstream
of work in the field than his harsh language implied. [In the introduction to the
second edition of Administrative Behavior, Simon (1957a, p. xiv), perhaps gathering momentum, commented, “We talk about organization in terms not unlike
those used by a Ubangi medicine man to discuss disease. At best, we live by
homely proverbs … at worst, we live by pompous inanities.”] Simon did correctly recognize the preoccupation of earlier theorists with questions of the allocation of functions and the structure of authority, and he did properly call for an
expansion of the range of topics to be investigated. But he did not question the
interest of the field in arriving at sound bases on which administrators could
make informed judgments about organizational design, nor did he question the
central concern of the field with efficiency. Indeed, Simon (1957a, p. 38) made
this the very basis for administrative theory: “The theory of administration is
concerned with how an organization should be constructed and operated in
order to accomplish its work efficiently.”
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The theory of administration is concerned with how an organization should be
constructed and operated in order to accomplish its work efficiently.
—Herbert Simon
With respect to the task of building a theory of public organization, Simon’s
efforts were far more important for what they implied than for what they explicitly stated. First, in keeping with the viewpoint of logical positivism, Simon suggested the possibility of separating facts and values in the study of administrative
behavior and then undertaking a rigorous program of experimental research
designed to produce a comprehensive theory of administration. Second, Simon
moved very quickly away from his own affiliation with political science and
public administration, favoring instead a generic approach. Obviously, to the
extent that public administration moved in this direction—and it moved in this
direction to a considerable extent—more and more concern would focus on
means rather than ends, on administrative techniques rather than political principles. Interestingly enough, this argument was central to Dahl’s critique.
Dahl: Efficiency and the Nonrational Quality of Human Behavior
If Simon’s critique of pre–World War II public administration theory was the
more biting, Dahl’s was in many respects the more radical and, in the long run,
the more telling. Dahl, like Simon, acknowledged the desire of students of public administration to develop a true science, but he noted several major difficulties that had been encountered in this effort. Dahl (1947) first noted that the
positivist interpretation of science suggested that social sciences, including the
study of organizations, could and should be value-free. Dahl contended, however, that the field of public administration, while claiming to be value-free,
was actually based on a preference for particular values, most notably the value
of efficiency. As we have just seen, earlier students of administration, including
Simon himself, held efficiency to be a neutral, value-free criterion by which
administrative actions could be judged. What Dahl suggested was simply that
efficiency itself was a value and as such had to compete with other values, such
as individual responsibility and democratic morality.
In such competition, according to Dahl, efficiency did not always fare so
well. For example, how should one reconcile the need for citizen involvement
in administrative decision making with the efficient operation of an agency? Or
how should the study of administration evaluate the German prison camps of
World War II, most of which were apparently highly efficient? Or how should
we go about developing a theory of personal responsibility, one that seemed
inherently to conflict with the demand for total efficiency? In these and many
other cases, it was apparent that students of public administration were involved
with ends as well as means and therefore needed to make their values more
explicit. To continue to adhere to the doctrine of efficiency—while disguising
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this doctrine as scientific fact—was not only misleading but morally dangerous.
Here Dahl was clearly interested in the field of public administration rather than
administration in general. The most serious valuational conflicts he found
occurred when the value of efficiency collided with the values of democracy,
especially those related to democratic morality. Of course, one might also argue
that the criterion of efficiency in private enterprise sometimes runs counter to the
social responsibility of business; however, Dahl was interested in the public sector
and government, finally arguing that the field of public administration is distinguished by its involvement with ethical questions and political values.
Dahl’s second point was that the study of public administration must be
based on the study of human behavior. Here Dahl simply acknowledged that
most major problems of public administration revolve around human beings
and that human beings, consequently, cannot be ignored in the study of public
organizations. Dahl (1947, p. 4) took his analysis a step further to suggest that
capitalism has urged on us “an attempt to organize the production process
along rational lines” and that such an approach had been accepted by many theorists of organization, theorists who saw the creation of rational, logical structures
as most desirable. However, Dahl wrote, to adhere to such a rationalistic model
ignores the fact that human beings do not always act in rational ways or even
perform most efficiently in the context of rational structures. Thus, “we cannot
achieve a science [of administration] by creating in a mechanized ‘administrative
man’ a modern descendant of the eighteenth century’s rational man, whose only
existence is in books on public administration and whose only activity is strict
obedience to ‘universal laws of the science of administration’ ” (p. 7).
Not surprisingly, Herbert Simon (1947), who had just developed such a
concept, wrote an immediate rebuttal to Dahl’s article. The basis of Simon’s
response was an obscure and confusing comparison of pure and applied science,
one designed to remove pure science from the worship of efficiency that Dahl
criticized. This argument, however, was rather ineffective, especially in light of
Simon’s own dictum equating the theory of administration with the pursuit of
efficiency. Repeatedly, Simon denied that his pure science of administration was
“prescribing for public policy,” yet he failed to acknowledge the policy implications of a preoccupation with efficiency—that, in a sense, efficiency is a policy
(p. 202). In this particular exchange, therefore, Simon may have come in second.
But his rational model of administration, which was just being presented to the
public administration community, would more than compensate by becoming
the standard for work in administration for many years to come.
THE RATIONAL MODEL OF ADMINISTRATION
As we have mentioned, the rational model of administration has held a prominent
place in the literature on public organizations. Terms such as inducements–contributions,
the zone of acceptance, and satisficing are a standard part of the vocabulary of students of
public administration today. If for no other reason, these terms demand attention
because of their frequent use by administrative theorists and practitioners. More
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important, these terms, and the broader ideas they represent, have had an important,
though not altogether positive, impact on the way we think about public organizations. To the extent that the rational model of administration is viewed as a model
for human behavior in organizational settings, the guidance it provides should be
carefully considered.
The rational model of administration was given its earliest and most forceful
presentation in the literature on public organizations in Simon’s (1957a) Administrative Behavior. The model was then elaborated by Simon in a series of essays
entitled Models of Man (1957b) and in two jointly authored works, a textbook
entitled Public Administration (1950), written with Donald W. Smithburg and
Victor A. Thompson, and a detailed review of the literature on organization theory entitled Organizations (1958), written with James G. March. Beginning in the
early 1950s, Simon’s work turned increasingly toward the social psychology of
decision making, then to information technology and the processes of cognitive
development. Consequently, although Simon’s own efforts in the field of public
administration have been somewhat limited in more recent times, the influence
of his work remains quite substantial, and his occasional efforts in public administration today still have considerable influence.
This section outlines the rational model of administration as presented by
Simon, drawing primarily on his early work, especially Administrative Behavior
(1957a). The following section examines two related topics: the process of
human decision making (as viewed by Simon and later writers) and the closed
system–open system dispute (which developed at least in part in reaction to
Simon’s work and culminated in a synthesis by James D. Thompson).
The Positivist Perspective
In Administrative Behavior (1957a), Simon undertakes the task of laying out a
comprehensive theory of administrative organization based on a positivist view
of knowledge acquisition and an instrumental interpretation of organizational
life. Fully embracing the positivist perspective, Simon argues that the role of
the scientist is the examination of “factual” propositions, those based on the
observation of manifest behavior or those logically inferred from such observations. The objectivity of the scientist is paramount, and for this reason, the scientist must take care to establish a factual basis for any conclusions that might be
drawn. To prevent subjectivity from creeping into the research process, the scientist must purge theories of any intimations of human values. Neither the values
of the scientist nor those of the actor being observed should enter into research
and theory building. That this is even possible, argues Simon, is because facts and
values can be logically separated. “Factual propositions are statements about the
observable world and the way in which it operates” (1957a, p. 45). Statements of
value, on the other hand, speak to the issue of how things should be; they express
preferences for desired events. In contrast to the rather elusive nature of values,
factual statements are precise. Propositions of fact, according to Simon, may be
“tested to determine whether they are true or false—whether what they say
about the world actually occurs or whether it does not” (pp. 45–46).
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Simon does note, however, that although the words good and bad are often a
part of discussions of administration, the use of such terms does not compromise the
neutrality of the scientific approach that he advocates. Rather, in terms of organization, good things are those that enhance the organization’s capacity to attain its
goals; bad things are those that do not. Whatever increases efficiency is good; whatever does not is bad. And of course, says Simon, this stance is only what one would
expect of a theory of administration that sees efficiency as its primary aim.
The Concept of Rationality
At the basis of administrative organization is the concept of rationality. Organizations are created in order to enhance human rationality and to structure human
behavior so that it may approximate abstract rationality. Simon begins by arguing
that individual human beings are limited in their capacity to respond to the complex problems we face. “The capacity of the human mind for formulating and
solving complex problems is very small in comparison with the size of the
problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real
world—or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality”
(1957b, p. 198). Since individuals are limited, or in his later term, bounded in
the degree of rationality they can attain, they find it necessary to join together
in groups and organizations to deal effectively with the world around them. In
organizations, we find a way of molding human behavior to rational patterns of
obtaining our objectives. Thus, “the rational individual is, and must be, an organized and institutionalized individual” (1957a, p. 102).
The rational individual is, and must be, an organized and institutionalized individual.
—Herbert Simon
Obviously, to speak of rationality in this way is to give the concept a far more
limited and technical meaning than it holds in other contexts. In contrast to a long
philosophical tradition that holds human reason to be concerned with such grand
issues as justice, equality, and freedom—the essence of building human societies—
Simon’s view is essentially concerned with the relation between means and ends,
and here the organization is the primary means. The key to achieving rational
behavior, according to one philosopher (Horkheimer, 1974, p. 50), is to “calculate
probabilities and thereby coordinate the right means with a given end.” To say,
therefore (in the language of the rational model), that a particular organization is
rational is not to say that it serves politically or morally reasonable purposes such as
those alluded to by Dahl but simply to say that it operates to maximize efficiency.
In such a view, rationality is equated with efficiency. To behave in a rational manner is to behave in such a way that one contributes to the accomplishment of
the organization’s objectives. To put it the other way around, to be rational, the
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individual must follow the design of the organization’s leaders, its “controlling
group,” or, more familiarly, management. In this sense, Simon’s rational organization tracks the trajectory of scientific management, though without Taylor’s nominal humanism.
In the abstract, of course, to lay out a rational system for obtaining a given
objective is not very difficult, and that is essentially what the controlling group
does. The problem comes when one tries to insert human beings—with human
feelings, human interests, and human concerns—into the system. If we describe
as rational those activities that are consistent with the efficient accomplishment of
given objectives, it is clear that following the rules and carrying out one’s prescribed function is the only rational path to follow.
So Simon (1957a, p. 246) writes, “The stenographer’s rationality is exercised
in translating a piece of copy, whatever its content, into a typewritten manuscript. Her employer’s rationality is exercised in determining the content of the
copy.”
Individual Behavior
This extraordinarily limited concept of rationality obscures a number of very
important questions, not the least of which is the agency and moral responsibility
of the individual. Yet it permits a very precise and well-constructed formulation
of the way rational (or nearly rational) individuals act in organizational settings.
Simon departs most dramatically from his predecessors by focusing on the behavior of individuals in complex organizations and by asking how they might be
brought to approximate more closely the rationality of the system. Simon argues
that this can be accomplished only when individuals begin to make choices that
are guided by the interests of the organization and conditioned and constrained
by the organizational processes.
The key to individual behavior is the decision to act. The organization is
seen, therefore, as a decision-making system, defined to include “attentiondirecting or intelligence processes that determine the occasion of decisions, processes for discovering and designing possible courses of action, and processes for
evaluating alternatives and choosing among them” (Simon, 1965, pp. 35–36).
This formulation presents two somewhat distinct problems: one concerns the
decisions of people to join, remain in, or leave organizations, and the other
involves their behavior while they are members of organizations (Simon,
1957b, p. 167). Each is approached through a rational calculus of individual
costs and benefits. For example, with respect to the decision to remain a member
of the organization, Simon writes, “It may be postulated that each participant
will remain in the organization, if the satisfaction (or utility) he derives … is
greater than the satisfaction he could obtain if he withdrew. The zero-point in
such a ‘satisfaction function’ is defined, therefore, in terms of the opportunity
cost of participation” (p. 173). As long as the organization provides greater benefits than people think possible elsewhere, they will hedge their bets and continue in the organization.
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A similar kind of calculation occurs with respect to the behavior of individuals choosing to contribute their activities to the organization. Since it is in the
interest of the rational system to induce members to contribute to organizationally correct behaviors, those decreed from above, this question is up with the
issue of authority. Simon (1957a, p. 133; 1957b, pp. 74–75) argues that each
individual member establishes an “area of acceptance within which the subordinate is willing to accept the decisions made for him by his superior.” [Earlier,
Chester Barnard (1938, p. 168) had discussed a similar “zone of indifference.”
Orders that fall within this zone are followed and those that fall outside the
zone are not.]
But, obviously, it is in the interest of the organization to have the zone of
acceptance widely expanded; the greater the range of orders that the individual
will accept, the greater the likelihood that the individual will become an efficient
part of the administrative system. Therefore, the next step is to consider ways in
which the zone might be expanded. Of course, such an expansion would probably occur in response to greater inducements: more money or more status
might lead to more activity.
Administrative Man
Beyond this, the values of the organization may simply come to displace those
of the individual. The organization substitutes for the individual’s own judgment, an organizational decision-making process (Simon, 1957a, Ch. 10). To
the extent that this occurs, the classic utility-seeking “economic man” is
replaced by a more modern and more institutionalized “administrative man.”
Administrative man accepts the organizational goals as the value premises of
his decisions, is particularly sensitive and reactive to the influence upon him
of the other members of his organization, forms stable expectations regarding
his own role in relation to others and the roles of others in relation to him, and
has high morale in regard to the organization’s goals. What is perhaps most
remarkable and unique about administrative man is that the organizational
influences do not merely cause him to do certain specific things (e.g., putting
out a forest fire, if that is his job) but also induce in him a pattern of doing
whatever is appropriate, in cooperation with others, to further the organization’s goals. He develops habits of cooperative behavior (Simon, Smithburg,
& Thompson, 1950, p. 82).
This point, of course, returns us to the issue of rationality. Clearly, in
Simon’s formulation, the price of achieving organizational rationality is individual autonomy. As the values of the organization replace those of the individual, it
becomes apparent that one’s contributions will be most helpful if they are consistent with the vision of the organization held by those in control. Consequently
obedience to the demands of those in authority is not merely efficient, it is rational. Simon (1957a, p. 198) puts it this way: “Since these institutions largely
determine the mental sets of the participants, they set the conditions for the
exercise of docility, and hence rationality, in human society.”
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Clarifying Terms
Although the rational model will be critiqued later in this book, its language
needs to be clarified. Simon holds a scientific theory to be neutral and objective,
without preference for any value. If a theory of administration is concerned with
efficiency, then to be efficient is only rational. Indeed, one can be rational only
by being efficient. One can be most efficient by acting in accord with the design
of the system, and that can best be accomplished by following the directives of
those who designed the system. In this limited sense, rationality translates quickly
into obedience to hierarchically superior authorities. Rationality is compliance.
What began as a neutral and objective approach appears in fact to conceal strong
preferences that favor organizational superiors, whoever they may be.
In many ways, the rational model of administration represents not a departure from earlier principles of public administration but rather a scientific legitimation of those principles. There remains the same concern for efficiency and,
following from that, the same interest in authority and hierarchy as in previous
works. And a full consideration of the role of public agencies in a democratic
society is lacking—a consideration that might lead us to either a theory of individual responsibility in public organizations or a theory of the public role of
administrative bodies. The extraordinary importance of the rational model is
not to be denied, however. Within the context of technical rationality, Simon’s
exposition of the rational model is classic. If we accept efficiency as the ultimate
criterion for evaluating public agencies, and if we accept the cognitive view of
human beings as mechanistically responding to their environment by seeking
greater utilities, then the conclusions of the rational model seem nearly inevitable. And, as we have noted, a general acceptance of these assumptions has
marked the recent history of public administration theory.
DECISION MAKING AND POLICY FORMULATION
To illustrate further the impact of the rational model, let us turn to two particularly important topics raised in Simon’s work and see how these have been treated by later writers. Of all the issues posed by Simon, perhaps none has received
as much attention in the literature on public administration as the process of
decision making. Although Simon considered Administrative Behavior (1957a) to
be a study of decision making in organizations, he later came to state more
directly what was certainly implicit in his earlier work, that decision making constituted the core of administration—indeed, that decision making was essentially
the same as management itself. Of course, such a view was something of a departure from previous work and suggested a new focus for students of public
administration. In the past, under the influence of the politics–administration
dichotomy, interest in decision making had been concentrated at the highest
organizational levels, where broad policies are made. Simon argued, however,
that decisions at this level simply lead to decisions at other levels, all the way
down through the administrative system. From the decision of the chief
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executive to undertake a new program to the decision of the operative employee
to carry out a given order, the same basic process of decision making occurs. To
understand that process is to understand organizational behavior.
Simon (1967) saw that the decision-making process, at whatever level, consists of three parts: intelligence, design, and choice. By intelligence, Simon referred
to those activities by which one scans the environment and identifies occasions to
make a decision; by design, he referred to finding or developing alternative
courses of action; by choice, he referred to the selection of the alternative with
the best chance of success. Of course, in real life, Simon acknowledged, these
phases are not distinct; however, for analytical purposes, they seem to constitute
the basic elements of decision making.
Given an interest in organizational efficiency, one would expect that decisions
would be carried out in the most rational way possible, and indeed Simon’s argument moved in just this direction. The ideal for rational decision making was the
classic economic model, which assumes that the decision maker is completely
informed of both the goals of the organization and the possible available alternatives and that he or she acts to maximize something (gains, profits, utilities, satisfactions, and so on). Unfortunately, the administrative decision maker can rarely
approximate the kind of rationality required by the classic economic model.
Rarely can the administrator count on full knowledge of the situation, including
the consequences of various courses of action. For this reason, Simon’s “administrative man,” while seeking rationality (still defined in organizational terms), recognizes the limits of his capacity for rational behavior and must satisfice.
Administrative Man versus Economic Man
In contrast to economic man, administrative man seeks to “satisfice” (to find satisfactory solutions) rather than to maximize. Moreover, administrative man is
content with a simplified and incomplete view of the world that can never,
because of human limitations, approximate the complexity of the real world.
As Simon (1957a, p. xxvi) points out, these two characteristics are quite
significant:
In contrast to economic man, administrative man seeks to “satisfice” (to find
satisfactory solutions) rather than to maximize.
First, because he satisfices rather than maximizes, administrative man can
make his choices without first examining all possible behavior alternatives and
without ascertaining that these are in fact all the alternatives. Second, because
he treats the world as rather “empty” and ignores the “interrelatedness of all
things” (so stupefying to thought and action), administrative man is able to
make his decisions with relatively simple rules of thumb that do not make
impossible demands upon his capacity for thought. Simply put, although
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administrative man cannot achieve the ideal behavior of “economic man,” he
does the best he can with what he has.
Several remarks need to be made at this point. First, although administrative
man is capable of only “bounded rationality,” he also must seek rational (efficient) organizational actions. Second, the basic calculus remains the same for
administrative man as for economic man: to whatever extent possible, utilities
are to be maximized. Third, in order to diminish the negative effects of human
irrationality, the organization will impose its own standards of rationality on the
individual. This may occur either through the substitution of organizational decision premises for those of the individual or through molding the individual’s
behavior around programmed decisions or standard operating procedures.
These last points are important to keep in mind. Given Simon’s concern
with the limits of individual rationality and the pervasive influence that his concepts of bounded rationality and satisficing have had across the social sciences,
Simon may be read, mistakenly, as a critic of the rational organization. While
Simon concedes the inherent limitations of the individual actor who, as he
famously says, “has not the wits to maximize,” the organization remains capable
of achieving the comprehensive rationality that the individual alone cannot. It is
not just the individual decision-making process or even a group work process
that needs to be rationalized, but rather the entire organizational system. As
Catlaw (2007, p. 124) writes, “the recognition of limit … applies only to
the … Satisficing Man and not to the formal organization, which becomes a
complex system for rationalizing the ‘irrational,’ subjective [and limiting] element
of the individual decision.”
Lindblom’s Incremental Method
For the student of public organizations, Simon’s important discussion of decision
making had at least two effects: it moved the focus of decision-making studies
from the policy level to the operational level, and it highlighted the tension
between rational behavior and real behavior in human systems. This second
point was soon examined in greater detail by Charles E. Lindblom (1959) in an
article entitled “The Science of Muddling Through.” Here Lindblom outlined
two approaches to policy making (or decision making): the rationalcomprehensive method and the “successive limited comparisons” or incremental
method (p. 81). He then suggested that whereas the rational method had
received the greatest attention in the literature, the incremental method was
much more likely to be used in practice. Moreover, the use of the incremental
method was not just a compromised version of the rational method but in fact
held definite advantages for policy formulation in a democratic society.
Following the rational method, the policy maker would prioritize all relevant values and choose an objective, develop a list of alternative policies, examine these in light of their ability to achieve the desired goal, and then select the
alternative that would maximize the value chosen. Following another approach,
the incremental approach, the policy maker would settle on a limited objective
to be achieved by the policy, outline the few options that were immediately
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available, and then make a choice that combined into one “the choice among
values and the choice among instruments for reaching values” (Lindblom, 1959,
pp. 79–80). The comparisons would be limited by the administrator’s past experience and would likely achieve only partial solutions. For this reason, the policy
maker would expect to repeat this incremental process repeatedly in response to
changing circumstances.
Aspects of the Incremental Method
Several aspects of the incremental model stand out. First, Lindblom argues that,
contrary to the ideal suggested by the rational method of decision making, it is
never possible in real life to sort out and rank all the values of objectives related
to a particular problem. Citizens, elected officials, and other administrators may
differ as to their preferences and may have stated them in the first place. Moreover, in discussions of public policy issues, values quite often conflict with one
another. For this reason, according to Lindblom, values or objectives must be
stated in marginal terms with respect to particular policies. Since the administrator is concerned with the marginal difference between two or more policy alternatives in a given situation, “when he finally chooses between the two marginal
values, he does so by making a choice between policies” (Lindblom, 1959,
p. 83). Second, consistent with the pluralist model of democracy, Lindblom
argues that the most effective public policies are those that are already in effect
and are agreed to by a wide range of competing parties. By seeking incremental
or marginal changes in existing policies, Lindblom argues, the decision maker can
simplify the process of choice to manageable proportions. No longer is it necessary, as in the rational-comprehensive model, to take everything into account.
More important, such an approach to policy formulation is consistent with a
political structure in which the major parties agree on fundamentals and offer
only minor variations in their policy perspectives.
The incremental approach also helps the policy maker to pursue the pluralist
objective of reaching agreement among competing but balanced interests.
Lindblom, for example, recognizes that policy makers often ignore important
possible consequences of alternative policies, yet he contends that if different
groups ignore different consequences, a sense of balance will ultimately be
achieved. Because “almost every interest has its watchdog,” the interaction of
various competing groups will eventually lead to policies that are responsible to
a wide range of interests (Lindblom, 1959, p. 85). In this view, then, the only
test of good policy is that it is agreed on: “For the method of successive limited
comparisons, the test is agreement on policy itself, which remains possible even
when agreement on values is not” (p. 83).
In Lindblom’s view (1959), policy making that occurs through a series of
incremental steps provides the administrator (and in turn the society) with a
number of safeguards against error:
In the first place, past sequences of policy steps have given him knowledge about the probable consequences of further similar steps. Second,
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he need not attempt big jumps toward his goals that would require
predictions beyond his or anyone else’s knowledge, because he never
expects his policy to be a final resolution of a problem. His decision is
only one step…. Third, he is in effect able to test his previous predictions as he moves on to each further step. Lastly, he often can remedy a
past error fairly quickly—more quickly than if policy proceeded through
more distinct steps widely spaced in time. (p. 86)
Ultimately, the method of successive limited comparisons does more than
recognize the limitations of the (hopefully) rational decision maker, as did
Simon; it argues on behalf of an approach to policy making closely tied to the
pluralist view of democracy.
Three Models of Decision Making
Another attempt to outline various approaches to the decision-making process in
public organizations was Graham T. Allison’s account of the 1962 Cuban missile
crisis, Essence of Decision (1971). In his book, Allison argues that most foreign
policy analysts think about particular decisions, such as those faced by John
Kennedy in the missile crisis, in terms of largely implicit conceptual models, and
that these models significantly affect their view of the decision-making process.
Moreover, Allison contends that the classic or “rational actor” model of decision
making, though the most widely used, has serious deficiencies. Two other models, the “organizational process” model and the “governmental politics” model,
may be employed to improve one’s analysis and interpretation (pp. 4–7). Allison,
after presenting the three models, examines the Cuban missile crisis from each
perspective, noting the differences that result.
Allison describes the rational-actor model in terms similar to those used by
Simon and by Lindblom; it involves a process of setting objectives, designing
alternatives, examining consequences, and choosing the alternative that maximizes the objectives. “Rationality refers to consistent, value-maximizing choice
within specified constraints” (p. 30). What is important about Allison’s description of the rational-actor model for our purposes is not the process itself, which
we have encountered before, but the fact that Allison treats this process as the
standard model of decision making. Clearly, Allison contends that most people
who analyze foreign-policy decisions (and, by implication, other government
decisions) utilize the perspective of the rational model. One actor (whether an
individual, a group, or an agency) is taken as central to the analysis; then the
behavior of the actor is analyzed as intentional and goal-seeking. The analyst’s
attention is drawn to such matters as whether the actor followed the best strategy
or whether he or she deviated from what turned out to be the most rational
approach. The rational-actor model therefore directs the policy analyst, and presumably the policy maker, to a set of issues that focus on means rather than ends
in the decision-making process, and this may have little to do with the real contexts in which decisions are made.
Despite what he sees as the prevalence of the rational-actor model in the
analysis of foreign-policy decisions, Allison argues that other models are available,
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two of which he describes in some detail. The organizational process model is
based on the premise that few major government decisions are exclusively the
province of a single organization. Even decisions made at the highest levels of
government require information and advice (in other words, policy direction)
from several agencies. (Similarly, one could argue that decisions made by the
head of an agency require direction from several divisions of the agency.) This
being the case, an understanding of the way policies are eventually derived
requires knowledge of how various organizational components generate outputs
relevant to the policy in question.
Allison’s understanding of organizational theory is based on the work of
Simon as supplemented by the work of Cyert and March (1963) on “the behavioral theory of the firm.” This view sees the organization as less interested in
attaining specific goals or objectives than in operating within the framework of
a set of constraints negotiated through the various components of the organization. Operating within these constraints, the organization attempts to reduce
uncertainty in its environment and to seek out those alternatives that are immediate, available, and related to the problem at hand. Finally, although organizations are relatively stable, they do change to meet environmental demands, thus
providing new and often unexpected outputs. In any case, according to Allison,
the policy process cannot be understood without reference to the operations of
public organizations.
A third model, the governmental politics model, recognizes that major government policies are not made by single rational actors or even by monolithic
groups at the upper reaches of the bureaucracy. Rather, policy is the outcome
of a process of bargaining among individuals and groups with diverse interests
and varying degrees of power to support those interests. When disagreements
occur, parties contend with one another in a political game that leads either to
a victory for one party or, more likely, to a mixed result different from what any
party intended. “[What] moves the chess pieces [is] not simply the reasons that
support a course of action or the routines of organizations that enact an alternative but the power and skill of proponents and opponents of the action in question” (Allison, 1971, p. 145). Like the other models, the governmental process
model is important as a guide to analysis. A particular model directs our attention
to certain topics and focuses our understanding of the decision-making process.
We see the world in different ways, depending on which lens we choose.
CLOSED SYSTEMS VERSUS OPEN SYSTEMS
The works of Lindblom and Allison represent two important shifts away from
Simon’s description of the decision-making process: far less emphasis is placed on
rational choice, even choices made with “bounded rationality,” and far greater
attention is paid to environmental factors. In part, these changes occur as the
focus of attention is shifted back from individual decisions to major policy decisions (although all three writers seem to use decisions and policies interchangeably).
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At the higher level, the influence of nonrational factors is far more striking and the
impact of political bargaining is much easier to recognize. Here the organization is
no longer seen as an isolated unit but as one that is subject to important influences
from its environment.
Strategies for Studying Complex Organizations
These differences in perspective are treated more formally by James D. Thompson
in his characterization of closed-system and open-system strategies for studying
complex organizations. Thompson suggests in Organizations in Action (1967) that
two fairly distinct approaches, closed and open systems, have developed for studying working organizations. Typically, Thompson argues, these approaches have
been considered as competing accounts of how public organizations might work.
In reality, though, modern organizations exhibit the tendencies of both closed and
open systems.
The first of these, the closed-system strategy, is basically concerned with efficiency in the accomplishment of objectives. An attempt is made to employ the
resources of the organization in a functional manner, with each component contributing to the “logic” of the system and with control mechanisms designed to
reduce uncertainty. As examples of closed-system thinking, Thompson cites
Taylor’s scientific management, Gulick and Urwick’s administrative management, and Weber’s concept of bureaucracy. We might also include Simon’s
description of the rational model of administration, or at least those portions of
the model most directly concerned with efficiency and control.
In contrast, the open-system strategy assumes that we cannot fully know all
the variables that may influence the organization, nor can we predict and control
their influence. For this reason, the open-system approach suggests that we
expect surprise or uncertainty. As a natural system, “the complex organization
is a set of interdependent parts which together make up a whole because each
contributes something and receives something from the whole, which in turn is
interdependent with some larger environment” (Thompson, 1967, p. 6). The
goal, the survival of the system, is attained through an evolutionary process of
development. Although changes do occur, the overall tendency of the system is
toward homeostasis, or balance. As examples of this model, Thompson cites
studies of informal organization and studies commenting on the relationship
between the organization and the environment.
Within the field of public administration, at least two major case studies
emphasizing relationships between the organization and its environment have
been produced. To show how they contrast with closed-system thinking, each
is examined briefly in the following two sections.
An Open-System Approach to Organizational Analysis
The first major case study, a study of the emerging Tennessee Valley Authority
entitled TVA and the Grass Roots (1949), was undertaken by Philip Selznick in the
mid-1940s. Selznick was particularly concerned with the grassroots policy of the
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agency, a policy of decentralization and the involvement of already existing local
and state agencies as an approach to democratic planning. However, in the course
of his discussion, Selznick outlined an open-system or institutional approach to
organizational analysis. This approach was also the basis for a later work on the
organizational statesman entitled Leadership in Administration (1957).
Although organizations are often conceived as instruments for achieving
given purposes, according to Selznick (1957, pp. 1–22), they soon take on sociological characteristics that far exceed the closed-system interest in rationality or
efficiency. In the first place, the members of the organization resist being treated
as means; rather, they participate as whole personalities, each having a particular
and unique set of experiences and desires. Second, the organization exists within
an institutional framework that makes certain demands on it. Parties, interest
groups, and other agencies all interact within the same matrix, meaning that no
group is free from the influence of others. For this reason, organizations cannot
escape the impact of these “nonrational” factors.
This condition requires that the organization be analyzed in structuralfunctional terms—that is, with an eye to discovering how the organization adapts
to meet its basic needs for stability and self-preservation. Among such basic needs
is “the stability of informal relations within the organization,” a need that is fulfilled through the development of informal mechanisms that may accommodate
the individual differences noted earlier (Selznick, 1949, p. 252). The informal
system enhances the flow of organizational communication but also restricts the
policy prerogatives of the leadership. Another need of the organization is “the
security of the organization as a whole in relation to social forces in its environment” (p. 252). This need may be met at least in part by developing stable relationships with various actors in the environment, even relationships that may
seem to compromise somewhat the organization’s ability to determine its own
directions.
The Process of Cooptation
One such mechanism, which lies at the core of Selznick’s discussion of TVA, is
called cooptation, defined as “the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization as a means of averting
threats to its stability or existence” (1949, p. 13). Cooptation is seen as a technique
for securing the consent and commitment of potentially threatening groups in the
environment. By bringing these groups into the structure of the organization (e.g.,
by placing persons on advisory groups or by negotiating service agreements with
other agencies), the organization seeks to gain support for its own policies and position. However, as Selznick points out, “the use of formal cooptation by a leadership
does not envision the transfer of actual power” (p. 14). The organization does not,
therefore, offer control, for to do so would be tantamount to handing over the
organization to outsiders. Selznick sees the special role of the organization’s top
leadership as dealing with the institutional character of the group. “The art of the
creative leader is the art of institution building, the reworking of human and technological materials to fashion an organism that embodies new and enduring values”
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(Selznick, 1957, pp. 152–153). As the transition is made from administrative management (which is concerned with productivity and efficiency) to institutional leadership, the executive is faced with new tasks that relate to attaching values and
meaning to the actions of members of the organization. Decisions at this level are
not routine but critical; much attention must be given to the definition of the
group’s purpose and the development of the organization’s character; and the executive must develop effective relationships with those in the environment—relationships that both accommodate the demands of outside groups and maintain the
essential integrity of the organization itself. “If there is a practical lesson for leadership here,” writes Selznick (1957, p. xiii), “it is this: if you have to compromise,
guard against organizational surrender.”
The Impact of Environmental Factors
Another study indicating the importance of environmental factors in shaping the
activities of a public organization was Herbert Kaufman’s study of the U.S. Forest
Service, The Forest Ranger (1960). Kaufman proposed to focus on one problem
facing the Forest Service (as well as other large organizations)—that of “administrative integration.” Given the large distance between broad policy statements
made by those at the top of the organization and the actions taken by those at
the bottom, the potential always exists for substantial discrepancies between the
policy announced and the actions taken. Kaufman therefore sought to examine
those factors beyond the organization’s control that might lead field officers to
deviate from the prescribed path of the organization and those factors that could
be employed by the organization to achieve greater consistency.
Given the large distance between broad policy statements made by those at the top
of the organization and the actions taken by those at the bottom, the potential
always exists for substantial discrepancies between the policy announced and the
actions taken. At the level of the institution, the organization must continually cope
with a high degree of uncertainty.
In the Forest Service, Kaufman found a number of things that might lead
toward fragmentation, most being influences from outside the organization. For
the rangers, “the customs and standards of the communities in which they reside
and the preferences and prejudices they bring with them from their extraorganizational experiences and associations may lead them in a variety of directions”
(p. 57). For example, rangers are occasionally faced with decisions that affect
their local friends and neighbors. In such cases, the rangers’ concerns for these
people may play an important role in their decisions. If firmly established local
interests are involved, the ranger could be subject to serious pressures from the
community. In either case, the unity of the Forest Service might be challenged.
To counter such centrifugal tendencies, the Forest Service, at least in earlier
times, utilized various techniques of integration. These included using procedural
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devices (such as decision-making rules and financial and workload planning),
detecting and discouraging deviation (through reporting, inspections, and, where
necessary, sanctions), and encouraging a certain degree of conformity (through
selection and training). To prevent a ranger from being unduly influenced by
members of the local community, field officers were encouraged to develop a
high degree of identification with the service prior to assuming a position in a community. Personnel were frequently transferred from one location to another,
thereby preventing local interests from becoming more important to the ranger
than the interests of the service. Ultimately, in Kaufman’s view, it is the capacity
of the organization to increase the receptivity of field personnel to organizational
directives that determines the degree of administrative integration achieved. (We
might note that in recent years the Forest Service has adopted a much more decentralized, “empowering” approach to its organization and management. A study of
that organization today might lead Kaufman to quite different conclusions.)
Integrating Open- and Closed-System Approaches
At the beginning of this section, we noted that decision making might be viewed
differently at different locations in the organization. Now that we have seen two
examples of open-system thinking, we may return to this point and attempt to
integrate our knowledge of open and closed systems with a concern for organizational levels. Again we may be aided by the work of James Thompson’s efforts to
reconcile the closed- and open-system approaches based on three organizational
levels of responsibility and control: technical, managerial, and institutional. In his
view (1967, pp. 10–11), each organization consists of various suborganizations: the
technical suborganization is concerned with the effective performance of the actual
task of the organization; the managerial suborganization is concerned with mediating between the technical group and the clients of the organization and with providing the resources necessary to accomplish the technical task; and the
institutional suborganization is concerned with the relationship between the organization as an institution and the wider social system of which it is a part.
Thompson argues that since the closed-system logic of the rational model
seeks to eliminate uncertainty, it would seem advantageous for organizations to
attempt to apply such logic to the operations of the technical core. To the extent
that variables affecting the task of the organization can be brought under control
at this level, greater technical rationality (efficiency) is possible. At the other
extreme, at the level of the institution, the organization must continually cope
with a high degree of uncertainty. Here factors in the environment over which
the organization has no control prove most difficult; thus, open-system logic,
recognizing the influence of outside factors and the likelihood of uncertainty, is
more appropriate. The role of the managerial level is to move back and forth
between these positions. “If the organization must approach certainty at the
technical level to satisfy its rationality criteria but must remain flexible and adaptive to satisfy environmental requirements, we might expect the managerial level
to mediate between them, ironing out some irregularities stemming from external sources but also pressing the technical core for modifications as conditions
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alter” (Thompson, 1967, p. 12). In this way, Thompson sees the possibility of
reconciling the interests of closed and open systems, certainty and uncertainty,
determinateness and indeterminateness, and lays the groundwork for so-called
contingency theories of management.
CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS
Closely related to both the accounts of political decision making described by
Kaufman and Selznick and Thompson’s organizational systems theory, two significant developments in public organizational theory pose important questions
for the rational model of organizations. These are the new institutionalism and
complex adaptive systems theory.
The New Institutionalism
Emerging independently in sociology (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Zucker,
1987), economics (North, 1982; Ostrom, 1990; Williamson, 1985), and political
science (March & Olsen, 1989), the new institutionalism may be the
“hegemonic” or dominant perspective in the study of public organization’s
today (Frederickson & Smith, 2012). Though many theorists never forgot
about institutions, the core idea of the new institutionalism is that “organizations
are comprised of many institutional elements, some rules, norms, or beliefs being
forged in ongoing interaction and others being borrowed from their environments” (Scott, 2008, p. 439). These institutions enable and constrain action and
create the setting within which individuals make evaluations about rational or
appropriate behavior. Like Thompson’s argument about the dynamic of open
and closed systems, organizational actors are seen to be reacting to both institutions internal to the organization, such as policies, informal behavioral expectations, roles, and professional norms; but also to external institutions, like pressures
to adopt “best practices,” to react to global economic forces and election cycles,
and to respond to the rapid transmission of information enabled by social media.
There are many varieties and approaches within the new institutionalism, and
so one should be cautious in drawing general conclusions about it. But there are
three questions that one should pose when considering this approach to organizational life. First, the term “institution” is used to describe such a wide variety of
social phenomena that one might wonder what is not an institution. A related
issue concerns how differing institutions at different levels of analysis relate to
one another. In short, the term “institution” should not be taken for granted.
Second, like the rational model, some strands of new institutionalism may be
criticized for their preoccupation with order and stability and, in turn, an implicit
preference for the status quo. However, while early efforts tended to emphasize
the power of the bureaucratic iron cage, more recently scholars have described
the many overlapping and competing institutions and the fragmented, dynamic
organizational landscape that this implied—a theme Kaufman explored long ago.
This, in turn, permits greater organizational space for individual action.
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Third, there is the question of new institutionalism’s relationship to the rational
model. On the one hand, new institutionalists working out of the rational choice
perspective clearly follow the path laid out by Simon (e.g., Crow & Shangraw,
1989). Institutions give a new name to and quantitatively expand the “boundaries”
of Simon’s bounded rationality within the framework of positivist social science.
For management, the task remains the same: how to use data in order to design
institutional environments so that individuals will “rationally” make decisions that
advance the organizational vision of those in control. On the other hand, other
approaches offer a different account of decision making and managerial action. An
excellent example is Donald Moynihan’s (2008) book The Dynamics of Performance
Management: Constructing Information and Reform. Though he does not rely on new
institutionalism as an explanatory framework, Moynihan’s study of performance
management in three states shows how an array of internal and external institutions
shape the ways in which performance data is generated and used. Rather than
viewing performance information as “facts” for use in rational managerial decision
making, Moynihan describes what actually happens on the ground as an “interactive dialogue model.” In this model, performance data is not self-evident but
becomes meaningful only as the people involved interpret and construct its meaning through an ongoing dialogue within institutional constraints.
Complex Adaptive Systems
Contemporary systems approaches are often described as complex adaptive system
(CAS) theories. Like Thompson, CAS theories seek to describe the dynamic interaction, or feedback, of the inside and outside of the organization (Richardson,
1991). But they make at least three notable qualifications of traditional systems theories, drawing in large part from complexity science and chaos theory. First, CASs
“are understood as dynamic spaces governed by nonlinear processes” (Koliba, Meek,
& Zia, 2011, p. 182). In nonlinear processes, the parts of a system interact in a way
that makes the whole system’s developmental path more uncertain and unpredictable. As Mitchell (2009, p. 38) writes, “changing, hard-to-predict macroscopic
behavior is a hallmark of complex systems.” This complexity and nonlinearity characterizes many public organizations. Gerrits (2012), for example, provides an illuminating case analysis of the Dutch railway system using this framework. Second, CAS
theories emphasize the self-organizing qualities of systems as they constantly learn,
evolve, and adapt to new conditions. Systems and their macro-level properties are
said to emerge through dynamic interaction rather than necessarily through rational
planning or design. The whole is not a simple aggregation of the parts. It is through
the parts’ interaction that an unexpected pattern of the whole becomes recognizable.
Third, those who use CAS theories to study organizational phenomena often use
new methods such as computer simulations or computational modeling to understand complexity and nonlinear processes. In some cases, simulations can serve as a
platform for “participatory modeling,” which refers to the process of incorporating
stakeholders into the modeling process (e.g., Checkland, 2001).
There are many thematic similarities between the new institutionalism and
CAS theories, and we may pose similar questions to them. The first issue concerns
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the “boundary” of the system. Where does “the system” end? How to specify relevant criteria for action? Some theorists view the boundary as being in the “eye of
the beholder” (Meadows, 2008; Gerrits, 2012), whereas others view organizational
boundaries as less difficult to define (Katz & Kahn, 1978). Second, like institutional
theory, a long-standing criticism of systems thinking has been its concern for equilibrium and order and so an implicit preference for those who occupy controlling
social and organizational positions. It would seem that CAS theories overcome this
problem, but it is not so clear. These theories certainly are concerned with change
but also with specifying the fundamental, often static conditions that give rise to
dynamic processes. Similarly, the nonlinear, emergent qualities of complex systems
would seem to supplant rational control in favor of a more collaborative interactive
model, like that suggested by Moynihan or advocated by Koliba, Meek, and Zia
(2011) in their work on governance networks. Yet there also is an abiding interest
in “those features of the world where the details do not matter, where large equivalence classes of structure, action, and so on lead to a deep sameness in being”
(Miller & Page, 2007, p. 7). This tends, again, to reduce complexity and contingency and to give an advantage to those who understand these timeless, deeply
hidden facts. These matters give CASs a similar tension with regard to the rational
model. Thus while we may see organizational complexity as implying the need for
a more cooperative, democratic organizational life, others may see new opportunities for rational design and managerial control.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has examined the rational model of administration and some of the
issues generated by the rational model. It is appropriate to conclude by noting
once more the durability of the rational model. Although a number of challenges
have been presented, the basic commitments of the rational model to a positivist
interpretation of the “facts” of administrative behavior and the use of technical
rationality (often translated as “efficiency”) as the main criteria for evaluating
organizational life remain at the core of thinking about public organizations.
Indeed, as long as these assumptions are held, the rational model appears to be
the only logical approach to understanding organizations. However, as we have
seen, approaches are now being developed that challenge these basic assumptions
and consequently the rational model itself. The following chapter deals in further
depth with these perspectives on organizational behavior.
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
1. What are the key elements of a “scientific” study of human behavior?
2. Discuss the key differences between Dahl and Simon with regard to the
study of administration.
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3. What is the “rational model” of administration? What does Simon mean by
“administrative man”?
4. How would you compare and contrast the differing views of “science”
expressed by theorists like Willoughby and Gulick, and Simon and Dahl?
5. Discuss Lindblom’s “incremental” approach to decision making.
6. What are the differences between “closed systems” and “open systems”?
7. Compare and contrast “institutions” and “systems.”
8. What are some of the ways in which the rational model of organization has
been challenged? Why does this model remain so durable?
CASES
1. Carol Markell is trying to decide which graduate school to attend. What
would her process of making the decision be like if she used an incremental
model? What would it look like if she used a rational model?
2. Edward Anaba is the director of public works for a tribal government in the
southwestern United States. A part of his work involves the direct supervision of key managers in his division, but part also involves working with
other tribal officials and with people in transportation agencies in other local
governments. Sometimes Edward feels that these two aspects of his job
require two different personalities. How would you advise Edward in
attempting to balance these diverse responsibilities?
REFERENCES AND ADDITIONAL READINGS
Allison, Graham T. (1971). Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban missile crisis. Boston,
MA: Little, Brown.
Barnard, Chester I. (1938). Functions of the executive. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Catlaw, Thomas J. (2007). Fabricating the people: Politics and administration in the biopolitical
state. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press.
Checkland, Peter. (2001). Soft systems methodology in action: Participative creation of
an information strategy for an acute hospital. In Jonathan Rosenhead and John
Mingers (Eds.), Rational analysis for a problematic world revisited. Second ed.,
pp. 91–113. Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sons.
Crow, Michael M., & Shangraw, Richard F. (1989). “Public administration as a design
science.” Public Administration Review 49: 153–158.
Cyert, Richard, & March, James A. (1963). A behavioral theory of the firm. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
102 CHAPTER 4
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some third party content may be suppressed from the eBook and/or eChapter(s). Editorial Review has deemed that any suppressed content does not materially
affect the overall learning experience. Cengage Learning reserves the right to remove additional content at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it.
Dahl, Robert A. (1947, Winter). “The science of public administration.” Public
Administration Review 7: 1–11.
DiMaggio, Paul, & Powell, Walter W. (Eds.). (1991). The new institutionalism in
organizational analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Frederickson, H. George, & Smith, Kevin B. (2012). The public administration theory
primer. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Gawthrop, Louis. (1984). Public sector management, systems, and ethics. Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press.
Gerrits, Lasse. (2012). Punching clouds: An introduction to the complexity of public decisionmaking. Litchfield Park, AZ: Emergence Publications.
Horkheimer, Max. (1974). Eclipse of reason. New York: Seabury.
Katz, Daniel, & Kahn, Robert. (1978). The social psychology of organizations. New York:
Wiley.
Kaufman, Herbert. (1960). The forest ranger. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University
Press.
Kingdon, John W. (2003). Agendas, alternatives, and public policies. Second ed. New York:
Addison Wesley Longman.
Koliba, Christopher, Meek, Jack W., & Zia, Asim. (2011). Governance networks in public
administration and policy. Washington, DC: CRC Press.
Lindblom, Charles E. (1959, Spring). “The science of muddling through.” Public
Administration Review 19: 79–88.
March, James G., & Olsen. Johan P. (1989). Rediscovering institutions. Free Press:
New York.
Meadows, Donatella H. (2008). Thinking in systems. White River Junction, VT: Chelsea
Green Publishing.
Miller, John H., & Page, Scott E. (2007). Complex adaptive systems: An introduction to
computational models of social life. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Mitchell, Melanie. (2009). Complexity: A guided tour. Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press.
Moynihan, Donald P. (2008). The dynamics of performance measurement: Constructing
information and reform. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
North, Douglass C. (1982). Structure and change in economic history. New York: W.W.
North.
Ostrom, Elinor. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective
action. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Richardson, George P. (1991). Feedback thought in social science and systems theory.
Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Scott, W. Richard. (1987). Organizations: Rational, natural, and open system. Second ed.
Englewood, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Scott, W. Richard. (1999). Institutions and organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Scott, W. Richard. (2008). “Approaching adulthood: The maturing of institutional
theory.” Theory & Society 37: 427–442.
Selznick, Philip. (1949). TVA and the grass roots. New York: Harper & Row.
Selznick, Philip. (1957). Leadership in administration. New York: Harper & Row.
THE RATIONAL MODEL OF ORGANIZATION 103
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some third party content may be suppressed from the eBook and/or eChapter(s). Editorial Review has deemed that any suppressed content does not materially
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Simon, Herbert A. (1946, Winter). “The proverbs of administration.” Public
Administration Review 6: 53–67.
Simon, Herbert A. (1947, Summer). “A comment on ‘the science of public
administration.’ ” Public Administration Review 7(19): 200–203.
Simon, Herbert A. (1957a). Administrative behavior: A study of decision-making processes in
administrative organizations. Second ed. New York: Free Press.
Simon, Herbert A. (1957b). Models of man. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Simon, Herbert A. (1965, March). “Administrative decision making.” Public
Administration Review 25: 31–37.
Simon, Herbert A. (1967). The shape of automation for men and management. New York:
Harper & Row.
Simon, Herbert A., & March, James G. (1958). Organizations. New York: Wiley.
Simon, Herbert A., Smithburg, Donald W., & Thompson, Victor A. (1950). Public
administration. New York: Knopf.
Thompson, James. (1967). Organizations in action. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Williamson, Oliver. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: The Free
Press.
Zucker, Lynne G. 1987. “Institutional theories of organization.” Annual Review of
Sociology 13: 443–464.
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5
Organizational Humanism and
the New Public Administration
As we have seen, the rational model of administration assumes that human
beings actively make choices, but that the range of their choices can be
significantly affected by those at the top of the organization, the “controlling
group.” Although we may pursue those “utilities” or satisfactions that we personally desire, our behavior may also be modified by institutional arrangements,
guidelines, or “decision premises” imposed from above, which encourage us to
act in a way consistent with the organization’s purpose as defined by those in
charge. We may obey because we seek rewards, because we fear punishments,
or simply because we have been conditioned to obey. In any case, our response
is shaped by forces in the environment subject to managerial manipulation.
In contrast to this viewpoint, the individual may be seen as an active participant
in the development of the social world, one whose needs, intentions, and self-worth
play a major role in determining the course of human events. Here the individual is
not seen as simply a consequence of social forces operating in the environment but
is accorded a far more active and creative role. This view gives precedence to individual feelings and desires, recognizing that human values may sometimes be given
priority over those of the organization. It is this approach to the development of the
human personality that unites an otherwise diverse set of challenges to the rational
model of administration—challenges that sprang from ideas that began to appear in
the 1930s and have remained influential to the present.
This chapter explores the development of these alternatives, characteristically
more humanistic in their orientation yet still best seen as counterpoints to the
prevailing theme of organizational rationality. As an interesting note, although
the more humanistic approaches to organizational life might have been expected
105
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to emerge first in writings on public rather than private management, exactly the
opposite was the case: the main thrust of what came to be called the human
relations approach occurred first in business administration and industrial psychology. Only later did those in public administration take up the themes of
the human relations school and then added their own special perspective.
For this reason, the discussion begins with an examination of the work of
several writers typically associated with business rather than public administration,
especially Chris Argyris, the theorist of this group who has had the greatest impact
on public administration. This discussion is followed by an explanation of the growing interest in organizational change—discussed in public administration largely
under the heading of organization development (OD) and championed by Robert T.
Golembiewski—and by a look at a humanistically based protest movement within
public administration known as the new public administration. Throughout, both the
possibilities and limits of organizational humanism are noted.
THEMES IN ORGANIZATIONAL HUMANISM
Organizational humanism has many loosely connected roots. On the one hand,
scientific studies of worker behavior and informal organization led to the conclusion that more open, participatory styles of management would result in workers
who were not only more satisfied but also more productive. Humanism was
required by the demand for efficiency. On the other hand, examination of the
process of organizational change led many to suggest that increased involvement
of lower-level participants (even the organization’s clients) would facilitate moves
to restructure or reinvigorate organizations. Humanism was required by the
demand for change. Pointing in quite a different direction was a third stream of
thought, primarily social commentary, which held that a humanistic approach to
the individual in an organizational society was itself a priority—that the individual’s efforts to maintain a sense of freedom, creativity, and responsibility in an
age of increasing organization should be encouraged for moral and ethical reasons alone. Humanism was required by the demand for humanism. Each of these
perspectives deserves our attention.
Students of business management who are generally credited with laying the
groundwork for the human relations approach to management and organization
developed their views in contrast to the prevailing administrative management perspective, which sought scientific principles of organizational design that would
enhance the efficiency of the organization. Of these, Chester Barnard may be
taken as representative of a group urging greater attention to informal actors in
organizational life. In addition, the well-known Hawthorne studies illustrate an
increased concern for the social or interpersonal climate of the organization.
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Barnard on Informal Organizations
Although Barnard is often taken as a precursor of the rational model of administration (for his use of an inducements—contributions formula and the notion of a
“zone of indifference”), his work also has interesting humanistic overtones.
Especially in contrast to the structural emphasis of other writers in the later
1930s, Barnard’s recognition of the complexities of human motivation is quite
striking. Barnard (1948, p. 21) begins his book The Functions of the Executive by
arguing that organizational studies always imply a certain view of the individual—
a view that sometimes sees the individual as a product of social forces and at
other times accepts the idea of “freedom of choice and of will.” Barnard does
not attempt to reconcile these two positions but instead makes their contradiction the cornerstone of his theory of organization. Defining a formal organization
as “a system of consciously coordinated activities or forces of two or more persons” (p. 81), Barnard recognizes that such cooperative systems depend on the
participation of the individual and that the wants and desires of the individual,
whether rational or not, must be met for cooperation to result. “If the individual
finds his motives being satisfied by what he does, he continues his cooperative
effort; otherwise, he does not” (p. 57).
The maintenance of the organization, which is the chief function of the
executive, depends less on the design of formal structures of authority than on
an understanding of human motivation. For example, authority is defined not in
terms of hierarchical position but as a form of communication or order capable
of guiding the individual’s behavior. To achieve cooperation, one must take into
account the social circumstances that affect the individual’s willingness to cooperate. Among these is the informal organization that grows up alongside the
formal structure of the organization. Barnard views this matter, like many others,
somewhat dialectically: “Formal organizations arise out of and are necessary to
informal organization; but when formal organizations come into operation,
they create and require informal organizations” (p. 120).
In addition to understanding that social factors underlie cooperative behavior, the executive must also recognize that these factors will be expressed in contradictory ways, as a contest between reason and intuition, independence and
dependence, freedom and control. Rather than seeking the “one best way” of
scientific management or the correct principle of administrative management,
Barnard urges executives to understand the dialectical nature of human cooperation. “Cooperation and organization as they are observed and experienced are
concrete syntheses of opposed facts and of opposed thought and emotions of
human beings. It is precisely the function of the executive to facilitate the synthesis in concrete action of contradictory forces, to reconcile conflicting forces,
instincts, interests, conditions, positions, and ideals” (p. 21). In this, the executive
bears a moral responsibility to expand the field of cooperation and choice and to
enhance the development of the individual. One cannot occur without the
other.
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The executive bears a moral responsibility to expand the field of cooperation and
choice and to enhance the development of the individual. One cannot occur
without the other.
The Hawthorne Experiments
Whereas Barnard based his conclusions on experience and philosophical reflection, another group of writers developed similar positions based on rigorous
empirical research. In 1927, a group of researchers from Harvard University
began a series of studies of working conditions at the Hawthorne Works of the
Western Electric Company in Chicago. The experiments, basically following in
the scientific management tradition, were initially concerned with the relationship between working conditions (such as lighting, temperature, and humidity)
on the one hand and aspects of worker productivity (such as fatigue and monotony) on the other. In the conduct of the research, certain groups of workers
were treated as an experimental group, isolated from others in the plant and
asked to work under varying conditions. Both the conditions and the productivity of the workers were measured precisely. Yet, as the experiment proceeded,
the expected relationships between working conditions and productivity failed to
materialize. Indeed, despite all the variations in conditions, productivity generally
continued to increase.
For this reason, the researchers turned to the informal or social factors that
might be affecting the workers’ motivation. The special attention accorded the
test group, particularly the changes in supervisory practice required in the experiments, was apparently influencing productivity more than changes in physical
conditions. A significant increase in the morale and solidarity of the test group
was noted, as was a change in the relationship between the workers and their
supervisors. Specifically, “social conditions had been established which allowed
the operators to develop their own values and objectives” (Roethlisberger &
Dickson, 1940, p. 561). These observations led the study team to important conclusions concerning both the nature of supervision and the influence of the
informal organization.
The researchers moved to the theoretical position that any complex industrial organization serves two different purposes: the stated purpose of producing
certain goods or services and the purpose of “creating and distributing satisfactions among the individual members of the organization” (p. 562). Among the
satisfactions desired are not only monetary incentives and proper physical conditions, but also social and psychological rewards. This being the case, the form of
supervision that utilizes effective human relations will be most effective. The role
of the manager reflects the dual purposes of the organization. On the one hand,
the manager seeks to accomplish the organization’s purposes; on the other, the
manager’s job, just as Barnard said, is to maintain the equilibrium of the organization, to balance satisfaction and cooperation. One cannot underestimate the
role of the informal organization in achieving this end. Indeed, the researchers
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concluded that “the limits of human collaboration are determined far more by
the informal than the formal organization of the plant” (p. 568).
The widely publicized Hawthorne experiments, like the work of Chester
Barnard, provide a sharp contrast to the prevailing 1930s interpretation of organizations as dependent on carefully designed formal structures of authority. These
experiments held instead that the behavior of individual workers is the key to
organizational work and that securing the cooperation of the employees is the
central problem of organization. Moreover, they held that both psychological
satisfactions and the benefits of a positive social environment influenced worker
productivity. But despite these shifts, it was clear that the chief objective of the
manager (and, not coincidentally, the chief concern of the management scientist)
was still to find the most efficient way to secure worker compliance with the
wishes of management. This objective led to a search for the most effective techniques of human relations—those that would increase worker satisfaction but,
more important, increase the productivity of the organization.
McGregor’s “Theory X and Theory Y”
Many students of human relations emerged in the following years, but two
of the most popular formulations were Douglas McGregor’s “Theory X and
Theory Y” and Robert Blake and Jane Mouton’s “Managerial Grid.” In his
book The Human Side of Enterprise, McGregor (1960, p. 561) pursues the argument that successful management depends on “the ability to predict and control
human behavior” and that developments in the social sciences are providing the
basis for a new approach to more effective management. This new approach to
management is contrasted to more traditional forms in terms of the basic assumptions it makes about human behavior. According to McGregor (1960, pp. 33–34),
managers in industry and writers on management traditionally have made the
following assumptions about the worker:
1. The average human being has an inherent dislike of work and will avoid it
if he or she can.
2. Because of this human characteristic of dislike of work, most people must
be coerced, controlled, directed, or threatened with punishment to get them
to put forth adequate effort toward the achievement of organizational
objectives.
3. The average human being prefers to be directed, wishes to avoid responsibility, has relatively little ambition, and wants security above all.
Based on these “Theory X” assumptions, an approach to management has
developed that relies on rewards and punishments, incentives, threats, coercion,
and control. McGregor, however, holds that such an approach to management is
ineffective, even in its “softest” versions, for it neglects the social and ego needs
of individuals.
A recognition of these needs by modern social science results in an alternative set of assumptions about human behavior and leads to an alternative
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approach to management. These are McGregor’s new assumptions, “Theory Y”
(1960, pp. 47–48):
1. The expenditure of physical and mental effort in work is as natural as play or
rest.
2. External control and the threat of punishment are not the only means for
bringing about effort toward organizational objectives. People will exercise
self-direction and self-control in the service of objectives to which they are
committed.
3. Commitment to objectives is a function of the rewards associated with their
achievement.
4. The average human being learns, under proper conditions, not only to
accept but to seek responsibility.
5. The capacity to exercise a relatively high degree of imagination, ingenuity,
and creativity in the solution of organizational problems is widely, not
narrowly, distributed in the population.
6. Under conditions of modern industrial life, the intellectual potentialities of
the average human being are only partially utilized.
The organizational principle to which these assumptions point is integration,
the creation of conditions under which the individual’s own objectives will be
obtained at the same time that he or she contributes to the attainment of the
organization’s goals. The worker is to be integrated into the organization—that
is, managers must take care to determine the needs and desires of their employees, perhaps through more open and participatory modes of conduct, and then
help orient those individual objectives so that they can be best obtained through
work toward the organization’s objectives.
PERSONALITY AND ORGANIZATION
A far more sophisticated interpretation of the relationship between the individual
and the organization, one more suggestive of alternative theoretical possibilities, is
found in the work of Chris Argyris. Argyris gained early prominence with the
publication of Personality and Organization (1957), a review and synthesis of previous literature on the interchange between the individual personality and the
demands of the organization. Following this theoretical statement, Argyris (1962)
then conducted a number of empirical studies related to various aspects of his theory, especially interpersonal competence and organizational effectiveness. More
recently, Argyris has focused on management and OD or, more broadly, what
he terms “organizational learning.” In this section, the connections between
Argyris’s work and the work of other human relations theorists is examined,
as are some ways in which Argyris seems to be moving toward an alternative
conception of organizational life.
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Management Practice and Individual Growth
In Personality and Organization, Argyris argues that formal organizational structures
and traditional management practices tend to be at odds with certain basic trends
toward individual growth and development. Reviewing studies of personality
development, Argyris (1962, p. 50) concluded that people in our society tend,
in their growth from infancy to adulthood, to move from passivity to activity,
from dependence to independence, from a limited to a greater range of behaviors, from shallow to deeper interests, from a shorter to a longer time perspective, from a subordinate position to a position of equality or superordination, and
from a lack of awareness to greater awareness. Movement along each of these
dimensions constitutes growth in the direction of a healthier adult personality.
In contrast, standard management practice, guided by the theory of formal organization, directly inhibits the growth of the individual. The specialization of tasks
and the concentration of power and information that characterize formal organizations imply certain assumptions about the human personality—assumptions that better describe infants than adults. For example, in most organizations, employees have
very little control over their work and are expected to be dependent, submissive,
and limited in the range of their responses. Under such conditions, in which normal
opportunities for growth and development are restricted, employees experience considerable frustration, which manifests itself in many ways ranging from regression to
hostility. Moreover, individuals employing these patterns of adaptation are given
support by others similarly situated, and their behavior is thereby reinforced.
From the perspective of management, this behavior is highly dysfunctional,
for it limits the contributions that the individual and the group make to the work
of the organization. A typical response on the part of management is to crack
down, to take strong actions to control what is seen as negative behavior. If
managers assume (as in Theory X) that workers are basically lazy, then the apathy
exhibited by frustrated employees just confirms this view and calls for an authoritarian response. Of course, such a response simply leads to further frustration on
the part of workers, which is in turn met by further crackdowns by management,
thereby continuing the cycle.
A healthier approach, both for management and for the worker, would
begin with an understanding of the individual’s basic tendencies to grow and
develop; management would then seek to fuse these tendencies with the
demands of the organization’s task. Presumably, such an effort would provide
optimal self-actualization for both the individual and increased efficiency for the
organization. The difficult task of achieving this congruence or fusion of individual needs and organizational demands belongs to the executive.
A healthier approach would begin with an understanding of the individual’s basic
tendencies to grow and develop; management would then seek to fuse these
tendencies with the demands of the organization’s task.
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The effective leader, according to Argyris (1962), has a clear understanding
of the organizational context: “There is no one predetermined correct way to
behave as a leader. The choice of leadership pattern should be based on an accurate diagnosis of the reality of the situation in which the leader is embedded”
(p. 207). The key to such “reality-centered leadership” is the manager’s capacity
to observe a situation, diagnose what is actually happening, and learn from the
experience. This requires that the manager develop “skill in self-awareness, in
effective diagnosing, in helping individuals grow and become more creative, in
coping with dependent-oriented … employees, and in surviving in a competitive
world of management” (p. 213).
Argyris’s emphasis on learning about self and others provides an important
connection between his early work on personality and organization and his later
work on organizational change; it also suggests an important distinction between
his work and that of other human relations theorists. Certainly, much of Argyris’s
work, like the work of other human relations theorists, may be appropriated by
management for the more sophisticated manipulation of organizational members.
But such a use of human relations techniques does not involve any real sense of
engagement between the leader and the group, no implication of fraternity or
community. A commitment to learning, however, implies a relationship involving
shared meanings and raises the possibility of creating conditions not only of trust,
openness, and self-esteem but also of community. This potentially radical implication of Argyris’s work, an implication that Argyris himself has not fully developed,
is pertinent to a discussion of his view of organizational change.
If most organizations today suffer from mistrust, closed communication, and
excessive formalization, how may we introduce changes in the direction of greater
interpersonal trust, more open communication, and a greater degree of personal and
organizational flexibility? Argyris (1972) responds—following the social psychologist
Kurt Lewin—that an unfreezing of older patterns of behavior must occur, followed
by the adoption of new patterns that are then frozen in place. Obviously, such a
process is difficult, especially where a projected change would deviate significantly
from existing norms and thus involve a high degree of personal and systemic discomfort. In behavioral science approachs to planned change, often discussed as OD—
organization development—Argyris finds an approach to move organizations and
their members toward more positive and congruent relationships.
The Role of the Interventionist
Most OD programs involve an interventionist, typically someone from outside the
organization who works with those in the client system either to improve the
effectiveness of existing interpersonal relationships or to facilitate the implementation of planned changes in the organization’s operations. Although OD efforts may
indeed move the organization’s members toward greater openness and trust, there
is always the possibility that they may simply enhance managerial control. Argyris’s
particular formulation of the tasks of the interventionist is suggestive of more democratic outcomes. Just as a manager’s behavior should not create excessive resistance and dependency on the part of workers, neither should the interventionist’s
actions create those conditions in the focal organization. To avoid this, Argyris
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(1970) proposes three primary tasks for the interventionist: “(1) to help generate
valid and useful information; (2) to create conditions in which clients can make
informed and free choices; and (3) to help clients develop an internal commitment
to their choice” (pp. 12–13). The role of the interventionist is to facilitate personal
and organizational learning, an issue that requires special attention.
Writing with a colleague, Argyris and Donald Schon (1978) argue that individuals and organizations hold “espoused theories” (those theories of action we
profess to follow in our behavior) and “theories-in-use” (those we actually do follow). For effective learning to occur—that is, for learning to affect action—our
espoused theories and our theories-in-use must become more compatible and
must be subject to change when we detect problems in their functioning. When
organization members discover problems that affect the organization’s ability to
carry out its theories-in-use, they may make alterations that Argyris and Schon call
“single-loop learning.” But when organizational inquiry attempts to set “new priorities and weightings of norms” or to restructure the norms themselves, “doubleloop learning” is said to occur (p. 24). Beyond this, individuals and organizations
engage in “deutero-learning,” which is essentially learning about learning. Here,
people examine previous instances of learning or failing to learn. “They discover
what they did that facilitated or inhibited learning, they invent new strategies for
learning, they produce these strategies, and they evaluate and generalize what they
have produced” (p. 27). In other words, they refine their theory of learning.
Argyris’s point seems to be that organizations and individuals facing the complexities and turbulence associated with modern life must constantly inquire into their
own capacities to learn effectively, and that they may be assisted in this by an interventionist. The interventionist then becomes a researcher, an educator, and a change
agent. Of course, in an organization whose members are committed to learning, this
role belongs to the manager. The interventionist and the manager then assume the
same role, but this result poses a dilemma for Argyris. The manager is not disinterested but one who has a personal interest in the life of the organization. Also, being
in a position of some power, the manager has a stake in the status quo, a vested
interest in maintaining the structure of power as it is. When learning occurs that is
critical of the existing normative structure of the organization, the manager must
choose either to act authoritatively to preserve the organization as it is or to act democratically to help alter the group’s norms. Obviously, a full commitment to doubleloop learning would require the latter, yet Argyris is ambiguous on this point.
POSTSCRIPT ON MOTIVATION AND
ORGANIZATIONAL HUMANISM
Since MacGreggor and Argyris, of course, there has been extensive theoretical
and empirical scholarship in the area of motivation (Denhardt, Denhardt, &
Aristiguesta, 2009, Ch. 6) and how institutional arrangements influence individual
motivation and organizational productivity. Some of this work has been summarized
by Daniel Pink (2011) in his widely read and accessible book, Drive: The Truth
About What Motivates Us. Drawing on current behavioral research and echoing the
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decades-old views of MacGreggor and Argyris, Pink argues that the rewards-based
“carrot and sticks” system of motivation is dominant in organizational life today.
Unfortunately, this approach remains misguided because rewards, such financial
and performance incentives, often do not work and can even diminish individual
interest in work. Such carrots can also “crowd out” other kinds of intrinsic motivation and limit creativity, especially in nonroutine work tasks where innovation is
increasingly important. Ultimately, people seem to thrive when they are permitted
autonomy in their work, feel competent but yet challenged to improve in the task,
and see their work as connected to a purpose larger than themselves.
This “carrot and stick” model of motivation has played an important role in
the market-style administrative reforms of public organizations as well as much of
the criticism of public employees during the last thirty years (discussed in Chapter 6). These reforms have been informed by a theory of motivation in line with
the rational model of organization that holds that individuals are rationally selfinterested actors. In turn, institutions must be reorganized in line with this
motivational core to advance public purposes. Managers are urged to “get the
incentives rights” and introduce pay-for-performance programs. In public
administration, the topic of “public service motivation” (PSM) has received considerable attention in the field (Perry & Hondeghem, 2008) and aims, in part, to
correct this approach. PSM concerns the “mechanisms unique to public institutions that energize and direct behavior” that can encourage altruistic or other
regarding behavior (Perry & Hondeghem, 2008, p. 5). Consistent with Pink’s
argument, some scholars in public administration, such as Donald Moynihan
(2008), argue that the adoption of these market-style reforms create organizational environments that work against this form of motivation.
It is valuable for students of public organization to familiarize themselves
with the many advances in theories of motivation and to appreciate how various
theories may imply different managerial strategies. For purposes of the argument
in this book, however, the basic question for organizational humanism remains
the same: Are the uses of motivational theories themselves motivated by a desire to
secure employee compliance and the legitimacy and goals of the controlling
group? How one answers this question indicates whether organizational humanism serves as an instrument of manipulation or an aid in exploring how the many
complex individual lives in modern organizations can be brought together to
shape and advance common purposes.
ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT IN
THE PUBLIC SECTOR
An interesting public sector parallel to the work of Chris Argyris is found in the
extensive writings of Robert T. Golembiewski. From his early work on small
groups and organizational behavior as well as his thinking on ethics and management, Golembiewski has moved to a more sustained focus on OD as a perspective from which to view growth and change in public organizations.
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Moral Management
Golembiewski’s early Men, Management, and Morality (1967) can be read in several different ways: as a beginning study in administrative ethics, as another
attempt to integrate the individual and the organization, or as a prelude to
behavioral science applications to achieve planned change. Golembiewski begins
with the standard human relations argument that traditional theories of organization—with their emphasis on top-down authority, detailed supervision, and
organizational routine—do not allow for the simultaneous development of the
individual. However, where Argyris based his argument on increasing the psychological maturity of the individual, Golembiewski raises a different issue: In
his view, the failure of formal theories of organization to address the question
of individual freedom reveals an insensitivity to the moral posture of the individual worker. In Men, Management, and Morality (1967, p. 53), Golembiewski
argues that an expanding body of research indicates that “moral sensitivity can
be associated with satisfactory output and employee satisfaction.”
Specifically, Golembiewski (1967, p. 65) points to five values associated with
economic life that, he says, follow from the Judeo-Christian ethic:
1. Work must be psychologically acceptable to the individual.
2. Work must allow man [sic] to develop his own faculties.
3. The work task must allow the individual considerable room for selfdetermination.
4. The worker must have the possibility of controlling, in a meaningful way,
the environment within which the task is to be performed.
5. The organization should not be the sole and final arbiter of behavior; both
the organization and the individual must be subject to an external moral
order.
These values are then examined in light of new ways of organizing that are
said to lead to the enhancement of the Judeo-Christian ethic while, not incidentally, being associated in the behavioral science literature with high employee
satisfaction and high output. For example, the first value is discussed in terms of
job rotation and job enlargement, and so forth.
Individual Freedom versus Managerial Control
Although Golembiewski’s (1967) stated objective in this review is “to enlarge the
area of discretion open to us in organizing and to increase individual freedom,”
in the end, it seems that much more of the former than the latter has been
accomplished (p. 305). The managerial techniques discussed hardly extend
beyond a litany of human relations efforts in complex organizations. Very little
is omitted. Theory X and Theory Y, the Managerial Grid, Argyris’s work on
personality and organization—all are present and contribute to a general view
of more open and participatory management leading to greater worker satisfaction and organizational productivity. One is left to wonder, however, given
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Golembiewski’s concern for the individual and the Judeo-Christian ethic,
whether worthwhile efforts might be made to increase individual freedom,
even if they were possible only at some cost to organizational productivity. But
this possibility is not considered. In the absence of such a discussion, one is again
left with the feeling that the human relations school is simply providing, even if
unintentionally, a greater range of techniques for managerial control—techniques
that can be sold to workers on an ethical basis and enhance the legitimacy of
management’s actions.
For Golembiewski, the dilemma is most clear (although still unresolved) in
his discussion of the fifth value—that the organization must not be the final arbiter of behavior—that an external moral order should be used to evaluate both
the individual and the organization. Golembiewski correctly points out that as
long as complex organizations are permitted to do so, they develop their own
moral standards, which may be considerably at odds with those of the individual
or the larger society. But rather than confront the task of building a sociopolitical
ethic based on democracy, socialism, or whatever, Golembiewski (1967) chooses
instead to discuss the issue of centralization and decentralization in organizations.
He posits decentralization as the answer to “the central moral question”—
indeed, “[d]ecentralization is the creature and creator of this entire analysis”
(p. 286). Presumably, individuals in decentralized organizational structures
would have greater moral latitude. Although this might be true, the ethic of
the organization would still assert itself, especially since “… freedom to act in a
decentralized structure is paid for by adherence to corporate policies” (p. 273).
The freedom of the individual would still be defined by the organization; there
would be no external moral order to which both the individual and the organization could be held accountable.
Although Golembiewski’s Men, Management, and Morality falls far short on
this point, one might certainly make a more positive evaluation of this work,
especially in the interest of building a theory of public organizations. In contrast
to the strong positivist orientation in public administration, a tradition to which
he largely subscribes, Golembiewski directly opens the question of morality in
organizations. Unlike those who seek a strict separation of fact and value, he
seeks an integration of the two—one might even say a connection between
objectivity in theory and ethics in practice. Moreover, it is noteworthy that
Golembiewski’s analysis ultimately leads to the issue of decentralization.
Although his treatment of decentralization is far too narrow to constitute the
basis for an external moral order—one could hardly base such an order, as he
does, on the fact that Du Pont seems to have profited from decentralization—
the issue of decentralization does point in two interesting directions. First, it
implies that the relationship between the individual and the organization (or
the society) must be resolved in moral and political terms rather than in terms
of managerial technique. Second, it raises the question of how organizations
might be reformed to extend the moral benefits of decentralization while also
maintaining the material benefits of increased productivity. It would have been
interesting if Golembiewski had chosen to emphasize the former in his later
work; instead, he chose to emphasize the latter.
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“Meta Values” and Organizational Change
Golembiewski’s approach to organizational change is stated most clearly in his
book Renewing Organizations, published in 1972 and revised and extended in
1979 under the title Approaches to Planned Change. In these works, Golembiewski
relies on his earlier examination of the dynamics of small-group behavior to detail
a laboratory approach to organizational change—that is, an approach dependent
on changes in learners induced through the experience of the learners themselves
in direct social encounters, as in T groups. Golembiewski sees the laboratory
approach as the larger genre from which OD activities flow, and in his discussion
of organization development techniques, Golembiewski (1972, p. 112) deviates
little if at all from mainstream OD practice. He does, however, pay considerably
more attention than many other writers to the value implications of his work.
Since these issues have direct consequences for building a theory of public organization, as we see in Golembiewski’s own work, the following discussion focuses
less on specific techniques of OD, survey feedback, team building, and career
development than on the value implications of such work.
Golembiewski (1972, pp. 60–66) sees five “metavalues” as guiding the laboratory approach to personal and organizational change:
1. Acceptance of inquiry based on mutual accessibility and open
communication.
2. Expanded consciousness and recognition of choice, especially the willingness
to experiment with new behaviors and to choose those that seem most
effective.
3. A collaborative concept of authority, emphasizing cooperation and willingness to examine conflicts openly and with an eye toward their resolution.
4. Mutual helping relationships with a sense of community and responsibility
for others.
5. Authenticity in interpersonal relationships. These values not only define the
structure of the laboratory situation (for example, the T group), but also
provide a model for the organization as a whole.
These values are both the guiding principles of the interventionist and the ultimate values that he or she seeks to establish in the organization.
Since these values stand in considerable contrast to the traditional values of
bureaucratic management, they would seem to urge an alternative to such
approaches, at least at the level of theory. Golembiewski argues that the traditional pyramidal values are indeed often dysfunctional and in need of replacement. In contrast, he outlines a collaborative–consensual system of management
emphasizing openness, confrontation, feedback, and shared responsibility. Yet
this new model never appears to be a direct substitute for bureaucracy. Rather,
following the logic of contingency management, it appears to be a convenient
alternative in certain circumstances.
In certain kinds of organizations, such as military or police organizations,
mechanical or functional systems may be required. “Inducing aspirations about
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consensus in such organizations, consequently, may be foolhardy. Or inducing
such aspirations may even be cruel, if compelling considerations require a structure within which only centralized conventions for decision making are realistic”
(Golembiewski, 1972, p. 571). Yet who is to determine whether considerations
are compelling? It is more likely to be the manager than the interventionist, and
more likely either of these than the worker. Organization development efforts
do not envision greater worker freedom or satisfaction at the cost of productivity. Indeed, “the implied exchange is that, as individuals can approach those multiple humanistic values in organizations, so also will they be fuller and freer
contributors to the organizational task…. OD does not contemplate some kind
of free ride, in short” (Golembiewski & Eddy, 1978, p. 11).
Organization development seeks certain metavalues, including those that are
at odds with traditional bureaucratic concerns; yet it also seeks “narrower organization goals that are managerially desired” (Golembiewski, 1972, p. 10). The
potential conflict between the two and the potential conflict between the interventionist and the manager raise moral questions that date to Men, Management,
and Morality, but they also raise political questions. Whereas some OD, such as
Argyris, seem careful not to impose their own values, Golembiewski seems to
urge his followers to do so. That their values might initially appear more attractive to those interested in democratic systems makes their imposition no more a
matter of choice than the imposition of other values.
Implications of Golembiewski’s Work
Despite its shortcomings, Golembiewski’s discussion may, in one important way,
carry more significance for the field than even he recognizes. Let us examine
Golembiewski’s argument from the standpoint of Thomas Kuhn’s book The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970). Kuhn argues that certain traditions of scientific inquiry act as models for scientific work. These paradigms do not come
about incrementally, nor do they change incrementally. Rather, various paradigms may compete for acceptance in a field, especially as scientists discover
“anomalies,” or things that simply cannot be explained within the current paradigm. Eventually one of the alternative paradigms may come to be accepted in
what Kuhn calls a “scientific revolution.”
Let us assume for a moment that students of public administration have
reached some agreement about the appropriate questions to ask and the ways
to ask them—in other words, that a paradigm is currently in operation. This
would suggest that the theoretical differences have occurred within the framework of some greater agreement about the field. How might we describe this
agreement? As we have seen, most theories of public administration are concerned with the efficiency of public organizations in elaborating public policies
through generally hierarchical structures within which various mechanisms are
employed to achieve compliance. Moreover, students of public administration
share a general concern for developing their field through an application of
objectivist or positivist social science based on the observation of manifest behavior and on the propositional frameworks constructed from the resulting data.
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These two thrusts, in turn, imply a particular view of the relationship between
theory and practice in public administration. Regardless of whether this area of
general agreement is called paradigmatic in Kuhn’s terms, existing approaches to
theory clearly have much more in common than is apparent on the surface.
If this is the case, we would expect the greatest turbulence in the discipline
to be caused not by those developments, such as the rational model of administration or mainstream organization development, which are consistent with this
basic pattern, but instead by those perspectives that appear to challenge fundamental and unquestioned beliefs. One body of work that had just such an effect
on the field of public administration is the “new public administration.” For that
reason, before the possibilities for agreement in public administration are
explored further, it will be helpful to consider the anomalies cited by the new
public administration.
THE NEW PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
An interesting chapter in the development of public administration theory in the
United States is still typically called the new public administration, even though
this “new” public administration was born back in 1968. Some feel that the new
public administration sought a comprehensive alternative to the existing patterns
of research and teaching in public administration, that the new public administration represented a paradigmatic challenge to the field. Others feel that its work
was more limited, that its proponents pointed out certain problems in existing
approaches but lacked a specific alternative focus. We tend toward the latter
view. Although we feel that the new public administration held and continues
to hold significance for the field of public administration, its significance lies
more in its discovery of anomalies within the framework of traditional theories
and the lines of thought that it has inspired (explored in Chapter 7) than in the
presentation of a coherent alternative.
The Minnowbrook Perspective
To begin with, the so-called new public administration was a far more modest
effort than either friends or foes like to believe. If it can be said to have constituted a movement, it did so only symbolically, as a result of the attributions of
others rather than of any coherence among its members. The new public administration began with a conference held in late 1968 at Syracuse University’s
Minnowbrook Conference Center. The conference was designed to bring
together a number of the most promising young scholars in the field of public
administration to discuss their interests and approaches and, by implication, to consider how those might differ from the approaches of more established writers in
the field. Papers and comments presented at the conference were collected and
published under the title Toward a New Public Administration (Marini, 1971), a volume that its editor, Frank Marini, heralded as presenting the “Minnowbrook
perspective.” Since the movement now had a name, the name had to have a
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movement. Thus, despite the remarkable diversity of the papers in the Minnowbrook
volume [and in a related work, Public Administration in a Time of Turbulence (Waldo,
1971)], a movement was born—a movement that was, from the beginning, more
fictional than real.
Although some who identified with the new public administration had leftist
tendencies, this movement was hardly as radical as those that arose in nearly all
other social science disciplines during that period. For example, unlike their
counterparts in other disciplines, the younger students of public administration
sought neither a radical caucus within the field nor alternative journals to express
their views. Intellectually, there was also little coherence. Although certain
themes dominated the Minnowbrook discussions and many that followed,
those themes were largely adaptations of more general demands for relevance,
equity, and participation. No single approach to understanding public organizations emerged to challenge the existing pattern of agreement within the field.
Yet the demands were clearly troublesome in that existing approaches to the
field apparently could not respond—a fact discomforting to many (not only
intellectually, but also personally).
Politics and Administration
If any vestiges of the old politics–administration dichotomy remained by the
mid-1960s, they were effectively eliminated by the new public administration.
It did so not by arguing, as earlier scholars had, that the dichotomy was not a
real one—that administrators do make policy—but by arguing instead that
administrators should make policy. In part, this argument was a response to the
failure of other political agencies, such as the executive and the legislature, to
address in any satisfactory fashion such issues as poverty, racism, and war. If
they could not (or would not) do so, then perhaps the time was right for administrators to take matters into their own hands. But the new public administration
also directed its challenge closer to home, for it was apparent that scholars in
public administration and political science were unable to provide knowledge
relevant to these problems. The preoccupation of public administration with
administrative management and the fascination of political science with behavioralism had prevented scholars from approaching public problems in a way
that would help society resolve those problems that were most pressing. According to LaPorte (1971):
Contemporary public administration exists in a state of antique maladapted analytical models and normative aridity. There is almost no basis
for rejecting or accepting either substantive problems or analytical
models save political-administrative crises or academic fashion. Teaching
and research tend to be based on past problems or instant response to
present “establishment” problem definitions. Both bases have limited
utility in developing administrative vision, political leadership, or
intellectual vigor and a kind of wandering relevance to students,
practitioners, and the future. (p. 21)
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For the field of public administration, the question was not simply the
“recovery of relevance,” to borrow Todd LaPorte’s phrase. After all, as many
of those who objected to the new public administration pointed out, the study
of public administration had always been closely tied to the practical operations
of government, especially to efforts at government reform. Indeed, the standard
charge made by most other academics was that public administration, as a field of
study, was too practical, too relevant. The agenda that the new public administration actually urged, therefore, was not to recover relevance but to become
relevant in broader terms, to become relevant to the political system as well as
to its administrative elements.
One of the Minnowbrook participants put it this way: “Public administration is not merely the instrument for executing public policy but one determinant of the way in which the public sees the world—particularly the political
world—and their own place in it” (Crenson, 1971, p. 88). Although it was perhaps intended as an instrument for carrying out the will of the executive and the
legislature, the public bureaucracy in modern society—simply by virtue of its
immense presence and complexity—impacts the political system in many ways.
Not only are important issues decided within the bureaucracy, public organizations direct the attention of the public, play a significant role in setting the public
agenda, and help to establish the values of the society. Public organizations are
therefore not only on the periphery of politics but also in its mainstream.
Not only are important issues decided within the bureaucracy; public organizations
direct the attention of the public, play a significant role in setting the public agenda,
and help to establish the values of society.
This being the case, the study of public administration must be drawn away
from narrow studies of administrative procedures to a broader concern for the
way in which policies are shaped, confirmed, and managed in a democratic society. The closed-system view must give way to an open-system perspective that
would help in understanding the policy process more completely. In part, such a
study would be empirically based, and several of the Minnowbrook papers discussed how this might come about. However, it would also be normative; it
would involve both students and practitioners of public administration in an
effort to prescribe the appropriate directions for the society and the ways in
which those directions might be pursued. In facing this issue, the new public
administration confronted the old fact-value distinction.
Facts versus Values
According to the new public administrationists, social scientists had failed to produce relevant knowledge in part because their commitment to positivism had
limited their activities to data collection and statistical manipulation, leading
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toward empirically based theory. Although it was not overtly challenging this
approach (except in one case noted below), the new public administration
sought a recognition of the values at play in the research process and a stronger
advocacy role for social scientists. For example, it was pointed out that the values
of both the scientists and their subjects often impinge on the value-free ideal of
positive social science and that a recognition of this potential might both clarify
the research process and make it more relevant to the solution of social problems.
A scientist, it was noted, chooses a topic of study that is of personal interest, not
one dictated by the discipline. Presumably, scientists with a heightened sense of
social awareness would address problems of importance to the society. Moreover,
recognition of the possibility of bias enables the scientist to be more careful in
protecting the objectivity of the research and therefore the validity of the
result.
The next step for the scientist is to use the knowledge gained through the
research activity for improvements in social conditions. The scientist’s responsibility
does not end with the production of knowledge but rather includes its dissemination, especially to those in a position to influence public policy in the chosen
direction. Students of public administration were urged, therefore, to make themselves available to policy makers and, based on their greater understanding, to
become advocates for change. The new public administration, then, was explicitly
normative in its thrust. Although research might be empirically based, normative
conclusions were seen as not only inevitable but also necessary.
Was the new public administration, through its greater attention to normative concerns, raising a basic challenge to positivism or merely urging its reform?
The latter seems to be the position of George Frederickson (1971), who commented in the Minnowbrook volume that the new public administrationists
were neither antipositivist nor antiscientific but merely interested in using their
scientific and analytical skills to understand the impact of various policies and to
explore new ways of satisfying client demands. Frederickson described the new
public administrationists at Minnowbrook with some accuracy as “second generation” behavioralists, a term much like Gary Wamsley’s later (1976) postulation
of a “new social science” (p. 391). Although he was writing a critique of the new
public administration, Wamsley seemed to summarize well the position of many
at Minnowbrook by arguing for a positive social science that recognizes that
“values and norms occupy a premier role that guides the direction and sets the
agenda for the scientific study” (pp. 393–394).
For the most part, the new public administrationists seemed concerned with
reforming positivist social science. But there was an exception, and—in a manner
consistent with the confusion of appearance and reality that seemed to characterize the new public administration—this exception came to be viewed as the rule.
It was Larry Kirkhart’s contribution to the Minnowbrook papers, an attempt to
outline a theory of public administration from the standpoint of existentialism
and phenomenology. In his article, Kirkhart (1971) noted that new developments in the social sciences, especially in sociology, epistemology, and growth
psychology, might provide the groundwork for transcending the traditional
Weberian view of rational bureaucracy. These developments, which Kirkhart
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felt directly challenge the positivist approach to social science, make possible several “nonbureaucratic variants,” one of which Kirkhart called the “consociated”
model. The epistemological viewpoint underlying Kirkhart’s work was explicitly
antipositivist in conception and in many ways foreshadowed certain important
efforts in public administration a decade later. (These efforts are examined in
Chapter 7.) However, it is unfair to label the new public administrationists
“phenomenological” as a group. At best, their hope was for an enlightened science of public administration that would examine norms and values and act on
them. The question remains as to which values were found most attractive.
Efficiency versus Equity
Being highly attuned to normative issues, the new public administrationists were
quick to point out some of the values that supported earlier theories of public
organization, chief among these being the criterion of efficiency. They correctly
noted (as did Chapter 4 of this book) that efficiency is a value chosen from
among a larger set of values and that the adoption of the value of efficiency precludes attention to any other, such as equity or participation. Moreover, they
noted that the tendency toward technicism—which seems to be implied in a
heavy dependency on efficiency as a basic value—in pursuit of rational efficiency
suggests increasing depersonalization and objectification. In contrast, they sought
a different or at least complementary basis for the study of public administration.
At the center of their alternative was the concept of social equity.
Equity, of course, involves a sense of fairness or justice—specifically, the correction of existing imbalances in the distribution of social and political values. In
contrast to equal treatment for all, equity proposes that benefits be greater for
those most disadvantaged; in contrast to efficiency, equity emphasizes responsiveness and involvement. Moreover, in the new public administration, the concept
of equity is applied not only to the activities of the executive, legislative, and
judicial bodies but also to administrative agencies, leading to a considerable
redefinition of what public administration is all about. For example, compare
the earlier definitions of public administration of Willoughby or White with
the Minnowbrook definition of Todd LaPorte (1971): “The purpose of public
organization is the reduction of economic, social, and psychic suffering and the
enhancement of life opportunities for those inside and outside the organization”
(p. 32). Or note Frederickson’s (1971) charge that “a public administration
which fails to work for changes which try to redress the deprivation of minorities
will likely be eventually used to repress those minorities” (p. 211). Thus, to the
traditional concerns for efficiency and economy, the new public administration
adds a concern for equity.
Equity involves a sense of fairness or justice—specifically, the correction of existing
imbalances in the distribution of social and political values.
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The most careful elaboration of the concept of equity as an ethical guideline
for public administrators is probably David K. Hart’s (1974) discussion and application of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971). Hart notes that the existing
ethical standard for public administration is that of impartial administration,
which holds that policies be applied equally to all without regard to circumstances not specifically related to the policy at hand. Social equity would recognize the different needs and interests of different people and therefore would
result in differential treatment. As a philosophical basis for this approach, Hart
examines Rawls’s concept of “justice as fairness,” an attempt to secure rights
“not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests” (Hart,
1974, pp. 3–4). As a way of illustrating his theory, Rawls suggests an intellectual
device, the “original position,” in which binding decisions are made concerning
the structure of society. If such choices are made under a “veil of ignorance” in
which none of the parties knows its place in society, its class, or social status, each
party will take care to create circumstances that it will find acceptable regardless
of its eventual position in the society. As a consequence, “the collective efforts of
the society [will] be concentrated in behalf of its least advantaged members so
that at least a minimum of rights and respect, income and wealth, will be guaranteed to all” (Hart, 1974, p. 7).
As a rough example, imagine a city council that has just been given a grant
of $10 million for street improvements. One approach the council members
might take, out of self-interest, would be to concentrate the money in their
own neighborhoods so that they would receive the greatest advantage. Another
approach, the impartial approach, would be to distribute the funds equally to all
neighborhoods, so as to spread the benefits to all parts of the city. A third
approach, based on social equity, would be to concentrate the money in those
neighborhoods most in need of street improvements. If the council members
acted under Rawls’s “veil of ignorance,” that is, if they acted on the basis of
fairness rather than self-interest, they would be significantly more likely to
choose the third alternative, which would promote social equity in the
community.
Hierarchy versus Participation
In addition to their interest in social equity, the new public administrationists
placed considerable emphasis on the value of participation, either the participation of clients in the operation of agency affairs or the involvement of lowerlevel organizational participants in organizational decision making. The first of
these themes was, of course, consistent with mid-1960s efforts toward citizen
participation—for example, the “maximum feasible participation” of the poor
in antipoverty programs—and even more in keeping with the radical cry of
“power to the people.” Certainly, the involvement of clients in agency affairs
had often been attempted before: one need only recall Selznick’s discussion of
TVA and the Grass Roots (1949), discussed in Chapter 4. But the new public
administrationists recognized that such efforts were often attempts to co-opt
client groups rather than to involve them substantially in the decision-making
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process. As an alternative, they sought more open organizational structures having permeable boundaries and marked by confrontation and exchange.
Among those who focused most directly on this issue was Orion White,
whose earlier work, “The Dialectical Organization” (1969), had suggested the
importance of an active and continuing interchange between agency personnel
and client groups in pursuit of policies and procedures that take all interests into
account. In the Minnowbrook volume, White (1971) pursued this notion by
describing administrative adaptation in terms of confrontation and consensus
around ethical values rather than in terms of negotiation and bargaining, leading
either to the imposition of a solution by the most powerful or to a compromise
between the interests of both. In pursuing his alternative (a “politics of love”),
White argued for adaptation through open communication, equality through a
functional distribution of power, and a conscious recognition of the ideological
principles that guide action.
Another dramatic call for a new approach to public organizations was voiced
by Frederick Thayer in An End to Hierarchy! An End to Competition! (1973).
Thayer argued that an organizational revolution was underway, one that would
eventually lead to a “withering away” of pyramidal hierarchies. Such a process
would necessitate finding nonhierarchical meanings for democracy and a substitution of cooperation for competition as a driving political and economic force.
While Thayer’s proposal was viewed with some skepticism, moves toward less
hierarchical and more cooperative systems of governance were taking place,
although hardly with the rapidity that Thayer and others desired.
The second theme, involving lower-level participants in organizational decision making, was frequently voiced by new public administrationists, although in
the end (again with the possible exception of Kirkhart) it could hardly be seen as
more than an extension of earlier work in human relations. The new public
administrationists certainly struggled with the issue of how organizations might
be restructured to achieve greater involvement and participation without letting
such efforts become nothing more than devices for managerial manipulation;
however, their results were mixed. As in many other areas, the new public
administrationists were here accused of providing a radical critique—in this
case, an antihierarchical, antibureaucratic critique—but offering few solutions or
alternatives.
Later, Harlan Cleveland (1985) predicted “The Twilight of Hierarchy.”
Cleveland suggested that the importance of physical resources has undergirded
the development of hierarchies of power based on control, hierarchies of influence
based on secrecy, hierarchies of class based on ownership, hierarchies of privilege
based on early access to resources, and hierarchies of politics based on geography.
As information becomes more important than physical resources, “Each of these
five bases for discrimination and unfairness is crumbling today— because the old
means of control are of dwindling efficacy, secrets are harder to keep, and ownership, early arrival, and geography are of dwindling significance in getting access to
the knowledge and wisdom which are the really valuable legal tender of our time”
(p. 188). Leadership, under these circumstances, will depend less and less on hierarchy and more and more on shared power and participation.
ORGANIZATIONAL HUMANISM AND THE NEW PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 125
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CONCLUSION
The work of the organizational humanists marks a curious chapter in the development of public administration theory. Although they correctly identified many
limitations of the rational perspective, their interest in more open participatory
styles of management was all too easily subsumed under the rational approach.
That is, the techniques of worker involvement (even organization development)
were soon appropriated as simply more subtle and sophisticated ways of securing
worker compliance. At the same time, the organizational humanists—such writers as McGregor, Blake and Mouton, Golembiewski, and Argyris—were raising
questions of great importance, especially to those interested in public organizations. Their plea for a new role for workers and clients in the direction of the
organization came very close to being an argument for democratic administration. Yet in the end, these theorists seemed constrained from fully embracing
that notion by their managerial perspective and their epistemological viewpoint.
Although they suggested issues that were not being fully addressed in the context
of mainstream social science, their work eventually entered into the mainstream.
The more pressing questions, at least for those interested in public organizations,
remained for the new public administrationists to ask. Yet they too provided few
answers. Contrary to the views of many, the new public administrationists did
not urge a new alternative paradigm for the study of public administration.
Rather, their work was a loosely knit collection of commentaries on the condition of public administration theory and practice that pointed out the problems
existing in the field and called for action to correct those problems. Although the
language of public administration today is less shrill and the proposals less stark,
the anomalies revealed by the new public administrationists continue to occupy
the attention of both theorists and practitioners. There remains a substantial concern for understanding the integration of policy and administration through a
more relevant policy science, and there continue to be attempts to derive a
new epistemological base for the study of public administration that would reconcile the often contending empirical and normative interests of the discipline.
Theorists and practitioners alike seem to share a feeling that our understanding of
life in public organizations is incomplete—that there is something more or something different that we need to know in order to make sense of our lives and our
work.
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
1. Contrast “formal” and “informal” organization.
2. What are the differences between “Theory X” and “Theory Y”?
3. What is the role of the interventionist in organizational learning?
4. What are the implicit values espoused by organizational development
practitioners?
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5. Discuss the treatment of efficiency and equity in the new public
administration.
6. What was “new” in the new public administration?
CASES
1. Cynthia Clarke just graduated from a Master of Public Administration
(MPA) program and has started working for a state office of tourism. Most
of her management classes seemed to recommend a highly participatory
approach to management, one that would, at a minimum, involve a broad
range of employees in organizational decision making. Cynthia’s boss, Rick
Mussari, describes his own management style as highly participatory, but in
practice he is one of the most top-down, authoritarian managers that
Cynthia has ever seen. What’s going on here? What, if anything, should
Cynthia do?
2. Briona Booker manages a local parks and recreation department and loves
her job. Her employees, however, seem uninterested in what they are doing
and strike Briona as extremely careless and unproductive. Briona has also
picked up some clues that many in the organization don’t seem to think
much of her. She is wondering whether a consultant might be brought in
to help revitalize the department. What type of intervention would you
recommend?
REFERENCES AND ADDITIONAL READINGS
Argyris, Chris. (1957). Personality and organization. New York: Harper & Row.
Argyris, Chris. (1962). Interpersonal competence and organizational effectiveness. Homewood,
IL: Dorsey.
Argyris, Chris. (1970). Intervention theory and method. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Argyris, Chris. (1972). The applicability of organizational sociology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Argyris, Chris, & Schon, Donald. (1978). Organizational learning. Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley.
Barnard, Chester I. (1948). The functions of the executive. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Cleveland, Harlan. (1985, January–February). The twilight of hierarchy. Public
Administration Review 45: 185–195.
Crenson, Matthew A. (1971). Comment: Contract, love and character building. In
Frank Marini (Ed.), Toward a new public administration: The Minnowbrook perspective,
pp. 83–88. San Francisco: Chandler.
ORGANIZATIONAL HUMANISM AND THE NEW PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 127
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affect the overall learning experience. Cengage Learning reserves the right to remove additional content at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it.
Denhardt, Robert B., Denhardt, Janet V., & Aristigueta, Maria P. (2009). Managing
human behavior in public and nonprofit organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Frederickson, H. George. (1971). Toward a new public administration. In Frank Marini
(Ed.), Toward a new public administration: The Minnowbrook perspective, pp. 309–331.
San Francisco: Chandler.
Golembiewski, Robert T. (1967). Men, management, and morality. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Golembiewski, Robert T. (1972). Renewing organizations. Ithaca, IL: Peacock.
Golembiewski, Robert T. (1979). Approaches to planned change. New York: Dekker.
Golembiewski, Robert T., & Eddy, William (Eds.). (1978). Organization development in
public administration, part 1. New York: Dekker.
Guy, Mary E., Newman, Meredith A., & Mastracci, Sharon H. (2008). Emotional labor.
Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Hart, David K. (1974, January–February). Social equity, justice, and the equitable
administrator. Public Administration Review 34: 3–11.
Kirkhart, Larry. (1971). Toward a theory of public administration. In Frank Marini (Ed.),
Toward a new public administration: The Minnowbrook perspective, pp. 127–163.
San Francisco: Chandler.
Kuhn, Thomas S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
LaPorte, Todd. (1971). The recovery of relevance in the study of public organization.
In Frank Marini (Ed.), Toward a new public administration: The Minnowbrook perspective,
pp. 17–47. San Francisco: Chandler.
Marini, Frank (Ed.). (1971). Toward a new public administration: The Minnowbrook perspective.
San Francisco: Chandler.
McGregor, Douglas. (1960). The human side of enterprise. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Mouton, Robert R., & Blake, Jane S. (1966). The managerial grid. Austin, TX: Gulf.
Moynihan, Donald. (2008). The normative model in decline? Public service motivation
in an age of governance. In James L. Perry & Anne Hondeghem (Eds.), Motivation in
public management: The call of public service, pp. 247–267. New York: Oxford.
Perry, James L., & Hondeghem, Annie (Eds.). (2008). Motivation in public management: The
call of public service. New York: Oxford.
Pink, Daniel. (2011). Drive: The surprising truth about what motivates us. New York:
Riverhead Books.
Rawls, John. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap.
Roethlisberger, Fritz, & Dickson, William. (1940). Management and the worker. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Scharmer, C. Otto. (2009). Theory U. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler.
Selznick, Philip. (1949). TVA and the grass roots. Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press.
Senge, Peter, Scharmer, C. Otto, Jaworski, Joseph, & Flowers, Betty Sue. (2005).
Presence: Human purpose and the field of the future. New York: Broadway Business.
Thayer, Frederick E. (1973). An end to hierarchy! An end to competition! New York: New
Viewpoints.
128 CHAPTER 5
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Waldo, Dwight. (Ed.). (1971). Public administration in a time of turbulence. San Francisco:
Chandler.
Wamsley, Gary. (1976, November). On the problems of discovering what’s really new in
public administration. Administration and Society 8: 385–400.
White, Orion E., Jr. (1969, Winter). The dialectical organization: An alternative to
bureaucracy. Public Administration Preview 29: 32–42.
White, Orion F., Jr. (1971). Administrative adaptation in a changing society. In Frank
Marini (Ed.), Toward a new public administration: The Minnowbrook perspective,
pp. 59–62. San Francisco: Chandler.
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6
The Policy Emphasis and the
New Public Management
Very much line with the social turbulence and demands for change of the late
1960s, organizational humanism and the new public administration posed
fundamental questions to traditional thinking about public organizations. Organizational humanism asked about the status of the individual in the organizational
society and challenged basic assumptions about human beings and our relationship
to work. Similarly, the loosely defined “new public administration” provoked
debate about the very role of the “neutral” public servant. It called for public
administration to adopt a broader more socially concerned perspective; for public
servants to be advocates for social equity rather than merely instruments for managerial efficiency; and for scholars and practitioners to reconsider the relationship
between facts and values. Both the organizational humanists and the new public
administrationists also raised doubts about the capacity of hierarchical organizations
to meet both individual and social needs, prompting exploration of alternative
organizational arrangements and, especially, new forms of participation.
The organizational humanists and new public administrationists were not
alone, however, in their dissatisfaction with existing theories and practices of
public organization. In this chapter, we provide an overview of other significant
and influential developments in public organization theory that emerged out of
this period and which sought to diagnose and address the problems of public
organizations.
Two broad approaches are considered here. First, we discuss the “public policy orientation” as a way of understanding the role of public organizations in
expressing social values and implementing public programs. Within this perspective, two important issues are considered—responsiveness and effectiveness.
130
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Responsiveness in public policy speaks to the ways in which the political system
expresses the preferences and will of the public, the community, or its representatives. A central question regarding public organizational responsiveness is the
composition of the people in the organization and the values they hold and practices they enact in formulating and carrying out public policy. Effectiveness concerns the degree to which public organizations succeed in meeting the expressed
intentions or meet the needs of the communities or publics they serve. Effectiveness in this way concerns problems of organizational performance and processes
of policy implementation. Of course, means and ends—or policy formulation
and policy implementation—cannot be so easily separated, and, as we will see,
this new public policy orientation often reintroduces old problems, such as the
politics–administration dichotomy, in a different form.
Second, the “new public management” is discussed. The new public
management emerged from practical developments in public organizational
operations in the 1970s and, in particular, the fiscal and political crises that governments around the world confronted during that time. In time, this approach
diagnosed the problems of public organizations in terms of bloat, inefficient use
of resources, and ineffectiveness in implementing public programs. As a remedy,
it encouraged restrictions on governmental growth, privatization of existing government assets, and use of contracts in lieu of direct service provision. Initially
lacking theoretical content, with time the movement appropriated elements of
the policy emphasis and aspects of the new institutionalism in economics (Catlaw
& Chapman, 2007), among other influences. Taken together, the practical and
theoretical aspects of the new public management advance a quite different,
somewhat contradictory vision of the public servant and organization that
emphasizes management techniques drawn from the private sector and marketbased values. In stark contrast to organizational humanism, it advocates a view of
human beings as essentially rationally self-interested actors and proposes a set of
organizational reforms consistent with that model.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC
POLICY ORIENTATION
Many early theorists of public organizations were critical of the politics–administration dichotomy, which they saw as failing to recognize the influence of the
bureaucracy on the formation of public policy. Paul Appleby (1949), in Policy
and Administration, complained that the tendency to separate policy and administration left no policy-making role for administrators other than the chief executive. To the contrary, he argued, “administrators are continually laying down
THE POLICY EMPHASIS AND THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 131
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rules for the future and are continually determining what the law is, what it
means in terms of action” (p. 7). In addition to this exercise of discretion, administrators have access to important information about policy questions and are
often called on to make recommendations for legislative action. In these ways,
Appleby said, “public administration is policy making” (p. 170).
Similarly, Norton Long (1962) wrote, “The bureaucracy is in policy and
major policy to stay: in fact, … bureaucracy is likely, day in and day out, to be
our main source of policy initiative” (p. 67). By this time, there was no question
among students of public administration that public organizations played an
important role in defining public policy. The “initiatives” of public agencies, furthermore, required a solid base of analysis on which recommendations could be
built. This meant that the study or analysis of public policy, especially the consequences of proposed policies, became highly important. Students and practitioners of public administration, then, had very practical reasons to engage in
the study of public policy.
The bureaucracy is in policy and major policy to stay: in fact, … bureaucracy is likely,
day in and day out, to be our main source of policy initiative.
—Norton Long
Theoretical concerns existed as well, concerns that were voiced more clearly
by political scientists less centrally involved with public administration. Following
trends in social science generally and in political science specifically, they urged
on their colleagues a view of policy studies more relevant to the issues of the day.
Those having a more liberal interpretation argued that political scientists had previously neglected social problems, such as poverty and urban decay, and consequently bore some responsibility for those problems. Those political scientists
leaning toward a more conservative interpretation argued that careful and rational techniques of analysis should provide a model for the rest of the government
and the raw material for a reconstructed science of politics. In either case, traditional political science was assailed for being too concerned with the institutions
of government and the behaviors of government actors. What was being overlooked, it was argued, was a careful analysis of the content and impact of public
policies.
Among political scientists, there were at least two distinct orientations
toward the emergence of public policy. Quite early, Harold Lasswell and others
of the “policy science” approach (Lerner & Lasswell, 1960) felt that systematic
inquiry into the policy-making process could establish relationships between
instrumental policies and end values. Lasswell saw the policy scientist like a physician who would diagnose the problems of society. Normative choices about
the ultimate direction of society would be followed by prescriptive, expert
recommendations for the way such goals might be attained. Lasswell clearly saw
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a role for technical expertise in policy science, but his vision also encompassed
important normative concerns for a democratic society—an aspect of his vision that
is sometimes underappreciated (Smith & Larimer, 2013, p. 13).
A second approach popular among political scientists was one that would
utilize studies of public policy to generate empirically based knowledge about
the political process. Thomas Dye (1970), for example, held that a sharp distinction between normative and empirical models should be maintained and that the
study of public policy, though guided by normative interests, could provide only
empirical explanations of public policy. “By choosing to employ an empirical
model, we are committing ourselves to the task of explanation rather than recommendation” (p. 25). In Dye’s (1976) view, public policy is simply “whatever
governments choose to do or not to do.” Policy analysis, in turn, is “finding out
what governments do, why they do it, and what difference it makes” (p. 1). The
study of public policy can focus either on the causes of particular policies—that
is, the political, social, or economic circumstances that have created particular
kinds of policies—or on the consequences of policies—for example, the effect a
particular policy will have on a particular kind of problem. In either case, the
goal of the policy analyst is the same: to provide a description and explanation
of the causes or consequences of various policies. This information may be useful
to the policy maker; however, that use is incidental to its purpose of building a
broader theoretical understanding of governmental action. The political scientist
has the role of scientist, not advocate.
Especially important in the development of a political science perspective on
public policy was David Easton’s model of the political system. Easton (1965, p.
110) argued that the political system consists of the patterns of interaction of
political actors, those persons concerned with the “authoritative allocation of
values” for the society. From the environment flow various demands on and various supports for the system, which are converted into outputs in the form of
public policies. These outputs are then fed back to the environment and affect
future inputs into the system.
Responsiveness and Effectiveness
For the student of public organizations, Francis E. Rourke (1969) provided a
careful analysis of the way in which the bureaucracy asserts its influence on the
policy process (see also previous discussions of Kaufman, Selznick, and systems
approaches in Chapter 4). Rourke contended that three factors are central to
the ability of an agency to influence the system. First, agencies depend on external support—the development of constituencies that assist in promoting their
viewpoint. Such support may come from outside the government—for example,
from educators who support the Department of Education or conservationists
who support the Forest Service—or from other agencies within the government,
as in the case of interdepartmental projects. Second, agencies vary in their impact
on the policy system based on the amount of information or expertise they possess. Such expertise may be brought to bear either by trained and experienced
agency personnel who are able to influence political decision makers (including
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appointed officials within the bureaucracy as well as legislators and other elected
officials) or by administrators who exercise discretion in applying their expertise
to the execution of existing policies. Third, bureaucracies differ in their impact
based on internal characteristics of the agencies, especially the vitality of the organization and the effectiveness of its leadership. This point is especially well illustrated by the traditional battles between the Department of State and the
Department of Defense—battles that have often been decided by the skill of
one secretary in urging his or her agency’s position.
Rourke’s work is important not only in outlining ways in which agencies
effectively influence policy outcomes but also in drawing attention to the ethical
and political implications of this process. Rourke noted two issues that are of
concern to students of the policy process: (1) responsiveness, the extent to which
the system “promotes a correspondence between the decisions of bureaucrats and
the preferences of the community or the officeholders who presume to speak for
the public”; and (2) effectiveness, the degree to which policies lead to decisions
that “are more likely than alternative choices to bring about the outcomes …
desired” (p. 3).
It is important to note, with Rourke, that these two concerns are often at
odds with each other, and neither can be dealt with in isolation. For example,
Rourke noted that secrecy in national security matters potentially affects both
responsiveness and effectiveness. In the case of John and Carol presented in
Chapter 1, the issues of responsiveness and effectiveness were not only central
but in apparent opposition. Ultimately, as we will see, the two issues merge
into a concern for how effectively those in public organizations are able to manage change processes to express societal values. As such, these two issues are at
the core of any theory of public organization.
RESPONSIVENESS IN PUBLIC POLICY
The issue of responsiveness has drawn the attention of a wide variety of scholars
and has ranged across many concerns, and it was the comparative lack of
responsiveness by government to the needs and views of large segments of the
American public that many thought to be at the root of the dissatisfaction with
government and general turmoil in American society. Certainly, if the public
bureaucracy substantially influences public policy, it would seem only proper to
consider ways of ensuring that actions of the bureaucracy reflect the values of the
society. But what exactly does this mean? The issue provokes a number of
important questions:
â–  Does it mean that those in public organizations should limit their own
influence to matters of little consequence, seeking neutrality and deferring
always to others?
â–  Does it mean that they should seek to match the mood of the legislators, the
supposed representatives of the people? Should this occur even where the
bureaucrat has information that would show the legislators to be misguided
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on a particular issue? Or should those in public organizations arrive at their
own view of what constitutes the public interest, perhaps majority opinion,
measured through polling or other procedures? Or do they have a responsibility to lead rather than to follow, to use their knowledge and expertise to
act in the public interest, even when the public is not ostensibly interested?
â–  And, as if these questions were not difficult enough, is it sufficient that the
resulting policies correspond to the values of the society, or must the process
through which they are developed itself necessarily be democratic?
Redford’s “Democratic Morality”
In his profound 1969 book, Democracy in the Administrative State, Emmette Redford offers an important perspective from which to consider these difficult questions. Redford suggests that evaluating responsiveness hinges on what he calls a
“democratic morality.” A democratic morality rests on three key issues, each of
which must be examined in light of the impact of large administrative organizations with substantial influence over the development of public policy. First, it
assumes that the person, the individual, is the basic measure of human value. It is
in the realization of the fullest potential of the individual that we come to judge
our political and social system. Second, democratic morality acknowledges that
all persons have full claim to the attention of the system. Differences in wealth or
position are not valid reasons for giving undue advantage to one group or
another. All persons are created equal. Third, individual claims can best be promoted through the involvement of all persons in the decision-making process,
and participation is not only an instrumental value, helpful in attaining other
ends, but is essential to the development of democratic citizenship. The ideal of
universal participation may take various forms; however, Redford indicates some
basics: “Among these are (1) access to information, based on education, open
government, free communication, and open discussion; (2) access, direct or
indirect, to forums of decision; (3) ability to open any issue to public discussion;
(4) ability to assert one’s claims without fear of coercive retaliation; and (5) consideration of all claims asserted” (p. 8).
In contrast, those large and complex organizations that so dominate modern
society appear to be marked by far different assumptions: that the goal of the
organization exceeds the purpose of human development; that an arrangement
of unequal offices in a hierarchical fashion best serves the interests of the organization; and that participation is of limited value, important only in an instrumental sense when it provides additional information to improve the quality of
decision making or when it improves the possibilities of successful implementation. Recognizing that such organizations not only provide the settings in which
most of us play out our lives but also influence quite directly the development of
public policies, one might well ask: What are the potential dangers to the preservation of democracy? Have our basic commitments to democratic morality
been affected or supplanted? Have we now chosen an alternative, organizational
morality? If not, what steps do we need to take to preserve the basic tenets of
democracy?
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Although these questions could (and should) be directed to all organizations,
whether traditionally considered private or public, Redford (1969) focuses his
response on those administrative agencies that are directly a part of the government.
These organizations, he asserts, have been built around a structural–functional
approach that has led to a governmental system of specialized program areas,
each with certain responsibilities for policy making and policy execution, each
with specialists directing their attention to a fairly narrow set of issues, and each
supported by specialized interest groups. Moreover, within these organizations,
not all persons have equal influence on policy decisions. Those in higher offices
and those with particular professional skills constitute a small minority within
which the power of the organization is concentrated. Policies, however, are
rarely the province of a single individual but rather result from the interaction
of many persons and indeed many organizations. Redford concludes that “the
attainment of the democratic ideal in the world of administration depends …
on the inclusiveness of the representation of interests in the interaction process
among decision makers” (p. 44). With Redford, we may conclude that
the growth of the administrative state has indeed restructured the problem of
democratic morality, yet it has not made it less important. As long as we are committed to the ideal of democracy, responsiveness is quite usefully viewed through
the lens of democratic morality and the capacity of public organizations to enhance
individual worth, equality among all citizens, and universal participation. It is along
these lines that we can examine the responsiveness of public organizations and
specific theoretical and practical efforts to ensure responsiveness.
Influencing the Bureaucratic Character
Broadly speaking, theorists of public organization have developed two different
approaches to the question of responsiveness in public agencies. One seeks to
ensure responsibility by influencing the character of the bureaucrat, either
through socialization, training, or professional standards. The other, perhaps a little less trusting of the goodwill of bureaucrats, suggests more formal mechanisms,
ranging from requirements for group representation among bureaucrats to
removal from office for cause. Obviously, these two approaches are not exclusive
of one another in either theory or practice. However, differences in the two are
suggestive of the complexities involved in securing responsibility in public agencies. A classic debate between Carl Friedrich and Herman Finer centered on this
issue and was framed as the difference between subjective responsibility, or felt
responsibility, which causes one to behave in a particular way and objective responsibility, or accountability to another person or group.
“Subjective” Responsibility
In the debate with Finer, Friedrich (1972) took the position that the complexity
of modern government and the need for creative and unusual solutions to
problems made specific objective mechanisms of control much more difficult.
Increasingly, administrators are called on to make decisions based not on precedent or direction from a superior body but on their technical expertise and their
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understanding of “popular sentiment” (p. 320). Where this is the case, the
administrator’s own sense of responsibility, what John Gaus called the “inner
check,” is often determining (p. 321). Fortunately, wrote Friedrich, the growing
influence of professionals in government permits us to be more secure, for welltrained professionals imbued with the spirit of democratic responsibility will be
attentive to public needs. Especially in the case of scientific professionals, the
“fellowship of science” can be counted on to maintain a proper balance of competence and concern.
This “inner check” and the character required of the public servant were a
prominent concern among early theorists of public administration as well. Most
took their cue from Appleby, who often repeated (and apparently demonstrated
by his example) the set of personal qualities most appropriate to government service. Appleby (1945, p. 4) hoped for a “special attitude of public responsibility”
that would be transmitted to those entering the field of public administration,
through either their background or their training. That special attitude went
beyond the qualities generally considered desirable in other fields of management,
such as interpersonal effectiveness, the ability to delegate, a focus on decision and
action, and personal dynamism. Rather, it had to do with “democratic spirit” and
the “enlistment of all the energies and abilities of the persons in an organization;
getting their full and zealous participation” (p. 46). Similarly, Marshall Dimock
(1936) “hoped for … loyalty, as well as honesty, enthusiasm, humility, and all
the other attributes of character and conduct which contribute to effectual and
satisfying service” (p. 132). Later, this same spirit was sought by Stephen K. Bailey
(1966), who interpreted Appleby’s work to indicate that administrators need an
understanding of the moral ambiguity of public policies, a recognition of the
moral priorities and paradoxes of the public service, and the moral qualities of
“(1) optimism; (2) courage; and (3) fairness tempered by charity” (p. 24).
This same feeling was echoed by Frederick C. Mosher (1968) in his classic
work of the period, Democracy and the Public Service. Mosher also saw government
being placed increasingly in the hands of professionals; their background and
training and the standards they adopted would be critical to the future of democratic government. But how can we be sure, asked Mosher, that the standards of
the professions are consistent with those of democracy? After all, in many professions, there is a tendency to become isolated from the public, to become
preoccupied with technical rather than human concerns, and to become selfinterested rather than public-spirited. Mosher’s answer lay in education. Through
the universities, especially the professional schools, the values of future professionals
would be shaped. Through broader, more humanized programs of professional
education for administrators, “the universities offer the best hope of making the
professions safe for democracy” (p. 219).
Ethical Studies
Concern for education and professional socialization of the character and values
of public servants remains an important aspect of contemporary public administration scholarship, notably in the area of ethics. Two approaches have been
taken. One has introduced students to philosophical studies in ethics and then
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sought applications to public-sector problems. As mentioned in Chapter 5, for
example, the work of John Rawls has been adapted to support a concern for
justice and equity in the public service.
A second approach tends to be more direct and accessible, emphasizing the
everyday institutional and practical context of public organizations. An important contribution is John Rohr’s Ethics for Bureaucrats (1978). Rohr argues that
bureaucrats have an ethical obligation to support what he calls “regime values.”
Since “bureaucrats have taken an oath to uphold the Constitution that brought
this regime into being and continues to state symbolically its spirit and meaning” (p. 67), they should look for guidance to the Constitution, or more specifically, to Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution in exercising
discretionary authority. Clearly, an examination of Supreme Court opinions
would give more specific meaning to such abstract concepts as justice and
equality, yet one might question whether the Supreme Court itself always
reflects the general views of the citizens, or even whether it should. Moreover,
the Court shifts its own views from time to time, and although examining the
reasoning for such shifts would be helpful in understanding the various arguments involved in a particular issue, the Court does not always give firm guidance to the administrator. Finally, the Court necessarily depends on precedents
in its review of cases, whereas administrators, as noted earlier, must often chart
new territory, not reviewing or relying on precedent but developing innovative approaches to public problems. The guidance of the Court would not be
especially helpful in these cases. Yong S. Lee has elaborated this theme in the
book A Reasonable Public Servant (2005).
In his subsequent book, To Run a Constitution, Rohr (1986) has extended his
work through a detailed examination of the constitutional legitimacy of the
administrative state as a prelude to a normative theory of public administration
in a constitutional context. Rohr sees the agencies of government as subordinate
to the three branches of government but simultaneously able to balance the various interests expressed there. Public administrators, who are key actors in this
balancing act, are again required to uphold the Constitution—to use “their discretionary power in order to maintain the constitutional balance of powers in
support of individual rights” (p. 181).
In a related vein, Anthony Bertelli and Laurence Lynn (2006) propose a
constitutional theory of public administration, based on principles they find articulated most persuasively by James Madison. They claim that a sense of managerial responsibility is required of public managers if they are to adequately deal
with the question of managerial discretion that inevitably arises in a separationof-powers constitutional scheme. This notion of managerial responsibility incorporates four “axioms” that Bertelli and Lynn argue must guide and constrain the
work of public managers: judgment, balance, rationality, and accountability.
Judgment is essential and is based on balance and rationality. These in turn sum
to accountability, “an institutionalized acceptance of the authority of the separation of powers in a Madisonian sense” (p. 13). Together, these attributes of managerial responsibility provide the basis for ethical action on the part of politically
responsive bureaucrats.
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Other theoretical explorations of administrative ethics have varied in their
approaches. Terry Cooper (1990) describes The Responsible Administrator as “a
juggler managing a multitude of competing obligations and values” (p. 223).
Cooper discusses four levels of reflection and deliberation on ethical issues: the
expressive level, which is guided by the emotions; the level of moral rules, drawn
from the organization or the larger society; the level of ethical analysis, involving
moral principles; and the postethical level, where our basic assumptions about
human nature, knowledge, and truth are considered. Cutting across these levels
are issues of responsible conduct on the one hand and of individual autonomy on
the other. The problem for the administrator is combining all these different
components in a way that guides action.
In his book Ethics Primer (2007), James Svara suggests that public duty, being
an expression of the public interest, is at the center of understanding administrative ethics. Duty, however, is not merely observing the law and obeying superiors. Rather duty must comprehend careful reflection on the nature of public
responsibilities and ultimately be connected to philosophical notions of virtue,
principles, and consequences. What Svara terms “the ethical triangle,” (p. 47) is
used to provide ethical guidance based on the ideals of public interest, justice,
character, and the greatest good.
Finally, in The Ethics of Dissent (2006), Rosemary O’Leary examines the ethical
dilemmas facing people working in public organizations yet, for various reasons,
seeking ends that are contrary to those prevailing in their agency. From our vantage,
it highlights the dilemma of professional socialization as a mechanism for securing
responsiveness. These government “guerillas” may undertake widely different kinds
of activities. Some may directly oppose agency policies, others may leak information
about agency activities, some may deftly sabotage their bosses, and some may slip
information to other agencies. A few will become “whistle-blowers,” but most
will remain behind the scenes. Their activities vary widely, and their motives and
values vary as well. Some are hoping to express a personal political agenda in
which they strongly believe, and others are committed to a particular technique or
approach that they see as out of favor in the agency. Some are merely freewheeling
independent agents. Most are considered “problems” by their managers. Yet many
are right, and their insights should not be dismissed. This raises an interesting question of how to deal with these people who may be either “ethical crusaders or
insubordinate renegades” (p. 90). O’Leary explores a variety of approaches, most
based around the notion that, when dissent is managed well, it can lead to greater
creativity and innovation. Consequently, managers are encouraged to create an organizational culture that encourages dialogue and debate, which provides opportunities
for different voices to be heard, and which creates constructive channels for dissent.
Limitations of Subjective Responsibility
As a means of advancing a democratic morality, the subjective approach to the
question of responsiveness has certain limitations. How can we ensure these qualities in our administrators? What happens when equally public-spirited officials disagree? How can terms such as “fairness tempered by charity” (Bailey, 1966) be
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made specific enough to be meaningful? To what extent can we trust the administrator’s own conception of the public interest? Clearly, it is enough simply to
argue for an abstract set of virtues to be adopted by all “good” and publicspirited administrators. At a minimum, we would expect that some general guidance would be provided by the administrator’s training and education, standards of
the profession, or reference to certain general principles of justice. We may wonder, however, whether the professions or the schools that produce professionals
will in fact undertake to communicate and reinforce a sense of democratic morality. Certainly, many professions have established codes of ethics or similar standards
of professional conduct; however, it remains unclear whether these include the
kinds of commitments to democracy hoped for by Friedrich, Mosher, and others
and whether they are sufficiently precise to be enforced in any meaningful way.
Similarly, universities, especially schools of public administration, have been more
attentive in recent years to issues of ethics and responsibility in their curricula. But
it remains to be seen whether such efforts are merely short-term reactions to political events such as Watergate or more recent issues of corruption or whether they
will have a more sustained influence on the development of public service professionals. Perhaps the most significant issue in the subjective approach is the process
and mechanism for values of socialization itself. As Catlaw and Jordan (2009,
p. 300) put it, “people don’t ‘take’ to values like hot gelatin to a Jell-o mold.
Socialized experience is overdetermined” by an individual’s prior experience,
emotional and developmental needs, institutional environment, and the largely
improvisational quality of everyday organizational life. In this sense, O’Leary’s
advice to seek an organizational culture that is receptive to recognizing and
discussing competing points of view seems wise.
Objective Responsibility
Returning to the other side of the Friedrich–Finer debate, Herbert Finer (1972)
firmly rejected the subjectivist view. He contended that leaving matters in the
hands and minds of individual bureaucrats, professionals or not, does little to
ensure responsiveness to the public. Certainly some members of public organizations, perhaps even a majority, will act with an appropriate concern for the
norms of democracy, but others may not. Whether for reasons of personal gain
or simply through a misguided sense of their professional duties and responsibilities, a minority may act without regard for the public interest and consequently
do damage to that interest. For Finer (1972) the issue was simple: “Are the servants of the public to decide their own course, or is their course of action to be
decided by a body outside themselves” (p. 328)? His answer was the latter: legislators should be permitted and indeed expected to provide a precise definition
of their intent based on careful consideration of the available technical evidence
and to exercise frequent review of the implementation of policy. Only through
the supervision and control of the bureaucracy by elected officials can responsiveness to the electorate be achieved. A sense of subjective responsibility may
seem sufficient, but more objective means of accountability are necessary to
preserve the interests of the society from the occasional whims of government
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professionals. The “guerilla bureaucrats” described by O’Leary would exemplify
the fears that Finer had. Moral responsibility is fine in theory, but political
responsibility is required in practice.
The political responsibility argument is, in the end, also an argument for
administrative management-control approach, and this was the view expressed
by many early writers on responsibility. The bureaucrat was to be strictly responsible to the legislature and to the chief executive. Responsibility was important,
indeed central to public service, and responsibility was to be found in “a definite,
hierarchical chain of command, reaching unbroken to the political heads of
agencies and to the president, the Congress, and the general public” (Appleby,
1952, p. 250). Although such a process was made more difficult by the increase
in layers of authority and responsibility in a big democracy, the answer remained
essentially the same: The resolution of critical issues must occur in a central
authority politically responsible to the people.
Limits of the Objective Responsibility
Questions should be raised about the limitations of the objectivist approach as
well. First, as the literature on the policy process indicates, it is not clear how
well the public’s will is really articulated through the legislature or elections.
A conspicuous example of this problem may be low voter turnout, particularly
at the local level. This makes legislative “mandates” ambiguous at best. Second,
policy networks (Heclo, 1977), interest groups (Lowi, 1969), advocacy coalitions
(Sabatier & Weible, C. M., 2007), and media influence also shape electoral
preferences (Baumgarter & Jones, 2009) and public policy. Large, passionate
minorities can lose to indifferent minorities, and the power of elites can exert
disproportionate influence on the process of policy formulation. Third, the laws
passed by legislatures are often vague and imprecise. Difficult details about what
policies mean are left to administrative agencies to work out, and this can affect
how policies and their consequences are viewed.
In sum, there is a wide range of reasons to be skeptical about the representativeness of legislative (and for that matter presidential) directives. This raises
questions about how well the objective approach secures democratic responsiveness. These issues relating to conventional forms of political accountability suggest that additional organizational methods of encouraging responsibility should
be examined. Two such approaches, representative bureaucracy and public participation, have received special attention in recent years as ways to enhance the
responsiveness of public organizations. While we focus on these two approaches,
other “objective” measures, such as ombudsmen, ethics commission, and open
meeting laws, are also important.
Representative Bureaucracy
The proponents of representative bureaucracy, a term coined by J. Donald Kingsley
(1944), argue that decisions emerging from bureaucratic agencies will more
nearly approximate the wishes of the public if the staffs of those agencies reflect
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the demographic characteristics of the general population. Kingsley hoped that a
less elite, less class-biased British civil service would limit the possibility of
bureaucratic dominance by the middle and upper classes in that country. Especially difficult would be a situation in which a party representing lower-class
interests would come to power yet be stymied in its reform efforts by a recalcitrant public bureaucracy. As the notion of representative bureaucracy has been
applied to the American experience, it has more often come to focus on race,
gender, and ethnic background, though still suggesting that persons from particular groups would represent the interests of those groups as members of public
agencies (see Alkadry, 2007, and the volume edited by Dolan and Rosenbloom,
2003, for a good overview). In addition to addressing the limitations of conventional forms of objective political accountability, the theory of representative
bureaucracy also seems to finesse some of the challenges of professional and educational socialization by, in principle, bringing people into public service with
similar experiences as those they serve.
For several reasons, though, the logic of representative bureaucracy seems
somewhat flawed. For example, studies of the policy preferences of the higher
civil service have indicated that the correlation between background and attitude
is weak. One cannot assume that persons coming from a particular group will in
fact represent the interests of that group. They may express the views of parts of
bureaucracy itself or the professional groups of which they are a part rather than
the interests of their demographic group. For all these reasons, the issue of representative bureaucracy is considerably more complicated than its advocates (for
example, Krislov, 1974) sometimes seem to realize.
Although representative bureaucracy has limitations as a means of securing
responsiveness, we should not be led to question the need to involve a wide
range of groups in the governmental process. To argue, as some have, that affirmative action programs for the recruitment, retention, and advancement of minorities
and women do not ensure the representativeness of bureaucracy is not sufficient
reason to limit such programs. In the first place, although such persons may not
represent the interests of their demographic group on all issues, they may indeed
represent such interests on key issues, thus providing a check on the potential
excesses of the majority. Moreover, the involvement of such persons provides
both a symbolic and a practical signal to others that centers of decision making
are accessible, and although agencies cannot necessarily be expected to respond
automatically to the interests of previously disadvantaged groups, that those agencies can be influenced. Someone should at least be willing to listen.
Citizen Involvement and Implications of Responsiveness
Even as these questions are being worked out, it is extremely important for public administrators to focus attention on the involvement of citizens in the governance process. Significant efforts to achieve public participation were, of course,
undertaken in the early 1960s as a way to improve government’s responsiveness.
But the practice of involving the poor in antipoverty efforts quickly became an
extremely volatile issue, especially in cases where the active participation of the
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poor led to confrontation with existing structures of power. However, by the
time these conflicts were recognized, the principle of public participation seemed
well established. For example, local school boards began to recognize the need
for decentralization and for the involvement of students, teachers, and parents in
the operation of school systems.
In all such cases, however, questions continued to arise as to whether real
power was being shifted to client representatives or whether the real power
remained with those who had previously controlled the organization’s activities.
For example, would the power holders form alliances to maintain their control
over client representatives, or would the skills and technical knowledge they possessed permit them to continue their domination of client groups? In many cases,
client representatives, if not politically skilled on entering decision-making bodies, gained skills quite rapidly, to the point that their voice was often effective
against surprisingly great odds. Still, the power of such representatives was probably exaggerated. Yet in many instances where co-optation was tried, participants
reacted so strongly that real and meaningful power resulted. (We will return to the
issue of civic engagement in Chapter 7.)
Whether responsiveness is sought through the selection of particular types of
persons to staff public organizations or through the imposition of external controls on their behavior, the issue of responsiveness must be recognized as central
to any modern theory of public organization. If public organizations by definition seek to express societal values, then their members bear a responsibility to
examine, understand, and interpret public values to the best of their ability.
Beyond this, however, one might argue that those in public organizations have
a responsibility to assist the public in articulating its needs; to identify important,
though often unexpressed, needs; and to express a desire for their solution. In
this view, the notion of responsiveness goes beyond simply reacting to those
values that are publicly stated; it involves a certain amount of leadership in bringing issues forward for examination, debate, and possible solution.
But our discussion of responsiveness has still another implication: that responsiveness in a democratic society involves not only seeking socially desirable ends
but also doing so in a way consistent with democratic values. This position
would mean, for example, that we would not pursue justice in an unjust way. It
might also mean that we would not seek democratic ends through nondemocratic
(elitist, authoritarian) organizations. To meet all these criteria, we would require a
theory of democratic administration far different from those currently found in the
literature on public administration. However, there are some indications of continuing work on such a theory, examples of which are presented later in this chapter and in the one that follows. But first we examine the issue of effectiveness.
Those in public organizations have a responsibility to assist the public in articulating
its needs; to identify important, though often unexpressed, needs; and to express a
desire for their solution.
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EFFECTIVENESS IN PUBLIC POLICY
In addition to their concern for responsiveness, students of public policy have
been attentive to the effectiveness of policy decisions and of the actions taken
to implement those decisions. Both dimensions of public policy were implicated
in the political and social crises of the late 1960s and 1970s, and scholars within
the policy orientation tried to make sense of both to understand how and why
public organizations seemed to be ineffective. This section thus focuses on the
political and institutional environment in which public policies are formulated
and then examines a special body of literature that brings together a concern
for responsiveness and a concern for effectiveness in its study of implementation
processes. The next section explores focuses on the field of policy analysis as an
approach to improved policy decisions. We note that the purpose here is not to
survey the vast scholarship in the general field and subfields of public policy formulation (see Sabatier, 2007, and Smith & Larimer, 2013, for overviews).
Rather, several prominent themes in that field are identified—themes that
would seem most directly to influence developing theories of public organization. Specifically, our focus is on public policy in the context of the larger political system and on contemporary approaches to the analysis and evaluation of
public policy that bear on the issue of “democratic administration.”
Lowi’s “Interest-Group Liberalism”
In contrast to those who encourage more representative processes of administration, Theodore Lowi (1969), in his highly influential book The End of Liberalism,
argues that responsiveness depends on the restoration of effectiveness in government. Lowi contends that the vast expansion of the government in the 1960s
occurred because the political system succumbed to the interests of organized
groups in society that were able to force their views on the government. The
government, in turn, assumed responsibility for the programs sought by those
groups and created vast agencies to carry them out. These agencies, Lowi asserts,
have taken on far too much discretionary power, although they have been able
to justify their power by claiming that they represent the popular will. To Lowi,
such a situation undermines the formality and direction required for effective
policy planning; he calls for the development of a far more legalistic or
“juridical” democracy.
Lowi traces the roots of our current approach to government to the early
twentieth century, a time when the values of capitalism prevailed to the near
exclusion of popular rule. Although the industrialization of society led to material benefits for some, it also created problems that it could not solve. The failure
of capitalism to secure the broad range of social benefits that it promised
eventually led to its demise as a public philosophy. Its replacement, which
Lowi terms interest-group liberalism, grew from two related sources, each feeding
on the other. The first was an increasing concern for rationality in social and
political processes—a rationality modeled by developments in technology
and industrial organization. The rationalization of society, which Weber had
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discussed, was well illustrated in industrial America, with its emphasis on hierarchy
and the division of labor. But rationalization also meant control, the ability to regulate and order human as well as mechanical activities. Following this logic, the concern for individual prerogative was soon displaced by a concern for social control.
In government, this trend supported a more “positive” role for government,
one in which government would act to balance the potential excesses of management and labor, technology and industrialization. This new attitude, called
statism, began, especially during the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt, to dominate the thinking of most political leaders in this country. A second trend affecting the development of a new public philosophy was the rise of many competing
organized groups, each promoting its own special interest. There were labor and
management, to be sure, but also racial and ethnic groups, trade associations,
consumer groups, and even religious organizations. Government was itself one
such interest group, perhaps the most important, but still just one among many.
And in all cases, the rise of administration provided special support. All groups
shared an interest in administration and organization; all sought to impose
administrative structures and processes on their internal operations and on as
much of their environment as they could. The group, converted by administration into organization, now became the center of attention; correspondingly, the
interplay of groups and organizations became much more important. Indeed,
market competition was increasingly displaced by group competition, or
pluralism. The combination of these two trends, statism and pluralism, led to
the rise of interest-group liberalism, which Lowi (1969) defines in this way:
“It is liberalism because it is optimistic about government, expects to use government in a positive and expansive role, is motivated by the highest sentiments,
and possesses a strong faith that what is good for government is good for society.
It is interest-group liberalism because it sees as both necessary and good a policy
agenda that is accessible to all organized interests and makes no independent
judgment of their claims” (p. 51).
This ideology seeks to apply notions of popular role to a more active and
more coercive government and especially to the administrative agencies through
which it exercises its power (p. 63). No longer is the legislature the primary
organ for policy making; instead, the development of policy has been shifted to
implementing agencies. Formal and authoritative rule making is replaced by a
system of bargaining and negotiation. “Liberalism has opposed privilege in policy
formulation only to foster it quite systematically in the implementation of policy” (p. 297). Such a government can be neither responsive nor effective.
Lowi’s answer is a new emphasis on legislative enactment and administrative
rule making that would codify as many relationships as possible, thus eliminating
the need for discretion and the bargaining and negotiation that it allows. Obviously, such a solution merely fights fire with fire; it urges more systematic and
detailed regulation (or rationalization) as a cure for the ills of regulation (or rationalization). Moreover, it asserts the role of the legislative body but does so in a
way that would create still another interest group—the legislature itself, since the
legislature would obviously require considerably more staff or administrative support in order to act in the comprehensive and detailed way suggested by Lowi.
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These concerns, however, are of less significance than Lowi’s implicit endorsement of elite rule, the rule of a privileged few holding the reins of power and
having only limited institutional constraints on the exercise of that power. In this
view, representation is at best an election-year phenomenon, less important than
the effort to centralize and formalize government power in pursuit of greater
government effectiveness. As the ends of government and popular involvement
in determining them come to be taken for granted, and as Lowi concentrates on
the means to attain those ends, he concludes by offering the same vision of an
administered society as the administrative management theorists—one in which
centralized powers seek not only to achieve rationality but indeed to define it.
THE DISCOVERY OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
Just as Lowi is critical of the role of government agencies in policy implementation, others have taken that role as given and sought to understand how efforts at
implementation might redirect the intended course of government policy. As students of the policy process more carefully examined the issue of effectiveness—that
is, the ability of politics to bring about desired outcomes—it became clear (as Lowi
noted) that simply declaring a policy by legislative decree or executive order was
not enough. Just as policies are not made in a vacuum, they are not carried out in
a vacuum. Rather, a complex set of environmental and institutional factors affect
the execution of public policies. Moreover, even in the relative absence of environmental influences, the bureaucratic agencies charged with executing particular
policies sometimes simply fail to do so. For whatever reason—limited resources,
inadequate organizational structures, ineffective communications, or poor coordination—the policies of the policy makers are not put into action in the way that
had been intended. These limits on policy execution have been discussed in a
body of literature focusing emerging in the early 1970s on policy implementation
(see Saetran, 2005, and Hill and Hupe, 2009, for overviews of implementation
studies). However, as the discussion of Kaufman’s The Forest Ranger (1960) and
Selznick’s TVA and the Grassroots (1949) in Chapter 4 illustrates, one can easily
find concern for carrying out public policies long before “implementation” was
discovered. Nevertheless, this renewed interest in problems of implementation
has several important implications for the development of a theory of public
organizations: it suggests greater attention to important environmental or interorganizational influences on organizational work, and it places the study of public
administration in the larger context of public decision making, thus acknowledging
the role of the public bureaucracy in expressing public values.
Just as policies are not made in a vacuum, they are not carried out in a vacuum.
Rather, a complex set of environmental factors affects the execution of public
policies.
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Policy Formation and Policy Execution
One of the earliest and most prominent studies to use the implementation focus
was by Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky’s Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland; Or, Why It’s Amazing That Federal
Programs Work at All (1984). Implementation is a lengthy description and analysis
of a particular economic development program in the Oakland, California, area
that, as the subtitle of the book indicates, was something less than a complete
success. Pressman and Wildavsky’s basic point is that a simple relationship
between policy formation and policy execution is deceiving. For example, they
conclude that in this case, “what seemed to be a simple program turned out to
be a very complex one, involving many participants, a host of differing perspectives, and a long and tortuous path of decision points that had to be cleared”
(p. 94). Even what appeared to be fairly straightforward programs consisted of
many distinct and competing interests representing widely divergent views on
many different though interrelated issues, all of which was diffused through the
multiple agencies within the U.S. federal system. At many points, these interests
and multiple decision points undermined the process of implementation.
Pressman and Wildavsky’s response to this finding is bound up in a somewhat confusing discussion of the relationship between policy formation and policy implementation. On the one hand, using language remarkably similar to that
of Frank Goodnow more than fifty years earlier, Pressman and Wildavsky (1973)
argue that policy and implementation may be separated for analytical purposes:
“Implementation … means to carry out, accomplish, fulfill, produce, complete.
But what is it that is being implemented? A policy, naturally” (p. xix). This
seems to hold the two separate for analytic purposes. But on the other hand,
Pressman and Wildavsky conclude that implementation should not be separated
from policy and, indeed, that many of the problems encountered in the Oakland
project might have been avoided if a greater concern for implementation had
been evidenced in formulating the original programs: “The great problem, as
we understand it, is to make the difficulties of implementation a part of the initial
formulation of policy” (p. 143). One way to do this would be to establish systems at the outset that minimize the number of intrusions into the implementation process—for example, by reducing the number of clearance or decision
points required. A second way of incorporating implementation considerations
in the original formation of policy “would be to pay as much attention to the
creation of organizational machinery for executing a program as for launching
one” (pp. 144–145). In either case, the requirement seems to be that policy
makers acknowledge the difficulties of implementation and take steps to reduce
the possibility of interference from others who might wish to influence the
direction of the program.
Stating this point in more extreme fashion, one might say that against the
vagaries of an open (democratic?) system, the best protection is closure. But
obviously to resolve the formation–implementation dichotomy by giving greater
control to the policy makers is a solution that reduces the influence of local and
regional groups. Just as the concern for effective implementation underlying the
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Pressman and Wildavsky position is undeniable, the administrative management
solution they offer is difficult to ignore. Placing more value on decisions in the
hands of policy makers does not transcend the formulation–implementation
dichotomy but simply changes its terms by expanding the considerations of
policy. Choices are made by those in charge and carried out by those who are
subordinate—just another version of the politics–administration split.
In later editions of Implementation (1984), Browne, Wildavsky, and Majone
offer an interesting reconsideration of the relationship between policy and implementation. Noting the confused presentation of the relationship between the
two in the earlier work, they seek a middle ground between a rationalist
approach to implementation planning that wrongly presumes we can control
the process and an “interaction” approach that disregards the intent and objectives of policy. Implementation, they say, is not its own reward. Instead, they
view implementation as an “evolutionary” process (see also Abel & Sementelli,
2003). Policies, sort of like genes, express dispositions and ideas. As these dispositions and ideas interact with specific environments, they will express themselves
in unique ways and they adapt to and learn from experience.
Given the evolutionary “drift” in policy implementation, how is policy success or failure to be evaluated? First, change, they suggest, is not unlimited.
Majone and Wildavsky write, “Whereas policies can assume marvelous new
forms during implementation, in order to understand policy evolution (indeed
any type of evolution), it is important to understand what cannot happen as
what can” (p. 173). Most policies do not develop too far from their original
dispositions. Implementation “monsters” are rare. Second, as the discussion of
Argyris in Chapter 5 suggests, learning becomes central to implementation and
evaluation as well. Browne and Wildavsky suggest that successful implementation involves creating learning organizations that can evaluate implementation
on an ongoing basis, recognize and use new information, adjust objectives, and
redesign their processes accordingly. “Policy implementation,” they write, “is
hypothesis-testing: it is exploration. Any political body that argues otherwise
mistakenly regards itself as omniscient and omnipotent” (p. 254). Obviously,
this raises grave doubts about the plausibility of traditional forms of political
accountability. Unlike, for example, Lowi’s criticism of liberalism, the evolutionary perspective sees policy formulation and implementation as intrinsically resistant to the instrumental, top-down mode of implementation he advocates. This,
in turn, prompts the need to reconsider the relationship between policy makers
and policy implementers as well as the very notion of political and administrative
control (pp. 245–256).
Games Policy Makers Play
An interesting contrast to Pressman and Wildavsky’s interest in control is provided
in Eugene Bardach’s (1977) book The Implementation Game. Bardach too is concerned with the multiple interests represented in the combination of federal,
state, and local relations and with those connecting the public sector at all levels
to private and semiprivate groups and organizations. Viewing the interactions of all
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these groups, Bardach recognizes some of the limitations of seeking more effective
policy processes through greater centralized control and turns instead to the metaphor of games to describe the process by which implementation occurs. Following
the “games people play” metaphor, Bardach analyzes the various kinds of bargaining and negotiation that occur in the implementation process. The result is a
clearer and more conceptual view of the implementation process and especially
those games that interfere with the effective execution of public policies. For
example, Bardach notes that the politics of implementation, which is distinguished
by the existence of a policy, is therefore highly defensive. A concluding paragraph,
however, is perhaps most telling. Here Bardach puts the study of implementation
in perspective by commenting, “The most important problems that affect public
policy are almost surely not those of implementation but those of basic political,
economic, and social theory” (p. 283).
Later Generations of Implementation Studies
Subsequent generations of implementation studies tended to further reveal the
immense complexity and difficulties of the process of implementation rather
than unlock its secrets. Indeed in some scholars’ view, implementation studies
“simply stuttered to a crawl because implementation resisted parsimonious explanation” (Smith & Larimer, 2013, p. 164). One review of the research, for example, identified some 300 distinct determinants of implementation (O’Toole,
1986). This is a rather dispiriting ending to the search for greater effectiveness
in policy implementation.
However, one reaction to running into this apparent dead end has been narrowing of scope and a renewed concern for the ways in which “management
matters” in shaping policy outcomes and organizational performance. Notably,
in Public Management: Organizations, Governance, and Performance, Kenneth Meier
and Laurence O’Toole (2011) integrate their research on the performance
impact of management practice on school districts in Texas. Focusing on highlevel managers, they call attention, among other factors, to the importance of a
manager’s external networking to secure technical knowledge, resources, and
political support; building excess managerial capacity so organizational units can
cope with external shock and environmental uncertainty; and the importance of
stability in both higher-level management and front-line employees (p. 276).
Meier and O’Toole write, “managers are not superheroes … but neither should
we underestimate the effect management can have” (p. 275).
METHODS OF POLICY ANALYSIS
As we discussed at the beginning of this chapter, there is tension in the policy
orientation between scientific and value-critical concerns. This tension also
expresses itself in terms of ambivalence about democracy, especially in the organizational setting; this was evident in Lowi and Pressman and Wildavsky’s
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centralizing solutions to the issue of effectiveness. A third aspect of this tension
concerns the proper method and “science” for conducting the analysis of public
policy.
Over the last several decades, policy analysis itself has proven to be a social
force of some importance itself. The policy-analysis movement—which, with its
own networks and organizations, journals and monographs, is certainly more of a
movement than the new public administration ever aspired to be—represents the
epitome of policy thinking in the United States. There are important exceptions
that call for critical, interpretivist, participatory, and social constructionist
approaches (e.g., deLeon, 1997; Miller, 2002; Schneider & Ingram, 1997;
Stone, 1997; Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006). The evolutionary perspective
described above is another. But the dominant message of the policy movement
remains clear: the key to effective government is the specification of the most
rational means for obtaining the agency’s objectives; the methods of positive
social science are best able to specify such means; and individuals trained in the
use of those methods (policy analysts, not managers) will best be able to guide
the future. Although many obviously welcome such a development, there are
clearly certain dangers in the application of policy analysis to all phases of social
and political life. For our purposes, an even greater danger is that the method
might be elevated to the status of a model or a theory of public organization.
At least three problems come readily to mind. First, dominant approaches to
policy analysis promote an uncritical acceptance of existing goals. By concentrating on the means to achieve given ends, policy analysis, like other instrumental
sciences, diverts attention away from a political exploration of the ends themselves. Societal values are taken as given rather than as products of human interaction. Such a viewpoint obviously reinforces the existing values of society,
making change appear neither warranted nor even possible. But even if change
were possible, there would be no normative standard to guide our actions.
Second, a preoccupation with objectification leads one to consider only those
topics that can be analyzed in the terms of the method itself. For example, one
prominent policy analyst has argued in behalf of a “new consciousness” among
analysts, one that would allow them to operate in terms of “objectives and measurable outcomes” (Scioli, 1979, p. 42). Presumably, those policies that cannot
be objectively measured should not be undertaken. The result is that the method
begins to structure social and political relationships rather than to reflect them.
This point has been made eloquently by Peter deLeon (1992), who argues that
policy analysis and program evaluation need to be made more relevant to the
citizenry, something that can be accomplished only through a “democratization”
of policy analysis. “The idea is to increase citizen participation in the articulation
and formulation of public policy programs. [It] asks that policy analysts devise
and actively practice ways to recruit and include citizens’ personal views into the
policy-formulation process” (p. 127). Feldman and Khademian (2007) have
advanced a related point concerning forms of knowledge. They argue that the
role of public managers is to find ways to incorporate different forms of experience and knowledge: the political knowledge of elected officials, the scientific
knowledge of experts, and the local or experiential knowledge of the public.
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Third, policy analysis seeks to resolve the theory–practice dichotomy by forcing
practice to correspond to theory rather than vice versa. Many have addressed the
theory–practice question by seeking alternative ways of conceptualizing the relationship between theory and practice, an effort examined in more detail in the
next chapter. However, if theory and practice diverge, another response is to
develop a practice that corresponds to the theory—in this case, to produce a set
of analysts throughout government whose professional allegiance is to the scientific method. That seems to be exactly the intention of the policy-analysis movement. The movement calls for a new profession of rational and practical policy
analysts extending from the universities and policy centers (“think tanks”) to all
areas of the government bureaucracy and even into the halls of Congress (see
Meltsner, 1980, p. 249).
THE INTELLECTUAL CRISIS
Vincent Ostrom, in some ways, represents the best in mainstream policy studies—
he is concerned with fundamental social and political values; he understands
something of the relationship between these values and the organization of public
agencies; and he seeks an extension of democratic norms in the operations of
public organizations. At the same time, his methodological commitments seem to
prevent him from extending his analysis as far as he otherwise might. On balance,
however, Ostrom provides important material for the student of public organization, and his work should be examined with some care.
Key Elements of Public Choice Theory
Ostrom (Ostrom & Ostrom, 1971) seeks to move away from what he sees as a
preoccupation with bureaucracy in American public administration toward a
broader conception of collective action and decoupling of the terms public organization and bureaucracy. He suggests that the mainstream of public administration
theory, from Wilson through at least Simon, has been too concerned with the
efficiency of the administrative process, efficiency generally sought through
mechanisms of centralization and control. This preoccupation has shielded
scholars from recognizing the fragmented, decentralized nature of the American
constitutional, federalist system. The result has been an “intellectual crisis” in
American public administration, in which theorists and practitioners lack a clear
sense of identity and the understanding to deal with the increasingly difficult
problems they now face (p. 205).
Ostrom seeks a solution to this contemporary crisis in the work of theorists
of public choice (e.g., Tiebout, 1956). This work is based on three key elements,
the first of which is the concept of methodological individualism, or the presumption
that the individual—that is, a representative individual decision maker—is
the basic unit of analysis. The individual decision maker, comparable in most
respects to the classic economic man, is assumed to be self-interested, rational,
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and seeking to maximize his or her own utilities. By “self-interested,” Ostrom
means that each individual has distinct preferences that may differ from the
preferences of others; by “rational,” Ostrom means that individuals can rank
alternative choices in a transitive manner; by “maximization,” Ostrom assumes
a strategy in which the individual seeks the highest net benefit in any decision
situation (p. 205). Like Simon’s administrative man or the classic economic man,
Ostrom’s individual decision maker does not represent the behavior of any particular individual but is suggestive of what we might expect a rational (or mostly
rational) individual to do, given certain conditions. (Note that Ostrom is not
critical of Simon’s work in this respect but only considers it unfortunate that
Simon did not extend his concept beyond the bounds of the organization to
embrace all collective action.)
A second feature of public choice theory lies in “the conceptualization of
public goods as the type of event associated with the output of public agencies”
(p. 205). Public goods are distinguished from private goods (those that can be
measured, marketed, and contained) by virtue of the fact that they are highly
indivisible. A public good provided for one person or group will be available
for use by all. For example, once national defense is provided for some in a
country, it is provided for all. Somewhere between private and public goods
lies a range of intermediate situations in which the production and consumption
of goods and services involve spillover effects, or “externalities,” which are not
contained in the normal mechanisms of the market. In their pursuit of these various forms of goods or benefits, individuals devise differing strategies. Among
these, individuals might, under certain circumstances, form enterprises to engage
in collective action seen as resulting in individual benefits. “Public agencies are
not viewed simply as bureaucratic units which perform those services which
someone at the top instructs them to perform. Rather, public agencies are
viewed as a means for allocating decision-making capabilities in order to provide
public goods and services responsive to the preferences of individuals in different
social contexts” (p. 207).
The third feature of work in public choice is the idea that different kinds of
decision structures (decision-making rules or arrangements) will have different
effects on the behavior of individuals seeking strategies of maximization. For
the student of public organization, the key question is whether an individual
would expect to gain more from a single, integrated bureaucratic structure or
from a multiorganizational arrangement. Ostrom follows the logic of public
choice to the latter conclusion: “If a domain that is relevant to the provision of
a public good or service can be specified so that those who are potentially
affected can be contained within the boundaries of an appropriate jurisdiction
and externalities do not spill over onto others, then a public enterprise can be
operated with substantial autonomy,” assuming the prohibition against coercive
powers being used to deprive certain persons of their rights (p. 211). Obviously,
such a solution is at odds with what Ostrom perceives to be the mainstream view
in American public administration, which emphasizes centralization and control.
To the contrary and consistent with his critique of the field, Ostrom’s analysis
suggests a constitutional arrangement that would feature multiorganizational
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arrangements with overlapping jurisdiction and fragmentation of authority operating at many different levels of government.
Theory of “Democratic Administration”*
What Ostrom draws from the work of public choice theorists is an argument for
the development of multiorganizational arrangements in the public sector that
resemble public enterprises operating with considerable independence and based
in significant measure on the mobilization of client support. The basic unit, the
enterprise, would operate at the lowest level consistent with the nature of its
work. Where externalities spill over into other domains, there could be recourse
to a second level of organization, and so forth; such arrangements as transfers or
grants-in-aid could be used to facilitate the relationship among the various levels
and among interrelated units at the same level. In this view, notions of hierarchy
and centralization, long central to mainstream public administration, no longer
appear workable in all situations. Indeed, they no longer even appear to be the
most efficient mechanisms for the distribution of public goods. In their place,
Ostrom (1974, pp. 111–112) proposes the theory of “democratic administration.”
As a replacement for the Wilsonian paradigm, which Ostrom decries as inconsistent
with the ideals of American democracy, a theory of democratic administration will
shift attention from “a preoccupation with the organization to concerns with the
opportunities that individuals can pursue in a multiorganizational environment”
(p. 132). Supported by a new policy analysis that would focus on the limitations
of existing organizational arrangements, the theory of democratic administration
would finally ensure the flexibility and responsiveness that were originally a part
of the American dream. Ostrom (1987) has elaborated his public choice view in a
second edition of The Political Theory of a Compound Republic, offering a reexamination of the thinking of Madison and Hamilton to support his thesis of decentralized,
market-oriented government. Not surprisingly, Ostrom discovers that the “preferred administrative system” is one that offers a large variety of choices to its “customers” and is one that is compound, overlapping, fragmented, and competitive.
Ostrom’s work provides a fascinating juxtaposition of several important
themes in public administration theory, in a sense turning the rational model of
administration on its head. Ostrom accepts the same assumptions of classic rationality that had been used in the works of previous theorists to support centralized
hierarchical power; however, by taking the logic of rational choice to the
extreme, Ostrom comes to far more democratic conclusions. In this sense, his
critique of earlier work in public administration theory is much more radical
than the critiques of the many human relations theorists who argue for cosmetic
changes in management style while doing little to alter the real distribution of
organizational power. Similarly, while seemingly accepting the analytical thrust
of modern policy studies, Ostrom puts policy analysis to work in the critique,
rather than the justification, of existing organizational structures. In doing so,
*From Vincent Ostrom, The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration, Revised Edition, pp. 111–112, 132–
133. Copyright © 1974. Reprinted by permission of The University of Alabama Press.
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he returns the study of public policy to its older and more fundamental role in
the expression of basic societal values. Most important, while clearly writing
within the tradition of public administration theory, Ostrom moves both outside
and inside the standard unit of analysis, the bureaucratic organization, to consider
the reformation of those social structures through which we distribute public
goods and to discover ways in which those new enterprises might be made
more responsive to the preferences of individuals.
Limits of the Economic Model
Despite its scientific and ethical appeal, Ostrom’s work leaves several important
questions unanswered. These questions, essential to a comprehensive theory of
public organization, have been discussed at length in an exchange between
Ostrom (1977) and Golembiewski (1977). Although that discussion need not
be rehearsed here, several summary points should be made. The first is empirical: the assumption of classical rationality sacrifices the individual actor for a
methodological construct that even public choice theorists admit does not
accurately reflect reality. In effect, they argue that such and such would be
expected if people were rational. But real people only approximate rationality
from time to time. To rest theoretical propositions on assumptions that only
remotely correspond to reality raises serious questions about the usefulness of
those propositions beyond their value as a basis for empirical research. That is,
all social scientific research necessarily employs models of behavior that are, in
some sense, reductive. Models are simplified abstractions of reality. The relative
parsimony of the rational choice model has enabled a robust research program
to flourish, but there is the danger that this particular model be conflated, or
confused with, human behavior in general. This danger is especially worrisome
in fields like public policy and administration where research seeks to inform
management practice and policy formulation. As we will see in the discussion
of the new public management, assumptions about human behavior have profound implications for how we govern and organize ourselves. The net effect
of the dominance of the economic model, then, is to conceal other bases for
choice and thus possibilities for human action. Why not presume a normative
model and attempt to derive the moral basis for democratic administration?
Why not, as developments in neuroscience suggest (McDermott, 2004), focus
on feeling or intuition—aspects of humanity every bit as important as rationality?
Were we to bring different dimensions of human experience to the fore, we might
think differently about public organizations and human well-being in general.
On balance, Ostrom’s work is far less rigid and narrow than that of others
who have pursued the policy emphasis in public administration. Indeed, he
seems to invite us to seriously entertain a phenomenological or critical approach
equally as radical as his inversion of the rational model. Just such an approach has
interested a group of theorists who have recently attempted to move beyond the
rational model of administration in its many variants and to construct a critical
understanding of life in public organizations. First we examine the latest outgrowth
of the policy orientation—one that brings analysis and implementation together.
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THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT
At the practical level, the fiscal and social crises of the 1970s led to a variety of
efforts to produce a government that “works better and costs less.” Fiscal austerity
measures, efforts to improve public productivity, and experiments with alternative
service delivery mechanisms, including contracting out and privatization—all can
be seen as based on what some have called “economic rationalism,” an effort
to find solutions to governmental problems based on an economic calculus.
At the same time, public managers interested in accountability and high
performance began to restructure their bureaucratic agencies, redefine their
organizational missions, streamline agency processes, and decentralize decision
making. We should note that while much of the political rhetoric around
these changes came to be characterized by an unthinking, ideological preference
for market-based techniques and theories (Brown & Jacobs, 2008; Sclar, 2000),
democratic governments during this time did face severe fiscal problems and
threats to their very legitimacy (Held, 1996, Chap. 7). How and why the
market-based reforms of a “new public management” and what are often called
“neoliberal” public and social policies won the day is a complex story that takes
us beyond the scope of this chapter (see Harvey, 2004; Peck, 2008).
New Public Management: Rhetoric and Technique
As Donald Kettl (2005) writes that what became known as “new public management” (see Hood, 1989) was part of a “global management revolution” that has
left few governments in the world untouched. At the heart of this revolution is a
criticism of both the responsiveness and effectiveness government (read: bureaucracy). This critique has several dimensions. First, government needs to become
more “productive” and make better use of fewer financial resources. Second, the
incentive structures in government are wrong and these need to be changed so
that public servants will be motivated properly to perform and be held accountable for results. Third, government, especially national governments, have overstepped their bounds and need to be reined in. In general terms, this has meant
several broad directives for reform (Kettl, 2005):
â–  A search for greater productivity.
â–  A greater reliance by governments on the use of markets.
â–  A stronger service orientation.
â–  A preference for decentralization from national to subnational governments
and other private or nonprofit organizations and corporations.
â–  A search for greater capacity to devise and track public policy.
â–  Development of various techniques to enhance accountability for results.
What kind of concrete administrative practices does this list of preferences
entail? Linda Kaboolian notes that reformers advocate administrative technologies
such as customer service, privatization, performance auditing and budgeting,
competition, market incentives, and deregulation. “Market-like arrangements
THE POLICY EMPHASIS AND THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 155
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such as competition within units of government and across government boundaries to the nonprofit and for-profit sectors, performance bonuses, and penalties
loosen the inefficient monopoly franchise of public agencies and public employees” (Kaboolian, 1998, p. 190; see also Barzelay, 2000; Bouckert, 2004; Dilulio,
1994; Kettl, 2005; Kettl & Milward, 1996; Kearns, 1996; Light, 1997; Peters,
2001; Pollitt & Bouckert, 2004).
From among these techniques, Lane (2002) argues that the key one is the
contract. He writes, “New public management (NPM) puts the contract in the
centre of public governance and not authority as with the traditional approach,
public administration” (p. 212). The contract is a core institution of private law,
and, in theory, its virtue is that parties enter voluntarily into contractual agreements. It is through entering voluntarily into agreements in the market, or contracts, that people decide that is valuable to them and what price they will pay
for a given good or service. Of course governments have always participated in
the market and contracted for goods and services through their procurement
processes. The new public management, however, extends the contract to
more and more service areas, including what Lane calls the “soft sector” areas
like education, law and order, and social services. The underlying idea is that
government should take advantage of the competition in the market place in
order to obtain value not possible under traditional bureaucratic authority
(Lane, 2000, p. 222). There are problems with this extended use of the contract
which we discuss later in this chapter.
Intellectual Bases
Though reforms began in the early 1970s, a stronger intellectual justification for
the new public management took time to coalesce—even if, frankly, it never
really cohered. There are at least three major sources of this: the new institutional and public-choice economics, the public policy movement, and managerialism (Hood, 1991; Lynn, 1996). From the new institutional economics and
public choice came concern for transaction costs, information asymmetries, user
choice, and incentive structures. This dovetailed with the burgeoning interest in
institutions and institutional design (see Chapter 4) as well as in perceived comparative advantages of various organizational structures (e.g., hierarchy, markets/
contracts, and networks) for service delivery—an interest we saw in Ostrom’s
work. From the public policy movement came the previously discussed interest
in policy implementation, a piece of which was reformulated as “public
management.” Like such of the implementation literature, it exhibits a primary
interest for “high policy” and executive leaders (Lynn, 1996, pp. 55–56). Laurence Lynn details the development of public management out of the policy
movement (noted above in the discussion of implementation) in his excellent
overview, Public Management as Art, Science, and Profession (1996). The third influence was the global “managerialist” movement (Hood, 1991). Reminiscent of
the scientific management of the early twentieth century, contemporary managerialism focuses on professional management expertise in achieving measurable
performance outcomes and enhancing productivity. Management—typically
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defined, as in the policy-grounded management perspective, the executive—is
seen as the central player. Given the manager’s centrality in planning and orchestrating organizational activity, he or she must be “free to manage” and not be
constrained by so-called bureaucratic impediments that impede productivity
and performance (Pollitt, 1990, pp. 2–3).
Theoretical Problems of New Public Management
Obviously there are implications of this move for governmental efficiency, but
there are also implications for issues of responsiveness as well. The new public
management has sought management reform in government not only through
the introduction of new techniques (though that has occurred), but also through
the imposition of a new set of values, specifically a set of values largely drawn
from the private sector and certain strands of economics. Of course there is a
long-standing tradition in public administration supporting the idea that “government should be run like a business.” For the most part, this recommendation
has meant that government agencies should adopt those practices, ranging from
“scientific management” to “total quality management,” which have been found
useful in the private sector. The reforms of the new public management take this
idea one step further, arguing that government should not only adopt the techniques
of business administration but should adopt certain business values as well.
One of the most important implications for this is how we think about public
service—both in terms of those who work in public organizations and those who
receive services from them. In the pages of the Public Administration Review, John
Kamensky (1996), one of the most thoughtful architects of the U.S. federal government’s National Performance Review, ties the reinvention movement directly to
public-choice theory, quoting the New Zealander Jonathan Boston as follows:
“The central tenet of the public choice approach is that all human behavior is
dominated by self-interest” (p. 251). Kamensky correctly notes that “public choice
theories have tended to reject concepts like ‘public spirit,’ ‘public service,’ and so
forth.” We become nothing more than producers and consumers of public services;
each of us animated only by the pursuit of our self-interest. These ideas, then, go
beyond improving the quality of government service and in fact represent a preference for a government that ultimately responds to the short-term self-interests of
isolated individuals (customers) rather than one that supports the longer-term pursuit of public interests publicly defined through a deliberative process (citizens).
We can also ask whether the idea of “consumer” or “customer” makes
much sense in the context of public service delivery. Obviously, the varied functions of government do not represent uniform products or even a “product
line,” as might be encountered in business. Rather, the work of government is
extremely diverse in the way it originates, is performed, and is received. Some
services, of course, such as traffic citations or being put in prison, are not even
services the immediate recipient wants. For these reasons, the relationship
between those in public organizations and their “customers” is far more complex
than the relationship between those behind the counter of a hamburger stand
and their customers.
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Similarly, the diversity of government activities means that even the first step
in a service-improvement effort, identification of the agency’s “customers,” can
be quite difficult. Private-sector customer service efforts often distinguish
between internal and external customers, but the problem for government not
only includes but goes far beyond that distinction. Among the categories of those
dealt with by government might be those who immediately present themselves
(and their available resources) for the service, those who may be waiting for the
service, relatives and friends of the immediate recipient, those who may need the
service even though they are not actively seeking it, future generations of possible service recipients, and on and on.
Of even greater theoretical importance, some who approach government for
services have greater resources and greater skill in bringing their demands forward.
In business, that fact would justify special attention; but in government it surely
does not. In fact, an emphasis on “customer relations” in government may create
a climate in which special privileges might be inappropriately granted. Also, many
public services—such as schooling or environmental quality or police protection—
are designed to have a collective benefit. For example, we generally assume that
having a more literate society is an important general societal goal that goes beyond
the effect schooling has on a particular individual. (Indeed, the fact that certain
issues cannot be easily “managed” or “marketed” is exactly why they are in the
public rather than the private sector.) Finally, the customer of business products or
services is rarely the producer of those goods and services; yet in the public sector
the “customer” of any government service is almost always at the same time a citizen—in a sense, the boss. As a citizen, the individual has a stake in all services that
are delivered, not just those that he or she consumes directly, a feature most clearly
seen when a majority of citizens choose to limit the amount of money to be spent
to deliver a particular service, even one that many other “customers” want.
Henry Mintzberg, the Canadian management theorist, has pointed out the
variety of relationships that citizens have with their governments—customers,
clients, citizens, and subjects—and suggests that the label “customer” is particularly confining. “I am not a mere customer of my government, thank you,” he
writes. “I expect something more than arm’s length trading and something less
than the encouragement to consume” (Mintzberg, 1996, p. 77). As citizens we
expect government to act in a way that not only promotes the consumption of
services (Mintzberg also asks, “Do we really want our governments … hawking
products?”) but also promotes a set of principles and ideals that are inherent in
the public sphere.
A third important element of the new public management is its enthusiasm for
what Osborne and Gaebler (1992) call “entrepreneurial government,” which they
define as “us[ing] resources in new ways to maximize productivity and effectiveness” (p. xix). But entrepreneurship connotes more than simple resourcefulness.
Specifically it entails creativity and innovation, a strong focus on ends (outcomes,
mission) rather than means, and a proactive stance toward problems (“prevent [them]
before they emerge, rather than simply offering services afterward”) (p. 20).
But most important, the idea of entrepreneurship suggests the individual government agent acting based on his or her own self-interest (or that of the agency).
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An example from Ted Gaebler’s own experience is used to make this point: “The
idea was to get them thinking like owners: ‘If this were my money would I spend
it this way’ ” (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992, p. 3). Again, the viewpoint represented
here is one that glorifies the innovative potential of the single self-interested individual over the powers of established institutional processes or the slower and more
hesitating but more involving and, perhaps, democratic efforts of groups.
As with customer service and the benefits of competition, no one can argue
that “using resources in new ways to maximize productivity and effectiveness” is
an unworthy goal. Nevertheless, although entrepreneurial activity on the part of
government has these obvious benefits, it is worth noting—as the private-sector
advocates of entrepreneurship are aware—that it has liabilities as well. On the
credit side of the ledger, entrepreneurs create and innovate; on the debit side,
they may take excessive risks or run roughshod over people and principles.
The “shadow” side of the entrepreneur is characterized by a narrow focus,
an unwillingness to follow rules and stay within bounds, and a preference for
action so strong as to threaten accountability. (“It is better to ask forgiveness than
permission.”) Cutting red tape—or as Barzelay (1992) calls it, “breaking through
bureaucracy”—requires opportunism, single-mindedness, and extraordinary confidence in one’s personal vision. While the public desires creative solutions to
public problems and likes savings produced through innovative thinking (and
even occasional risk taking), the notion of accountability is extremely important
as well and is a model that most voters and legislators seem to hold. As a practical
matter, in real organizations, entrepreneurial managers pose a difficult and risky
problem: They can be innovative and productive, but their single-mindedness,
tenacity, and willingness to bend the rules make them very difficult to control.
They can become “loose cannons.” As a theoretical concern, the notion of
public managers acting purely as if the public’s money were their own—that is,
being motivated by strict self-interest—flies in the face of a long and important
tradition of accountability and responsiveness in democratic public administration. Most important, it denies the public a role in determining the expenditure
of public funds and the design of public programs. In truth, treating the public’s
money as if it were indeed the public’s money is an important principle of democratic governance (deLeon & Denhardt, 2000, pp. 89–97).
The quick translation of business values into the public sector raises substantial and
troubling questions that public administrators should consider with great care.
Practical Consequences
We should be cautious about making overly general claims about how the ideas
and reforms of the new public management expressed themselves on the ground.
While many reforms were initiated by democratically elected governments, some
countries had these reforms imposed on them by international organizations, like
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the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, as a condition for receiving
financial assistance. Thus global politics often shaped reform. The dynamics of
the reform movement changed, too, over time as governments reacted to its
consequences. Importantly, the rationale and shape of reform looked very different depending on the particular national, cultural, and institutional context in
which they were carried out (Kettl, 2005; Lynn, 2006; Suleiman, 2003).
Having said this, the new public management has some unexpected consequences for problems of effectiveness and responsiveness that we began this
chapter considering. First, the new public management aimed to address the
perceived ills of government through the extensive use of contracting and
performance measurement. Contracting, however, has complicated already challenging issues of effectiveness and responsiveness in pluralistic, fragmented political
system by extending relationships of accountability beyond the government agency
and further fragmenting that system. Contractors and subcontractors deliver ever
more goods and services, and these providers are even further removed from direct
political control. As we discuss further in Chapter 7’s section on governance, these
new relationships complicate management processes and have required the development of new administrative capacities that, at least in the short term, frustrate
promised efficiency gains.
The simplistic use of performance measurement has also produced consequences somewhat contrary to their intentions. Evelyn Brodkin (2006), for example, has documented the ways in which the pressure to reduce welfare case loads
warped social service delivery in ways that harmed clients. She writes that these
measures skewed informal practices toward maximizing measured aspects of performance but with perverse consequences for unmeasured aspects. In this case,
rewards for caseload decline were not accompanied by penalties for failure to provide appropriate access. Similarly, rewards for meeting work and training placement quotas were not balanced by rewards for the quality of those placements or
penalties for pushing people into bad jobs or ineffective training. (p. 9)
A similar conclusion is reached about performance measures by Soss, Fording,
and Schram in their book Disciplining the Poor: Neoliberal Paternalism and the
Persistent Power of Race (2011). Importantly, their excellent research also indicates
that when sanctions are used under performance measurement regimes, they are
disproportionately applied to disadvantaged racial and education groups (p. 232).
Second, advocates of the new public management-style reforms often
naively understand “the market” and the prospects of public sector contracting
and competition. One of the most astute scholars on this point is Elliot (2000).
Sclar notes that in many instances there are simply no competitors in a given
service area and that contracting often trades a public-sector monopolist for a
private-sector one (see also Van Slyke, 2003). Another issue concerns the total
costs of contract administration. Contracts are not self-enforcing and so the
total costs of a contract must include monitoring as well as the costs of learning
how to work with new contractors. Given these factors, the long-term efficiencies gained from a contract may not be so great. The complex nature of public
services also necessitates multiyear agreements that undermine the flexibility
contracts allegedly enable. Sclar also points that empirical analysis shows that in
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some areas the comparative costs of public and private operations are “sufficiently
close that the question of savings hinges on the analysis of potential new costs
engendered by privatization in comparison to the costs that it would permit public authorities to avoid” (55). His basic point seems to be this: there is nothing
inherent about the private sector that makes it efficient, and nothing about private
sector employees that makes them better or smarter.
Third, and to Sclar’s point, Lane (2000) suggests that the logic of contracting
has often been unproductively and inappropriately extended to the “soft sector,”
or service areas like education, policing, prisons, and social services. Lane notes
that all of these areas require long-term commitments by highly professionalized
actors. The requirements are frequently at odds with the short-term interests of
private firms. Along these lines, privatization and contracting may generate
unhealthy dependencies and perverse policy effects. For example, Schneider
and Ingram (1997) ask whether the privatization of prisons accentuates the pressure for an ever-increasing supply of prisoners, leading to longer sentences and
more intrusive justice practices.
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding its aspirations to improve the responsiveness and effectiveness of
public organizations and its significant contributions to our understanding of how
public bureaucracies influence policy making, the full promise of the public policy
approach has not been realized. Despite its comprehensiveness, the policy orientation has not fundamentally altered our approach to theory. Both a reemergence of
the politics–administration dichotomy and a continuation or even an extension of
the instrumentalist conception of organization have been maintained, at least in
many works. Students of public policy have differentiated between policy formulation and policy implementation in much the same way that earlier students of
public administration separated their work from the study of politics, if only for
analytical purposes. Similarly, those embracing the public policy orientation have
largely maintained their commitment to a narrow view of social science, including
a positive view of science and an instrumental conception of organization.
Combining aspects of policy orientation, economics, and an executivecentered approach of management that is ambivalent about democracy, the practical culmination of this perspective is the new public management. This approach
to public organization has had a significant impact on government in the United
States and around the world. Ideas such as customer service, performance measurement, privatization, and contracts are increasingly a part of the language of public
administration. Unfortunately however, ideology and rhetoric have often trumped
sober consideration of the contextual appropriateness of these ideas, and reforms
often complicated the very problems they were intended to remedy. More generally though, these developments raise fundamental questions for administrators and
the public about the very nature of public organization and public service. Particularly important are the ways in which these new approaches seek to institutionalize economic and business values in addition to business techniques. In doing so,
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we run the risk of reducing public servants and citizens to the roles of selfinterested actors, merely producing and consuming public services. It is a limited
and limiting view of the world and what is possible.
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
1. What is the role of the public administrator in the development of public
policy?
2. What are the trade-offs between responsiveness and effectiveness?
3. What are some of the ways that administrators can achieve greater
responsiveness?
4. Discuss Ostrom’s public choice theory as it is applied to democratic
administration.
5. What are the key tenets of the new public management? Discuss its strengths
and weaknesses as an approach to public administration.
CASES
1. Ho Sook Choi wants her international aid agency to operate efficiently, but
she also wants it to be responsive to both donor nations and recipients of aid.
Taking time to communicate frequently with these various stakeholders
mean that Ho Sook is getting behind on her paperwork. She doesn’t want
to appear inefficient, but she also thinks the time she takes talking with
stakeholders is important. How can she balance these concerns?
2. Rachel Rubino heads a state motor vehicle division. In an effort to provide
better “customer service” (and fewer complaints), she dramatically streamlines the process of obtaining a driver’s license. But a key state legislative
committee charges that the changes she has made put the motoring public
in danger. What are the issues here?
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7
Beyond the Rational Model
Toward Democratic Public
Organization Theory
I
n previous chapters, we reviewed a wide variety of approaches to understanding public organizations and saw some of the arguments used in defense of
various positions. Public administration theorists seem to dispute endlessly about
their work, and there seems little possibility of developing anything approximating a paradigm in the field. This confusion has been described in a number of
interesting ways. In the mid-twentieth century, Dwight Waldo (1961) referred
to organization theory as an “elephantine problem” (p. 210). More recently,
others have commented on the “crisis of identity” in public administration—a
situation in which disagreement about the direction of the field prevents us
from addressing certain problems.
There is an identity problem in public administration theory, although we
would describe it more as a crisis of legitimacy, in which the agreed-on bases of
theory fail to reflect or respond to the needs of actors in the field—theorists,
practitioners, and citizens. In fact, we would argue that there is considerable,
though often implicit, agreement as to the proper direction of public administration theory. The thread that ties otherwise disparate theories grows directly from
the Weberian intellectual heritage, with its emphasis on rational bureaucracy,
and the Wilsonian political heritage, with its emphasis on the politics–administration
dichotomy. The result is an attempt to construct a rational theory of administration
based on a positivist understanding of human behavior set within a framework of
democratic accountability.
168
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This curious combination of Weberian social science and Yankee industrialism has several different components. First is the view that the proper study of
public administration is the study of how to operate public organizations most
efficiently—that is, how to achieve given objectives with the least cost. In this
view, goals and objectives are determined by responsible public officials (typically
legislators) to whom members of the bureaucracy are accountable. The means to
achieve those ends may vary, but by and large the integration of the various
subparts of the organization requires a hierarchical structure leading upward to
a single central authority. All kinds of devices are then employed to secure the
compliance of organizational members, with this rational pattern of activity being
derived from the organization’s mission. In this effort, science is the key. Science,
it is said, can provide causal explanations that will permit greater control over the
organization and its members by those with access to knowledge and resources,
and those in positions of power.
There is a crisis of legitimacy in public administration, in which the agreed-on bases
of theory fail to reflect or respond to the needs of actors in the field-theorists,
practitioners, and citizens.
Although most mainstream public administration theorists differ on details,
they seem to agree on these basic concerns. For example, Simon’s classic description of the rational model of administration moved beyond earlier theories of
administrative management, yet it did so in a way that preserved much of the
politics–administration (now translated into fact–value) dichotomy as well as the
hierarchical pattern of the administrative management viewpoint. Similarly, the
human relations theorists, while purporting to move beyond the rational model,
may have simply provided a more sophisticated array of techniques for managers
to use in securing compliance. Finally, the policy analysts, though recognizing
the increased role of bureaucracy in policy making, concentrate on the scientific
assessment of the impact of established or proposed policies while suggesting
implementation strategies that return us directly to the days of administrative
management though under the heading of the new public management, which
privileges the role of the executive and, in giving pride of place to the contract,
ends up asserting a severe division between policy and administration.
In contrast to this mainstream set of commitments in public administration
theory, there has always been a less well-understood counterpoint of interests in
democratic administration. In the last decade or so, this interest has emerged as a
specific and direct critique of the rational model in all its guises and as an attempt
BEYOND THE RATIONAL MODEL 169
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to move public administration theory beyond mere rational action. This chapter
examines this critique of the rational model and then turns to several alternative
perspectives now beginning to be discussed, some based in phenomenology,
others in critical social theory, and others growing from still other intellectual
traditions, such as postmodernism and feminist theory. What may be emerging
is a viewpoint drawing more readily from the intellectual traditions of Marxist
humanism and Freudian psychoanalysis. Most important, theorists moving in
this direction place very strong emphasis on the integration of theory and practice, seeking to develop theories that will serve as meaningful guides to life in
public organizations (Jun, 2002; White, 1999). As we will see, there is some
reason to expect that a more practical version of these theoretical schemes
might prove especially appealing to students of public administration and that
the contemporary world of governance may make them particularly important.
A CRITIQUE OF THE RATIONAL MODEL
Mainstream public administration theory appears to be centered on the rational
model of administration. However, the rational model and related theories have
several important limitations, which are noted throughout this book. At this
point, it is appropriate to summarize our critique of the rational model in terms
of three important problems: (1) the rational model is based on a limited and
confining view of human reason; (2) it is based on an incomplete understanding
of knowledge acquisition; and (3) theorists working within the framework of the
rational model fail to connect theory and practice adequately. Each point is
examined in some detail in this section.
Restricted View of Human Reason
The first issue—that the rational model is based on a limited and confining view of
human reason—can be approached from either a historical or a more immediate
perspective. In his book The New Science of Organizations, Alberto Guerreiro
Ramos (1981) connects the modern concept of instrumental rationality to the
growth of a market economy and then summarizes some of the consequences of
such a development. Modern organization theory, according to Ramos, is a byproduct of organizational processes arising with the development of a marketcentered society. In order to meet the demands of the market (including demands
that are artificially created), those in control of large organizations seek greater
efficiency through a rationalized production process. This approach has serious
consequences for the individual and the society. Only in the market society is
the production process so ordered that the individual is reduced in significance to
the status of a mere jobholder, one who fills a position in the hierarchy for a given
period of time in exchange for a wage. In the prevailing form of organization,
which Ramos terms the “economizing” organization, the mechanical design of
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production, based on instrumental or technical rationality, transforms the individual into the laborer, who is in turn subject to a new market mentality.
But, Ramos (1981) argues, the expansion of the market may now have
reached the point of diminishing returns in terms of both personal development
and social stability. Rationalized organization leaves little place for selfactualization; when self-actualization occurs, it is merely incidental to the
production process (which is contrary to the notions of certain human relations
theorists). Moreover, that process leads us further and further toward “psychological insecurity, degradation of the quality of life, pollution, and waste of the
planet’s limited resources” (p. 23).
Let us examine some of these points in greater detail. If the rational model
draws our attention to the means to attain given ends, then it also draws our
attention away from the ends themselves. In concentrating on efficiency alone,
we might fail to fully examine and participate in decisions that are of importance
to us, thus also failing to meet our democratic obligations. Acting in this way, we
would hardly be facilitating the expression of societal values. Rather, we might
simply be trying to achieve, at minimum costs, the objectives presented to us.
Although operating quite efficiently, we might find ourselves pursuing objectives
that, if properly understood, would be seen to be at odds with the values of our
society—our values.
These considerations are of special importance in discussing public organizations. The rational model’s distinction between means and ends clearly connects
to the politics-administration dichotomy, in which the role of public organizations is simply to discover the most efficient means toward politically given ends.
But as we have seen, the politics–administration dichotomy neither reflects practice nor correctly states the role of administration in a democracy. One might
argue (though wrongly, we think) that the determination of objectives in private
business organizations should be made only by those in positions of power.
However, public organizations, since they are involved in the expression of societal values, must give their members a share in decision making. And in doing so,
they must certainly emphasize the necessity of widespread communication and
participation in decision making. Members of public organizations bear a special
responsibility to promote the democratization of governance and the policy process beyond simply acting efficiently.
Those in public organizations also bear an obligation to act with fairness,
understanding, and humanity—a democratic morality. Yet even this obligation
is made more difficult by a solely rational perspective that ignores other aspects
of human life such as emotion and intuition. Emotion is said to interfere with
rational planning and decision making; intuition is said to detract from reason
and order. But emotion and intuition are important aspects of human existence,
and they should be, particularly because these areas of our experience connect
most clearly to our feelings and our values. Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom
(1976) made this point many years ago: “A bias in favor of a deliberate adaption
of organizational means to ends requires that human relationships be viewed as
instrumental means to the prescribed goals of the organization, not as sources of
direct prime goal achievement. Joy, love, friendship, pity, and affection must all
be curbed—unless they happen to foster the prescribed goals of the organization”
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(p. 252). Such an attitude obviously results in the depersonalization of the individual in complex organizations, a theme prominent in a number of works,
ranging from William Whyte’s The Organization Man (1956) to more recent
books such as William Scott and David K. Hart’s Organizational America (1979)
and Denhardt’s In the Shadow of Organization (1981). These writers seem to agree
that the control mechanisms of complex organizations trivialize personal interaction, so that individuals are merely objects to be used in the production
process. Each becomes an instrument to be manipulated by the other in the efficient pursuit of organizational goals. More importantly, each loses that sense of
self-reflection and self-understanding that is essential to creativity and personal
growth. Again, these concerns are even more pronounced in public organizations than in others. The commitment of those in public organizations to seek
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, to aid all citizens in their own development, and to provide an education for citizenship itself can occur only through
the interaction of persons, not objects.
The commitment of those in public organizations to seek life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness, to aid all citizens in their own development, and to provide an education
for citizenship itself can occur only through the interaction of persons, not objects.
A final problem with the concept of reason employed by the rational model
of administration is that it omits any concern for the moral context within which
action can occur. As noted earlier, several theorists have viewed the rationalization of society as a process in which broader questions of human values, represented by such terms as freedom, justice, and equality, are losing their importance as
criteria for judgment, being replaced by a specific calculus of costs and benefits,
means and ends. The deliberative, communicative, and participative functions
seem of little importance when the only issues to be discussed are measures of
efficiency. Yet if public organizations are to fulfill their promise of supporting
and promoting democratic governance, their members must be willing to think
in terms of larger questions, such as those that enable us to establish a sense of
personal responsibility or mutual action. We simply cannot secure a moral context for our actions, including our organizational actions, within the limited
framework of instrumental rationality.
An especially interesting discussion of this issue is contained in Guy Adams
and Danny Balfour’s book, Unmasking Administrative Evil (2004). Adams and
Balfour argue that contemporary public organizations are so dominated by technical
rationality that
ordinary people may simply be acting appropriately in their organizational role—in essence, just doing what those around them would agree
they should be doing—and at the same time, participating in what a
critical and reasonable observer, usually well after the fact, would call
evil. Even worse, under conditions of … moral inversion, in which
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something evil has been redefined convincingly as good, ordinary people can all too easily engage in acts of administrative evil while believing
that what they are doing is not only correct, but, in fact, good. (p. 4)
Adams and Balfour then examine various cases of administrative evil, starting
with the Holocaust, moving through Wernher von Braun’s involvement in the
U.S. space program, and then considering the Challenger disaster. Note that the
mask concealing administrative evil in these cases and even more ordinary
instances is the dominance of technical rationality in our thinking about public
organizations.
Incomplete Understanding of Knowledge Acquisition
The rational model seems to assume that there is only one way in which true
knowledge can be obtained—through the rigorous application of the methods
of positive science to social and technical relationships within organizations.
Whether or not this assumption is valid, we should be clear about both the
strengths and the weaknesses of this approach to knowledge acquisition. Let us
first review and summarize more formally the basic premises of the positive
science model:
1. A single approach to knowledge acquisition is considered appropriate for
both natural and social events; hence, the social scientist should use the
model of scientific inquiry of the more “advanced” natural sciences.
2. All knowledge that is not purely conceptual must be based on sensory
experience; in turn, all statements about such experience must be based on
direct observation, subject to agreement among observers, of the behavior
of social actors.
3. There is a strict separation of fact and value, a distinction between what is
and what ought to be; the role of the scientist is to gather facts, not to
speculate on values.
4. The goals of scientific inquiry are explanation, prediction, and control.
To explain means that one must discover the causal mechanism that propel
events; explanation enables prediction, and prediction enables control.
5. The relationship between theory and practice is remote at best. The role
of the scientist is to conduct investigations that provide the data on which
theoretical frameworks can be constructed. The scientist has neither interest
in nor responsibility for the application of knowledge. Rather, he or she
simply tries to create knowledge, while others determine its use.
Several readily apparent limitations of the positive science model have been
debated back and forth over the years and should at least be reviewed here.
[A more complete philosophical analysis of this debate is contained in Richard
Bernstein’s The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory (1976).] One of the most
pointed criticisms of the positive science model is that human behavior is culturally or historically determined—that it varies from place to place and time to
time. If this were the case, the behavior of one group would not necessarily be
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the same as that of another, and the development of broad generalizations applicable to all cultures at all times would be extraordinarily difficult. One variant of
this criticism, of course, is that human beings do in fact change their behavior
based on new information, including scientifically derived information. This
shift in habitual patterns of behavior could occur in several ways. On the one
hand, people might be inclined to behave in ways consistent with theories of
human behavior. For example, the human relations emphasis on selfactualization as a goal of human behavior might lead people to consciously
model their behavior after characteristics identified as self-actualizing (Maslow,
1962, 1971). Or, on the other hand, people might stop acting in ways that
appear contrary to theory. For example, people encountering the rational
model of administration, with its implicit critique of emotion, might seek to suppress their own feelings in organizational situations. In any case, the variability of
human behavior from place to place and time to time limits the positive science
pursuit of lawlike statements applicable to a wide range of human behaviors.
A second major criticism of the positive science approach to knowledge
acquisition concerns the role of subjective experience in human life. One aspect
of this critique focuses on those who are the objects of study, arguing that people
have purely subjective reasons for their actions—reasons that are not accessible to
those observing their behavior from the outside. In this view, the values and
intentions of individuals move their actions every bit as much as the external
influences to which they are subjected. Whereas the latter can be observed, the
former cannot; thus, the capacity of positive science to gain a complete view of
human action is limited. A similar objection focuses on the values of the scientist:
the scientist is also a human being, subject to the same interplay of emotions and
values as other human beings and therefore incapable of complete objectivity in
his or her consideration of the behavior of others. The scientist’s own values
creep into the research process at several points, especially in the selection of
topics for observation and in the assessment and evaluation of evidence. In either
case, the scientist’s own values intrude on the objectivity sought by the positive
science model. (One variant of this criticism is that human beings may react subjectively to the very act of being observed and that the intrusion of the scientist
into an everyday situation for the purpose of observation changes that situation.)
Inadequate Link between Theory and Practice
The seeming gap between theory and practice, academics and practitioners, has practically become a joke, but it conceals a deep unrest, a dissatisfaction with the way we
have sought to understand our work and make it meaningful. Unfortunately, the
mainstream positive science approach to acquiring knowledge about public organizations provides very little help; indeed, it may be the root of the problem.
What do practitioners want from theory? Two things, we think: (1) explanations and understandings from which new approaches to administrative work can
be fashioned; and (2) a framework in which the individual’s experience can be
seen as a meaningful part of something larger and more important, and as Richard
Box (2008) puts it, to feel like one is making a difference. The rational model of
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administration, in its many variants, has some capacity to meet the first need. It is
concerned with instrumental explanations that permit more effective prediction
and control, and it has, over the years, provided a number of very useful explanations that have been seized on by practitioners. Theorists working out of the
rational model have commented on budget techniques, incentive schemes, management styles, and many other topics. Their explanations have been of considerable
interest and value to practitioners. Communication has broken down at times,
most pointedly in the excessive jargon and quantification that seem to be associated
with the pursuit of positive social science. But for the most part, social scientists,
practitioners, and theorists have pursued the same explanatory goals.
What do practitioners want from theory? Explanations and understanding from
which new approaches to administrative work can be fashioned, and a framework in
which the individual’s experience can be seen as a meaningful part of something
larger and more important.
On the second point, the rational model and positive social science are more
vulnerable. An approach to knowledge acquisition that seeks to objectify human
experience can hardly be expected to comment on the meaning of that experience; indeed, it detracts from that meaning in its insistence on abstracted, depersonalized, and decontextualized knowledge. The meaning of experience, the
value it has to us individually and as a society, however, is based on our subjective and inter-subjective world. To objectify that experience is to rob it of the
very character or texture that makes it significant to us. When the practitioner
asks, therefore, that theory be meaningful, that it comment on matters of real
importance to human beings, the request simply cannot be met by those who
follow a model in which individuals respond to social forces as one billiard ball
responds to another. Even the act of evaluation by which we impute importance
to the inquiry is denied by the rational model. Any individual with concern for
the world around her wants more than this from theory.
These practical issues serve well to introduce the theoretical problem.
Theorists following the rational model are interested in explanation, prediction,
and control; however, they are not necessarily interested in whether their
theories directly relate to reality. Indeed, the Nobel Prize–winning economist
Milton Friedman (1953, p. 14) wrote, “Truly important and significant hypotheses will be found to have ‘assumptions’ that are wildly inaccurate descriptive
representations of reality, and, in general, the more significant the theory, the
more unrealistic the assumptions (in this sense).” If satisfactory explanations can
be produced by assuming that all people are fully rational in pursuing their selfinterests, then it makes little difference to theorists whether individuals act in this
way or not. Moreover, following the positive science model, the scientist bases
theoretical propositions on the observation of manifest behavior, behavior as
viewed from the outside. But behavior viewed from the outside may not
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correspond at all to the actions intended by the individual. Similarly, the practitioner
who must act on the information presented by the scientist must assume responsibility for that action and so would like guidance that is both instrumentally effective
and morally sound. The scientist working out of the positivist tradition, however,
assumes no responsibility for the way in which the accumulated knowledge is used
and thus fails to provide a basis for moral action.
In all these ways, the theorist following the rational model and its commitment to positive social science makes conscious choices that have the direct effect
of severing the experience of the individual from the processes of inquiry. The
result is that theory and practice, or as we say in Chapter 1, these different fields
of practice do not engage one another directly and become separated. However, it is
not an accident but rather an ironic and unfortunate consequence of specific
choices and specific commitments to one particular approach to knowledge acquisition. The problem, furthermore, is that this approach to knowledge acquisition
has become dominant and so tends to crowd out and disparage other forms of
acquisition, advancing what Catlaw (2013) calls “methodological Taylorism.”
This complicates the process we described earlier of communicating and translating
across fields and bodies of knowledge through a process of personal reflection and
mutual learning. It is difficult to recognize and appreciate other’s academic, professional, and personal knowledge when one thinks that there is a single, best way to
know the world and the person who knows it is the manager! We would add,
too, that this is an approach to the world that is increasingly out of place in a
value-plural and multicultural world (Alkadry, 2007).
Fortunately, the positive science approach is not the only available approach
to knowledge acquisition (although it has been made to appear that way). In fact,
other approaches now being explored offer, among other things, the possibility
of a more constructive relationship between theory and practice. Three such
approaches are examined in the remainder of this chapter; but first the importance of seeking such alternatives should again be noted. Any science that accurately portrays the experience of individual actors and directs itself to the issues
they find important will obviously be considered more reliable. Moreover, commitment to a mode of knowledge acquisition that does not objectify or depersonalize is a far more useful model for the relationship between theorists and
practitioners and between public servants and their clients than a mode that
does. The rational model can carry us only so far. Until certain important questions are addressed, the study of public organizations will be suspect and the crisis
of legitimacy will continue.
INTERPRETIVE/ACTION THEORY
Near the end of the discussion of Marx, Weber, and Freud in Chapter 2, we saw
that, depending on the purposes to be served by knowledge, one might choose
among different approaches to the question of knowledge acquisition. Among
these, the prevailing positivist viewpoint is oriented toward instrumental explanations that enable the prediction and ultimately the control of human affairs.
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Now we have found that, in its application to the study of public organizations,
the positive science approach is incomplete. Not only has the explanatory power
of the rational model proven limited, but we have now found that mere explanation is not all we want from theory. We also seek theories that will help us
understand the meaning of human action and enable us to act with greater skill
and clarity in pursuing our personal and societal goals. Fortunately, there are
modes of inquiry more suited to these purposes.
Phenomenological Roots
Interpretive social theory—or action theory, as some public administration theorists
have come to call it—has its roots in the philosophical work of Edmund Husserl
around the turn of the century. Husserl, a mathematician by training, sought a philosophical basis for scientific inquiry that would strip away the presuppositions or
assumptions on which positive science was based and move directly to an understanding of human meaning. This approach, called phenomenology, seeks to suspend
the definitions or characterizations of human behavior imposed on the actions of
human beings from the outside by scientific observers and to apprehend instead
the exact meaning of those actions from the standpoint of the actors themselves.
In this effort, attention is focused on the way individuals interpret their everyday
existence, sometimes called their life-world. Human beings are seen in this view
as conscious beings who act intentionally and thus give meaning to their actions.
The world of meaning became central to the phenomenologist and represented a critical break with the techniques of the natural sciences. All consciousness is consciousness of something: we seek something, we hope for something,
we remember something. Every act of consciousness, as we reflect on it, bestows
on our world meanings to which we, in turn, give order. The human capacity to
endow action with meaning sets the reality to be examined by the social scientist
quite apart from the reality of the natural scientist; therefore the methodology of
the natural scientist cannot be copied by the social scientist. Rather, the social
scientist must seek ways to understand the structure of consciousness—the
world of meanings of the social actor.
The connection between meaning and intentionality leads to a view of
human beings as active agents in a social world rather than as passive respondents
to that world. Intentionality is the active directing of consciousness toward a
specific object and itself stands at the very heart of consciousness. Through our
intentions, we give meaning to the world around us and in effect construct that
world. Husserl uses the somewhat awkward term essences to refer to the pattern
of unities of intended meanings that we build up either as individuals or as
groups. For example, the notion of a university brings to mind for each of us
and for us as a society a certain constellation of meanings. From both a personal
and a scientific standpoint, the understanding of such patterns of meaning is far
more important than explanations built around the mere descriptions of observed
behavior. (As noted before, the term action is often reserved by interpretive
theorists to indicate the intentional nature of action as opposed to the reactive
nature of behavior. Hence the term action theory.)
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An Intersubjectively Comprehensible World
For the social scientist and the student of public organization, perhaps the most
important contribution of phenomenology has been its restoration of the relationship between subject and object and its elaboration of the role of this relationship in constituting an intersubjectively comprehensible world—a world in
which we all can share. As we have noted, the relationship between subject
and object was severed by positive science through the argument that objectivity
can be obtained only through a separation of fact and value. Interpretive social
scientists—in particular, Alfred Schutz (1967, p. 37)—have argued, to the contrary, that the subject and the object are one: we can, on the one hand, attend to
and interpret in themselves the phenomena of the external world which present
themselves to me as indications of the consciousness of other people. When we
do this, we say of them that they have objective meaning. But we can, on the
other hand, look over and through these external indications into the constituting process within the living consciousness of another rational being. What we
are then concerned with is subjective meaning.
Since what is observable is always related to the awareness of the actor, the
two aspects, objective and subjective, can never be fully separated. And since the
act of understanding implies evaluation, the same is true of fact and value.
In such a situation, we can relate to one another in various ways. Although
there are some persons with whom we do not interact face to face and whom we
treat somewhat anonymously, there are also those whom we consciously recognize
and view as a subject (a “thou” relationship) and those who reciprocate in such a
recognition (thus constituting a “we” relationship). What is most important about
the “we” relationship is that it necessarily involves a mutual recognition and even a
mutual disclosure of motives. Thus, from the phenomenological standpoint, not
only is the instrumental reduction of human beings to the status of objects improper,
it is impossible. Any study based on such an assumption would fail to acknowledge
that individuals are open possibilities, intentional and reflective, engaged in the continuing and mutual task of establishing social reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1966).
The Active–Social Paradigm
One application of phenomenology to the field of public administration is
Michael Harmon’s Action Theory for Public Administration (1981). Harmon resurrects Kuhn’s notion of scientific paradigms, arguing that public administration
today requires a new paradigm capable of both a value theory and a theory of
knowledge different from those implied by the rational model of administration.
Harmon describes what he calls an alternative paradigm (although his alternative
is really more theory than paradigm) based on the assumption that human beings
are naturally active rather than passive and social rather than atomistic. The active
view of human nature supposes that individuals impute meaning to their activities and consequently determine the circumstances that are of importance to
them. Rather than simply responding to factors in the environment, as in the
passive interpretation of human nature, the active conception holds that individuals interact with their environment in a reciprocal relationship.
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People both influence and are influenced by the circumstances around them.
The ability of people to conceive of the world in symbolic terms, to reflect on
events, distinguishes their active nature from the passive nature of physical
objects. Consequently, the capacity of human beings for self-reflection must be
taken into account in any interpretation of human activity. The social conception of the individual sees the person as a product of social interaction. In this
view, meaning is constituted not merely by the individual, but also by the individual interacting with others in face-to-face situations. Mutual awareness leads
to mutual participation in the construction of social reality.
Harmon argues that the active–social conception of self requires a new normative basis for accountability in public organizations. Holding that public
administration is distinguished by “making and legitimating decisions in public
organizations” (p. 5), Harmon (1981) asserts that public administration theory
must address the relationship between substance and process and between individual and collective values. Following other process theorists, Harmon argues
that the value of human action is found in the action itself rather than in the
ends produced by that action. For example, the evaluation of issues such as
justice and freedom can ultimately be determined not by specific substantive
outcomes, but by the degree to which democratic procedures—those open to
and involving of citizens—are followed. This follows directly from the assumption
that human action is an ongoing interaction between people and their environment.
Given the dynamic quality of human life, prediction and control become difficult;
and it is difficult to specify ends in advance. Thus paying attention to the particular
quality of those interactions is important.
Related to this, the relationship between individual encounters and larger collective values must be addressed. Harmon argues that the notion of mutuality or
community is the basic normative premise guiding the face-to-face relationship.
He suggests that in relationships characterized by mutuality, individuals take into
account the wishes of others and are open to influence by others. Moving from
the face-to-face encounter to the realm of larger social systems, Harmon proposes
that a parallel normative theory must be developed. “The idea of social justice is
the logical extension of mutuality applied to social collectivities and should therefore be regarded as the normative premise underlying ‘aggregate’ policy decisions
made by and implemented through public organizations” (p. 84). Although he
generally pursues John Rawls’s notion of justice, Harmon holds that justice is a
natural outgrowth of our active–social nature. The fundamental question that
arises, therefore, is “how to strengthen the natural bonds among people so as to
promote a kind of social order that enables, more than it constrains through domination, acts of individual freedom and social cooperation” (p. 83).
Reformulating Administrative Responsibility
This question leads to a critique and reformulation of the classic notion of
administrative responsibility, which holds that accountability is maintained in
public agencies through a correspondence between the actions of those agencies
and the intentions of the legislature. Such a view holds to an instrumental
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relationship between means and ends, with administrative agencies seen as constrained to execute the desires of the governing body. Moral obligations lie
somewhere outside the individual and are enforced through various constraints,
either those imposed externally by law or regulation or those internalized by
administrative professionals. In contrast to this view, Harmon argues that the
active–social nature of the self implies an alternative mode of responsible administrative action—specifically, personal responsibility. “Personal responsibility
implies that actors are agents who must bear the moral brunt of their actions
rather than shift the blame or responsibility to other people or external standards
of correctness” (p. 125).
This view, however, is not meant to imply that individual administrators
should act with total discretion. Rather, Harmon maintains, since administrative
action is necessarily interaction, personal responsibility implies social responsibility as well—individuals should be guided by community interests as well as their
own discretion. Such a view, however, once again raises the confusion between
self and society, with the possibility that social expectations might come to guide
personal responsibility rather than personal responsibility lying at the basis of
social responsibility. More important, issues of practicality come into play. In
some (perhaps many) cases, there is great difficulty in arriving at consensual definitions and, consequently, in executing personal responsibility. For this reason,
Harmon argues, mechanisms of accountability are still required for the more
extreme cases. Overall, Harmon sees a tension between accountability and discretion that requires a continual “negotiation of meaning.” This argument is
carried forward in Harmon’s more recent book, Responsibility as Paradox (1995),
in which he argues that responsibility is inevitably paradoxical in that it embodies
two opposing ideas: moral agency—the individual’s own sense of responsibility—
and the accountability of institutional authority.
One might ask whether accepting the administrator’s own view of the world
enables one to evaluate that view critically. Harmon would seem to agree that
individuals may be led to the acceptance of false ideologies, particularly as they
are subject to domination by others who impose a sense of reality on them; yet if
this is the case, the mere acceptance of the administrator’s own view conceals the
bias, the ideology, implicit in that view. And if that view limits the freedom and
creativity of the individual, it should be subject to critique. At this point, the
approach based on phenomenology would seem to be limited. Harmon’s acceptance of an epistemology based on phenomenology would appear, in the end, to
undercut his argument for a more critical perspective on administrative life. In
order to achieve such a perspective, one must go a step further to investigate
what has been called a critical theory of public organization.
CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY
The critical perspective recognizes that a certain tension exists between our own
strivings and the limitations imposed on us by social conditions, even those conditions of which we are only vaguely aware. The role of theory is to reveal these
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contradictions and thus to permit us to pursue our own freedom. As Richard
Box (2005, p. 11) puts it, “critical theory is intended to identify contradictions
between what is and what might be and to show the potential for constructive
change.” Since this understanding provides the opportunity for greater freedom
and the exploration of the human potential, it is inevitably connected to action
in pursuit of the true needs and desires of the individual.
The critical perspective has been elaborated by a number of major scholars,
most prominently Jurgen Habermas, who has attempted the most comprehensive
restatement of the critical position (see Habermas, 1970, 1974a, 1974b, 1975,
1979; Bernstein, 1976; and McCarthy, 1978). Through the work of Habermas
supplemented by that of other theorists, we consider several aspects of the critical
approach of particular relevance to the study of public organizations. Specifically,
we examine (1) the critique of instrumental reason, (2) the scientization of political life and the reduction of the public sphere, and (3) the relationship between
knowledge, effective communication, and human interests.
Critique of Instrumental Reason
Members of the Frankfurt School, an institute created in the early 1920s for the
investigation of a critical theory of society, sought to expose the roots of social
domination in modern life, thus opening the way for the eventual realization
of freedom through reason. But in this task they immediately encountered a
challenge to reason itself, or more precisely, a redefinition of the basis for social
rationality (Jay, 1973). Max Horkheimer, the school’s administrative and intellectual leader, discusses this issue by contrasting two modes of reasoning. Most of
the great philosophical systems, he argues, assume reason to be a principle existing objectively in nature by which one can evaluate the reasonableness of one’s
actions. Reason, in this sense, guides social choice and speaks in the language of
justice and freedom, violence and oppression. In contrast to this mode of rationality, Horkheimer (1974, p. 18) points to the rise of a more instrumental form
concerned simply with the most favorable (meaning “efficient”) means to attain a
given end.
Herbert Marcuse (1964) points out the limitations of the modern interpretation of reason in a critique of Weber. Specifically, he argues that Weber’s notion
of rationality as concerned with the way in which means are developed to attain
presupposed ends not only removes from discussion the various social interests
being served by allegedly rational institutions but also elaborates patterns
of technical control, “methodical, scientific, calculated, calculating control”
(pp. 223–224). Since existing modes of technology imply domination, Weber’s
notion of rationalization becomes not critical but apologetic, in the sense that
acts may be justified through their contribution to technically rational action
(pp. 214–215). In place of reasoned contemplation and enlightened action, we
are to be content with the limited task of finding technical solutions to the
design problems of the existing social machinery.
Habermas extends Marcuse’s critique of Weber by examining the alternatives one might propose to an extended rationalization of society. Both agree
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that Weber’s dependence on a technical definition of rationality ultimately constitutes an ideological justification of the extension of domination, but they are
even more concerned with Weber’s description of this outcome as inevitable.
They argue, to the contrary, that an alternative scenario may be developed
since human institutions are socially constructed and therefore may be reconstructed by conscious choice and effective action. Whereas Marcuse sees the possibility of altering the conditions of domination described by Weber in a new
mode of science and technology, one offering a different relationship between
humanity and nature, Habermas (1970, Chap. 6) suggests instead that science
and technique as defined in the modern world are inevitably associated with
purposive–rational action. The effort proposed by Habermas involves restoring
an alternative structure of action, that of symbolic or communicative interaction,
to its proper status.
By “purposive–rational action,” Habermas means the field of work seen in
terms of instrumental action in pursuit of given goals. The preoccupation of
purposive–rational action is technique, the solution of means–ends problems.
By “interaction,” on the other hand, Habermas (1970) means the building of
the normative structure of society, one “governed by binding consensual
norms, … which must be understood and recognized by … interacting subjects”
(p. 92). Social systems may therefore be distinguished according to whether
purposive–rational action or interaction predominates.
Habermas argues that the translation from traditional to modern capitalist
societies described by Weber’s concept of rationalization is marked by a shift in
the basis for social legitimation. In traditional societies, the field of purposive–
rational action is so fully embedded in the normative structure of society that it
rarely threatens the efficacy of cultural traditions. In emerging capitalist societies,
however, for the first time, there is a guarantee of permanent economic growth;
consequently, the field of purposive–rational action becomes self-sustaining. “In
this way, traditional structures are increasingly subordinated to conditions of
instrumental or strategic rationality: the organization of labor and trade, the
network of transportation, information, and communication, the institutions of
private law, and, starting with financial administration, the state bureaucracy”
(Habermas, 1970, p. 98). The possibility then arises that the field of symbolic
or communicative interaction will eventually become lost in the emerging field
of purposive–rational action.
Reduction of the Public Sphere
Such a development would have important implications for the political system.
In an early essay, Habermas (1974b) describes the “public sphere” as that arena in
which the various interests in society engage in discourse related to the establishment of the normative agenda for society (see also Pranger, 1968). In recent
times, the public sphere has been considerably narrowed, to the point that the
interests being voiced tend to be those of hierarchical superiors in business, labor,
and the professions, mediated or administered by the mass media. Such a delimitation of the public sphere is consistent with a subjugation of political power to
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a purposive–rational intent. Under these conditions, the field of politics is no
longer required to concern itself with the normative structure of society, with
the relationship of society to the “good life,” and so forth. These concerns are
now subordinated to the new tasks of politics, which are to secure the private
form of capital utilization, to facilitate the growth of the economy, and to bind
the loyalty of the masses to their new condition. Politics, in this new interpretation, is oriented toward eliminating the risks and dysfunctions associated with
capital production. “Government activity is restricted to administratively soluble
technical questions, so that practical questions evaporate, so to speak” (Habermas,
1970, p. 103). (In this context, practical questions are those that guide social
practice, not simply those that are pragmatic.)
Obviously, the increasing preoccupation of the government with solving
technical problems has special implications for notions of democratic citizenship,
for public discussion is not required in order to solve technical questions; indeed,
the involvement of the masses may be dysfunctional. Thus, the reduction of the
public sphere results in a general depoliticization of the citizenry. Their role is no
longer one of aiding in the choice of social directions but one of occasionally
choosing between alternative sets of administrative personnel, whose function,
in turn, is to deal effectively with those problems that impede the smooth operation of the social and economic system. All of this is explained, as Marcuse
(1964) points out, by the logic of scientific and technical progress and is made
more palatable by the promise of increasing goods and services for all. Most
importantly, Habermas (1970) comments, “it is the singular achievement of this
ideology to detach society’s self-understanding from the frame of reference of
communicative action and from the concepts of symbolic interaction and replace
it with a scientific model” (p. 105). The result is a new consciousness in which
the world is viewed in terms of technique.
Restoring Undistorted Communication
In the critical view, however, the connection between theory and practice, once
severed by traditional theory, is reestablished. Habermas (1970, pp. 274–300)
illustrates this process through an examination of Freudian psychoanalysis as a
critical discipline. Habermas interprets repression, the central concept in psychoanalysis, as the privatization of language, the withdrawal of certain symbols from
public communication to a place where they are inaccessible to but still influence
the ego. The resulting power struggle or internal disturbance affects the individual, but in ways of which he or she is unaware. The task of analysis is to reestablish effective intrapersonal communications by restoring a part of the patient’s
hidden life history. This result is achieved through a strictly personal process
aimed at rediscovering one’s self and confirmed as correct in its interpretation
only by the patient. In this way, inquiry and autonomy become one: “In selfreflection, knowledge for the sake of knowledge attains congruence with the
interest in autonomy and responsibility” (p. 314). Whether speaking of the individual or the society, Habermas argues that the key is the restoration of undistorted communication.
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Truly rational action can occur only by removing restrictions on communication, including the restriction that most often distorts our attempts to arrive at
consensus: domination. Where communication patterns are asymmetrical—that
is, where one party to the communication has power over the other—inevitable
distortions occur, in social life just as in the individual psyche. These distortions
must be revealed prior to any process of emancipation. “Public, unrestricted
discussion, free from domination, of the suitability and desirability of actionorienting principles and norms, … such communication at all levels of political
and repoliticized decision-making processes is the only medium in which
anything like “rationalization” is possible” (Habermas, 1979, pp. 118–119). Through
a process of generalized, critical self-reflection, we may restore the intimacy of theory
and practice needed for enlightened human action—that is, praxis.
Through a process of generalized, critical self-reflection, we may restore the intimacy
of theory and practice needed for enlightened human action—that is, praxis.
A Critical Analysis of Public Organizations
Although few explicit attempts have been made to apply critical analysis to the
study of public organizations (see Abel & Sementelli, 2003; Box, 2005; David,
1996; Forester, 1989; Hummel, 1987; King & Zanetti, 2005; Mooney Nickel,
2011; Zanetti, 1997), several questions raised in the literature of critical theory
bear on such an effort (see, for example, Burrell & Morgan, 1979). Habermas,
like Weber, illustrates the operation of technical rationality through reference
to the public bureaucracy, for the sphere of state administration epitomizes the
concern for technique and efficiency that is becoming increasingly more pervasive in society in general. At the same time, as critical theorists and others have
noted, increasing amounts of social power and discretion are being concentrated
in the public bureaucracy. The convergence of these trends—increasing power
being placed at the disposal of basically technical interests—amounts to an
implicit redefinition of the role of the public bureaucracy and thus raises important questions that might well be addressed from a critical perspective.
At a time when the intentions of bureaucrats are not clearly understood and
are even held suspect by the public, there is ample reason to be concerned about
the continued legitimacy of the public service. Today the very presence of public
officials elicits distrust in some and outright hostility in others—a situation that
implies at least a perceived lack of congruence between the interests of bureaucrats and those of the public. But perhaps the contradiction of interests that
appears to exist is in fact based on systematically distorted communications
among the various parties. Under these circumstances, the analysis of structural
limitations in communicative practices called for by critical theory would seem a
useful place to begin.
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Specifically, we have argued (Catlaw, 2007a, Chap. 3; Denhardt, 1981,
pp. 628–635) that a critical approach to public organization would examine the
technical basis of bureaucratic domination and the ideological justifications for
this condition and would ask in what ways members and clients of public
bureaucracies might better understand the resultant limitations placed on their
actions and in turn develop new modes of administrative praxis. Such an
approach to public organization would first construct its understanding of the
formulation and implementation of public policy on a value-critical basis, placing
such questions in the larger historical and normative context in which they properly reside. It would seek to lay the foundations for greater autonomy and
responsibility both within the bureaucracy and in its interactions with others.
Moreover, a critical approach would insist on highlighting those aspects of public
organization theory and practice that serve to limit the individual’s recognition of
and contribution to the process of governing. In contrast with the current restrictive relationships within the bureaucracy and the excessively depersonalized
treatment of those outside, a critical approach would see an essential connection
between personal and societal self-reflection on the one hand and personal and
societal development (including so-called “organizational learning”) on the other
(see Argyris & Schon, 1978).
Jong S. Jun has recently elaborated this perspective in The Social Construction
of Public Administration (2006). Consistent with what has thus far been said, Jun
argues that public administration has become preoccupied with managerial and
technical matters grounded in a positivistic and functionalist tradition of epistemology. The result is that public administration is primarily concerned with
maintaining organizational order and suppressing activities that hinder organizational policies or processes. Along the way, he argues that citizens and civic organizations are increasingly seen to “get in the way.” Jun contends that we must
reinterpret public administration “by considering at least two important dimensions of public administration: 1) public administration is carried out in the context of democracy and civil society; and 2) administrative activities need to be
conducted, and design choices need to be made through the participation and
interaction of multiple actors who will be affected by policies or projects”
(pp. 32–33). Jun’s recommendation, a social construction of public administration
based in interpretive and critical theory, relies on the administrator engaging in
critical and reflexive action, that is, praxis.
In contrast to the emphasis on order and regulation that we find in the
mainstream literature in public administration, a critical approach would emphasize the conditions of power and dependence that characterize contemporary
organizational life and the considerable potential for conflict and disorder that
these conditions portend. Such an approach would enable us to rethink issues
of organizational change in dialectical terms, as a consequence of competing
forces operating in a linguistic context, and would thus permit a more dynamic
understanding of organizational life. Moreover, such an approach would reveal
certain contradictions inherent in hierarchical organizations. By specifying the
ways in which current relationships of power and dependence result in alienation
and estrangement, a critical theory of public organization would suggest more
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direct attempts to improve the quality of organizational life (see Denhardt, 1981,
Ch. 6).
One avenue for accomplishing this analysis would be to focus on the flawed
patterns of communication that now mark both internal and external relationships in public organizations. Hierarchical relationships between managers and
subordinates and between bureaucrats and clients obviously restrict the possibility
for entering into discussions in which the various parties to the communications
are considered equals. To analyze and to reorder those linguistic patterns that
now limit our interactions might permit the expression of values previously
repressed.
For example, imagine an alternative style of management aimed not at control but at assisting individuals (members or clients) in discovering and pursuing
their own developmental needs, even recognizing that these may sometimes be
at odds with those of the dominant values of the bureaucracy. (If we assume that
the bureaucracy and the society share the same dominant values, this approach
might seem problematic; however, since bureaucracies take on a life and values
of their own, we have reason to question the correspondence of organizational
values with those of the society at large.) What Brian Fay (1977) has referred to
as an “educative” mode of inquiry assumes that “repressive and frustrating social
conditions exist at least partly because people are systematically unclear about
their needs and the nature of their social relationships” (p. 206). His educative
approach seeks to help people determine their true needs as well as the social
conditions that prevent the fulfillment of those needs. Through self-reflection,
people may achieve new clarity about the distorted conditions under which
they live, thus permitting them to act to alter those conditions. Similarly, an educative style of management would seek to help individuals to discover and then
to pursue their own needs and interests—a situation that would open greater
spaces for communication and normative dialogue among the organization’s
members.
These same considerations would apply with perhaps even more force to the
relationships between bureaucrats and their clients. A dialectical understanding of
these relationships would point out the way in which members of bureaucracies
exercise power over clients, subject clients to rigid and depersonalized procedures, and limit, through co-optation and other devices, the contribution clients
might make to the operation of the agency. (A critical view would, of course,
recognize that such acts do not necessarily occur with malicious intent on the
part of individual bureaucrats but occur rather as a consequence of structural
deficiencies.) For citizens, such clients are both producers and consumers of government services.
To give priority to the developmental trajectories of all parties, both bureaucrats and clients, is to reaffirm a commitment to the democratization of social
relationships of all types and to focus on the distortions that have prevented the
desires of individuals from being expressed constructively through organized
social and political action. In an age when the public sphere has been transformed into a field of competition among group interests, the internal democratization of those groups, including the public bureaucracy, provides one possible
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way of maintaining a commitment to democratic processes. Moreover, democratized structures would represent the interests and values of a substantially
greater proportion of the citizenry than is presently engaged in public dialogue,
to some extent restoring a proper relationship between purposive–rational and
communicative interaction. Under such conditions, the public bureaucracy
might even become a primary vehicle for societal self-reflection and critique.
DISCOURSE AND POST-TRADITIONAL
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Recently, a number of important public administration theorists have followed
their colleagues in other disciplines (ranging from art and architecture to sociology and philosophy) in pursuing the idea of postmodernism (Fox & Miller,
2005), discourse (McSwite, 2000), or related approaches that David John Farmer
(2005) characterizes as “post-traditional public administration.” Obviously, the
term postmodernism implies a reaction against the modern condition, which
many take to be several centuries old. For others, postmodernism has taken on
a much more embracing meaning, including not only a critique of modernism
but at least a hint at the future of social thinking. Postmodernism means many
things at many levels, and for this reason it is extremely difficult to pin down.
Moreover, postmodernists have adopted a unique, sometimes esoteric language
to express elusive concepts and ideas. Yet, in our view, theorists in public administration who use postmodern ideas advance the critical approach outlined above.
They seek to examine the limits of the rational model and objectified aspects of
the social world in order to formulate a less distorted, more mutually enabling
context for action.
If there is a common denominator to the many meanings and purposes of
postmodernism, it is probably the idea that individuals and societies today seem
to have lost the capacity to represent the “real.” That is, whether we are talking
about aesthetics, morality, epistemology, or politics, we seem unsure of our basis
for discussion and debate. The old terms that we used to rely on to establish reality
no longer seem to work. Indeed, they can be shown to have “fatal” flaws, typically
flaws that reflect their origin as products of the particular social, cultural, and historical eras in which they were constituted. Generally, postmodernists hold that
language constitutes rather than reflects the world. It therefore follows that knowledge, being based in language, is always bound by the historical circumstances and
the specific environment in which it arises (see Spicer, 2000).
In a related way, postmodernists are particularly critical of the recent tendency for symbols to replace what they represent, to become themselves the
most important currency in the exchange of thoughts and ideas. In this view,
words and “signs” or “signifiers” are increasingly unlikely to mean anything
solid or lasting. They instead become detached from real referents (a tendency
the postmodernists call epiphenomenalism) and build on each other (a process
which the postmodernists call self-referential). For example, modern advertising
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creates symbolic universes in which cars are sold based on their “sex appeal” and
beer is sold by frogs and lizards. In each case, a particular set of symbolic premises
forms the basis for a self-contained and narrowly defined conversation, most of
which is actually “one way,” from speaker to listener. Only those who understand the particular “cultural images” that have been established can participate,
and even then there is little if any opportunity for meaningful discussion or dialogue. Staci Zavatarro (2013) has recently applied these ideas to understanding
how cities try to brand and market themselves. She argues that cities are increasingly behaving like private firms who traffic in images, and this has important
implications for democratic governance and citizen engagement.
The postmodern response to this tendency of modernism is to question or
“deconstruct” the flaws lying at the center of each social, cultural, or political
tendency, norm, or taken-for-granted institution. Indeed, in a sense, the postmodernists seem to claim that everything is false, at least in the sense that nothing
can be proved to be real. In any situation, in anything that is said, infinite numbers of interpretations are available. Since you can never really say what you
intend with language, there is no way you can establish truth or falsity. Thus,
no interpretation is superior to another; to put it differently, all interpretations
are of equal validity, meaning that none have validity. In effect, then, every
interpretation is false and every understanding is a misunderstanding.
These concerns are especially important when it comes to the broad-scale
explanations that modern man has constructed to explain social reality. “Modernity … reflect(s) a complete faith in the capacity of reasoned language to capture
the world. It … reflect(s) optimism, claiming the potential for complete understanding. Postmodernists would renounce this faith, this optimism, and this claim
to power” (Farmer, 1995, p. 47). From the modernist perspective, these broadscale explanations are the transcendent and universal truths that underlie civilization and serve to give it legitimacy; they are the explanations that make the
modern world understandable. Examples would include dialectical materialism
in Marxism, the theory of repression in psychoanalytic theory, the notion of
hierarchical bureaucracy in Weberian thought, logical positivism in the philosophy of science, and systems theory in social sciences. The postmodernists
question all such overarching or comprehensive explanations, variously called
“metadiscourses” or “metanarratives,” and challenge their pretense to explain
everything, called “foundationalism.”
Jean-François Lyotard, a key postmodern theorist, writes: “I will use the
term modern to designate any science that legitimates itself with reference to a
metadiscourse … [that makes] explicit appeal to some grand narrative” (in Fox &
Miller, 1995, p. 44). Postmodernism is skeptical of all such metanarratives
because they can be shown to have fundamental flaws typically based on the
way they inevitably misrepresent reality through their choice of a particular perspective or “language.”
In the mind’s eye of the postmodernists, therefore, functional architecture
gives way to more eclectic forms that seek to capture the chaos and alienation of
the contemporary condition; logical positivism gives way to a radical interpretivism, or probably better, methodological anarchism; hierarchical bureaucracy
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gives way to devolution and discourse; and the “laws” of ethics give way to the
ethics of the situation. As Fox and Miller contrast the two, modernism and postmodernism express the following differences: integration versus disintegration, centralization versus decentralization, totalization versus fragmentation, metanarratives
versus disparate texts, the impulse to unify versus hyperpluralism, and universalism
versus relativism (Fox & Miller, 1995, p. 45; see also, Miller & Fox, 1997).
In the world of politics, symbolic politics reign supreme while simulation
and media spectacle replace political debate and deliberation. This is the age of
the sound bite, the world of spin doctors and negative campaigning. Public policy conversation has been eclipsed by insincere and attention-grabbing symbolic
imagery, which the postmodernists refer to as hyperreality, a term used to indicate
that “signs and words have become increasingly estranged from more authentic
communities of discourse” (Fox & Miller, 1995, p. 7). Again, words and symbols
become self-referential, meaningful only in a narrow context and meaningful
only to those who understand that specific context. Consequently, political
discourse is replaced by one-way media campaigns and the kind of spoon-fed
irreality that was the subject of Wag the Dog (a movie that quickly became part
of the political debate because it seemed too close to reality—or was it a case of
reality being too close to fantasy? But then that’s the point).
At the broad social level, what people share is mostly symbolic and thus
largely ephemeral, though there still may be the possibility of agreement and
consensus within smaller groups, neighborhoods, or communities. Although we
share a “media-infused hyperreality of consciousness” (Fox & Miller, 1995,
p. 43), the postmodernists argue that there can be agreement and understanding
within smaller communities (a tendency they call the development of neotribalism).
If the signs and symbols through which public conversation occurs have become
self-referential and epiphenomenal, then we would expect that diverse subcultures
would talk past one another (in the language of postmodernism, their “language
games” are “incommensurable”). As a result, postmodernists tend to celebrate
the small, the unusual, the marginal, and the different. Thus, in social and political
conversations, as in all other things, “Postmodernism is the return and revenge of the
different, the assertion of the random nonpattern and the unassimilable anomaly”
(Fox & Miller, 1995, p. 45).
In sum, postmodernists regard the supposed progress of the modern era with
great skepticism. They point out that the glorification of fact and rationality by
modernism resulted in world wars, concentration camps, genocide, poverty,
racism, industrialization, bureaucratization, urbanization, and many other ills.
To the postmodernists, this record indicates the failure of modernism, but perhaps more important, it indicates failure of the modern search for a rational
understanding of the “real” world. Increasingly, what appears to be “real” is, to
the contrary, unreal, symbolic, illusory, or pure fiction, in many cases manipulated fiction designed to mislead. Thus, everything that is apparent is suspect and
should be questioned, especially if it can be shown to reflect a dominant mainstream perspective that might exclude those without the capacity to manipulate
the symbolism of modern life to their own benefit. Postmodernism reflects a
rejection of the false hope of modern rational understanding.
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Applications in Public Administration
The postmodern, discourse, or post-traditional position has been attractive to a
number of scholars in public administration. Here we examine several works that
are representative of post-traditional thought in the field. Charles Fox and Hugh
Miller argue, in Postmodern Public Administration (1995), that American representative democracy today is neither representative nor democratic. Rather, the supposedly legitimizing functions of democratic deliberation have been displaced by
a set of symbols that lack substantial referents in experience. Under such circumstances, top-down bureaucratic systems have come to dominate the political process to the exclusion of real dialogue and the field of public administration has
served, at least in part, to provide the intellectual support for that development.
Fox and Miller argue, therefore, that the first step in moving beyond this condition is to recognize that constructs such as hierarchical bureaucracy are socially
created rather than immutably a part of the natural world.
Similarly, Fox and Miller suggest that public policy is not the result of rational explorations of objective conditions but rather that policy discourse is inherently political. “It follows that not science but the clash of metaphors, similes,
and analogies, strategically crafted arguments, and rhetorical gambits are the
actual determinants of policy” (p. 113). Moreover, the application of universal
“truths” to policy discussions subverts the significance of “lived experience”
(Miller, 2002). As an alternative, Fox and Miller suggest the importance of
“authentic discourse,” or what Miller later calls “an “ethos of discourse,”
through which public deliberations would occur in a way that would exclude
insincere claims, those that are only self-serving, those from persons unwilling
to attend to the discourse, and claims from “free riders.” The role of the public
administrator is to assist in the creation and maintenance of authentic discourse,
through which the values of a multitude of public citizens will be heard and
attended to. Viewpoints must confront one another and ideas may well clash.
But forums built around norms of inclusion, attentiveness, and understanding
hold forth the possibility of reasserting the norms of democracy.
A somewhat different post-traditional approach is taken by David Farmer in
The Language of Public Administration (1995), To Kill the King (2005), and Public
Administration in Perspective (2010). Farmer suggests first that modern public administration theory constitutes a language through which people understand the public bureaucracy, its possibilities, and its limitations. As do other languages, public
administration theory reflects a variety of assumptions, approaches, fears, and
wishes that guide the way we understand and the way we practice public administration. However, Farmer argues that traditional public administration theory,
though contributing significantly to the good work done in the public service,
is limited in its capacity to upgrade the public bureaucracy. Specifically, modernist theory has difficulty in addressing questions such as how to invigorate the
public bureaucracy so as to obtain the benefits of enterprise. Public administration theory is a paradigm case of modernity, emphasizing as it does calculating or
instrumental rationality, scientific and technical dependencies, and hierarchical
authority.
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In contrast, Farmer argues that a new way of thinking about public administration and bureaucracy can work to transcend the limits of present-day thinking and open new possibilities for an enhanced public service. Specifically,
Farmer recommends a “reflexive” approach to revealing the assumptions that
limit today’s public administration theory. Reflexive interpretation seeks to
draw out and use our understanding of public administration by examining the
consequences of the field’s linguistic character. “It is an art that examines the set
of assumptions and social constructions that constitute the theoretical lens
through which we see, and it speculates about an alternative set or sets of socially
constructed assumptions (that form another lens) through which we could see.
The focus is on the lens and on alternative lenses, rather than on the objects
that are ‘seen’ through the lenses; the attention is paid to the act of seeing and
options for seeing” (Farmer, 1995, p. 12; see also Farmer, 2010).
A new way of thinking about public administration and bureaucracy can work to
transcend the limits of present-day thinking and open new possibilities for an
enhanced public service.
Farmer then suggests four “interests” or concerns that might guide a
post-traditional reconstruction of public administration theory. The first is
imagination, once considered the property of the aesthetic world, but now a characteristic being needed much more broadly. Farmer suggests that “imaginization,”
a noun form of the verb “imagine,” could come to parallel the term rationalization,
which we encounter in the work of Max Weber as well as that of many
mainstream public administration theorists. Bringing playful imagination to the
practice of governance would join contemplation and open possibilities in new
and interesting ways—ways not confined by the bounds of rationalism (Farmer,
2005, pp. 3–20). The second concern is “deconstruction,” which Farmer recommends as a way of stripping away the assumptions that underlie modernist public
administration theory (and its dependence on terms such as hierarchy and efficiency)
and as a way of understanding the symbolic character of contemporary politics and
contemporary bureaucracy.
The third is “deterritorialization,” by which Farmer means removing the
code or grid that is placed on understanding by the way that thinking, particularly “scientific” thinking, is conducted. A post-traditional approach would recognize that science is but one discourse among many, thus freeing our thinking
to explore new and creative possibilities. Fourth and finally, Farmer explores the
moral world of public administration through the term “alterity,” meaning a
basic concern for how an administrator should behave in relation to others. In
discussing this idea, Farmer ultimately encourages an anti-institutional or antiadministration posture within public administration, one that would approach all
existing institutions of government and the public bureaucracy with postmodern
skepticism if not outright opposition. (For a variety of papers on the concept of
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antiadministrationism, see Farmer, 1998. For further elaboration of notions such
as thinking as play, justice as seeking, and practice as art, see Farmer, 2005.)
One other book that extends the post-traditional approach to public administration theory is Legitimacy in Public Administration (1997) by O. C. McSwite
(a pseudonym for Orion White and Cynthia McSwain). Drawing from psychoanalytic theory and philosophical Pragmatism, McSwite traces the history of the issue
of legitimacy in public administration with special reference to the Friedrich–Finer
debate examined earlier and suggests that our understanding of how democratic
accountability can be maintained in an administrative state has been confounded
by our failure to specify the processes of democracy. We cannot solve the legitimacy issue because we cannot figure out how to make democracy work. In something of a compromise, we have turned to what McSwite terms the “men of
reason”; that is, we have chosen to select reasonable leaders and then trust them
to act reasonably. Yet this means that the men of reason ultimately must make
their decisions alone, or at best with some consultation or formal input (such as
voting). They act with a certain “closedness,” in contrast to the kind of openness
and collaboration that the idea of discourse implies.
Pursuing a post-traditional position, McSwite concludes that no significant
change in public administration or American government is likely to occur
until we are able to see (1) how it is possible to act without relying on reason
and (2) how to come to terms with the idea of otherness (the “alterity” question). Questioning theoretical “solutions” to these problems, McSwite offers a
practical first step—to open ourselves to one another. “The alternative is to
listen, to become hollowed out, and to receive the other as oneself. This … is
not so much the end of reason as its transformation. By making people and their
lives an object in its contemplations, reason separates us from one another when
the reality of the human condition is: I am you” (pp. 276–277).
Michael Spicer (2000, 2010) builds on the postmodern perspective, arguing
that American public administration theorists and practitioners have implicitly
based their ideas on a view of the state as a purposive association, one designed
to bring together various interests in pursuit of mutually agreed-upon objectives.
The state, in this sense, concerns itself with defining the ends of government and
mobilizing resources to achieve those ends. It is uniform in its orientation and
pragmatic in its application, ideas consistent with and supported by the idea of
an administrative state. In such a state, the idea of political discussion and dispute
about values or ends is displaced by a focus on technical approaches to getting
things done.
Such a view, Spicer (2000) argues, is increasingly irrelevant to the postmodern world, a world in which diversity reigns supreme—in terms of values,
cultures, life styles, and so on. In this world, an alternative is called for, one
that views public administration as more than the instrument of the purposive
state. Spicer argues that the alternative vision of public administration better
suited to the postmodern world is one based in the notion of civil association.
Here, the role of the state and its administrative agencies is to bring together
diverse interests to engage in discussion and dispute about central political values
and to facilitate the resolution of conflict.
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In a similar vein, Camilla Stivers (2008) writes poignantly that we live in
“dark times.” We live in dark times in two senses: in the sense that our world
is made more desperate by the forces of evil and terror that seem to pervade our
contemporary politics, especially after 9/11, and the sense described by the political philosopher Hannah Arendt, a time in which the bonds of the political
world, a world of interaction between and among people, are broken. That
“double darkness,” Stivers argues, is exacerbated by the new, market-oriented
governance (the new public management).
My argument is that market understandings reflected in the new governance make each of use, inside and outside government, competitive
individuals who connect out of self-interest and dissolve the connection
when it no longer serves us. Dark times call for other connections than
strictly instrumental ones. They call for the renewal of public spaces, for
the creation of myriad opportunities for people—citizens, noncitizens,
officials, and administrators—to meet so each can express his or her own
viewpoint on the issues, great and small, that face us. (p. 6)
In such a world, the public servant has a special ethical responsibility to think
and to act reflectively, helping to connect hope and political reality in new and
“enlightening” ways.
Another significant post-traditional treatise is Thomas Catlaw’s Fabricating the
People (2007a). Catlaw begins by noting that alongside a general mistrust of government in the United States there has been, as we have noted, a continuing
crisis of legitimacy in the field of public administration, “an ongoing search for
an identity and disciplinary coherence” (p. 1). In response, the field has offered
two explanations, one that public administration must develop a different set of
core values, the other that public administration must perform better, that is,
create a government that runs better and costs less. Both of these responses,
Catlaw argues, are misleading.
Instead, he seeks a completely different kind of explanation, arguing that the
crisis of legitimacy in public administration is the result of a breakdown in the
“ontological” basis for the field, the core assumptions the field holds with respect
to reality itself. These assumptions, according to Catlaw, are not given as a matter
of common sense but are rather created as we encounter and reshape the world.
Moreover, as applied to public administration, they have a significant political content, suggesting ways of organizing and conducting politics. “Applying this to our
own political context, the institutions of representative government and the
modern presuppositions of democracy—namely, the idea of a popular sovereign
or People—themselves are linked to a distinct set of ontological commitments,”
which are key to understanding the crisis of legitimacy in public administration
(pp. 2–3).
The problem is that the notion of “We the People” implies a unity or
agreement that all are assumed to accept. There is a viewpoint that “We”
share. However, on the contrary, the world today is characterized by multiplicity
and increasingly diverse sets of identities and interests. Under these circumstances, the traditional notions that we have used to construct a meaningful
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world—terms such as political and epistemological representation and popular
sovereignty—no longer seem to work. Whereas our traditional and foundational
political ontology presumes a degree of unity that lies behind apparent differences, today difference is central to understanding governance. But, for various
reasons, public administration has not been able to confront the concerns this
failure of political ontology poses. Take, for example, the politics–administration
dichotomy. So long as the sovereignty of “the People” is assumed as existing
“out there,” the distinction between politics and administration—expressing the
people’s will and carrying it out—will be maintained.
For public administration, then, challenging the notion of “the People” reveals
that many of the concerns that have occupied theorists of public organization are
actually symptoms of an underlying pathology—a unified view of “the People.”
According to Catlaw, “By tracing the logic of the People, we will begin to see
how governing exceeds our traditional ‘political’ institutions and patterns of social
organization and interaction” (p. 14). In turn, the formulation moves the field past
concerns such as politics–administration dichotomy. “‘Governing’ becomes located
in every space, actualized through every interaction. It can no longer be plausibly
delegated to either side of the dichotomy or any traditional institution …” (p. 14).
Ultimately, Catlaw argues not for just a rejection of a particular model of
representation (or popular sovereignty) but the very idea of representation.
Such a move, he argues, opens the possibility of new modes of governance. In
this view, “Governing might concern itself with the processes by which and
through which truth, objectivities, and subjectivities are contextually produced,
imposed, and sustained, rather than with the mechanisms” associated with public
administration technique (p. 189). Catlaw carefully notes that to move away
from “the People” is not to move away from democracy, but, quite the opposite, it is to open greater possibilities for self-governance and the locations for
democratic practice. Democracy, he holds, has always been about transcending.
And public administration, in turn, becomes a transcending practice, “the general
practice of making and sustaining human worlds” (p. 191) in a manner that overcomes relationships of domination and marginalization.
Catlaw elaborates this idea in his work with Kelly Campbell Rawlings
(2011). They argue for an understanding of democracy not only as a form of
government or social sphere but as a “way of life.” They write that “democratic
self-governing entails a primary focus on the concrete ways in which people talk
with and live together rather than an ascription of values, functions, and roles to
specific institutions, spheres, or sectors of society—all of which have been rendered quite problematic [by social conditions today]” (p. 33). They describe the
ways in which schools, workplaces, and families can be spaces for democratic
interactions and outline how patterns of democratic interaction in one area of
life shape other areas. In the end, if we want a robust democratic public sphere,
we need to start building it in our everyday lives.
Finally, in his analysis of the basic “narrative” of public administration (mentioned earlier), Harmon (2006) argues for a unitary (nondualistic) conception of
governance, one he says might include the following features: collaborative experimentation involving policy makers and administrators, embracing uncertainty as a
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cardinal feature of social life, facilitating the process of social interaction, and a concept of democratic equality that recognizes the legitimacy of individual differences
(p. 144).
Although the postmodernist or post-traditional view of the world presents a
complex and multifaceted appreciation of the contemporary condition of
humanity and, partially as a result, is extraordinarily difficult to access, it clearly
has lessons for public administrators. Certainly skepticism of the dominance of
reason in the world of administration is even more pervasive in the literature of
postmodernism than in other critiques we have seen. Moreover, public administration theorists pursuing the post-traditional approach have seen a connection
between the assumption of reason (or rationality) and the inwardly focused
nature of much of public administration. In various ways, all the posttraditional public administration books we have examined arrive at a similar conclusion (though they would note important differences)—life in the world today
is likely to increasingly reveal our mutual dependence on one another and, in
turn, to make even more important the requirement that patterns of governance
be based on inclusive, open discourse among all parties, including citizens and
administrators. And although post-traditional public administration theorists are
skeptical of traditional approaches to public participation, fearing that they may
turn into controlled discussion that serves the interests of systems rather than
authentic discourse, there seems considerable agreement that enhanced, inclusive
public dialogue is required to reinvigorate the public bureaucracy and restore a
sense of legitimacy to the field of public administration.
Variations in Feminist Theory
Closely allied with post-traditional theories of public administration are feminist
approaches to this field. Although much research on women’s issues in public
administration has focused on topics such as diversity, equal pay, and “glass ceilings,” critical feminism goes well beyond these topics to examine alternative
models of public organization. Kathy Ferguson’s early book The Feminist Case
against Bureaucracy (1984) identified how the ideal type bureaucracy is inherently
gendered, reflecting traditional masculine biases toward power and authority,
both within the bureaucracy and in the relation between citizens and public
organizations. In opposition to this posture, Ferguson recommends a new
approach to organizations in which they would be “based on power defined as
energy and strength, groups that are structured, not tied to the personality of a
single individual, and whose structures do not permit the use of power to dominate others in the group” (p. 180), as well as a new interpretation of citizenship
based on “shared processes of speaking, deliberating, and judging,” (p. 174).
Similarly, Camilla Stivers (1992) argues that public administration theory
ultimately assumes a masculine conception of control as essential to administrative development. After examining the “masculinization of thought” that caused
reality to be viewed apart from the self and therefore subject to control, Stivers
suggests a feminist alternative, one that would accept rather than dichotomize
rigor and relevance and recognize that without discussion, facilitation, and
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communal activities, we risk giving in to mastery, domination, and control.
What Stivers calls a “wild patience” acknowledges not only the patience
required of the facilitative administrator but also the wildness required of one
who refuses to settle for whatever comes along.
Particularly interesting have been feminist studies of leadership, which have
yielded somewhat mixed results. However, one summary of these studies suggests that people evaluate the leadership styles of men and women differently,
valuing initiative in the masculine style and concern for others in the feminine
style (Bartunek, Walsh, & Lacey, 2000). According to this research, women who
lead in nurturing and facilitative ways are likely to be accepted and rated highly
by both men and women, while those taking the initiative receive less support.
Stivers and other feminists, however, additionally raise the question of “whether
feminine leadership styles simply mask hierarchy more effectively; they would
want to know whether we need leaders at all—in the sense of someone who
defines the meaning of situations, shows others the right way to approach
problems, and makes them want what the leader wants (motivates them)” (Stivers,
1993, p. 133; Stivers, 2002).
Several authors argue that continued exploration of the way we think about gendered relations socially, culturally, and organizationally might provide great insight into
the eventual reconstitution of hierarchical organizational structures and democratic
governance (Burnier, 2003; Denhardt & Perkins, 1976; Eagan, 2006; McGinn &
Patterson, 2005). Patricia Mooney Nickel and Angela Eikenberry (2006) describe
the ways in which gender based and other forms of marginalization—such those
based on race, sexuality, or able-bodiedness—disproportionately burden certain
organizational members. Conventional management approaches focus on an individual’s “stress” and how she can “cope” with it rather than confronting conditions
that create and enforce their marginalized, “stressful” organizational life. Powerfully rejecting theories that would divide public life from organizational life, they
write, “A democratic feminist management continually draws attention to how
marginality is maintained through the portrayal of gender roles as natural….
When the private and the personal become political it is no longer ‘natural’ for
women, or any other group exploited outside the official realms of value, to be
subjugated” (p. 364).
Along similar lines, Janet Hutchinson (2002) calls for an “en-gendering” of
democratic public administration that “requires a societal change far more fundamental than adopting a new participatory model. It requires a fundamentally different understanding and lived experience of gender” (p. 732) and the unequal
treatment and conditions that the experience of gender can mean for individuals.
Such an understanding needs to see that gender “is not static” and locked in the
male/female dichotomy but “is relational, fluid, and changing in reference to the
environment” (p. 736). Jennifer Eagan builds on Hutchinson’s work and explores
what being a “citizen” means from a feminist perspective. She asks about who the
“good” citizen is and the unspoken norms that authorize administrators to make
those kinds of determinations. Eagan urges administrators to view both their own
identities and those of the “citizens” they serve as contingent and uncertain and to
approach their work with an attitude of hesitation and modesty about their
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knowledge of the world. She writes, “In the end, we cannot know who we are
dealing with. However, public administrators and political theorists should be on
guard against thinking that they know the identities and motivations of citizen
subjects, particularly marginalized ones” (p. 395).
Race and the Development of Public Organization Theory
Scholars of public organization have made important, if unfortunately belated,
advances in recent years in exploring how race influences how public organizations
work (or do not work) and the manner in which public administrators construct
and manage the public sphere. Matthew Witt (2006) in his article “Notes from the
Margin: Relevance and the Making of Public Administration” makes a significant
contribution in this regard. He writes that theorists and researchers continually
neglect the topic of race despite the fact that “no policy venue confronted by public administrators is untouched by the consequences of racist institution building in
the United States, or, increasingly, abroad” (p. 60). Even approaches critical of
conventional public administration, like the new public administration and postmodernism, fail in this regard. Witt documents how the field was virtually silent
on the landmark 1896 Supreme Court case Plessey v. Ferguson (which legalized the
doctrine of “separate but equal”) and Jim Crow, and how it remains silent about
the pervasive and continued use of racialized and racist public policy (such as
“redlining” in housing markets). Worse still, what discussion did occur in the
early development of the field of public administration, he concludes, was ugly.
It concerned “disputations on the variance of human talent and genius as determined by racial characteristics. … In nearly every instance, this writing gave
credence to and justification for white racial supremacy” (p. 38).
This point is reinforced in Kyle Farmbry’s book, Public Administration and the
Other (2009). Farmbry shows that one of public administration’s “founders,”
Woodrow Wilson, held explicitly racist, antidemocratic views. In addition to
reversing policies to desegregate the federal civic during his presidency, Wilson
wrote in 1909, “An extraordinary and very perilous state of affairs had been created in the South by the sudden and absolute emancipation of the negroes, and it
was not strange that the southern legislatures should deem it necessary to take
extraordinary steps to guard against the manifest and pressing dangers which
entailed” (quoted in Farmbry, 2009). More broadly, Farmbry illustrates the
ways in which public administration and policy pervasively construct and subordinate “others,” such as Native Americans, Japanese-Americans during the Second World War, and immigrants. “Others” are individuals or groups that we
keep ourselves distant from and may discriminate against. Yet, at the same
time, they are very close to us since their supposed difference is used to stabilize
and secure our own identity. Farmbry’s analysis, thus, can also be used to understand how we construct and use “others” in our everyday lives. (This issue was
touched in the discussion of Freud and psychoanalytic theory in Chapter 2.)
Another notable contribution in this area is Dvora Yanow’s (2003) book,
Constructing “Race” and “Ethnicity” in America. Yanow provides a detailed account
of how administrative practices and category-making construct how Americans
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think about race. In showing the historical development of official categories of
race and ethnicity in the U.S. Census, Yanow argues that there is nothing
“natural” about race or how we have come to think about it. Rather, “Contemporary
American race-ethnic discourse, though its policy and administrative practices, embodies and reflects a struggle for public recognition and certification of self-proclaimed
identity, at time including resistance to state-imposed modes of ‘self-identification’ ”
(p. 92). Similar to Jennifer Eagan’s comment, these are struggles to challenge and redefine what the “good American” is and who—literally and figurative—will be counted
by government.
Queer Theory and the Body in Public Organizational Life
The importance of sexuality and ablebodiedness in public organizations is provocatively explored in “queer theory.” Originating in feminist and gender studies
explorations of the experience of gays and lesbians, queer theory radically questions
all assertions of “normality” and seeks to build theory from the experiences of those
who seem to violate those norms. It rejects any designation of the “natural,” such as
distinction between male and female sexualities and the hierarchical “heteronormative” organization of the social world that follows from it. Instead queer theory
views all identities as performances, which shift depending on the context and
dominant norms. Similar to Farmbry’s work on “otherness” and Catlaw’s critique
of representation, it inquires into how these performances depend on the domination or subjugation of other possible identities. For example, Lee, Learmouth, and
Harding (2007) use queer theory to examine public organization and management
norms at work in images of the “good manager.” Perhaps counterintuitively, their
ethnographic study shows how gay men can become “others” even in contexts in
which the organization provides services for men who have sex with men.
Queer theory can also be used to explore the implicit assumptions about
ablebodiness in public organizations and public policy. From the perspective of
queer theory and related work disabilities studies (see Davis, 2010), it is the specific context or situation that is dis-abling of particular kinds of bodies. It prompts
us to ask whether we are making unconscious assumptions about what certain
individual bodies are capable of when we design public institutions and policies.
Are we assuming certain physical abilities (sighted, hearing, height), language
abilities (English-, Spanish-, Tagalog-speaking), reading abilities, and so on?
How can we create spaces and interaction that enable all people to participate in
public organizational life? Practically, the principles of “universal design” offer
guidance about how to think about answering these questions and designing
inclusive, enabling spaces for human interaction.
THE NEW PUBLIC SERVICE
Denhardt and Denhardt (2007) advance an alternative to the new public management as the “new public service,” which draws its inspiration from (1) democratic
political theory (especially as it is concerned with the connection between citizens
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and their governments) and (2) alternative approaches to management and organizational design growing from the more humanistic tradition in public administration theory, including phenomenology, critical theory, and postmodernism.
The “new public service” draws its inspiration from (1) democratic political theory
(especially as it is concerned with the connection between citizens and citizens, and
citizens and their governments) and (2) alternative approaches to management
and organizational design growing from the more humanistic tradition in public
administration theory.
Citizenship, Community, and the New Public Service
Michael Sandel, writing in Democracy’s Discontents (1996), traces two traditions in
American political life. The first, which Sandel says has largely prevailed in recent
history, describes the relationship between state and citizens in terms of procedures and rights. In this view, government fulfills its responsibility to citizens by
assuring that procedures are in place to guarantee that government operates
according to democratic principles (through voting, representation, due process,
and other devices) and that the rights of individuals, such as the right of free
speech or the right to privacy, are protected. In this view, the citizen’s role is
to develop the capacity to choose those pursuits that are consistent with his or
her interest and to respect the rights of others to do the same thing. This view is
one based in a philosophy of self-interest—one holding that government exists
merely to mediate the specific personal and collective interests of those in society, to provide an arena in which self-interests can be played out and adjudicated. Obviously, this perspective underlies public choice economics and the
new public management.
An alternative view of democratic citizenship sees the individual as much
more actively sharing in self-government. The role of the citizen is one that
looks beyond self-interest to the larger public interest; it is one that takes a
broader and more long-term perspective. Obviously, such an interpretation of
democratic citizenship asks much more of the individual. Among other things,
it “requires a knowledge of public affairs and also a sense of belonging, a concern
for the whole, a moral bond with the community whose fate is at stake. To share
in self-rule therefore requires that citizens possess, or come to acquire, certain
qualities of character, or civic virtues” (Sandel, 1996, pp. 5–6).
Another theme of relevance to restoring democratic citizenship and establishing a new public service is connected with the term civil society. As many
have argued, somewhere between citizens and their government, there must be
a healthy and active set of “mediating institutions” that serve simultaneously to
give focus to the desires and interests of citizens and to provide experiences that
will better prepare those citizens for action in the larger political system. Families,
work groups, churches, civic associations, neighborhood groups, voluntary
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organizations, clubs and social groups, and even athletic teams help establish connections between the individual and the larger society. The smaller groups,
which collectively might be referred to as “civil society,” are important because
people need to actively work out their personal interests in the context of
community concerns. Only here can citizens engage one another in the kind of
personal dialogue and deliberation that is the essence not only of community
building but of democracy itself.
Public Administration in the New Public Service
Many theorists and practitioners in the field of public administration have picked
up these themes, both in their understanding of the relationship between governmental professionals and citizens and in their approach to leadership and management in public agencies. Many have focused on civic engagement and have
explored the variety of ways in which members of public organizations might
create greater spaces for dialogue and deliberation involving both “bureaucrats”
and citizens. Cheryl King, Camilla Stivers, and their coauthors conclude their
edited volume Government Is Us (1998) by suggesting three changes that would
help bring a new focus on citizens and citizenship by public administrators. First,
in contrast to the traditional administrative “habit of mind,” they suggest that
administrators see citizens as citizens (rather than merely voters, clients, or “customers”), that they share authority and reduce control, and that they trust in the
efficacy of collaboration. Second, in contrast to managerialist calls for greater efficiency, they seek greater responsiveness and a corresponding increase in trust on
the part of citizens through active investments in citizen involvement on the part
of governments and administrators. Many other books have made contributions
to this project, for example Richard Box’s Citizen Governance (1998), John
Clayton Thomas’s Public Participation in Public Decisions (1995), John Bryson and
Barbara Crosby’s Leadership for the Common Good (1992), and Cheryl King and
Lisa Zanetti’s Transformational Public Service (2005). Third, however, they warn
that active involvement must not be seen as a substitute for substantial improvements in the lives of individuals, especially those without work and facing complex
and difficult social problems.
One especially interesting treatment of these issues comes from the policy
literature, which, as we have seen, is largely biased toward issues of market,
choice, and self-interest. In contrast, Peter deLeon (1997) suggests that the policy
sciences have strayed from their original intent of supporting democratic processes and may have in fact contributed to a decline in democracy. He further
suggests a “participatory policy analysis” that would engage analysts and citizens
in a mutual quest for solutions to important public problems. Such an approach
might rescue policy analysis from the hold of positivism and permit development
of a more democratic model of the policy sciences. The pivotal questions facing
the policy sciences, according to deLeon, are “empty without a democratic
vision” (p. 11).
In the “real world,” a number of important experiments in citizen engagement have occurred. One of the most widely cited is the “Citizens First!”
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program in Orange County, Florida. An effort guided by County Chairman
Linda W. Chapin, “Citizens First!” starts with the proposition that people acting
as citizens must demonstrate their concern for the larger community, their commitment to matters that go beyond short-term interests, and their willingness to
assume personal responsibility for what happens in their neighborhoods and the
community. After all, these are among the defining elements of effective and
responsible citizenship. “These are the qualities that we must extend throughout
our community by reminding people that in relation to our government we
must all be citizens first.” But the “Citizens First!” theme cuts in another way.
Chapin remarks, “To the extent that people are willing to assume (the role of
citizens), those … in government must be willing to listen and to put the needs
and values of citizens first in our decisions and our actions. We must reach out in
new and innovative ways to understand what our citizens are concerned about.
And we must respond to the needs that they believe will help make a better life
for themselves and their children. In other words, those of us in government
must put citizens first.”
Those in government must … put the needs and values of citizens first in their decisions and actions; they must reach out in new and innovative ways to understand
what citizens are concerned about, and they must respond to citizen needs and
interests.
Obviously, the idea of “Citizens First!” bears some resemblance to the efforts
of many governments to improve “customer service,” a theme that has become
quite popular recently. But the “Citizens First!” idea recognizes the limitations of
treating citizens as “customers.” “Citizens First!” approaches this issue by making
a distinction between customer satisfaction according to a private-sector model
and citizen satisfaction according to a citizenship model and suggesting that ultimately government must be more concerned with and more responsive to the
needs and interests of citizens. When people act as customers, they tend to take
one approach; when they act as citizens they take another. Basically, customers
focus on their own desires and wishes and how they can be expeditiously satisfied. Citizens, on the other hand, focus on the common good and the long-term
consequences to the community. The idea of “Citizens First!” is to encourage
more and more people to fulfill their responsibilities as citizens and for government
to be especially sensitive to the voices of citizens. “Citizens First!” is a two-way
street in which responsible governance is characterized by a partnership with the
people and in which an active, involved, and responsible citizenry supports effective governance. “Citizens First!” promotes reciprocal responsiveness (Chapin &
Denhardt, 1995).
Finally, the new public service expresses in the leadership and management
of public agencies a renewed concern for democratic values. In this expression,
various writers have sought to go to the heart of the field of public
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administration and recast its basic perspective from a traditional preoccupation
with efficiency and performance to a balanced concern for democratic responsiveness. For example, Gary Wamsley and James Wolf (1996) express the way
in which public administration must play a role in the new public service in
this way: “Given the challenges and problems confronting the American political
system, it needs a public administration that can be accepted not only as an efficient implementer of policy, but as a legitimate actor in the governance process,
[which] ultimately must come by deepening the democratic character of public
administration” (p. 21). Similarly, writing in The Spirit of Public Administration,
H. George Frederickson (1997) argues that “public administrators have a responsibility to structure relations between organizations and the public so as to foster
development of an evolving concept … of the common good” (p. 52).
This theme is well reflected in O. C. McSwite’s Invitation to Public Administration (2002), an engaging volume that encourages each public servant to more
closely examine the personal interests and personal expressions that are associated
with a life of public service. After exploring the meaning of a reflective public
service, McSwite concludes that “the public service is a workplace that is edifying because … the work it does entails genuine encounter with self, others, and,
more generally, the intractable issues of real life. No matter what a public servant
is given to do, the ultimate purpose in doing it is to protect and further the public interest. Being relentlessly put up against this ultimate standard is the curse of
the public servant’s life and at the same time the salvation that life in the public
service offers” (2002, Epilogue).
Leadership in the New Public Service
An especially important theme in the development of the new public service has
been the changing nature of leadership in public organizations. Montgomery
Van Wart has traced the study of leadership in the public service in his book
Dynamics of Leadership in Public Service (2005). Looking at the traits of leaders,
their skills, and behaviors, Van Wart traces the theoretical development of the
idea of leadership from early managerial and transactional approaches through
charismatic and transformational leadership. One theme that clearly emerges is a
shift from the traditional hierarchical form of leadership to a shared leadership
model, one that has received considerable attention in the literature on public
administration.
For example, Jeffrey Luke (1998) examines the type of leadership required
to raise and resolve important public problems, such as improving schools, protecting natural resources, or reducing urban poverty. What Luke calls “catalytic
leadership” involves elevating the issue to the public and policy agendas, engaging a diverse set of people in the issue, stimulating multiple strategies and options
for action, and sustaining action and maintaining momentum. David Carnavale
(1995), on the other hand, examines leadership within organizations, suggesting
that “trustworthy leadership” is essential to building trustworthy government. In
his view, “The goal of all leadership in high-performing organizations is to
reduce subordinate dependency and build self-leadership among individual
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workers and teams” (p. 55; see also Denhardt, 1993, Ch. 4). Larry Terry, in
Leadership of Public Bureaucracies (1995), suggests that administrators as leaders
must maintain the integrity of the institutions they represent—institutions that
embody important public ideals. For this reason, Terry suggests an important
role for administrators in conserving the public service values that are part of
the institutions they represent. Finally, Robert and Janet Denhardt, in The
Dance of Leadership (2006), consider leadership as an art, describing the ways in
which leaders enact elements of their own artistry in their work. For example,
artistic leaders seem to have an understanding of the rhythm of events or the
flow of energy in their organizations.
In a particularly interesting treatment of the issue of leadership, titled StreetLevel Leadership (1998), Janet Vinzant and Lane Crothers examine the work of
street-level public servants, such as police officers and social service caseworkers,
and comment on the increasingly difficult and challenging nature of work at that
level. Vinzant and Crothers (1998) note that the scope and nature of street-level
discretion has expanded “because of changes in citizen expectations, management systems, and political climate, and the increasingly ‘wicked’ nature of the
problems these workers confront” (p. 141). For this reason, Vinzant and Crothers
argue for using the concept of leadership as a framework for evaluating the
performance and the legitimacy of actions at the street level. Again, the issue of
public service is central to this analysis. Related themes are considered by Steven
Maynard-Moody and Michael Musheno in Cops, Teachers, and Counselors (2003),
which shows how individual administrators’ personal identity and values come
into play in frontline service delivery.
Finally, the relationship between leaders, administrators, and citizens comes
together in Terry Cooper’s book An Ethic of Citizenship for Public Administration
(1991). Cooper argues that the notion of citizenship involves not only rights but
also responsibilities; consequently, the person who acts as a citizen must assume a
positive role in the betterment of the society as a whole. The citizen acts in pursuit of the common good and in accord with the core values of the political
system—political participation, political equality, and justice. When a citizen
becomes a public administrator, he or she assumes the role of “citizenadministrator,” not only being a citizen but working for the citizenry. The ethical basis of citizenship then becomes the basis for the ethical posture of the public
administrator. His or her ultimate obligation is “to deliver public goods and services in ways that enhance the common good of community life through which
character and civic virtue are formed.”
How these ideas might come to guide the work of practical public managers
as they seek to transform their organizations into exemplars of public service is
contained in one of our own books, The Pursuit of Significance (Denhardt, 1993),
which offers an overview of managerial strategies that some of the very best (perhaps even revolutionary) public managers around the world are using in making
improvements in the quality and productivity of their organizations. Based
on interviews and other conversations with outstanding public managers in
Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and the United States, the book examines
some of the theoretical underpinnings of these strategies, but it does so in terms
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of specific management practices. Among the themes that emerge as one reviews
the work of these managers are the following: a commitment to values, a focus
on serving the public, empowerment and shared leadership, “pragmatic incrementalism,” and, most important, a dedication to public service. What is most
striking about these approaches is the way they reflect the search for meaning
or significance that is so much a part of the motivation for top public managers.
These are not ideas that are implemented simply to follow a business model;
rather, they reflect what is distinctive about the public service.
OUTLINING THE NEW PUBLIC SERVICE*
Denhardt and Denhardt (2007) have described the new public service as an alternative to both the old public administration and the new public management. In
their view, there are two themes that undergird the new public service: (1) to
advance the dignity and worth of public service and (2) to reassert the values of
democracy, citizenship, and the public interest as the preeminent values of public
administration. Drawing from these themes, they elaborate seven key principles
of the new public service.
1. Serve citizens, not customers. Public servants do not merely respond to the
demands of customers but focus on building relationships of trust and
collaboration with and among citizens. The new public service seeks to
encourage more and more people to fulfill their responsibilities as citizens
and for government to be especially sensitive to the voices of citizens. Public
service is seen as a form or extension of citizenship. Citizenship is conceived
not as a legal status but as a matter of responsibility and morality. Citizens
demonstrate a concern for the larger community, their commitment to
matters that go beyond short-term interests, and their willingness to assume
personal responsibility for what happens in their neighborhoods and the
community. In turn, government must be responsive to the needs and
interests of citizens—and must work with them to build a civil society.
2. Seek the public interest. Public administrators must contribute to building a
collective, shared notion of the public interest. The goal is not to find quick
solutions driven by individual choices; instead, it is the creation of shared
interests and shared responsibility. In the new public service, the public
administrator is not the lone arbiter of the public interest. Rather, the public
administrator is seen as a key actor within a larger system of governance
including citizens, groups, elected representatives, and other institutions.
This suggests that public administrators play an important role in assuring
that the public interest predominates, that both the solutions themselves
and the process by which solutions to public problems are developed are
*Adapted from Janet V. Denhardt and Robert B. Denhardt, The New Public Service: Serving, Not Steering, expanded
ed. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2007). Copyright © 2007 by M.E. Sharpe.
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consistent with democratic norms of justice, fairness, and equity. One of the
most important implications of viewing the government as a vehicle for
achieving shared values is that the purpose of government is fundamentally
different from that of business. These differences make the exclusive use of
market mechanisms and assumptions about trust as a self-interested calculation at least suspect. Although there are many characteristics that distinguish
business from government, government’s responsibility to enhance citizenship and serve the public interest is one of the most important differences—
and a cornerstone of the new public service.
3. Value citizenship and public service above entrepreneurship. The public interest
is better advanced by public servants and citizens committed to making
meaningful contributions to society than by entrepreneurial managers acting
as if public money were their own. The role of the administrator in the new
public service is not rowing or steering customers but serving citizens. Public
administrators work within complex policy networks, and it is their job to
involve citizens in the development of policy—through active, authentic
participation. This participation not only informs policy but also builds the
capacity of the citizenry. Advocates of the new public service argue that the
prevailing view in both politics and administration is associated with selfinterest, but that a resurgence of democratic spirit might have great benefits
for society and for its members. There is certainly no question that government agencies should strive to offer the highest quality service possible
within the constraints of law and accountability; however, such efforts
should be grounded in the idea that citizenship and the relationship between
citizens and their government is central.
4. Think strategically, act democratically. Policies and programs meeting public
needs can be most effectively and responsibly achieved through collective
efforts and collaborative processes. Citizen participation should not be limited to framing issues; it should also extend to policy implementation. In the
new public service, citizen involvement is not limited to setting priorities.
Instead, in this view, public organizations should be managed so as to
enhance and encourage the engagement of citizens in all facets and phases of
the policy-making and implementation process. Through this process, citizens will become involved in governance instead of only making demands
on government to satisfy their short-term needs. Accordingly, from the
perspective of the new public service, mechanisms like coproduction are
derived from the concept of community, not from the concept of the
market. In other words, these are not just cost-cutting measures; they are
community-building measures. Citizens and public servants have a mutual
responsibility for identifying problems and implementing solutions.
5. Recognize that accountability is not simple. Public servants should be attentive to
more than the market; they should also attend to statutory and constitutional
law, community values, political norms, professional standards, and citizen
interests. From the perspective of the new public service, the question
of accountability in the public service is a complex one; it involves the
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balancing of competing norms and responsibilities within a complicated web
of external controls, professional standards, citizen preferences, moral issues,
public law, and ultimately the public interest. In other words, public
administrators are called on to be responsive to all of the competing norms,
values, and preferences of our complex governance system. Accountability is
not simple and cannot be made so. From the Denhardts’ perspective, it is a
mistake to oversimplify the nature of democratic accountability by focusing
only on a narrow set of performance measures or by attempting to mimic
market forces—or worse, by simply hiding behind notions of neutral
expertise. To do so calls into question the nature of democracy and the role
of citizenship and a public service dedicated to serving citizens in the public
interest. The new public service recognizes that being a public servant is
a demanding, challenging, and sometimes heroic endeavor involving
accountability to others, adherence to the law, morality, judgment, and
responsibility.
6. Serve rather than steer. Increasingly, public servants must use value-based
leadership in helping citizens articulate and meet their shared interests rather
than attempt to control or steer society in new directions. In the new public
service, leadership is based on values and is shared throughout the organization and with the community. This change in the conceptualization of
the public administrator’s role has profound implications for the types of
leadership challenges and responsibilities faced by public servants. Public
administrators must know and manage more than just the requirements
and resources of their programs. To serve citizens, public administrators must
not only know and manage their own resources but also be aware of and
connected to other sources of support and assistance, engaging citizens and the
community in the process. They do not seek to control, nor do they assume
that self-interested choice serves as a surrogate for dialogue and shared values.
In short, they must share power and lead with passion, commitment, and
integrity in a manner that respects and empowers citizenship.
7. Value people, not just productivity. Public organizations and the networks in
which they participate are more likely to be successful in the long run if they
are operated through processes of collaboration and shared leadership based
on respect for all people. Public-sector managers have a special responsibility
and unique opportunity to capitalize on the “heart” of public service. People
are attracted to the public service because they are motivated by public service values. These values—to serve others, to make the world better and
safer, and to make democracy work—represent the best of what it means to
be a citizen in the service of a community.
The new public management, which has come to dominate thought and
action in the field of public administration, is grounded in the idea that the
best way to understand human behavior is to assume that governmental and
other actors make choices and undertake actions based on their own selfinterest. In this view, the role of government is to unleash market forces and
incorporate market-based managerial techniques so as to facilitate individual
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choice and achieve efficiency. Citizens are seen as customers and problems are
addressed by manipulating incentives. Public servants are expected to be
entrepreneurial risk takers who get the “best deals” and reduce costs.
Unlike the new public management, which is built on economic concepts such as
the maximization of self-interest, the new public service is built on the idea of the
public interest, the idea of public administrators serving citizens and indeed
becoming fully engaged with those they serve.
In contrast, the new public service holds that public administration should
begin with the recognition that an engaged and enlightened citizenship is critical
to democratic governance. In this view, this “high” citizenship is both important
and achievable because human behavior is not only a matter of self-interest but
also involves values, beliefs, and a concern for others. Citizens are the owners of
government and capable of acting together in pursuit of the greater good.
Accordingly, the public interest transcends the aggregation of individual selfinterests. The new public service seeks shared values and common interests
through widespread dialogue and citizen engagement. Public service itself is
seen as an extension of citizenship; it is motivated by a desire to serve others
and to achieve public objectives.
GOVERNANCE, NETWORKS, AND DEMOCRACY
Thus far, this chapter has shown that there has been a persistent counter-theme
in public organization theory. These theorists have criticized and pushed back
against the many facets of the rational model by calling into question its assumptions about human beings, its forms of organization and human relationship, and
its approach to knowledge acquisition. The most recent of these approaches
position themselves in relation to the new public management, public-choice
theory, and market-based management strategies. Together with phenomenological, critical, and postmodern approaches, scholarship on gender and race
focuses on the importance of the embodied and contextual experience of actual
people inside public organizations and the communities that they interact with.
Other forms of knowledge are important, but, ultimately, specific people put
that knowledge to work in a specific context. Moreover, this work examines
the everyday struggles and challenges marginalized people deal with so that
more inclusive, democratic, and humane environments can be created. In
doing so, this scholarship recognizes and values interpretive, phenomenological,
and other “local” forms of knowledge rooted in people’s experience. This kind
of knowledge helps us to understand the complex ways in which sense- and
identity-making occurs in public organizations and how these processes constrain
or enable what individuals can be and do. This work is critical of the idea that
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managers can gain access to the kind of knowledge the rational model promises
and deeply skeptical about the uses to which such knowledge might be put. The
new public service, further, shares many of these ideas and seeks to formulate an
account of public organization that is rooted in mutual relationships among citizens and their governments to build civil society and advance the public interest.
But as we discussed in Chapter 2’s discussion of Marx, any consideration
about changing social conditions must be guided by critical reflection upon our
own situation and that of our society to reveal the basis of social domination and
the suffering it promotes. While it is impossible for us to describe the unique
situation with which each individual grapples, we can ask, what is the situation
that many practitioners in public service confront today? And how does this situation shape the possibilities for advancing a democratic alternative to the rational model? The remainder of this chapter addresses these questions by exploring
contemporary developments and assessing their implications for a democratic
theory of public organization.
From Government to Governance
One of the most important developments in the field of public administration
and policy over the past several decades has been an opening of the policy
process to multiple interests, organizations, and agencies. Whereas in the past
government was the primary mover in producing public policy, today many
more actors are involved. Ranging from small nonprofits at the local level to
large multinational organizations such as the World Trade Organization, many
groups and organizations have become integral to the policy process. There are
several reasons that this situation has arisen. First, as we discussed in the previous
chapter, there has been a growth in third-party government through contracting
with private and nonprofit organizations to deliver services. Second, governments are increasingly “joining up” with one another to deliver integrated services. Third, technological advances have made real-time collaboration much
easier than before (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004). Fourth, there have been growing
demands from the public to be consulted and included in policy formulation and
administrative processes.
Moreover, it has become clear that in many policy arenas neither government nor markets can fully address the problems society faces today. Neither the
top-down control associated with government hierarchy nor the relative anarchy
associated with markets provides an adequate model for resolving today’s complex problems. As Sorensen and Torfing (2008) point out, today’s society is
marked by increasing fragmentation into relatively autonomous subgroups, complexity in the nature of public problems, and new societal dynamics “created partly
by the multiplication and interconnection of spatial and temporal horizons of
action and partly by the blurring and contestation of the boundaries between
institutions, sectors, and regulatory scales” (p. 5).
Under these circumstances, the traditional mechanisms of governmental
control of the policy process are no longer workable—or even possible. Instead,
there has been a dispersion of power and governing into a variety of policy
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“networks” (Marcussen & Torfing, 2003; Milward & Provan, 2000; Provan &
Milward, 2001). Today, government is involved in the policy process alongside
many others—businesses, associations, nonprofit organizations, and citizens at
large. As a result, the design and implementation of public policy, or what
some have called “the steering of society” (Nelissen et al., 1999), no longer
resides with a single governmental unit acting alone or in close concert with
one or two others but has been supplanted by often quite complex governance
networks comprised of a plurality of actors, each bringing their own special
interests, resources, and sets of expertise. In addition to government agencies,
businesses, and nonprofits, “such groups include community organizations, cooperatives, advocacy groups, service organizations, political parties, schools, charitable organizations, and professional groups” (Crosby, 1999, p. 3). Moreover,
these groups may cross geographic and jurisdictional boundaries, even national
boundaries.
For these reasons, it increasingly makes sense to talk not just about government but also about “governance.” Though there are many definitions available,
governance can be defined as the traditions, institutions, and processes having to do
with the exercise of power in society (Peters, 2001; Bogason, 2000). The governance process has to do with the way decisions are made in a society and how
citizens and groups interact in the formulation of public purposes and the implementation of public policy. Today the governance process involves many different groups and organizations (see Ingraham & Lynn, 2004; Jones, Schedler, &
Mussari, 2004; Kettl, 2005; and Pollitt & Boukaert, 2004). One of the most
interesting challenges raised by the new world of network governance is how
to reconcile traditional hierarchical government with the demands for networks
built along horizontal lines. Similarly, theorists are now beginning to ask how
network governance might contribute to or detract from strengthening democracy. This is an important point since networks are not inherently democratic.
Obviously, the increasing involvement of multiple groups in the design and
implementation of public policy through governance networks has important
consequences for our understanding and appreciation of democratic processes
(Sorensen & Torfing, 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2008). As a result, there has been a
burgeoning interest in democratic network governance—how governance networks might be structured and operated in keeping with democratic ideals.
Among other things, studies have focused on definitions of democratic network
governance, typical structures of network governance, the role of metagovernance schemes, and how democratic network governance can best incorporate
norms of transparency and civic engagement (Bang, 2003; Goldsmith & Eggers,
2004; Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Heffen, Kickert, & Thomassen, 2000; Kettl,
2002; Kickert, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1997; Kooiman, 1993; March & Olsen,
1995; Marin & Mayntz, 1991; Pierre & Peters, 2000; Rhodes, 1997; Sorensen &
Torfing, 2008).
Early studies of the operations of networks in the public, nonprofit, and
for-profit sectors tended to focus on the question of how various structures contribute to or detract from the effective operation of networks (Milward & Provan,
2000; Provan & Milward, 2001). Provan and Kenis (2008) describe three forms
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of network governance. The simplest form is participant governance, in which the
network is governed by the participants themselves. Participant-governed networks can be highly decentralized or highly centralized and may be governed
by a lead organization. The second form is called lead organization–governed
networks. In these cases, the inefficiencies of shared governance give way to
the necessity for one organization taking a lead role in the network. A third
type of network governance is the network administrative organization. Here, a
separate administrative entity, either an individual or a formal organization, is
set up to govern the network. Provan and Kenis argue that the success of a
particular mode of network governance is related to issues of trust, size, goal
consensus, and the nature of the task.
More recent theories of democratic network governance tend to specify more
explicitly the nonhierarchical nature of network governance in the formulation of
public policy and consequently raise interesting questions about how to govern
when no one is in charge. Sorensen and Torfing (2008) define a governance
network as “1. a relatively stable horizontal articulation of interdependence, but
operationally autonomous actors; 2. who interact through negotiations; 3. which
take place within a regulative, normative, cognitive and imaginary framework;
4. that is self-regulating within limits set by external agencies; and 5. which
contributes to the production of public purpose” (p. 9). Similarly, Borzel and
Panke (2008) define network governance as “the formulation and implementation
of collectively binding decisions by the systematic involvement of private
actors with whom public actors coordinate their preferences and resources on the
voluntary (nonhierarchical) basis” (p. 156). In any case, the interdependency characteristic of democratic network governance means that relations among participants are horizontal rather than vertical, and no one actor can use hierarchical
power to dominate others without risking destruction of the network (Wachhaus,
2009).
This feature of network governance makes for unique problems of cooperation and collaboration. Goldsmith and Eggers (2004) describe governing by networks as the “new face of the public sector” and emphasize the individual
qualities that successful network managers require for success (p. 188). The problem these managers face is that because there are many participants in the network, authority and responsibility are dispersed and consequently traditional
modes of accountability are difficult. Through processes of negotiation and
collaboration, clear goals must be decided upon and responsibilities for achieving
those goals clarified. For this reason, instead of the traditional skills of top-down
management, network managers “must possess at least some degree of aptitude in
negotiation, mediation, risk analysis, trust building, collaboration, and project
management” (pp. 157–158). They must possess the capacity and inclination to
work across boundaries and across sectors; they must have the skill to respond
flexibly and creatively to ever-changing circumstances.
Similar themes are explored in Robert Agranoff’s Managing within Networks
(2007; see also Agranoff & McGuire, 2003). Agranoff notes the important role of
what he calls public management networks in the governance process but points out
that there are different types of networks, based on the purposes they seek to
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achieve. Informational networks exist for the purpose of exchanging information
about policies, programs, and possible solutions to common problems. Developmental networks extend beyond information-sharing to provide members with
services that may help individual constituent organizations better achieve their
objectives. Outreach networks engage in all of the previous activities but also
enhance opportunities for new programs that may be implemented through a
variety of agencies. Finally, action networks formally adopt collaborative courses
of action, often delivering services directly to a client population (Agranoff,
2007, pp. 10, 35–82).
Many scholars have explored the notion of collaboration as a way of generating collective action in cases where there is no clear hierarchy or sense of
authority. Agranoff, for example, uses the term collaborarchy to describe the difficult activities involved in managing networks (pp. 83–124). Others have
explored in great detail how groups collaborate and how they might engage in
shared leadership. Contributors to a special issue of the Public Administration
Review (2006) on “Collaborative Public Management” discussed the process of
facilitating and operating multiorganizational arrangements to solve problems
that cannot be solved by a single organization. “Collaborative means to co-labor,
to cooperate to achieve common goals, working across boundaries in multisector
relationships. Cooperation is based on the value of reciprocity” (O’Leary,
Gerard, & Bingham, 2006, p. 7; see also O’Leary & Bingham, 2009).
As part of the symposium, Thomson and Perry (2006) offered five dimensions
of collaboration that must be taken into account in the operation of any democratic governance network. The first is what they call the governance dimension, the
requirement that parties must come together to jointly make decisions about the
rules to govern their activities and develop structures through which power can be
shared. Such processes imply that the collaboration or network lacks authoritative
or hierarchical structures for decision making and that all parties must recognize
the legitimate interests of other parties in the relationship. The second, the administration dimension, focuses on management practices and, in their view, requires
“clear roles and responsibilities, the capacity to set boundaries, the presence of concrete achievable goals, and good communication” (2006, p. 25).
Third is the autonomy dimension, that is, the process of reconciling individual
and collective interests. Parties to a collaboration or network retain their own
distinct identities and allegiances to their “home” organizations, but they must
also contribute to the achievement of collective goals and objectives. Indeed,
many scholars point to this circumstance as perhaps the most challenging to the
maintenance of effective governance networks (Bardach, 1998; Tschirhart,
Christensen, & Perry, 2005; Vigoda-Gadot, 2003; Wood & Gray, 1991). When
individual goals or self-interest conflicts with goals of the collective, the maintenance of the network is extremely difficult. For this reason, one of the requisite
skills of leaders in networks is that of arriving at agreement around a set of shared
goals or directions.
The fourth is the mutuality dimension, the idea that unless all parties receive
mutual benefits from the collaboration either in terms of differing interests or
shared interests the collaboration will not likely be maintained. In contrast to
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negotiation, which begins from differences, Thomson and Perry (2006) stress the
importance of “jointly identifying commonalities among organizations such as
similarity of mission, commitment to the target population, or professional
orientation and culture” (p. 27). The trust and reciprocity dimension is fifth and
refers to the necessity of establishing conditions of mutual trust among partners
to the collaboration and building both short-term and long-term reciprocity, a
willingness to contribute assuming that others will contribute as well. Obviously,
trust building is a central leadership skill especially in governance networks.
Democratic Network Governance
The extension of networks throughout the governance process raises significant
questions for the future of democratic norms and institutions (Catlaw, 2007,
2008). On the one hand, networks may be seen as operating outside the normal
mechanisms of both bureaucratic control and political accountability. The sheer
number of people involved and the extended chains of accountability complicate
the determination of desired political outcomes and may give the impression that
governance by network is, to borrow a phrase from the philosopher Hannah
Arendt (1970), “rule by nobody.” Governance networks also are criticized for
being dominated by elites and experts who have the technical and political
knowledge and skills to negotiate the complex dynamics within networks. This
frustrates the ability of ordinary citizens to influence the policy process, especially
if traditional forms of political accountability are eroded. On the other hand, networks can be seen as bringing policy discussions and implementation issues closer
to the citizenry. Not all networks are technical or elitist, but can involve a range
of actors from across society and inclusive network management would consider
ways to connect and engage varied networks. In this sense, the opening of government through governance may help to mobilize the knowledge and expertise
that is required to address complex social problems and make provide a broader
setting within which to create consensus around societal values and goals in a
noncoercive way.
Perhaps the most thoughtful and thorough discussion of this question is by
Eva Sorensen and Jacob Torfing (2005), who have argued that governance networks need to be democratically “anchored.” They describe four basic characteristics of democratic governance networks. First, they are controlled by
democratically elected politicians. In the context of networks, this entails an indirect or “soft” control called “metagoverning.” As metagovernors, elected officials
influence the design and structure of a network and its “framing,” that is, its
overarching narrative, resource distribution, and political objectives. They also
influence the network through their direct participation in the management of
the network. Second, the network needs to represent the membership of the
groups and organizations that participate in the network. Concretely, this
means that groups should be able to “select and instruct their representatives,” have
the ability to “to form an informed opinion about their representatives’ performance in
the governance network,” and be able to “express different opinions and criticize the
representatives’ performance in the governance network” (p. 201, emphasis in original).
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Third, networks should be accountable to “the territorially defined
citizenry.” They write, “The citizens that live within the local, regional, national
or transnational territory within which a certain governance network is making
authoritative decisions should be able to hold the governance network accountable for its policy output and the policy outcomes it produces” (p. 208). This
means that decisions made by governance networks should be contestable by
those affected by the decisions of the network. Given this, network processes
must be transparent, accessible, and responsive to criticism. Finally, networks
should adhere to “the democratic rules specified by a particular grammar of conduct” (p. 201). Basically this means that network actors must take into account
prevailing democratic norms, such as inclusion, deliberation, and the commitment to improving society.
CONCLUSION
The notion of democratic anchorage provides both theorists and practitioners
with invaluable guidance for considering the “democratic” quality of network
interactions. However, generally missing from the literature on governance and
network is the idea central to this book: the democratization of social relationships of all types and a concern with the distortions that have prevented the
desires of individuals from being expressed constructively through organized
social and political action. As John Dryzek (2008, p. 270) writes, “ ‘democratization’ here means not the spread of liberal democracy to more concerns of the
world. … Instead, it means deepening of the democratic qualities of any situation, structure, or process.” In their work on “democracy as a way of life,”
Rawlings and Catlaw (2011) define democratic in this sense as:
We would say that democracy … refers to a particular qualitative process or way of talking and interacting with others. This process emphasizes openness to the other; flexible habits of mind; a concern for
individual creativity, autonomy, and personal efficacy; involvement in
the tasks close at hand in our lives, which, in turn, seems to facilitate the
development of a sense of self in relation to others; and close attention
to the concrete empirical situation. It is concerned, to borrow Orion
White’s nice wording, with the particular texture of contextual interaction or contact and a kind of mutual learning through activity and
interaction that such contact provides (1990).
Certainly the pursuit of broad societal goals cannot be neglected, but, in our
view, neither can individuals be sacrificed to these goals. This seems especially
germane in light of what we know about the evolutionary nature of the implementation process and the increasing complex, fragmented nature of governance.
Individuals simply cannot be sacrificed to objectives when “objectives” are moving targets and managerial capacities for control are severely limited.
The argument in this book is that there is a way to see both the formulation
of societal goals and the meeting of individual desires as part of an integrated
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democratic process. The governance perspective, however, has been reticent to
expand the terrain of democratic practice to the inside of public organizations, to
considering, for example, the workplace or school as a location for democratization (Rawlings & Catlaw, 2011). In doing so, it has foreclosed much of social life
from democratization and, in part, remains unconcerned with important dimensions of individual well-being. In closing we note that this is not only a normative concern. There are important connections between what goes on inside
organizations and the kind of public life we get (Alkadry, 2003; Catlaw &
Rawlings, 2010; Rawlings & Catlaw, 2011). In the organizational society, organizational life is where we develop the habits, capacities, and dispositions that we
take with us to our interactions with citizens, clients, and stakeholders. To
neglect the former is to shortchange the latter.
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
1. How would you describe the mainstream view of public administration in
this country?
2. What are some of the basic critiques of the rational model of administration?
3. What are the essential elements of phenomenology and critical theory?
4. What are the key elements of post-traditional public administration?
5. What are some of the ways that race and gender have influenced the
development of theories of public organization?
6. What is the new public service? How does it connect to theories of democratic network governance?
7. What are some of the ways that your organizational life impacts your life
outside of work?
CASES
1. Leslie Jones, a recent MPA graduate, is skeptical of approaches to public
administration that seem to exclude value considerations. How might she
construct a personal philosophy of public administration that would be more
consistent with democratic ideals?
2. A manager of a state transportation department, Jay Cutler, has been working for years to obtain agreement concerning a new highway. The new
thoroughfare is needed in an environmentally sensitive area, but Cutler has
encountered stiff opposition from local elected officials and business owners.
Rather than giving up on citizen involvement, he wants to expand his efforts
to involve the public. What are some of the ways he might do so? If you
were consulting with his department, what would you recommend?
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REFERENCES AND ADDITIONAL READINGS
Abel, Charles Frederick, & Sementelli, Arthur J. (2003). Evolutionary critical theory and its
role in public affairs. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Abel, Charles Frederick, & Sementelli, Arthur J. (2007). Justice and public administration.
Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press.
Adams, Guy B., & Balfour, Danny L. (2004). Unmasking administrative evil. Rev. ed.
Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Adams, Guy B., & Balfour, Danny L. (2009). Unmasking administrative evil. Third ed.
Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Agranoff, Robert. (2007). Managing within networks. Washington, DC: Georgetown
University Press.
Agranoff, Robert, & McGuire, Michael. (2003). Collaborative public management.
Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Alkadry, Mohamad G. (2003). Deliberative discourse between citizens and administrators:
If citizens talk, will administrators listen? Administration & Society 35: 184–209.
Alkadry, Mohamad G. (2007). Democratic administration in a multicultural environment. In Richard C. Box (Ed.), Democracy and public administration, pp. 150–168.
Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Arendt, Hannah. (1970). On violence. New York: Harcourt Brace & Company.
Argyris, Chris, & Schon, Donald. (1978). Organizational learning: A theory of action perspective. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.
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8
The Practitioner as Theorist
Thus far, a number of important contributions to public administration theory
have been reviewed, and the complexity of the issues faced by anyone
involved with public organizations should be apparent. Theory, of course,
requires complexity; it demands that we examine all sides, that we seek explanation and understanding, and that we look to both the past and the future.
Theory also requires simplicity—that we select those issues of greatest importance to us (and be clear about how we make our choices); that we bring
together and synthesize those concerns; and that we find a satisfactory way of
relating our theories to our actions. As we each build our own theory of public
organization, we inevitably develop perspectives that are simultaneously complex
and simple.
But how can we possibly hold perspectives that are both complex and simple? More importantly, how can we possibly bring together such apparent opposites as politics and administration, efficiency and responsiveness, fact and value,
autonomy and responsibility, theory and practice? Certainly the task is not easy.
Indeed, the seemingly paradoxical nature of theory building is exactly why some
students of public administration find theory so intractable. How nice it would
be if we could find a carefully worked out theory that would answer all our
questions and provide a comfortable and secure basis for our actions. Students
seek answers (and some theorists encourage this by pretending that they have
answers), but in the end, there are no permanent answers for those seeking
guides to action. At best, there are only questions and directions—we hope
that these are the right questions and directions.
At this point, in many books on theory, the author would have pointed out
the weaknesses of earlier works in the field and would then attempt to provide a
new answer, a new theory of public organization. We do not attempt to present
223
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such a theory. Instead, we offer a few comments about the process of theory
building itself and share some concerns that have been and continue to be
important to us as administrators and theorists in building our own personal theories of public organization. Perhaps, there are issues here that you, the reader,
might also wish to pursue as you seek a satisfactory framework for your actions.
At a minimum, we should identify the questions we both must answer.
WHOSE THEORY? WHICH PRACTICE?
We begin this chapter by returning to a theme that has figured prominently in
this book: the relationship of theory and practice. Libraries could be filled with
volumes on this topic, but at the heart of the theory–practice debate is the relationship between two kinds of knowledge and, importantly, which one is a
more real or accurate account of how the world works.
Modern science as it emerged in the late nineteenth century expressed deep
skepticism about the views and beliefs that everyday people held. From a “scientific” perspective, individuals were seen largely as products of powerful social
forces that shaped their views and determined their behavior. Even some of the
critical perspectives that we have discussed positively in this book held this view.
For example, the Marxist could hold that the working class was subject to “false
consciousness,” or misrecognition of its true interests due to the distorting effects
of capitalist ideology. A Freudian could doubt whether people really understood
their true needs and desires. Ironically, scientists and theorists largely exempted
themselves from these criticisms. This meant that there was a position “outside”
of these powerful social structures, ideologies, and unconscious forces from
which a scientist could get a true, unbiased perspective on the world. Furthermore, this was a position in which human agency, or autonomous action, was
thought to be possible.
The scientific view of theory that prevailed essentially was the positivist one,
and it demanded that theory provide generalized, causal explanations of underlying social processes. The implications for practice were fairly clear: By understanding these causal mechanisms, one could manipulate or control these
processes. Public administrators, for example, could rationally and instrumentally
apply this theoretical, scientific understanding to the world in order to control
complex processes—like the economy—and guide them toward desired ends.
The same logic (and hope) was more or less extended into the realm of management as we saw with Frederick Taylor and the pursuit of a science of administration (Chapter 3) and a rational model of organization (Chapter 4). As Hugh
Miller and Cheryl King (1998, p. 45) characterize this view, “theory is made
relevant to practice through the transfer of theoretical knowledge to practitioners
who are expected to improve administrative effectiveness by applying such
knowledge to practice.”
As we have seen at several points in our discussion, though, the relationship
between theory and practice is not what this straightforward application suggests.
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Max Weber (see Chapter 2), for example, recognized that people were not the
“sociological dupes” that positivist theory thought they were. Individual people
have ideas and beliefs that need to be taken into account in any explanation of
their behavior. While not discounting the power of broad social or structural
forces, Weber argued that the point of view of the actor must be considered.
The influential philosopher Edmund Husserl (discussed in Chapter 7) provided
another important insight. Husserl said that human beings exist in what he called
a life-world. The life-world is the domain of the family, the school, and all the
other everyday activities that we are involved in. It is given to us in advance of
whatever scientific endeavors we pursue. It is, so to speak, the platform of experience from which science begins.
When Husserl was writing, many other philosophers and theorists were
exploring similar themes, and one could draw a variety of different conclusions
from Husserl’s claim. But three are particularly important for this discussion. First,
Husserl thought that the life-world—the places where people live, work, and
make sense of their lives—is a worthy subject of scientific inquiry in and of itself.
There was much to be learned from ordinary people and their experience. Second,
the rationalistic, positivist attitude, he worried, neglects this and threatens to distort
our understanding of the world and how it works. As one commentator put it, “In
particular, the success of modern science since Galileo has displaced our immediate
forms of lived experience with the forms of objects dictated by science” (Moran,
2000, p. 183). The issue here, in Husserl’s view, is that rationalist science does not
merely mirror the world as it really is, but science is, in fact, creative. The theoretical,
scientific attitude is in that sense much like the artistic one and, interestingly,
researchers in this tradition often speak about data “generation” rather than data
“collection” (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2013). Science and theory can be related
to one another to help us understand and make sense of the world. But theory
cannot (or should not seek to) replace the unique understanding and knowledge
in the life-world. Third, the concept of the life-world raises doubts about the ability to have a view from “outside” social processes, structures, and forces for this
reason: Scientific inquiry is always already built on a platform of practices, values,
and experiences that inform how research is conducted. Scientific theory is, then,
historical and socially situated. This view flips the positivistic claim that theory can
be applied to practice. From this vantage, it is the everyday life-world that serves as
the ground for theory (Hummel, 1996).
This second perspective, the “interpretive” one, offers a different, more
complicated view of the relationship between theory and practice. Since there
is no one-to-one correspondence between theoretical statements and social phenomena, instrumentally controlling social processes via theoretical knowledge
becomes difficult. Theory cannot simply be applied. There must always be an
intermediate process of making sense of and translating theoretical or scientific
statements in light of local conditions. This also changes the power relationship
among theorists, scientists, and ordinary people. Ordinary people are assumed
to have some understanding of what they are doing and also why they are
doing it—even if that understanding is incomplete in some way. They place a
central part in making theory relevant to the life-world and in advancing theory
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itself. Finally, the very idea that science takes place in a neutral site outside of everyday practice is rendered moot. Researcher and theorist identity, history, context, and
experience, all are important factors to be considered in how theory is generated.
Criticism and Theory
A third approach to the theory–practice question is the critical one. As we
described in Chapters 2 and 7, critical theory seeks to describe how existing political, social, economic, or organizational conditions constrain or limit the lives
that we as human beings can live. The implicit hope is that, by learning about
and better understanding our limitations, it will encourage us to take action that
positively transforms our conditions and relationships with others, and enhances
our autonomy. To this end, as White (1999, p. 79) puts it, “The logical structure
of critical reasoning is the process of self-reflection.…” In other words, critical
theory asks that we reflect on the knowledge presented to us, assess how it relates
and speaks to our own situation, and then decide whether to take action to
change our conditions based on that self-reflection.
Critical theory also addresses both aspects of the theory–practice question
discussed above. First, it is critical of the dominance and limitations of positivist
research and shares many of the concerns raised by the interpretive perspective
about rationalism and positivist science. But it also casts a critical gaze over the
institutions of the life-world to analyze everyday practices and how not only science but also the life-world can be changed. It must be said, as Dvora Yanow
(2006, p. 22) points out, that the dividing line between interpretive and critical
approaches to theory is often not as hard and fast when we are analyzing “actual
practices” in which “questions of power in its communal, social, organization,
political, and/or other institutional manifestations” are considered.
THEORY, PRACTICE, AND PUBLIC
ORGANIZATIONAL LIFE
These are the broad contours of the theory–practice debate. Clearly, it is a
debate that involves more than the seemingly straightforward issue of how to
provide relevant, useable knowledge to practicing administrators. The theory–
practice debate, in fact, touches big questions about the purpose of scientific
inquiry, power relations, and the fundamental nature of the reality being studied—though these questions are largely hidden when we assume that theory is
merely applied to practice. Equally clear, however, is the fact that the rationalist,
positivist view of theory prevailed, that it remains dominant, and that this dominance has very important implications for the everyday work of governance and
the ability for individual practitioners to build personal understanding of their
public-organizational lives (see also Bevir, 2010).
A significant issue, one we have mentioned at various points in this book, is
that the positivist framing of the theory–practice issue tends to crowd out other
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ways of understanding the world and also to minimize and even disparage the
local, everyday knowledge that human beings gain from interacting with others
in their life-worlds. It prefers the knowledge of the technical expert or manager.
Unfortunately, this tends to restrict and narrow an administrator’s options rather
than enhance them. For example, implicit in the positive science approach is the
idea of a structured world behaving according to regular laws expressing functional imperatives. The mode of action suggested by this approach is hierarchical,
structured, and authoritarian. If the range of responses is limited in this way,
theory is constraining rather than enabling. Furthermore, by viewing the world
as constituted independent of our participation in it, mainstream social science
theory concentrates on explanations or understandings of existing phenomena.
But the administrative world is constructed and reconstructed through the
actions and interactions of individuals and groups. Consequently, those permanently “valid” explanations of mainstream science are valid only within the
context of a particular, narrow, and measurable construction of reality. They do
not allow and certainly do not encourage the possibility of change—the possibility that we might alter existing realities. Yet as we saw earlier, change is not only
inevitable but necessary. The very necessity of change requires an approach
to learning different from the one prescribed or modeled by mainstream social
science. Similarly, by assuming that the social world, the world of administrative
action, is ordered in such a way that causal relationships can be determined,
theorists emphasize the resolution of such concerns. They seek the “right
answer.” By making a different assumption, however—that the social world is
marked by conflict and change—we come then to focus more on process issues,
on patterns, meanings, and relationships constantly working themselves out in
our lives and in the lives of others. We come to see other people as possessing
important understanding about our shared condition and as vital participants in
organizational life.
Table 8.1 outlines the implications of various approaches to public organizations in terms of three central organizational processes: ways of knowing, ways of
deciding, and ways of acting. Workers in public organization must constantly
seek information about the world, make decisions based on their understanding
of the world, and take actions based on those decisions. To the extent that we
T A B L E 8.1 Three Models of Administration Viewed in Terms
of Three Organizational Processes
Rational Model Interpretive Model Critical Model
Positive social science Interpretive theory,
phenomenology
Critical social theory
Ways of knowing Control Understanding Autonomy, reflection
Ways of deciding Rational decisionmaking processes
Emotive–intuitive,
symbolic
Value-critical
Ways of acting Instrumental action Expressive action Educative action
(praxis)
© Cengage Learning
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direct our learning toward broad organizational processes such as these, our
understanding of organizational life will be increased.
In its approach to knowing, the rational model of administration employs the
techniques of positive social science in seeking causal explanations based on the
objective observation of human behavior. The interpretive model, on the other
hand, seeks to provide an understanding of the meanings that individuals bring
to organizational activities. This approach recognizes that the world of public
organizations is socially constructed and focuses its attention on the way in
which intersubjective meaning is constituted in that world. Finally, the critical
model seeks to uncover those patterns of belief or ideology that inhibit our development and limit our futures, either as individuals or as groups in society.
Whereas the rational model seeks knowledge in order to control, the interpretive
model seeks understanding on which communication can be built, and the critical model seeks to unravel the social constraints that limit our personal growth
and to open to new opportunities.
Each of these models implies a particular approach to decision making. The
rational model places considerable emphasis on rational or cognitive processes.
Decisions are made on the basis of an objective analysis of the data or information at hand. The interpretive model, however, recognizes that such objectivity
is not fully descriptive of human action, nor should it be. Indeed, at times, decisions are made and should be made on the basis of human emotions or intuitions. The interpretive model therefore permits decision-making processes that
employ emotional, social, and psychological approaches different from those of
the rational model. Meaning and symbolic significance are key. Finally, the critical model seeks an integration of these approaches through a rational analysis of
one’s circumstances that might provide one with the possibility of seeing the
world differently. But our passions and emotions begin to move us toward
more effective action. The critical model then provides a critique of the values
and beliefs that we hold and suggests ways we might more clearly establish and
seek to obtain important human values, including, most prominently, the value
of freedom, autonomy, and creativity.
Finally, each of the models implies a particular way of acting. The rational
model suggests an emphasis on instrumental behaviors that contribute to meeting
organizational objectives. Through the actions individuals take, control is
extended. The interpretive model seeks expressive actions that permit us to
reveal our normative commitments and to work with others to develop a greater
sense of interpersonal understanding. Expressive actions allow us to enter into
personal relationships accepting of others as they present themselves and cleansed
of the tendency to objectify. And the critical model suggests that individuals
bring together autonomy and responsibility, communication and consensus, theory and practice into a mode of enlightened action through which they will
educate themselves and one another. The critical model suggests an educative
approach to organizational life that would prove enabling rather than constricting
to human action. It would provide for an informed approach to human action
that might well be captured by the term praxis. In praxis, we find once again the
connection between personal learning and the relationship between theory and
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practice. The notion of praxis implies that as we acquire knowledge about our
circumstances and as we view that knowledge in a critical, self-reflexive manner,
we pursue more effective communication and consequently greater autonomy
and responsibility for ourselves and others around us. In our view, it is toward
administrative praxis that practitioners as theorists must guide their theory building and their actions.
The notion of praxis implies that as we acquire knowledge about our circumstances
and as we view that knowledge in a critical manner, we are compelled to pursue
more effective communication and greater autonomy and responsibility.
PERSONAL LEARNING AND THEORY BUILDING
By reading this far, you have implicated yourself as one concerned with issues
that have traditionally occupied the attention of public administration theorists.
As inevitably you must, you will build and rebuild your own theory of public
organization many times. All three theoretical approaches described above can—
and should—be part of this process. We do, however, need to be aware of the
different ways knowledge can be related to our professional practice and the
assumptions we may unwittingly make about that relationship because the way
you build your personal theories, the choices you make, and the relationships
you develop will guide your actions in your day-to-day work in public organizations. Your theories will provide a context and a direction for your actions and
also project a future into that organization. You will develop a perspective, and
by doing this you will be able to think of your work as meaningful. The continuing process of constructing your own theory of public organization will be
among the most important and possibly most subtle tasks of your career.
Importance of Theory for Practitioners*
Of course, the importance of theory, which we stress here, is something thoughtful practitioners have always recognized. While we were working on this book,
for example, a number of prominent persons in the field of public administration
visited our campus for discussions with our faculty and students. Among these
were the regional director of the Federal Office of Personnel Management, the
city manager of San Antonio, the director of the Council of State Governments,
and the budget director of the state of Missouri. In every case, without excessive
prompting from the faculty, these practitioners emphasized the importance of
*A portion of this chapter is adapted from Thomas J. Catlaw, “The Death of The Practitioner,” Administrative Theory &
Praxis 28: 190–207.
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theory for public administration education. They seemed to be saying that the
basic techniques of administration are of only passing importance. What endures
in their work is the context, the sense of meaning that theory provides. The difference between a good manager and an extraordinary manager lies not in technical skill but in the sense of oneself and one’s surroundings—a sense that can be
derived only through thoughtful reflection, through theory.
The difference between a good manager and an extraordinary manager lies not in
technical skill but in the sense of oneself and one’s surroundings—a sense that can
be derived only through thoughtful reflection.
This raises an important issue. Since the view of theory building described
here emphasizes the personal nature of this process, we need to consider the
unique personal qualities and experiences of those we interact with as we explore
and make sense of formal academic theories and research. Different people may
require or respond to different theories and approaches depending upon their
organizational role or perspective. Consider, for example, that many faculty
who have been involved in teaching both preservice and in-service students in
master’s programs in public administration have come to recognize the importance of theory to practitioners. They report, often somewhat to their surprise,
that in-service students (practitioners) are much more interested in theory than
preservice students. Although one might expect that students just out of undergraduate programs might be more academically inclined and that practitioners
involved in the work of public agencies might be more interested in technique,
exactly the opposite seems to be the case. Our own explanation for this is that
preservice students have the idea that administrative life revolves around technical, nuts-and-bolts skills. In-service students, however, realize that such skills are
only the beginning and that the really difficult concerns have to do with the
context of administration.
The more general point, however, is that it is important to explore—and to
help one another to explore—the unique intersection of ourselves and our organizational context and to develop personally relevant theories that help make sense
of that relationship so that meaningful and effective action become possible.
Unfortunately, this issue—of the intersection of the person and the context—is
often obscured by the generic, positivist way in which we talk about “practice”
or “the practitioner” (Catlaw, 2006). For example, not only are MPA students
different by virtue of being preservice or in-service but they also occupy a wide
range of positions (frontline, mid-level manager, executive) across a wide range of
agencies and programs (and now, increasingly, in public, private, and nonprofit
organizations). This, too, complicates an easy designation of what constitutes useful, practical knowledge.
Related to this, in Making Social Science Matter, Bent Flyvbjerg (2001, pp. 9–24)
provides another way in which the relationship of theory to practice is more
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complicated than it appears. Drawing from Hubert and Stephen Dreyfus’ model of
learning, he shows that there are five general levels in the human learning process:
(1) novice, (2) advanced beginner, (3) competent performer, (4) proficient performer, and (5) expert. At each level, qualitatively different levels and forms of
competence are involved. When we are notice learners, for example, we learn by
acquiring basic facts and general rules. But as we gain more experience, we soon
realize that it is too complicated to have a rule for every situation we encounter. So
we not only look to facts and rules but also to our own experience and that of the
people around us to make decisions. People who are “experts” are often hard
pressed to reconstruct why they reacted or decided as they did. Their analytic process is “rapid, intuitive, holistic, interpretive, and visual” (p. 14). We can see that
positivist knowledge may be relevant to the first three stages of learning and so is
important for preservice students. But other forms of knowledge—such as interpretive and critical forms—may be needed to address the needs to competent
in-service performers and experts. Different learning needs require different ways
of knowing in light of a person’s organizational context.
The categories of identities and how they are expressed relative to a context
are also important. That is, “competence” is not simply a capacity possessed by a
given, generic actor in a context. “Competence,” somewhat like “ablebodiedness” discussed in Chapter 7, is a function of the given context, its demands,
and the other people with whom we work. A concrete example concerns the
role of gender in organizations. We know that, in general, the competencies of
women in leadership positions are perceived differently than those of men.
Practical knowledge and action for women can (but need not always) assume a
different hue than for men. Certain bits of theory may be practical for women,
less so for men.
All this is to say, simply, that there is, after all, no “one best way” to build a
personal theory of public organization. From the standpoint of practitioners,
therefore, the problem is not whether to be concerned with theory but how to
locate or construct theories that provide useful guides for action based upon our
organizational situation, our level of competence, and our personal identity and
experience. This suggests that the development of more effective approaches to
theory building lies in the capacity of both practitioners and theorists for ongoing
self-reflection and learning.
Personal Learning and Theory Building
Again, this approach does not diminish the importance of theory itself, but it
does suggest a problem in our past efforts to develop theories of public organization. In the traditional or mainstream model of theory and practice, theories are
developed independent of practice and then passed on to the practitioners who
seek to apply them in whatever ways seem appropriate. The practitioner is not a
part of the process of theory building; the theorist is not a part of the work of the
organization. In our view, the corrective lies in a personal approach to building
theories of action that brings individuals and their unique situations and experiences into the discussion.
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Let us illustrate from our own experience, our own daily practice. We do
not sit around our homes at night and wonder where our theory went wrong.
We wonder about our practice and try to make sense of it. We wonder about,
say, a failure to understand the viewpoint of a particular department chair or our
exasperation at the arbitrary decisions of an administrative committee. When we
think about practice and the particular experiences of the day, we always view
them retrospectively. Since our concern is with action in the future, such
thoughts are necessarily confining. After all, we know that exactly the same situation will never be repeated in exactly the same way. At the same time, we
know that similar situations may and likely will occur. Consequently, if we can
move from the immediate experience of the day to reflect and generalize about
the future, we will be more effectively served. If we can analyze our experiences,
compare them with those of others, and look to existing research (including
existing theoretical research) for guidance, then we may be able to develop a
perspective that will satisfactorily guide our actions in the future.
To put all that has been said thus far in more formal terms, theory and practice seem to be connected in the process of personal learning. As individuals live
and work in public organizations, as they read and inquire about the work of
others in such organizations, they build a body of experience that is extremely
valuable for practice. However, until that body of material is analyzed, reflected
on, and generalized into theory, it is not really useful for action. To build a
theory is to learn a new way of viewing the world; indeed, it is to construct a
new reality for our lives and our work. The process of theory building is a process of learning. Therefore, any approach to action in public organizations must
encompass not only a theory of organization but also a theory of learning.
In order to move beyond the limitations of these efforts, we would suggest
that we redirect our thinking by conceiving of our effort as one of building
theories of public organization, not theories of government administration, and
by seeking theories of action that balance our concern for organizational questions with our concern for individual learning and the quality of interpersonal
relationships. Let us examine each of these issues in terms of our administrative
experiences and in terms of new approaches to theory building that might
inform those experiences.
TOWARD THEORIES OF PUBLIC ORGANIZATION
Let us again share with you some of our personal concerns as administrators. As
you may have guessed by reading this book, when we consider an administrative
role, a notion of democratic responsibility weighs heavily on our minds. Yet that
notion is not the one prescribed by traditional theories of legislative accountability. Rather, it suggests the infinite ways in which we as administrators can
respond to the needs and wants of those with whom we work. The theory of
democratic responsibility that we require far exceeds that offered by most public
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administration theorists in the past. We are not sure what the alternative might
be, but we know it must recognize our role as one who reacts to, interprets,
expresses, and even evokes the public interest. It recognizes that public organizations are a different breed because they express public, not private, values.
We also often wonder how change occurs, how we manage change, and
whether we always even recognize change. We quickly lose confidence in theories that prescribe cures for administrative “problems,” for we recognize that
what are problems to administrators are prerogatives, even pleasures, to other
people. For example, we have a problem with a certain director in our organization. But is that his problem or mine? In either case, we believe that the problem
cannot be resolved simply through an exercise of control on my part; rather, in
order to be durable and effective, my response must be communicative and
consensus-seeking. It must enable action.
Connecting Values and Actions
Our concern for both responsibility and change is influenced by a commitment
to democratic processes and procedures. But this theoretical commitment cannot
stand apart from the psychological considerations required to actualize it. Acting
in accordance with democratic processes of equity and participation is very difficult for managers in our society. Especially in matters involving some interpersonal tension, a democratic approach to administration exposes an individual and
his or her vulnerabilities to others. To do this, managers must have a high degree
of personal security as well as a firm understanding of where they stand and what
they are about. Each one must have a very personal kind of theory.
To connect the value commitments we hold and the actions we take in
public organizations suggests that we need not only greater precision but also
greater flexibility in the frameworks through which we act. This point returns
us to the limiting assumptions (discussed in the first chapter) under which the
study of public organizations has operated in the past—that public administration
is government administration and that public administration is primarily concerned with large hierarchical structures. We noted that these ideas have not
only limited the range of organizational designs studied by theorists of public
organization but also questioned whether such a study can even aspire to any
theoretical coherence.
This issue can be viewed in terms of both the political and intellectual heritage of public administration. In our view, public administration theory has been
limited in its consideration of political issues by either an explicit or implicit
policy–administration dichotomy. The idea is that political decisions will guide
the work of administrative agencies and that moral accountability should be
conceived only in hierarchical terms—in terms of the responsiveness of agencies to
elected public officials. Especially as they have been content to define public administration as government administration, theorists have retained remnants of the policy–administration dichotomy and the limited view of democratic governance
THE PRACTITIONER AS THEORIST 233
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it implies. As we discussed in Chapter 7, even important developments in network
governance are limited in this regard. The problem is magnified when seen in terms
of the intellectual heritage of public administration theory. Those in public organizations have a direct impact on the lives of individuals, not only as they execute orders
given from above but also as they act on their own in pursuit of public purposes.
Moreover, the growth of public organizations has meant that these organizations
affect their members and clients simply by virtue of their size, complexity, and
impersonality. The proper moral basis for public organization, therefore, is not contained in the hierarchical relationship between agencies and legislatures but is one
that must be faced directly.
This issue was analyzed by George Frederickson, who seeks a clearer understanding of what is meant by the term public in public administration. Frederickson
(1991) suggests that generally the term means different things depending on your
viewpoint. The pluralist perspective sees the public in terms of interest groups, the
economist sees the public in terms of consumers, and so on. For the field of public
administration, Frederickson suggests that a theory of the public must incorporate
several dimensions of effective and responsible democratic governance. First, such a
theory should be concerned not with individuals or groups but with the notion of
the public interest, especially as this idea is defined in constitutional terms. Second,
the notion of public in public administration must reflect “the virtuous citizen,”
informed and involved in the work of the polity. Third, a theory of the public
must incorporate the notion of responsiveness, even to individuals and groups that
do not powerfully express their own interests. Finally, and along the same lines,
the administrator must be benevolent. “Rather than merely facilitating the pursuit
of self-interest, the public administrator will continually strive, with elected representatives and the citizens, to find and articulate a general or common interest and
to cause the government to pursue that interest” (pp. 415–416).
We have seen that political science as a discipline fails to comprehend the
full range of concerns of those in public organizations and particularly fails to
give full consideration to organizational and managerial issues. We have also
noted that the field of organizational analysis is limited, failing to comprehend
adequately the moral context of public organization. And some have argued
that public administration is merely a profession that can never attain theoretical
significance but must always borrow from other disciplines—which simply means
that theories will never exactly correspond to practice.
Managing Change in Pursuit of Public Values
A discipline, both in the academic sense and in the practical sense, is formed by the
possibility of theoretical coherence within a given field. It is now possible to
develop such coherence in the study of public organizations by centering on
those in public organizations as managing change in pursuit of publicly defined
societal values. Such a definition suggests an integration of the perspectives
provided by political science and organization analysis (as well as those of other
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disciplines that contribute to the study) by acknowledging the importance of
change processes in organizational contexts and the responsibility of managers to
deal effectively with such processes. At the same time, it suggests the important
role of those in public organizations in influencing public life and their responsibility to manage such an impact in a way consistent with democratic standards.
To define our study in this way obviously permits us to embrace the traditional concerns of public administration theory but also to suggest that public
administration be considered part of the larger study of public organization.
The theories of public organization described in this book have been developed
within the tradition of public administration theory in the United States. Yet
these works suggest implications for the more general organizational society in
which we live. To the extent that large and complex organizations dominate
the social and political landscape, it is appropriate to ask whether all such organizations should be so governed as to maintain our commitments to freedom,
justice, and equality. The question then becomes not, “How should we view
the operations of government agencies?” but rather, “How might organizations
of all kinds be made more public, more democratic, and better able to express
the values of our society?”
How might organizations of all kinds be made more public, more democratic, and
better able to express the values of our society?
Certainly major aspects of public policy today are being decided or seriously
affected by so-called private agencies. Many of these private organizations far
exceed, in their size and complexity, governments in other places and previous
governments in this country. Modern organizations—government or nongovernment—have an enormous impact on the personal lives of individuals in
our society. As the nation-state has in many ways given way to the conglomerate, the relationship between state and citizen, organization and client, is
becoming very close. This trend suggests that all organizations be evaluated by
the degree of their publicness. In such an effort, public administration theory,
especially theories of democratic administration, might come to be a model for
organization theory generally.
Such a viewpoint directly suggests what public administration theorists in the
past have often resisted: that public organizations should be required by definition to act in accord with democratic procedures and to seek democratic outcomes. If we commit ourselves to the expression of publicly defined societal
values, we can do no less. Although this work has, from time to time, been
pushed aside in the rush toward science and technique, it remains very important
to the field of public organizations today, for it best expresses the moral commitment of our discipline. And it is the moral commitment that is implied in human
action that practitioners cannot escape.
THE PRACTITIONER AS THEORIST 235
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A NEW ROLE FOR THEORISTS
We have emphasized the role of practitioners as theorists because of our work
administrators. We also claim to be theorists of sorts. How then do we see our
roles and the role of other theorists in building theories of organizations? Obviously, we do not feel that theorists should spend all their time and energy working
out supposedly causal relationships that may or may not speak to problems or
questions beyond their particular area of study. Theorists need to direct their attention to different problems, perhaps the most pressing of which is the problem of
understanding how public organizations can work to the benefit of a democratic
society. But academic research has an important role to play in building a sound
basis for the study of public organizations. Much of this research is frankly not
directed toward practitioners and need not be. Certain complicated and detailed
questions must be examined, evidence must be gathered, and considerable discussion must take place before any impact is felt on the world of practice. This role is
an appropriate one for academics, even for theorists—a role that practitioners need
neither fear nor disparage. Practitioners should not and largely do not want theorists to be exactly like them or to see the world just as they see it. They want
theorists to have a broader view or at least to see the world from another viewpoint. As we see it, the problem begins when we assume that a single “theory” or
perspective on “practice” has a monopoly on useful knowledge and so closes itself
off to other possibilities (see Catlaw, 2013; Raadschelders, 2011; Riccucci, 2010).
No person or theory captures the complexity of the world, and it is a rare person
or theory indeed that cannot teach us something.
CONCLUSION
Public organizations now face a crisis of legitimacy. Citizens are questioning the
efficacy of our institutions and the intentions of those who occupy them. They
feel that the views of public officials are inconsistent with their own expectations.
Government cutbacks, government deficits, and frequent intimations of scandal
highlight this crisis. These conditions demand a theoretical as well as a practical
response.
Many practitioners today are experiencing discouragement, frustration, and
exhaustion, part of which is due to the lack of theoretical development. As Freud
taught, individuals may act on hidden assumptions that may be to some degree
inappropriate to the world as it is encountered. Symptoms or discomforts result
that the therapist may use as clues to recovering a portion of the individual’s life
history, thereby enabling him or her to live a fuller, more congruent life. Similarly, Marx argued that societies adopt counterproductive patterns of belief, ideologies that disguise the actual oppression under which people live. For example,
although members of bureaucratic organizations may live under conditions of
alienation, they may only vaguely recognize what is happening to them. They
may experience their alienation as a vague sense of discomfort that is symptomatic of a misdirected framework for action.
236 CHAPTER 8
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Both practitioners and theorists must continually learn in order that all recognize their
mutual responsibility for the fullest and best expression of our democratic values.
Individuals or social groups may come to recognize the insufficiency of the
theories on which they base their actions by carefully working out an understanding of the larger picture to which these symptoms or discomforts provide
a clue. People require a context in which to see things in a more complex and
critical fashion, to see things in terms of the larger picture—and therefore to see
things differently. In psychoanalysis, it is the therapist’s role to assist in this effort.
In critical social theory, it is the theorist’s role to assist in building a theoretical
framework. The role of the theorist of public organizations is to help the actor
build a theory on which new and liberating, enabling, and communicative action
(praxis) can be based.
Finally, our mutual concern, whether as administrators or as theorists, is to
develop approaches to our work that allow us both to see practice as we confront
it on a daily basis and to see practice in perspective. Theory does not simply reflect
life; it also projects life. Good theory does more than just analyze—it synthesizes a
variety of elements and looks toward the future. In anticipating the future, we
must consider both facts and values. The future demands that we make choices
and that we constantly change and adapt to new circumstances. The future
demands that we learn and seek to create contexts in which we can do so.
From Waldo and Barnard, we learned that intelligence and compassion are
required in public organizations; now, having finished our study, we can
appreciate their recommendations more completely. Waldo, the proponent of
intelligence, devoted his life’s work to the pursuit of a theory of democratic
administration; Barnard, the proponent of compassion, argued for an understanding of change not merely in terms of control but also in terms of communication
and consensus. Democratic administration, Waldo’s dream, seems, if anything,
further away now than ever before. Today, the language of productivity and
efficiency seems to prevail over the language of democracy and concern. But,
as we now know, the long-run viability of public institutions—indeed, the
very survival of democracy itself—requires a theory of democratic governance
that includes democratic administration. At the same time, the hope for a
“sense of the organization,” Barnard’s plea, also seems outdistanced. Hierarchy,
structure, and command are strong—perhaps especially strong because we take
them for granted and often fail to recognize them for what they are.
Waldo and Barnard sought to resolve this dilemma by seeking to enhance
the moral integrity of a few influential managers. Perhaps a broader lesson can
be drawn—that public organizations exist only in a state of tension, in a state
of development; therefore, individuals must continually be learning both in
order for life to be engaging and to engage in the work of public life. Such an
effort, in which theory and practice would be as closely integrated as learning
and action, would require not only that practitioners think as theorists, and vice
THE PRACTITIONER AS THEORIST 237
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versa, but also and more importantly that all recognize their mutual responsibility
for the fullest and best expression of our democratic values.
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
1. What is the connection between values and action?
2. How do theoretical ideas affect administrative practice?
CASES
1. James Butler finds the rational model of administration quite attractive;
Cyndi Lewis considers herself more of a phenomenologist or critical theorist.
What differences would you expect in their approach to administration?
2. Jane Patrick has just finished her MPA and started work in a major federal
agency. But she doesn’t want her learning to end. How can she develop a
strategy for continuing to learn about public administration and public
policy?
REFERENCES AND ADDITIONAL READINGS
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Bozeman, Barry. (1987). All organizations are public: Bridging public and private organization
theories. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Bus, Terry F., Redburn, F. Stevens, & Kristina Guo (Eds.). (2006). Modernizing democracy.
Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Catlaw, Thomas J. (2006a). The death of the practitioner. Administrative Theory & Praxis
28: 190–207.
Catlaw, Thomas J. (2006b). Performance anxieties: Shifting public administration from
the relevant to the real. Administrative Theory & Praxis 28: 89–120.
Catlaw, Thomas J. (2008). What’s the use in being practical? Administrative Theory &
Praxis 30: 515–529.
Catlaw, Thomas J. (2013). Beyond methodological Taylorism? Pluralism, research, and
the study of public administration. Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory
23: 758–766.
Cook, S. D. Noam, & Wagenaar, Hendrik. (2012). Navigating the eternally unfolding
present: Toward an epistemology of practice. American Review of Public Administration
42: 3–38.
Cunningham, Robert, & Weschler, Louis. (2002). Theory and the public administration
student/practitioner. Public Administration Review 62: 104–111.
238 CHAPTER 8
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affect the overall learning experience. Cengage Learning reserves the right to remove additional content at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it.
Denhardt, Robert B. (1997). Experiential learning in public administration. Journal of
Public Affairs Education 3: 149–151.
Denhardt, Robert B. (2001). The big questions of public administration education. Public
Administration Review 61: 526–534.
Denhardt, Robert B., & Denhardt, Janet V. (2009). Public administration: An action
orientation. Sixth ed. Belmont, CA: Cengage Wadsworth.
Farazmand, Ali, & Pinkowski, Jack (Eds.). (2007). Handbook of globalization, governance,
and public administration. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.
Flyvbjerg, Bent. (2001). Making social science matter: Why social inquiry fails and how it can
succeed again (S. Sampson, Trans.). Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
Frederickson, H. George. (1991, February). Toward a theory of the public for public
administration. Administration and Society 22: 395–417.
Frederickson, H. George (Ed.). (1993). Bureaucracies, public administration, and public policy.
Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Harris, Peter. (1991). Foundations of public administration. Hong Kong: Hong Kong
University Press.
Hill, Carolyn J., & Lynn, Laurence E., Jr. (2009). Public management. Washington, DC:
CQ Press.
Hofstede, Geert H., & Hofstede, Gert Jan. (2005). Cultures and organizations. Second ed.
New York: McGraw-Hill.
Hummel, Ralph. (1996). Practice illuminating theory. Administrative Theory & Praxis 20:
150–158.
Kee, James Edwin, & Newcomer, Kathryn E. (2008). Transforming public and nonprofit
organizations. Vienna, VA: Management Concepts.
Kettl, Donald F. (2009). The next government of the United States. First ed. New York:
Norton.
King, Cheryl Simrell, & Zanetti, Lisa A. (2005). Transformational public service. Armonk,
NY: M.E. Sharpe.
McSwite, O. C. (2001). Theory competency for MPA-educated practitioners. Public
Administration Review 61: 111–115.
Miller, Hugh T., & King, Cheryl S. (1998). Practical theory. American Review of Public
Administration 28: 43–60.
Moran, Dermot. (2000). Introduction to phenomenology. New York: Routledge.
Orr, Kevin, & Bennett, Mike. (2012). Public administration scholarship and the politics
of co-producing academic-practitioner research. Public Administration Review 72:
487–495.
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Raadschelders, Joseph C. N. (2003). Government. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Raadschelders, Jos C. N. (2011). Public administration: The interdisciplinary study of government.
New York: Oxford University Press.
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leadership. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar.
Rhodes, R. A. W. (1997). Understanding governance. Buckingham. U.K.: Open University
Press.
THE PRACTITIONER AS THEORIST 239
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some third party content may be suppressed from the eBook and/or eChapter(s). Editorial Review has deemed that any suppressed content does not materially
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Riccucci, Norma M. (2010). Public administration: Traditions of inquiry and philosophies of
knowledge. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
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Empirical research methods and the interpretive turn. Second ed. Armonk, NY:
M.E. Sharpe.
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Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.
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globalization and the environment. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.
United Nations, Division for Public Administration and Development Management.
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In J. Weintraub & K. Kumar (Eds.), Public and private in thought and practice, pp. 1–42.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
White, Jay D. (1999). Taking language seriously: The narrative foundations of public
administration research. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Yanow, Dvora. (2006). Thinking interpretively: Philosophical presuppositions and the
human sciences. In Dvora Yanow & Peregrine Schwartz-Shea (Eds.), Interpretation
and method: Empirical research methods and the Interpretive Turn, pp. 5–26. Armonk,
NY: M.E. Sharpe.
240 CHAPTER 8
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Appendix
THE ADMINISTRATIVE JOURNAL
One of the greatest difficulties facing students and practitioners wishing to
broaden their understanding of public organizations is the apparent gap between
theory and practice in the field. What seems to make sense in principle does not
always seem to work in practice; theories generated by academics often bear little
resemblance to the real world of the public administrator. The administrative
journal, described here, is a practical device to help the reader make the connection between theory and practice in public organizations. By making careful
entries in a journal, the reader can bring together theories of the individual and
the organization, on the one hand, and the way he or she thinks, feels, and acts
in administrative situations, on the other.
The administrative journal is based on an approach to learning that suggests
that the most significant learning about administration is grounded in the experience of the individual. Whether we are students or practitioners, we all have a
variety of experiences that, if used constructively, can contribute to our understanding of organizational life. We act in administrative capacities; we read and
discuss theories of organizational dynamics; we study and analyze case studies; we
engage in simulations and other training activities; and we come up with new
ideas, even fantasies, about the possibilities for effective public action. By actively
reflecting on our experiences and by drawing generalizations from them, we can
learn important lessons about the way organizations work and about the way
individuals act in organizational settings.
The administrative journal asks that we focus our attention not on the immediate tasks in which we are engaged (although these are important and provide
the base for learning) but rather on the basic human processes that underlie action.
We speak of the things being done as tasks and of the ways they are being done
as processes. For example, to speak of the monitoring of welfare applications
is to describe a task; the administrator’s relationship with welfare recipients is a
241
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process. Similarly, to speak of a person engaged in learning is to describe a task; to
speak of that learning as active or passive is to describe a personal process. Importantly, these process issues are the ones that administrators find most lasting.
Although the tasks in which we engage change from day to day, we still find ourselves confronted with the same concerns (for communication, motivation, power
and authority, and so on). The most important lessons we can learn, therefore, are
those that relate to organizational processes common to many different situations.
For example, one writer has indicated six basic organizational processes that
underlie the actions of individuals and organizations: communication, leadership
and authority, members’ roles and functions, group norms and group growth,
intergroup dynamics, and decision making. Another characterization of human
processes focuses on ways of knowing (how we acquire knowledge), ways of
deciding (how we make choices based on the knowledge we have), and ways
of acting (what specific steps or behaviors we employ to execute our choices).
In any case, the administrative journal takes the position that our understanding
of the dynamics of organizational activity will be best achieved through attention
to organizational processes.
If we suggest that learning is enhanced as we begin to generalize from our
immediate experience and move from a consideration of tasks to a concern for
processes, we can see the kind of learning pattern that results. Most of us begin
with what we are doing on a day-to-day basis; we are occupied with our immediate task-related experience. But substantial learning can occur as we move
toward the realm of process generalization. Here connections can be made
between the data generated by our experience and theories or generalizations
that can help explain that experience. Thereafter, as we approach future tasks, we
do so in a more informed way; our experience has been enlightened by both our
reflection and our generalization, thus enabling us to act more effectively.
Of course, in public organizations, people often get so caught up in the
pressure of immediate events that their concentration remains fixed in the taskexperience sector. They are concerned with meeting deadlines, with attending
conferences, with negotiating various positions, and so forth and have little
time to engage in reflection and in the kind of informed learning that reflection
may bring. Some learning, of course, occurs in these situations; however, the
administrative journal suggests that much more effective use is made of our
experience if we take the time to explicitly explore the underlying processes of
our day-to-day experiences.
Similarly, we need to fully involve ourselves as whole personalities in the
process of learning from our experiences. Since, in a real sense, we are what
we learn, we must connect our learning to the innermost depths of our personalities, dealing with issues of the heart as well as the head. We must be concerned
not only with what we think but with what we feel, not only with what we do
but with who we are. For this reason, the administrative journal encourages us to
consider all aspects of ourselves as we approach the learning process; it suggests
that our understanding of organizational life is guided just as much by our inner
experience as by our outer experience.
242 APPENDIX
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THE JOURNAL FORMAT
The administrative journal provides a practical way of transcending the
immediate situation and engaging in more extensive learning by enabling us
to see each experience from four different perspectives. Our approach to
working in the journal is to bring ourselves to a relaxed state and then to
enter the journal at whatever section seems most appropriate to our experience. We first write down our thoughts as they are guided by the interests of
that particular section, then move to another section and comment on the
same idea or event from the standpoint of that section, and so on. As we
continue to work back and forth between the various sections, we begin to
establish connections between the meanings we hold and the actions we
undertake. As we become aware of the flow of our activities, new ways to
enhance our learning present themselves and we can explore the possibilities
they hold for our lives.
The journal consists of four main sections and an appendix, briefly described
in the following sections. Several examples of entries appear at the end of this
discussion.
Section I. Outer Experience
The first section of the administrative journal is used to record our everyday
experiences as they relate to public organizations. These may include ongoing
administrative work in which we are engaged, case studies, simulations or other
training activities, or simply our own impressions. In this section, we briefly
record a particular experience so that it can provide a basis for later reflection
and generalization. The description of the experience need not be long or
detailed; we need enter only enough information to enable us to recall the incident when we return to this section later. It is, however, important that we try
to be as objective as possible in recording exactly what happened and that we
resist the temptation to immediately evaluate our experience. One way to proceed is to assume a third-party perspective, that is, to take the position of someone outside the experience writing about the experience from that position,
uninvolved and nonjudgmental. The key to our work in this section of the journal is to be clear, concise, and nonevaluative.
Questions that can be answered in this section include the following:
â–  What were the circumstances surrounding the experience?
â–  Who were the people involved?
â–  What was the time period?
â–  What actions did I take in this situation?
â–  What did others reveal about themselves?
â–  Am I being fully honest and completely factual in my account of what
happened?
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Section II. Reflections and Generalizations (Outer Experience)
In this section, we seek a deeper understanding of the dynamics of the situation
we have described, looking for clues to understanding at the individual, group,
and organizational levels. As we reflect on the experience, we may be led to
connections between this experience and other experiences, and we may find
that we can begin to generalize our immediate experiences in terms of larger
lessons. Similarly, we may find that we are aware of important theoretical material that would help our understanding of the experience. In any case, having
reflected on the experience, we seek to draw out the larger, more enduring
lessons for which this experience provides a ground.
Questions relevant to this section include the following:
â–  What human processes were operating in this situation?
â–  What did the experience have to do with the six dimensions of organizational process or with ways of knowing, deciding, and acting?
â–  What commentary does the experience provide concerning any of these?
â–  Based on this experience, what general advice could I give concerning the
workings of organizational processes?
â–  What theoretical material have I encountered recently that would help
explain this situation?
â–  Where could I look for further explanation?
â–  What persons might serve as resources for my continued learning about this
type of event?
Section III. Inner Experience
In the first section on outer experience, we adopted a third-party standpoint in
order to provide an objective account of our experience; in this section, we
assume a first-person stance and seek a fully subjective account. We ask how
the experience affected us—emotionally, physically, intellectually, and spiritually.
Aspects of our inner life activated by the experience should be recorded here.
We may, for example, have felt pleasure or pain, a sudden surge of energy or
some depression, or we may have become aware of some new insight or rejected
an earlier lesson.
Questions we may wish to answer here include the following:
â–  How do I feel about what is happening?
â–  What are my strongest emotions?
â–  What is my physical condition at this moment?
â–  Have there been any changes during the experience?
â–  Do I feel stress or a sense of release?
â–  Am I tense or relaxed?
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â–  Do I feel intellectually alive and active, or am I more passively taking things
in?
â–  What is the aesthetic sense of this moment?
â–  Does this experience, in any way, transcend the ordinary flow of events and
take on a spiritual quality?
Section IV. Reflections and Generalizations (Inner Experience)
This section of reflections and generalizations again permits us to move more
deeply into our experience and to establish the connections between the immediate experience and a larger view.
Here we might want to answer the following questions:
â–  How does my inner experience at this moment compare with that of
previous moments?
â–  What is the significance of the emotions I am now experiencing?
â–  How do these emotions compare with those I have experienced in other,
similar situations?
â–  Similarly, what can I understand of my present physical, intellectual, or
spiritual experience at this moment?
â–  How does this relate to similar experiences?
â–  What portion of my inner experience is most prominent?
â–  Is this portion often most prevalent, or am I focusing on a part of my
experience that I usually neglect?
â–  What outside sources can help me understand my inner experience at this
moment?
â–  What poetry, music, or literature provides insight?
â–  What are the implications of my experience for the future?
Section V. Appendix (Period of Growth)
Although most of our daily or weekly work will involve the four major sections
of the journal described thus far, at some points we will want to step back and
take a broader view of the development of our learning about administration.
The appendix provides a place to record this view. One way to begin work in
the appendix is to describe the particular period of personal and professional
development in which we find ourselves at present. This period may be as long
as several years, as in the case of someone who has moved to a new job and has
been learning about the new organization; or the period may be as short as a few
days or even a few hours, as in a training session. In any case, let the period
define itself. Think of an event that begins the period (such as enrolling in
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a Master of Public Administration program) and an event that concludes it
(completing the MPA). Record that period in the appendix and then elaborate
using the following questions as a guide:
â–  In which phase of my life and my work am I now?
â–  What is the current circumstance of my learning?
â–  What are the events that mark the beginning and may mark the end of this
period?
â–  What have been the basic patterns of my experience during the period thus
far? (If you have already been working in the journal for some time, the four
main journal sections will provide important data to help in answering this
and other questions.)
â–  What have I been doing?
â–  What have I been learning?
â–  What are my plans and expectations for the rest of the period?
â–  In what ways have they affected my learning?
â–  How do I feel about my own work during this period?
â–  In terms of my own personal development, what do I want most out of this
period?
WORKING IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE JOURNAL
To work most effectively in the administrative journal, we should find a time
and place in which we are not likely to be disturbed. We begin our work by
sitting quietly and letting our thoughts run freely through the events of the
day. At first, in keeping with the hectic pace of administrative life, we are likely
to find our minds racing from one event to another in frantic fashion. However,
as we begin to relax and still our minds, thoughts will flow at a more natural
pace. We will feel more comfortable with our thoughts and will be better able
to sense the deeper processes of our experiences. Soon we will begin to focus on
a single event or idea that we would like to use as a starting point for our work
in the administrative journal. We turn to the appropriate section of the journal
and begin to write down our thoughts, not seeking literary style but simply writing down whatever comes to mind.
Of course, many sources will provide us with beginning points for our work
in the journal. Obviously, most relevant to our understanding of public organizations will be the concrete experiences we have had as members or clients of
such groups. However, experiences occurring outside organizations, yet involving human processes that occur in organizations (communication, decision making, and the like), may be equally important. Finally, case studies, simulations,
and even imaginary situations may provide avenues into the journal. In each of
these cases, it would probably be most appropriate to begin our work on “outer
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experiences” described in section I and then to move through the other three
sections in order.
This procedure, however, is by no means the only way to work in the journal. After reading a particular article or having a particular discussion about theories of organization, we might make notes in one of the sections on reflections
and generalizations (section II or IV). After noting the theoretical material, we
could then move to the experience sections (I and III), asking in each case how
the theory comments on past experiences we have had or future experiences we
project. Similarly, we might be compelled by a very emotional experience to
begin with an entry in the inner experiences section of the journal that could
then be elaborated in each of the other sections. In any case, movement back
and forth from one section of the journal to another is essential for discovering
the pattern of our work. We should therefore label each entry to provide crossreference to entries in other sections.
The objective of the administrative journal is to provide a basis for making
connections among the events and reflections that are part of our learning and
our personal development. For this reason, we will find that the sections of the
journal are by no means discrete. Considerable overlap will occur, and the
“proper” location for a particular entry may not be at all clear. Similarly, we
may at first think that the individual entries themselves reveal very little about
our learning, and we may feel discouraged about our work. In either case, however, we should remember that the most important results of our journal activity
will appear as we begin to develop enough information to establish a sense of the
continuity of our development. After we work in the journal for a period of
time, we can read back through the various entries and discover recurring
problems or themes, which may in turn be used as beginning entries for further
journal work.
The purpose of the administrative journal is to aid in connecting theory and
practice in our understanding of public organizations. The main sections of the
journal require that we view experiences from different vantage points, thereby
seeing them not only more completely but also in a way that allows us to integrate
them into our own learning. By working through the various sections of the journal on a continuing basis, we will discover that our learning about organizations
has a pattern of its own and that we can indeed affect the course of our own
learning. As we become more effective in our learning, we will find rewards
both in the work we do and in the pleasure we receive from that work.
EXAMPLES OF JOURNAL ENTRIES
The following are journal entries for one experience of an MPA student enrolled
in a class in organizational theory and behavior. Note that the basic experience
need not be that of a student, as in this example, but might involve your work in
any type of group or organization of which you are a member.
APPENDIX 247
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Outer Experience (Entry 1)
In one of my courses, a midterm examination was given and the class was
informed that it would receive the graded paper back the next class session.
During the interim, one of the class members had a personal conference with the
professor in which the professor told the student his grade on the exam. The professor also volunteered that every member of the MPA program taking the exam
had received an A grade with the exception of one person. The student who
had the interview mentioned this to several people, and rumors and speculation
immediately started as to who might be the unfortunate person who missed
the A.
Hearing the information directly from the student who had had the conference, I also spread the word. Everyone, myself included, was worried that he or
she was the one with the B grade.
Reflections and Observations on Outer Experience (Entry 1)
The experience of anxiety produced in the class by the revelation that one student had not received an A involved many levels of the administrative process,
the most important being communication and group norms. The professor was
at fault for violating the norm of revealing all the class grades at the same time.
However, revealing one individual’s grade would not have been so bad if he had
not also revealed that all members of our program except one had received an A.
The student was also partially to blame because he could have kept the information to himself and should have perceived the negative impact that the revelation
would have. The aforementioned factors—of the violation of norms by the professor and communications involved—are very important, since similar situations
arise in any organization. The importance of the administrator’s analyzing the
implications of his actions or communications must be stressed. The professor
in this case may have been making a personal gesture of trust and friendship to
the student and may have expected the student to maintain confidentiality. This
gesture, however, was not perceived by the student, who used poor judgment in
telling the class.
This incident also relates to Maslow’s theories on motivation. For example,
what initially motivated the professor to do what he did? And what motivated
the student to react the way he did? Maslow states that people have certain basic
needs and that unsatisfied needs motivate behavior. The professor was most
probably fulfilling “social needs,” which include friendship and affiliation. The
student was probably fulfilling “ego needs” by letting the class know that the
professor confided in him and no one else; thus, he hoped to raise his prestige
and status. The class was motivated to speculate and worry because of shaken
“security” and “self-actualization” needs. Again, the awareness of the potential
effect of one’s actions and communications should be taken into consideration.
Also, it should be noted that the reaction of the class reflects the instability of an
organization (i.e., the MPA program) that puts undue pressure on its members to
perform at unreasonably high standards. It causes instability, insecurity, and dissatisfaction with the organization.
248 APPENDIX
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Inner Experience (Entry 1)
I personally felt quite upset that the student told me about the grades. Like
everyone else he told, I assumed I might be the one with the B. This caused
me great anxiety. I was angry at the teacher for telling the student his grade
when I didn’t know my own, and I was also angry at his confiding in the student
the overall MPA grades. In retrospect, I was ashamed of myself for taking part in
the rumor spreading; if I had it to do over again, I would not take part. The
nervousness about the grade (which I would have to wait four days to verify)
made me feel very tense emotionally, and my muscles were also tense until
I was able to discover whether I was the unlucky person.
Reflections and Observations on Inner Experience (Entry 1)
I very often become tense at times of uncertainty. The insecurity of not knowing
how I have done on a test, even when the odds are in my favor, is quite distressing. I also often react with feelings of anger to what I feel is bad judgment or
incompetence on the part of other individuals. I am trying to make a conscious
effort to be more tolerant of human errors in judgment. Intellectually, I have
been quite aware of the importance of clear communication for many years.
I attempt to make clear any deep or hidden meaning that I feel is important
and is not being perceived. The studies of Maslow and Jung in psychology
would be helpful in understanding why and how individuals are motivated to
act the way they do and in appreciating the importance of clarifying deep or
hidden meanings. The importance for an administrator of being aware of the
aforementioned factors cannot be overstressed.
APPENDIX 249
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Name Index
A
Abel, Charles Frederick, 148, 184
Adams, Guy B., 42, 172–173
Addams, Jane, 71
Agranoff, Robert, 210–211
Alkadry, Mohamad G., 176, 214
Allison, Graham T., 15, 93–94
Appleby, Paul H., 18, 53, 56, 131–132, 137, 141
Arendt, Hannah, 193, 212
Argyris, Chris, 106, 110, 111, 112–114, 115, 185
Aristigueta, Maria P., 113
B
Bailey, Stephen, 137, 139
Balfour, Danny L., 42, 172–173
Bang, Henrik P., 209
Bardach, Eugene, 211
Barnard, Chester I., 1, 17, 88, 106, 107–109
Barzelay, Michael, 156, 159
Baumgarter, Frank R., 141
Bensel, Richard F., 48
Bernstein, Richard, 173, 181
Bertelli, Anthony M., 138
Blake, Robert, 109
Bogason, Peter, 209
Borzel, Tanja, 210
Boston, Jonathan, 157
Bouckert, Geert, 156
Boukaert, Geert, 209
Bourdieu, Pierre, 4
Box, Richard, 174, 181, 184, 200
Bozeman, Barry, 15
Brodkin, Evelyn, 160
Brown, Lawrence D., 155
Bryson, John, 200
Burnier, DeLysa, 196
C
Caldwell, Lynton, 47
Carnavale, David, 202
Catlaw, Thomas J., 91, 131, 140, 176, 185, 193–194,
198, 212, 213, 214, 230, 236
Chapin, Linda W., 200
Chapman, Jeffrey, 131
Checkland, Peter, 100
Christensen, Robert K., 211
Cleveland, Frederick A., 56
Cleveland, Harlan, 125
Cooper, Terry L., 139, 203
Crenson, Matthew A., 121
Crosby, Barbara, 200, 209
Crothers, Lane, 203
Crow, Michael M., 100
Cyert, Richard, 94
D
Dahl, Robert A., 82, 83–84, 171
David, Charles R., 184
deLeon, Linda, 150, 159
deLeon, Peter, 200
Denhardt, Janet V., 113, 198, 203, 204
Denhardt, Robert B., 20, 113, 159, 172, 185, 186, 196,
198, 201, 203, 204, 206
Dickson, William, 108
Dilulio, John J., Jr., 156
DiMaggio, Paul, 99
Dimock, Marshall E., 54, 55, 69–70, 137
Dryzek, John S., 213
Dye, Thomas, 133
E
Eagan, Jennifer, 196, 198
Easton, David, 133
Eddy, William, 118
Eggers, William D., 208, 209, 210
Eikenberry, Angela M., 196
F
Farazmand, Ali, 46
Farmbry, Kyle, 197
250
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Farmer, David John, 187, 188, 190–192
Fay, Brian, 186
Feldman, Martha S., 150
Ferguson, Kathy, 195
Finer, Herman, 136, 140–141
Flyvbjerg, Bent, 230–231
Follett, Mary Parker, 73
Forester, John, 184
Fox, Charles J., 187, 188, 189, 190
Frederickson, H. George, 99, 122, 123, 202, 234
Freud, Sigmund, 23, 34–39
Friedman, Milton, 175
Friedrich, Carl J., 136–137
G
Gaebler, Ted, 158, 159
Gaus, John, 137
Gerrits, Lasse, 100, 101
Giddens, Anthony, 31
Gladden, Edgar. N., 46
Goldsmith, Stephen, 208, 209, 210
Golembiewski, Robert T., 106, 114–119, 154
Goodnow, Frank, 48, 50–51, 54, 147
Gray, Barbara, 211
Gulick, Luther, 52–53, 64, 65–67, 68, 69, 70
H
Habermas, Jurgen, 181–182, 183–184
Hajer, Maarten A., 209
Hamilton, Alexander, 47
Harding, N., 198
Harmon, Michael M., 2, 55, 178–179, 180, 194
Hart, David K., 124, 172
Harvey, David, 155
Heclo, Hugh, 141
Heffen, Oscar van, 209
Hegel, G. W. F., 24–25
Held, David, 155
Hill, Michael, 146
Hondeghem, Annie, 114
Hood, Christopher, 155, 156
Horkheimer, Max, 86, 181
Hummel, Ralph P., 42, 184, 225
Hupe, Peter, 146
Husserl, Edmund, 225
Hutchinson, Janet R., 196
I
Ingraham, Patricia W., 209
Ingram, Helen, 150, 161
J
Jacobs, Lawrence R., 155
Jay, Martin, 181
Jefferson, Thomas, 47
Jones, Bryan D., 141
Jones, Lawrence R., 209
Jordan, Gregory M., 140
Jun, Jong S., 185
K
Kaboolian, Linda, 155–156
Kahn, Robert, 101
Kamensky, John, 157
Katz, Daniel, 101
Kaufman, Herbert, 97–98
Kearns, Kevin P., 156
Kenis, Patrick, 209–210
Kettl, Donald F., 155, 156, 160, 209
Khademian, Anne M., 150
Kickert, Walter J. M., 209
King, Cheryl S., 184, 200, 224
Kingsley, J. Donald, 141–142
Kirkhart, Larry, 122–123, 125
Klijn, Erik-Hans, 209
Koliba, Christopher, 100, 101
Kooiman, Jan, 209
Koppenjan, Joop F. M., 209
Kuhn, Thomas, 118–119
L
Lane, Jan-Erik, 156, 161
LaPorte, Todd, 120–121, 123
Larimer, Christopher W., 133, 144, 149
Larson, John Lauritz, 48
Lasswell, Harold, 132–133
Learmouth, M., 198
Lee, H., 198
Lerner, Daniel, 132
Levitan, David M., 73
Light, Paul Charles, 156
Lindblom, Charles E., 91–93, 94, 171
Long, Norton, 132
Lowi, Theodore J., 141, 144–146, 148, 149
Luke, Jeffrey, 202
Lynn, Laurence E., Jr., 138, 156, 160, 209
Lyotard, Jean-François, 188
M
Madison, James, 138
March, James A., 94
March, James G., 85, 99, 209
Marcuse, Herbert, 33–34, 181–182, 183
Marcussen, Martin, 209
Marin, Bernd, 209
Marini, Frank, 119–120
Marx, Karl, 23, 24–29
Maslow, Abraham, 174
Maynard-Moodly, Steven, 203
Mayntz, Renate, 209
McCarthy, Thomas J., 181
McCurdy, Howard, 50, 72
McDermott, Rose, 154
McGinn, Kathy, 196
McGregor, Douglas, 109–110
McGuire, Michael, 210, 211
McLellan, David, 25, 26, 27
McSwite, O. C., 187, 192, 202
Meadows, Donatella H., 100
Meek, Jack W., 100, 101
Meier, Kenneth, 149
Meltsner, Arnold J., 151
Metcalf, Henry O., 73
Miller, Hugh T., 150, 187, 188, 189, 190, 224
Miller, John H., 101
Milward, H. Brinton, 156, 209
Mintzberg, Henry, 158
Mitchell, Melanie, 100
Mommsen, Wolfgang J., 34
Mooney, James, 63
Mooney Nickel, Patricia, 184, 196
Moran, Dermot, 225
Mosher, Frederick C., 137, 140
Mouton, Jane, 109
Moynihan, Donald, 100, 114
NAME INDEX 251
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Musheno, Michael, 203
Mussari, Riccardo, 209
N
Nalbandian, John, 20
Nelissen, Nicolaas Johannes Maria, 209
North, Douglass C., 99
Novak, William J., 48
O
O’Leary, Rosemary, 139, 140, 141
Olsen, Johan P., 99, 209
Osborne, David, 158, 159
Ostrom, Elinor, 99, 151
Ostrom, Vincent, 47, 151–154
O’Toole, Laurence, 149
P
Page, Scott E., 101
Panke, Diana, 210
Patterson, Patricia M., 196
Peck, Jamie, 155
Perkins, Jan, 196
Perry, James L., 114, 211, 212
Peters, B. Guy, 156, 209
Pierre, Jon, 209
Pink, Daniel, 113–114
Pollitt, Christopher, 156, 209
Powell, Walter W., 99
Pranger, Robert J., 182
Pressman, Jeffrey, 147–148
Provan, Keith G., 209
R
Raadschelders, Jos C. N., 13, 46, 236
Rainey, Hal R., 15
Ramos, Alberto Guerreiro, 170–171
Rawlings, Kelly Campbell, 194, 213, 214
Rawls, John, 124
Redford, Emmett S., 135–136
Reiley, Alan C., 63
Rhodes, R. A. W., 209
Riccucci, Norma M., 236
Rice, A. K., 37
Richardson, George P., 100
Roethlisberger, Fritz, 108
Rohr, John A., 138
Rosenbloom, David, 72
Rourke, Francis E., 133–134
S
Sabatier, Paul, 141, 144
Saetran, Harald, 146
Sandel, Michael, 199
Schedler, Kuon, 209
Schneider, Anne Larson, 150, 161
Schon, Donald, 113, 185
Schwartz-Shea, Peregrine, 150, 225
Scioli, Frank P., Jr., 150
Sclar, Elliot D., 155, 160–161
Scott, W. Richard, 99
Scott, William, 172
Selznick, Philip, 95–97, 99
Sementelli, Arthur J., 148, 184
Shangraw, Richard F., 100
Simon, Herbert A., 15, 60, 81–83, 84, 85–92, 93, 94
Skowronek, Stephen, 48
Smith, Adam, 26
Smith, Kevin B., 99, 133, 144, 149
Smithburg, Donald W., 81, 85, 88
Sorensen, Eva, 208, 209, 210, 212
Spicer, Michael W., 187, 192
Stene, Edwin O., 61–62
Stillman, Richard J., 15
Stivers, Camilla, 70–71, 193, 195–196, 200
Stone, Deborah, 150
Stout, Margaret, 73
Svara, James, 55
T
Taylor, Frederick W., 58–60, 224
Terry, Lane, 203
Terry, Larry, 203
Thayer, Frederick E., 125
Thomas, John Clayton, 200
Thomassen, Jacques J. A., 209
Thompson, James D., 15, 62, 85, 95, 98, 99, 100
Thompson, Victor A., 81, 85
Thomson, Ann Marie, 211, 212
Torfing, Jacob, 208, 209, 210, 212
Tschirhart, Mary, 211
Tucker, Robert C., 25, 26, 27, 39
U
Urwick, L., 73
V
Van Slyke, David M., 160
Van Wart, Montgomery, 202
Vigoda-Gadot, Eran, 211
Vinzant, Janet, 203
von Braun, Wernher, 173
W
Wagenaar, Hendrik, 209
Waldo, Dwight, 1, 16, 45–46, 49, 57, 60, 62, 70, 71–72,
74, 120, 168
Wamsley, Gary L., 122, 200
Weber, Max, 23, 29–34, 181–182, 184, 191, 225
Weible, Christopher, 141
White, Leonard D., 48, 53, 61, 63, 64, 69
White, Orion, 125
Whyte, William, 172
Wildavsky, Aaron, 147–148
Williamson, Oliver, 99
Willoughby, W. F., 51, 52, 54, 55–56, 60, 61,
64–65, 67
Willoughby, W. W., 52
Wilson, Woodrow, 15, 48–50, 57, 197
Witt, Matthew, 197
Wolf, James E., 200
Wood, Donna, 211
Y
Yanow, Dvora, 150, 197–198, 225
Yong S. Lee, 138
Z
Zanetti, Lisa A., 184, 200
Zavatarro, Staci M., 188
Zia, Asim, 100, 101
Zucker, Lynne G., 99
252 NAME INDEX
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Subject Index
A
Accountability, 140–141, 179–180, 192,
205–206
Acquisition of knowledge. See Knowledge acquisition
Actions, 41
connecting values and, 233–234
interpreting others’, 40–41
Action theory, 176–180
Action Theory for Public Administration (Harmon), 178
Active-social paradigm, 178–179
Administration
see also Organizations (institutions);
Politics-administration dichotomy democratic,
71–74, 153–154, 169–170
equating public and government, 17–18
general theory of, 14–16
generic approach to, 80–81
politics and, 120–121
proverbs of, 81–84
rational model of, 79–104
Administration dimension, of collaboration, 211
Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making
Processes in Administrative Organization (Simon), 60, 81,
85, 89
Administrative branch, 52
Administrative decentralization, 52
Administrative ethics, 139
Administrative evil, 172–173
Administrative Journal, 241–249
examples of journal entries, 247–249
format, 243–246
working in, 223–224, 246–247
Administrative man, 88
vs. economic man, 90–91
Administrative management organizational structure and,
62–63
Wilson’s businesslike approach to, 48–50
Administrative practitioners, 3, 11, 13
Administrative responsibility, 179–180
Administrative Science Quarterly, 81
The Administrative State (Waldo), 45, 71, 74
Administrative studies, 54
Administrative theory
see also Theories beginnings of, 46–50
common threads among, 168–169
democratic governance and, 71–74
of Hamilton, 47
of Jefferson, 47
of Raadschelders, 46
of Simon, 82–83
systematic inquiry, 46
of Wilson, 48–50
Administrators
see also Managers character of, 137
discretion of, 52, 179–180
as policy actors, 53–54
professional education of, 137
role of, in new public service, 204–207
Agencies. See Government agencies
Alienation, Marx on, 27–28
Alterity, 191
Antithesis, 24–25
Approaches to Planned Change (Golembiewski),
117
“An Approach to a Science of Administration”
(Stene), 61
Ascetic approach, 30
Asymmetrical communication patterns, 184
Authentic discourse, 190
Authority, 17, 107
acceptance of, 87–88
charismatic, 32, 34
legal, 31–32
legitimacy of, 31
traditional, 32
Weber on, 33–34
Autocracy, 56, 57, 67–68
Autonomy, 38–39, 88
Autonomy dimension, of collaboration,
211
253
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B
Balance (managerial responsibility), 138
Behavior, 41
assumptions about, 109–110
cooperative, 107
individual, 87–88
nonrational quality of human, 83–84
science of human, 79–80
Behavioral sciences, 81, 112
Behavioral theory of the firm, 94
Bias, of scientist, 122
Bounded rationality, 91
Bureaucracy, 1–2
see also Public organizations breaking through, 159
expansion of, 33–34
governmental process and, 14
hierarchy of, 17, 185–186
ideal-type, 31–33
language and, 41
public, 2
redefinition of role of, 184
representative, 141–142
responsiveness of, 133–134
role of, in policymaking, 53, 132, 133–134
supervision and control of, 140
technical basis of, 185
Weber on, 30–34
Bureaucratic capitalism, 27, 28
Bureaucratic character, 136
The Bureaucratic Experience (Hummel), 41
Bureau Men, Settlement Women: Constructing Public
Administration in the Progressive Era (Stivers), 70
Bureau of Industrial Research, 73
Business management, 48–49, 55–57, 62–63
human relations approach, 106
C
Calvinism, 29–30
Capital accumulation, 68–69
Capitalism, 26–28, 144
bureaucratic, 27, 28
Dahl on, 84
division of labor in, 27
Marx on, 26–28
Weber on, 29–30, 34
Carrot and stick motivation model, 114
Catalytic leadership, 202
Centralization, 63–68
Change management, 234–235
Charismatic authority, 32, 34
Chief executive, 64–67
Choice, 90
Citizen Governance (Box), 200
Citizen involvement, 142–143
Citizen participation, 150, 205
hierarchy and, 124–125
Citizens good, from feminist perspective, 196
relationship between government and, 158, 199,
200–201
responsiveness to, 18
“Citizen’s First!” program, 200–201
Citizenship, 199–200, 205
City council, 50
City manager, 50
Civil association, 192
Civilization, impact of, 38–39
Civilization and Its Discontents (Freud), 38
Civil society, 199–200
Class conflict, 25–26
Class consciousness, 25–26
Closed systems integration of open systems and, 98–99
vs. open systems, 94–99
Collaboration, 211–212
administration dimension, 211
autonomy dimension, 211
dimensions, 211–212
governance dimension, 211
mutuality dimension, 211–212
trust and reciprocity dimension, 212
Common good, 201, 202, 203
Communication asymmetrical patterns of, 184
hierarchical relationships and, 185–186
restoring undistorted, 183–184
Communism, 25
Community, 199–200
Competence, 231
Complex adaptive system (CAS) theory, 100–101
new institutionalism and, 100–101
rational model and, 101
traditional systems theories and, 100
Complex organizations, 17
moral standards of, 116
strategies for studying, 95
Conscious minds, 34–36
vs. unconscious desires, 35–36
Consciousness, 177, 178
Consociated model, 123
Constitutional theory, 138
Constructing “Race” and “Ethnicity” in America (Yanow),
197
Contracting implications of, 160, 161
in new public management, 156
public sector, 160
Control of environment, 40
managerial, 116
social, 144–145
Cooperative behavior, 107
Cooptation, 96–97
Cops, Teachers, and Counselors (Maynard-Moody and
Musheno), 203
Critical analysis, of public organizations, 184–187
Critical knowledge, 42
Critical social theory, 180–187, 228
Cultural constraints, 38–39
Cultural values, 31
Customer service, 158–159
D
The Dance of Leadership (Denhardt and Denhardt), 203
Decentralization, 116
Decision making, 87
closed vs. open systems, 94–99
critical model and, 228
incremental method of, 91–92
interpretive model and, 228
models of, 93–94
participation in, 124–125, 135
process in democratic political systems, 18
process in government agencies, 15
process of, 89–90
rational actor model of, 93–94
rational model and, 228
254 SUBJECT INDEX
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Decision structures, 152–153
Deconstruction, 188, 191
Defense mechanisms, 35
Democracy, 47, 194, 207–213
autocracy and, 67–68
extension of, 47–48
role of public organizations in, 56–57
values of, 84
as way of life, 194
Democracy and the Public Service (Moser), 137
Democracy in the Administrative State (Redford), 135
Democracy’s Discontents (Sandel), 199
Democratic administration, 71–74, 153–154, 169–170
Democratic citizenship, 199
Democratic governance, 71–72
Democratic leadership, 73
Democratic morality, 135–136
Democratic network governance, 212–213
advantages of, 212
characteristics of, 212–213
criticism of, 212
Democratic responsibility, 64, 67, 72
Democratic theory, 18–19
Democratic values, 201–202
Democratization, 18
Departmentalization, 66
Depersonalization, 28
Design, 90
Deterritorialization, 191
Deutero-learning, 113
“The Development of a Theory of Democratic Administration” (Waldo), 71
“The Dialectical Organization” (White), 125
Dialectical processes, 24–25
Disciplining the Poor: Neoliberal Paternalism and the Persistent
Power of Race (Soss, Fording, and Schram), 160
Discourse theory, postmodernism and, 190–195
Displacement, 35
Division of labor, 25–26, 27, 65–67
in capitalism, 27
Dominant view, 41
Double-loop learning, 113
Drive: The Surprising Truth About What Motivates Us (Pink),
113
Dualisms, 55
Duty, 139
Dynamics of Leadership in Public Service (Van Wart), 202
The Dynamics of Performance Management: Constructing
Information and Reform (Moynihan), 100
E
Economic factors, in policy implementation, 147–148
Economic man, vs. administrative man, 90–91
Economic model, 90
limits of, 154
Educative mode, 186
Effectiveness, 134
of policy implementation, 146–149
in public policy, 131, 144–146
Efficiency administrative, 49–50, 82–83, 151
vs. equity, 123–124
gender and, 70–71
of government agencies, 9, 18
Gulick on, 65–66
as measure of success, 68–71
nonrational quality of human behavior and, 83–84
science and, 70–71
scientific approaches to, 58–59
as value, 70, 83–84, 123
Willoughby on, 64–65
Ego, 35
see also Conscious minds
Electorate, 52
Elite rule, 146
Emotion, 171
Employees, alienation of, 27–28
The End of Liberalism (Lowi), 144
An End to Hierarchy! An End to Competition! (Thayer), 125
En-gendering, democratic public administration, 196
Entrepreneurial government, 158
Entrepreneurial managers, 159
Entrepreneurship, 205
Environment, control of, 40
Environmental factors, 97–98
Epiphenomenalism, 187
Epistemological representation, 194
Equity, vs. efficiency, 123–124
Espoused theories, 113
Essence of Decision (Allison), 93
Ethical studies, 137–139
An Ethic of Citizenship for Public Administration (Cooper),
203
Ethics
see also Morality; Value(s)
administrative, 139
Ethics for Bureaucrats (Rohr), 138
The Ethics of Dissent (O’Leary), 139
Ethics Primer (Svara), 139
Ethos of discourse, 190
Executive chief, 64–67
function of, 107
Executive branch, 47, 52, 54
Executive leadership, 63
Existentialism, 122
Externalities, 152
F
Fabricating the People (Catlaw), 193
Face-to-face encounters, 179
Facts, vs. values, 85, 121–123
Federalist papers, 47
The Feminist Case against Bureaucracy (Ferguson), 195
Feminist theory, 195–197
Field of practice, 4
Fixation, 36
The Forest Ranger (Kaufman), 97
Formal organizations, 107
Foundationalism, 188
Frankfurt School, 181
Freedom of individual, 116
limits of personal, 29
Functional principle, 63
The Functions of the Executive (Barnard), 107
G
“Games people play” metaphor, 149
Gender, efficiency and, 70–71
Generic approach to administration, 80–81
Governance, 207–213
defined, 209
democratic network, 212–213
from government to, 208–212
participant, 210
SUBJECT INDEX 255
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Governance dimension, of collaboration, 211
Government activities, diversity of, 158
branches of, 48, 51
citizen involvement in, 142–143
customer relations in, 158
decentralized, 48
effectiveness, criticism of, 155
entrepreneurial, 158
expansion of, 144
formalist view of, 51
Hamilton and Jefferson on, 47
as holding company, 67
market model of, 193
public administration and, 14, 17–18
relationship between citizens and, 199, 200–201
responsiveness, criticism of, 155
third-party, 208
Government administration, 17–18
see also Public administration
Government agencies
decision-making process in, 15
efficiency of, 9, 18
integration of, 64
policy-making role of, 133–134
purposes of, 15
role of, in policymaking, 145–146
Governmental politics model, 94
Government employment, 1
Government Is Us (King and Stivers), 200
The Government of Modern States (Willoughby), 51
Great Depression, 73
Group psychology, 36–38
Guerilla bureaucrats, 141
H
Hawthorne experiments, 108–109
Hierarchical chain of command, 63
Hierarchy in bureaucratic organizations, 185–186
vs. participation, 124–125
Historical materialism, 25
History
Hegel’s view of, 24
Marx’s view of, 25
Holding company, 67
Human behavior. See Behavior
Humanism. See Organizational humanism
Human reason, restricted view of, 170–173
Human relations approach, 106, 108–109
The Human Side of Enterprise (McGregor), 109
Hyperreality, 189
Hypothesis, 61
I
Ideal-type bureaucracy, 31–33
Ideal types, 31–32
Ideas, development of, 24–25
Identity crisis, 168
Ignorance, veil of, 124
Imaginization, 191
Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington Are
Dashed in Oakland; Or, Why It’s Amazing That Federal
Programs Work at All (Pressman and Wildavsky), 147
Implementation studies, 149
Incremental method, 91–92
Individual as active participant, 105
decision maker, 151–152
freedom for, vs. managerial control, 116
motivations of the, 107
relationship between organization and, 110–113
relationship between society and, 39
sustenance, dependence on outside forces, 26
Individual autonomy, 38–39, 88
Individual behavior, 87–88
Individual development, 26–28
Individual growth, 111–112
Inducements-contributions, 84
Industrial organization, 26–28
Informal organizations, 107
Instrumentalism, 42
Instrumental rationality, 170–171
Instrumental reason, critique of, 181–182
Instrumental statements, 40
Integration, 63–68
Integrative theory, of public organizations, 18–20
Intellectual bases, new public management, 156–157
Intellectual crisis, Ostrom on, 151–154
Intelligence, 90
see also Knowledge
Intentionality, 177
Intentions, interpreting others’, 40–41
Interest-group liberalism, 144–146
International Monetary Fund, 160
Interpretive social theory, 176–180, 225, 228
decision making and, 228
Interpretive statements, 41
Intersubjectively comprehensible world, 178
Interventionist primary tasks, 113
role of, 112–113
In the Shadow of Organization (Denhardt), 172
Introduction to the Study of Public Administration (White),
48, 53, 63
Intuition, 171
Invitation to Public Administration (McSwite), 202
J
Journal keeping, 241–249
Judeo-Christian ethic, 115
Judgment (managerial responsibility), 138
Judicial branch, 52
Justice as fairness concept, 124
K
Knowledge critical, 42
dissemination of, 122
positivist, 231
uses of social, 39–42
Knowledge acquisition, 3–10, 173–174
theorists and, 11
L
Labor alienation of workers from, 27–28
division of, 25–26, 27, 65–67
Language, 41
postmodernism and, 187–189
of public administration theory, 190–191
The Language of Public Administration (Farmer), 190
Leaders, charismatic, 34
relationship between group and, 36–38
Leadership, 63, 64, 73, 96–97, 112
democratic, 73
deutero, 113
feminist studies of, 196
in new public service, 202–204
Leadership for the Common Good (Crosby), 200
256 SUBJECT INDEX
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some third party content may be suppressed from the eBook and/or eChapter(s). Editorial Review has deemed that any suppressed content does not materially
affect the overall learning experience. Cengage Learning reserves the right to remove additional content at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it.
Leadership in Administration, 96
Leadership of Public Bureaucracies (Terry), 203
Lead organization-governed networks, 210
Learning
see also Knowledge acquisition double-loop, 113
organizational, 111
personal, 229–232
process, 231
single-loop, 113
theory building and, 229–232
Legal authority, 31–32
Legislative branch, 52, 64–65, 145
Legislative centralization, 51
Legitimacy in Public Administration (McSwite), 192
Liberalism, 144–146
Life world, 177, 225
Limitiations, 41–42
Lived experience, 190
Local government council-manager form of, 50
responsibilities of, 52
Logical positivism, 79–80, 83
M
Machine models, 68–69
Making Social Science Matter (Flyvbjerg), 230
Management, 156–157
see also New public management collaborativeconsensual system of, 117
educative style of, 186
human relations approach, 106, 108–109
individual growth and, 110–111
moral, 115
scientific approaches to, 57–62
Managerial control, 116
Managerial Grid, 109
Managerial responsibility, 138
Managers
see also Administrators constraints on, 138
entrepreneurial, 159
good vs. extraordinary, 230
responsibilities of, 206
role of, 108
skills needed by, 112
Managing within Networks (Agranoff), 210
Market economy, 170
Meaning, 178
“The Meaning of Principles in Public Administration”
(White), 61
Men, Management, and Morality (Golembiewski), 115, 116,
118
Men of reason, 192
Metadiscourses, 188
Metavalues, 117–118
Methodological individualism, 151–152
Military model, 63
Minnowbrook perspective, 119–120
Models business, 48–50
of decision making, 93–94
economic, 90
machine, 68–69
market, 193
military, 63
rational model of organization, 79–104
role of, 12
Models of Man (Simon), 85
Modernism, 188, 189
Modernist theory, 190
Modes of production, 25
social dimensions of, 25
technical dimensions of, 25
Moral inversion, 172–173
Morality, 116
see also Value(s)
democratic, 135–136
Moral management, 115
Moral responsibility, 87, 107, 141
Motivation, 107, 108, 113–114
“carrot and stick” model of, 114
Multiplicity, 193
Mutuality dimension, of collaboration,
211–212
N
Neotribalism, 189
Network administrative organization, 210
Network governance, 209–210
defined, 210
democratic, 212–213
types, 210
New Deal, 67
New institutionalism, 99–100
complex adaptive system (CAS) theory and,
100–101
core idea of, 99
rational model and, 99–100
New public administration, 106, 119–125
agenda of, 121
equity and, 123–124
participation and, 124–125
policy emphasis in, 130–167
New public management, 56, 131, 155–161
advocates, 160
contract, 156
intellectual justification for, 156–157
practical Consequences, 159–161
reforms for, 155
techniques for, 155–156
theoretical problems of, 157–159
values, 157
New public service, 14, 198–204
leadership in, 202–204
principles of, 204–207
public administration in, 200–202
The New Science of Organizations (Ramos), 170
The New State (Follett), 73
“Notes from the Margin: Relevance and the Making of
Public Administration” (Witt), 197
O
Objective responsibility, 140–141
limitations of, 141
Objectivity, 30
Open systems
vs. closed systems, 94–99
integration of closed systems and, 98–99
Orange County, Florida, 200–201
Organization (process)
bureaucratic, 31–33
rational model of, 79–104
Organizational America (Scott and Hart), 172
Organizational analysis, 14–16
open-system approach to, 95–96
SUBJECT INDEX 257
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Organizational change, 112, 117–118
Organizational humanism, 105–119, 113–114
themes in, 106–110
Organizational learning, 110
Organizational process model, 93, 94
Organizational structure, 62–63
Organization development (OD), 106, 112–113, 118
in public sector, 114–119
The Organization Man (Whyte), 172
Organizations (institutions)
complex, 17, 95
defined, 17
formal, 107
individual’s relationship with, 38
informal, 107
personality and, 110–113
theories of, 17–18
Organizations (March), 85
Organizations in Action (Thompson), 95
Original position, 124
Otherness, 192
subordination of, 197
P
Participant governance, 210
Participation, hierarchy vs., 124–125
Participatory modeling, 100
Participatory policy analysis, 200
Performance measurement, new public management, 160
Personal action, theories and, 13
Personality, 110–113
Personality and Organization (Argyris), 110, 111
Personal learning, theory building and, 229–232
Personal responsibility, 179–180
Perspectives, limiting, 41–42
Phenomenology, 122, 177, 180
Plessey v. Ferguson, 197
Pluralism, 145
Policy. See Public policy
Policy analysis, 133, 144–146, 200
methods of, 149–151
Policy-analysis movement, 150
Policy and Administration (Appleby), 131
Policy and Administration (Goodnow), 50–51
Policy formulation, 89–94
incremental approach to, 91–92
Policy implementation, 146–149, 148
Policy making government agencies’ role in, 145–146
legislative role in, 145
process, 53
Political bargaining, 95
Political discourse, 189
Political representation, 194
Political responsibility, 141
Political science, 14, 16, 20, 62, 79–80, 132
Political scientists, public policy view, 132–133
Political theory, 14, 45–78
democratic, 15–16, 18
generic management approaches and, 15
private organizations and, 15–16
The Political Theory of a Compound Republic
(Ostrom), 153
Politics administration and, 120–121
symbolic, 189
“Politics, Administration, and the New Deal” (Gulick),
52
Politics-administration dichotomy, 50–57, 194
business management techniques and, 55–57
decision making and, 89
lingering influence of, 54–55
new public administration and, 120
rational model and, 171
Poor, involvement of, in antipoverty programs, 142–143
Popular sovereignty, 194
POSDCORB (planning, organizing, staffing, directing,
coordinating, reporting, and budgeting), 67
Positive science model, 173, 175–176
criticisms of, 173–174
Positivist perspective, 85–86, 116, 122–123, 224
Postmodernism, 187–189
applications in public administration, 190–195
Postmodern Public Administration (Fox and Miller), 190
Post-traditional public administration, 187–198
Power in bureaucracies, 184–187
concentration of, 66–67
Practitioners administrative, 3, 11, 13
as theorists, 223–240
Praxis, 228–229
Praxis, 29
Primal horde, 37
Principles, 61–62
Principles of Public Administration (Willoughby), 60
Private goods, 152
Private organizations, public administration and, 14–16
Privatization, 161
Production
Marx on, 27–28
means of, groups controlling, 26
modes of, 25
process of, 26
scientific principles applied to, 57–59
socioeconomic forces of, 25
Productivity, working conditions and, 108
Professionals, growing influence of, 137
Projection, 35
Proletariat, 26–27
Protestant ethic, 29–30
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism
(Weber), 29
“The Proverbs of Administration” (Simon), 81
Psychoanalysis, 35–36, 183
Psychology, group, 36–38
Public administration
see also Admin